

No. 24-13111

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT**

ALABAMA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,
Defendant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
No. 2:24-cv-00420 (Proctor, J.)

**BRIEF OF THE STATES OF MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, FLORIDA,
LOUISIANA, AND TEXAS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL**

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1, the undersigned counsel certifies that the following listed persons and parties, in addition to those listed in defendant-appellant's motion for stay pending appeal, may have an interest in the outcome of this case:

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**STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE,
AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

This Court should stay the district court’s injunction against Ala. Code § 17-11-4 (SB1), a law addressing ballot harvesting—a practice that risks fraud, imperils election integrity, and exploits the vulnerable.

SB1 generally restricts (1) submitting someone else’s completed absentee-ballot application and (2) paying or receiving pay for harvesting absentee-ballot applications. The district court ruled that those restrictions are likely preempted by Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, which provides that “[a]ny voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.” 52 U.S.C. § 10508. This Court will likely reject that ruling because it defies Section 208’s text. On application submission: SB1 expressly permits “voter[s] who require[] assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write” to receive “assistance” with voting—including absentee-ballot-application submission—from “an individual of the voter’s choice,” Ala. Code § 17-11-4(e), so it accords with Section 208. On paid ballot harvesting: SB1 does not prevent a voter from receiving voting assistance from *anyone*—it just bars paying or receiving pay for providing that assistance—and so it too aligns with

Section 208. Even if these provisions did burden voting assistance, they are reasonable regulations that Section 208 leaves States free to adopt.

Amici curiae—the States of Mississippi, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas—have election laws that have been challenged under Section 208. As in this case, litigants have sought to use Section 208 to block amici’s laws combatting voter fraud, promoting election integrity, and protecting voters from undue influence and manipulation. Amici thus have a strong interest in a sound understanding of Section 208. They submit this brief to emphasize two points that reinforce the text-based reasons for rejecting the decision below and thus support a stay pending appeal. First, important background principles reinforce that Section 208 leaves States leeway to reasonably regulate voting assistance—including the ways that assistance is provided. Second, deeming laws like SB1 to be preempted improperly thwarts state efforts to further the powerful public interests that underlie Section 208 itself.

ARGUMENT

I. Background Principles Confirm That Section 208 Permits States To Reasonably Regulate The Right To Voting Assistance.

Section 208’s text shows that it does not guarantee a boundless right to voting assistance. Mot. 6-13. Rather, the statute leaves States free to reasonably regulate how and by whom that assistance is provided. Section 208 establishes a right for covered voters to receive assistance from “a person of the voter’s choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10508 (emphasis added).

If Congress wanted to establish an unrestricted right to assistance, it would have said “*any* person of the voter’s choice” or “*the* person of the voter’s choice.” It did not. Section 208 must be read to adopt a right to voting assistance that is narrower than the right it would have adopted if it guaranteed assistance from *any person* or *the person* of the voter’s choice. Section 208 thus guarantees a robust but limited right to assistance that leaves States leeway to regulate that assistance.

Background principles reinforce the text-based view that Section 208 leaves States leeway to reasonably regulate voting assistance.

First, under our constitutional design, the Framers “intended the States to keep for themselves ... the power to regulate elections.” *State v. Meadows*, 88 F.4th 1331, 1346 (11th Cir. 2023). Although the federal government may exercise “significant control over federal elections,” *Shelby County v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013), States retain “broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised,” *Thompson v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama*, 65 F.4th 1288, 1307 (11th Cir. 2023). This structural feature of our constitutional system supports reading Section 208 to leave States the authority to reasonably regulate voting assistance.

Second, state laws addressing voter fraud and manipulation fulfill States’ “traditional ... responsibility” to deter and punish crime. *Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014). “[T]he punishment of local criminal activity” is “[p]erhaps the clearest example of traditional state

authority.” *Ibid.* So “it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides” “the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers” in this context. *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).

Third, “federalism concerns” dictate that when the text of a federal statute “is susceptible of more than one plausible reading,” courts should ordinarily “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” *Murphy v. Dulay*, 768 F.3d 1360, 1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Altria Group, Inc. v. Good*, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008)). “This presumption applies not only to whether Congress intends preemption but also to ‘the scope of its intended invalidation of state law.’” *Id.* at 1367 (quoting *Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr*, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Where (as here) “Congress has legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” courts “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” *Medtronic*, 518 U.S. at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is because preemption overrides the democratic will of a State’s citizens and interferes with the States’ role as “independent sovereigns in our federal system.” *Ibid.* So even if there were doubt that Section 208 leaves States with power to reasonably regulate voting assistance, principles of federalism would require avoiding a view of Section 208 that overrides reasonable state regulations like SB1.

These principles confirm that Section 208 allows covered voters to choose a person who will assist them, but it does not grant voters the right to make that choice without limitation. By allowing assistance from “a person of the voter’s choice,” Congress ensured that the voter would make the ultimate choice to receive assistance. And it preserved States’ ability to regulate that assistance, so long as they do so reasonably. SB1 is consistent with all of these principles. Mot. 7-13.

