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13
14 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
15 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

16 Scot Mussi; Gina Swoboda, the Chair of the
Republican Party of Arizona, and Steven
17 Gaynor,

18 Plaintiffs,

19 v.

20
21 Adrian Fontes, in his official capacity as
Arizona Secretary of State,

22 Defendant.
23

No. CV-24-01310-PHX-ESW

**ARIZONA SECRETARY
OF STATE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS**

(Oral Argument Requested)

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1 Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Defendant
2 Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes moves to dismiss the Complaint filed by
3 Plaintiffs Scot Mussi, Gina Swoboda, and Steve Gaynor (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).
4 Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to provide federal jurisdiction, and
5 Plaintiffs’ general concern about alleged ineligible voters on the voter rolls is insufficient
6 to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Complaint should be dismissed.

7 INTRODUCTION

8 The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) was enacted to “increase
9 the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office” and
10 “enhance[] the participation of eligible citizens as voters.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1)-(2).
11 This lawsuit, however, seeks to force additional, unspecified measures to Arizona’s
12 existing list maintenance program that would result in the removal of hundreds of
13 thousands of registrants based solely on misleading statistical analysis. Plaintiffs allege
14 that “at least 500,000 registered voters’ should be removed, but also that “other reliable
15 data sources show[] that Arizona has between 1,060,000 and 1,270,000 unaccounted for
16 voters on the state voter rolls.” (Docket Entry (“DE”) 1 ¶¶ 8-9). Plaintiffs’ numbers are
17 so disparate that it can mean only one thing: Plaintiffs are guessing. But speculative
18 purging of voter rolls is precisely the type of “discriminatory and unfair registration laws
19 and procedures” that NVRA is meant to prevent. 52 U.S.C. § 20501(a)(3).

20 The lawsuit should be dismissed for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs fail to meet the
21 bar for Article III standing. Plaintiffs’ sole allegation of harm boils down to a claim of a
22 fear of possible vote dilution. But vote dilution is not a cognizable claim outside of
23 redistricting cases, and the potential vote dilution that Plaintiffs fear requires a series of
24 systematic failures that are speculative, at best. Moreover, members of groups who work
25 to turn out voters are not harmed by continuing to work to turn out voters, despite
26 believing that they have to work harder to achieve their electoral goals.

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1 Second, even if Plaintiffs could satisfy the constitutional requirements to establish
2 standing to bring this suit, they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
3 Arizona performs list maintenance in compliance with NVRA. Indeed, Arizona's active
4 list maintenance programs exceed NVRA's requirements. Because unassailable facts
5 plainly belie Plaintiffs' claims, this Complaint should be dismissed.

6 **BACKGROUND**

7 **A. The National Voter Registration Act**

8 Pursuant to federal law, states may only remove voters from registration rolls: (1)
9 at the voter's request; (2) if a voter becomes ineligible as a result of criminal conviction
10 or an adjudication of mental incapacity; (3) if the voter has died; or (4) if the voter has
11 moved out of the jurisdiction. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3)-(4). States are required to
12 "conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of
13 ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of [death and change
14 of address]." 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3)-(4). There is some lag between when voters
15 become ineligible by moving out of the jurisdiction and when NVRA permits their
16 removal from the voter rolls. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) (providing a state "shall not
17 remove the name of a registrant . . . on the ground that the registrant has changed
18 residence unless the registrant" does not take certain required steps for two consecutive
19 election cycles).

20 NVRA programs to remove voters who have changed residence prohibit
21 immediate removal, and require states to the following steps before removal. First, when
22 a county recorder receives notice that a registrant has moved out of a jurisdiction, the
23 county recorder must send a notice to the registrant. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B), (d)(2).
24 If the registrant does not respond to the NVRA notice, *and* does not appear to vote in the
25 next two federal general elections, that voter may be removed from the rolls. 52 U.S.C.
26 § 20507(d)(1)(B). Thus, as a function of federal law, a person who moved out of
27 Arizona in 2019 would generally still be included in certain voter registration statistics.