II. Reading Section 208 To Preempt Reasonable Ballot-Harvesting Laws—Like SB1—Harms The Public Interest.

Ballot-harvesting laws like SB1 protect voters and promote important state aims—including the aims underlying Section 208—while imposing only minimal burdens. Reading Section 208 to preempt such laws thus harms the public interest.

First, ballot-harvesting laws like SB1 serve the “strong and entirely legitimate state interest” in “the prevention of fraud.” *Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee*, 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2340 (2021). “[V]oter fraud” has occurred “throughout this Nation’s history” and is a perennial “risk” in elections. *Crawford v. Marion County Election Board*, 553 U.S. 181, 195, 196 (2008) (plurality opinion). And “the potential and reality of fraud is much greater in the mail-in ballot context.” *Veasey v. Abbott*, 830 F.3d 216, 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State James A. Baker, III thus observed that “[a]bsentee

ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud.” Commission on Federal Election Reform, *Building Confidence in U.S. Elections* 46 (2005). And “[o]rganized absentee ballot fraud of sufficient scope to corrupt an election is no doomsday hypothetical.” *Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs*, 948 F.3d 989, 1071 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Bybee, J., dissenting), *rev’d and remanded sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee*, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021). It happened in North Carolina in 2018, for example, where the results of a race for a seat in the House of Representatives were invalidated because of fraudulent mail-in ballots. *Brnovich*, 141 S. Ct. at 2348; *see also Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for State of Alabama*, 992 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting “high-profile ... and well-documented cases of absentee voter fraud that captured the public attention of Alabamians” in the 1990s); Mot. 18-20 (describing fraud in Alabama). The Commission on Federal Election Reform thus specifically recommended that States adopt laws to restrict the handling of absentee ballots. *Building Confidence* 46-47. Laws like SB1 deliver on that recommendation.

Second, by promoting confidence in elections, ballot-harvesting laws like SB1 enhance citizens’ participation in democracy. Fraud “undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of elections and the perceived legitimacy of the announced outcome.” *Brnovich*, 141 S. Ct. at 2340; *see also Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam)

“Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government.”). Safeguarding election integrity thus “has independent significance, because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.” *Crawford*, 553 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion). And in enacting Section 208, Congress responded to concerns that voters who need assistance were “discourage[d] ... from voting for fear of intimidation or lack of privacy.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 62 n.207 (1982). Congress left States to further Section 208’s ends by “establish[ing]” regulations that “encourage[] greater participation in [the] electoral process” and “protect the rights of voters.” *Id.* at 62-63. Laws like SB1 do that, by advancing election integrity and protecting voters from fraud and manipulation.

Last, ballot-harvesting restrictions serve the “compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and undue influence.” *Burson v. Freeman*, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion). They minimize those risks by restricting when third parties can handle ballots, including third parties who are more likely to exploit absentee voters. In this way, laws like SB1 again advance a key aim of Section 208. That statute reflects Congress’s concern that blind, disabled, and illiterate voters are “more susceptible than the ordinary voter to having their vote unduly influenced or manipulated.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 62; *see ibid.* (such voters risk “hav[ing] their actual preference overborne by the influence of those assisting them or be[ing] misled into voting for someone other

than the candidate of their choice”). That concern is even more potent for absentee voting because mail-in voters are even “more susceptible to pressure, overt and subtle, or to intimidation.” Building Confidence 46; *see Brnovich*, 141 S. Ct. at 2348 (“[T]hird-party ballot collection can lead to pressure and intimidation.”). So ballot-harvesting laws like SB1 help protect voters who cast votes outside the traditional polling place.

The district court in this case recognized that “the presence of voter fraud in Alabama” “is undisputed,” yet it thought that “enjoining two narrow provisions of SB 1 only as they apply to Section 208 voters will not ... prevent Alabama from prosecuting voter fraud when it occurs.” D. Ct. Dkt. 76 at 12. But SB1 proactively targets specific dangers—like organized ballot-harvesting schemes—and thus serves powerful interests beyond prosecuting fraud after the fact. State legislatures “should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively.” *Munro v. Socialist Workers Party*, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986). And “a State may take action to *prevent* election fraud without waiting for it to occur and be detected within its own borders.” *Brnovich*, 141 S. Ct. at 2348 (emphasis added). By deterring fraud and manipulation, SB1 promotes “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes,” which is “essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4. The injunction against SB1 thus undermines the public interest.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with Section 208's text and with background legal principles, SB1 preserves voters' right to receive assistance with voting while advancing strong public interests. Section 208 does not preempt it. The district court was wrong to rule otherwise. This Court should grant a stay pending appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This brief complies with the content and form requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)-(5) and 32(a) and Eleventh Circuit Rule 29, and comports with the word-limitation requirements of those rules because the brief, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32, contains 1953 words. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface, including serifs, using Microsoft Word 2016, in Century Schoolbook 14-point font.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Justin L. Matheny, hereby certify that the foregoing brief has been filed with the Clerk of Court using the Court's electronic filing system, which sent notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

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