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1 The federal government has been tracking voter registration and list maintenance
2 through the Election Administration and Voting Survey (“EAVS”) since 2004.
3 Following each general election, the EAVS report compiles data from around the
4 country in a readable, reliable, and uniform format to ensure compliance with NVRA.
5 “The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state and local jurisdiction-level
6 data about election administration in the United States.” Ex. 1 at i. The EAVS plays a
7 “vital role” in “identify[ing] trends,” deciding where to “invest resources to improve
8 election administration” and “secure U.S. election infrastructure.” *Id.*

9 According to EAVS, total active registration per Citizen Voting Age Population
10 (“CVAP”) in the United States as a whole was 85.4%, and two-thirds of all states had
11 higher active registration rates as a percentage of CVAP than Arizona. *Id.* at 135. The
12 majority of states report active registration rates of over 80% of CVAP, but not Arizona.
13 *Id.* at 142. Finally, “some states may report an active CVAP registration rate of 100% or
14 more . . . because the 2021 CVAP was used to calculate the 2022 registration rate and
15 because due to federal law, some ineligible voters may take up to two full election cycles
16 to be removed from the registration rolls.” *Id.* at 166. Arizona had a 100% response rate
17 to EAVS in 2022. *Id.* at 243.

18 **B. Arizona’s List Maintenance Program.**

19 Arizona conducts regular voter registration list maintenance, removing convicted
20 felons, people who have died, and other ineligible registrants from the voting rolls.
21 Arizona sent out nearly one million confirmation notices, and removed 432,498 voters
22 from registration rolls¹ in 2022 alone. *Id.* at 182, 188. Arizona removed 8.9%
23 registrants, as a percentage of the state’s total number of active registered voters in 2022.

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25 ¹ Plaintiffs rely on EAVS in their Complaint, and it is therefore incorporated by
26 reference. *Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.*, 899 F.3d 988, 999, 1001-02 (9th Cir.
27 2018) (“[I]ncorporation by reference is a judicially created doctrine that treats certain
28 documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.”). Moreover, because the
EAVS is published by a federal agency and has indicia of trustworthiness, it is proper for
this Court to take judicial notice of it pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201. Consideration of
this information will not convert this motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and (b)(6), to a motion for summary judgment.

1 This is a bit higher than, but generally consistent with, the national average removal rate
2 of approximately 8.5% of registrants. *Id.* at 188-89. In fact, Arizona’s rate of removal in
3 2022 that was higher than twenty-eight other states. (*Id.*). The EAVS data demonstrate
4 that Arizona maintains an active program to remove voters who have moved out of the
5 jurisdiction (18.9%), died (25.0%), failed to return a confirmation notice (40.5%), at the
6 voter’s request (11.6%), and upon felony conviction (3.5%). *Id.* at 188, 190. Arizona’s
7 data indicates that the state’s list maintenance program is at least as active, and in many
8 cases *more active*, in removing ineligible voters from the rolls than the rest of the
9 country, where voter removal rates were reported as 26.8% who moved, 25.6% have
10 died, 25.4% failed to return a confirmation notice, 4.5% at the voter’s request, and 1.4%
11 upon felony conviction. *Id.* at 190-91. In short, Arizona removes ineligible voters from
12 its registered voter list in compliance with the law.

13 In addition to state and federal statutes, Arizona elections officials must follow
14 the Elections Procedures Manual (“EPM”), which carries with it the force of law. A.R.S.
15 § 16-452(A), (D). The EPM provides fifty-five pages of guidance on processing and
16 validating voter registration, including a thirteen-page subsection titled “Voter
17 Registration List Maintenance.” Ex. 2, EPM Ch. 1. This directs how and when to verify
18 and cancel registrants who are deceased, felons, incapacitated, or moved. *Id.*

19 For example, when a county recorder receives notification that a voter has moved,
20 through the United States Postal Service’s (“USPS”) National Change of Address
21 (“NCOA”) service, returned mail, or through other mechanisms, the county recorder
22 must send non-forwardable official election mail to that registrant’s address. *Id.* at 46.
23 If that mail is returned undeliverable, the recorder must send a second notice (the “Final
24 Notice”) to the new address, if the USPS provides one, or the address on record if no
25 forwarding address is available within twenty-one days of the mail being returned to the
26 county. *Id.* The Final Notice must notify the registrant that they have thirty-five days to
27 update their record or they will be put in “inactive” status. *Id.* If the registrant does not
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1 update their voter registration record or appear to vote in the “four years from the date of
2 the Final Notice or following the second general election after the Final Notice,” the
3 registrant’s record will be canceled. *Id.* at 47. This procedure is set forth in detail in the
4 EPM, and a violation of these provisions is a class 2 misdemeanor. A.R.S. § 16-452(D).

5 In the legislative session in 2022, a number of new laws related to voter
6 registration and list maintenance were enacted. One bill, H.B. 2243, 2022 Ariz. Legis.
7 Serv. Ch. 370 (H.B. 2243) (West), added new list maintenance requirements—not
8 required by NVRA—and was scheduled to take effect beginning January 1, 2023.
9 However, parts of that law have been enjoined by this Court. *Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes*,
10 No. CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB, 2024 WL 862406 (D. Ariz. Feb. 29, 2024).

11 **C. Arizona’s Elections Are Secure.**

12 Plaintiffs claim they fear that ineligible voters may have an opportunity to vote in
13 Arizona elections, which undermines their confidence in Arizona’s elections as a whole.
14 (See DE 1 ¶ 104). This fear is ill-founded. Arizona requires registrants to demonstrate
15 proof of citizenship to register to vote, A.R.S. § 16-166, and requires voters to present
16 identification at the polls to cast a ballot. A.R.S. § 16-579(A). Ballots cast by mail
17 undergo signature verification to ensure that the individual signing the ballot is the
18 person registered, A.R.S. § 16-550.

19 The 2020 and 2022 election spawned many lawsuits attacking the veracity of the
20 final results. All of these lawsuits failed. *See, e.g., Ward v. Jackson*, No. CV-20-0343-
21 AP/EL, 2020 WL 8617817 (Ariz. 2020); *Lake v. Hobbs*, No. 2 CA-CV23-0144, 2024
22 WL 2949331 (Ariz. App, June 11, 2024). Even Plaintiffs admit that there “is no
23 evidence that” the counties they argue have abnormally high registration rates
24 “experienced above-average voter participation compared to the rest of the country or
25 state.” (DE 1 ¶ 89). In short, despite intense scrutiny of Arizona’s elections since 2020,
26 there is no evidence that Arizona elections are not secure and properly conducted in
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1 accordance with the law, and even Plaintiffs agree that there is no evidence supporting
2 their fear of ineligible voters casting ballots in Arizona.

3 **D. Plaintiffs' Correspondence and This Lawsuit.**

4 Plaintiffs sent a letter to the Secretary on August 8, 2023, alleging that comparing
5 data “from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2017-2021 American Community Survey
6 [(“ACS”)] and the most up-to-date count of registered voters available from the Arizona
7 Secretary of State,” four Arizona counties “all have greater than 100% voter registration”
8 and “nine others have suspiciously high rates of voter registration.” (DE 1-3, 3). The
9 letter threatened a lawsuit if the “violations we have identified are not corrected,” and
10 that “if litigation ensues, you risk bearing the financial burden of the full cost of the
11 litigation.” (*Id.* at 4-5). The only information provided in the letter to support Plaintiffs’
12 claims was a comparison of “the most up-to-date count of registered voters,” *i.e.*, from
13 2023, with ACS data from 2017-2021, which Plaintiffs claimed indicate “there are more
14 registered voters than eligible voters.” (*Id.* at 2-3). Plaintiffs also requested information
15 on procedures and policies used by the Secretary to comply with NVRA.

16 The Secretary replied on August 15, 2023, explaining that after a review of the
17 data and the State’s policies and procedures that “Arizona already maintains its voter
18 rolls in compliance with NVRA.” (*Id.* at 7). The Secretary suggested Plaintiffs review
19 the EPM, which meticulously outlines the procedures that Arizona election officials
20 follow to comply with NVRA. Then, the Secretary took the additional step of reviewing
21 voter registration statistics to determine whether Plaintiffs’ concerns had merit. The
22 Secretary concluded they did not, and provided data to support his allegations. (*Id.*).
23 Plaintiffs replied to the Secretary’s letter on September 12, 2023, demanding the
24 Secretary comply with NVRA and accusing the Secretary of trying to mislead them by,
25 *inter alia*, specifically stating that certain data that Plaintiffs appeared to rely on was
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1 likely an undercount. (DE 1-3, 8). On June 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit with a
 2 previously undisclosed report upon which their allegations rely.² (DE1-1).

3 ARGUMENT

4 **I. Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Bring This Action.**

5 The United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to actual cases and
 6 controversies. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. A statutory private right of action does not
 7 absolve the Plaintiffs of their burden to demonstrate that they satisfy the constitutional
 8 requirement of standing. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016). “[L]ack of
 9 Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” *Maya v. Cenex Corp.*, 658 F.3d 1060, 1067
 11 (9th Cir. 2011). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
 12 each element of standing. *Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014).
 13 “[A]t an ‘irreducible constitutional minimum,’” a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an
 14 injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) susceptible to
 15 redress by a decision in their favor.” *Lake v. Fontes*, 83 F.4th 1199, 1202-03 (9th Cir.
 16 2023) (cleaned up). Neither “abstract, theoretical concerns,” nor an “interest shared
 17 generally with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws,”
 18 will satisfy constitutional standing requirements. *Id.* (citations omitted).

19 **A. Plaintiffs Assert No Injury Sufficient to Sustain Standing.**

20 Plaintiffs claim an interest in “supporting the enforcement of laws such as the
 21 NVRA that promote fair and orderly elections.” (DE 1 ¶¶ 22, 26, 28). Due to their
 22 mistaken belief that the Secretary and all fifteen independently-elected county recorders
 23 do not comply with Arizona law, federal law, and the EPM, Plaintiffs allege that
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25 ² Plaintiffs’ report is improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Unlike judicially-noticeable
 26 information and exhibits, which may be considered by this Court at this stage, neither the
 27 report nor allegations which rely upon it are entitled to the presumption of validity.
 28 *Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. Southern Calif. Gas Co.*, 209 F.2d 380 384 (9th Cir. 1953) (“A
 motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) . . . admits all well pleaded facts, but does not
 admit facts which the court will judicially notice as not being true nor facts which are
 revealed to be unfounded by documents included in the pleadings or introduced in
 support of the motion.”).

1 “ineligible voters have an *opportunity* to vote in Arizona elections, *risking* the dilution of
2 Plaintiffs’ legitimate vote.” (*Id.* ¶ 29) (emphasis added). They further allege their
3 beliefs “undermine Plaintiffs’ confidence in the integrity of Arizona elections, which
4 also burdens their right to vote.” (*Id.* ¶ 30). They allege these assumptions about
5 Arizona’s voter rolls result in spending “more time and resources monitoring Arizona’s
6 elections” and “get-out-the-vote efforts for like-minded individuals . . . [who] lack
7 confidence in the accuracy and integrity of Arizona’s elections.” (*Id.* ¶ 32-33). None of
8 these allegations are concrete or cognizable harms sufficient to confer standing.

9 First, Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring a federal lawsuit just to confirm that laws
10 are being followed to their liking. The Constitution’s standing requirement “reflects a
11 due regard for the autonomy of those most likely to be affected by a judicial decision,”
12 and “is not to be placed in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders,’ who will use it simply as
13 a ‘vehicle for the vindication of value interests.’” *Diamond v. Charles*, 476 U.S. 54, 62
14 (1986). “The requirement that the plaintiff possess a personal stake helps ensure that
15 courts decide litigants’ legal rights in specific cases, as Article III requires, and that
16 courts do not opine on legal issues in response to citizens who might ‘roam the country
17 in search of governmental wrongdoing.’” *Food and Drug Admin. v. Alliance for*
18 *Hippocratic Medicine*, 602 U.S. --, 2024 WL 2964140 at *5 (2024). Indeed, this is one
19 of a number of cookie-cutter lawsuits in which citizens are roaming the country, making
20 unfounded allegations of governmental wrongdoing. Plaintiffs’ wish that the Secretary
21 comply with NVRA (which he is already doing) is insufficient to establish standing.

22 Plaintiffs’ next allegation, that “ineligible voters have an opportunity to vote,”
23 which “risk[s] the dilution of Plaintiffs’ legitimate vote” is both too speculative and not a
24 cognizable claim. (DE 1 ¶ 29). Plaintiffs’ own Complaint admits that “[t]here is no
25 evidence that these counties experienced above-average voter participation compared to
26 the rest of the country or state.” (*Id.* ¶ 89). They acknowledge that their claimed harm
27 does not exist. Even if one assumes that Plaintiffs’ feared harm does not *yet* exist—but
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1 could theoretically occur in the future—such harm would only arise after a cascade of
2 independent actions. Such harm could result only after: (1) an ineligible voter requests
3 an early ballot or presents at a polling place; (2) casts a ballot; (3) that ineligible ballot is
4 tabulated; and (4) sufficient other ineligible voters engage in the same series of steps in a
5 number sufficient to “dilute” Plaintiffs’ votes. This is precisely the type of “long chain
6 of hypothetical contingencies that have never occurred in Arizona and ‘must take place
7 for any harm to occur’” that has been repeatedly rejected by federal courts. *Lake*, 83
8 F.4th at 1204. And even if these problems did not bar Plaintiffs’ standing, federal courts
9 do not recognize a generalized “vote dilution” harm outside of redistricting cases. *See*,
10 *e.g. Gill v. Whitford*, 585 U.S. 48, 68 (2018) (rejecting standing premised on an “interest
11 ‘in their collective representation in the legislature’”) (internal citations omitted).

12 Finally, Plaintiffs’ beliefs about the status of Arizona’s voter rolls, and the actions
13 they undertake as a result of those beliefs, do not make this a federal case. Plaintiffs’
14 asserted lack of confidence in Arizona’s elections is not a state-created burden on the
15 right to vote and does not provide standing. *Food & Drug Admin.*, 2024 WL 2964140
16 at *14 (explaining that plaintiffs’ “sincere legal, moral, ideological, and policy
17 objections . . . alone do not establish a case or controversy in federal court.”). A concern
18 about public confidence in the election is just that—public—not individualized. *See*
19 *Drake v. Obama*, 664 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding Plaintiff lacked standing
20 because he “has no greater stake in this lawsuit than any other United States citizen.”).
21 Likewise, any steps Plaintiffs choose to take are not state-created harms, but voluntary
22 actions taken due to their own mistaken beliefs. To the extent Plaintiffs conduct “get-
23 out-the-vote efforts to convince like-minded individuals,” that is precisely the kind of
24 activity in which they voluntarily engage, not an activity undertaken to counteract
25 alleged list maintenance deficiencies.³ *See Rodriguez v. City of San Jose*, 930 F.3d 1123,

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28 ³ Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot assert the alleged harms to the organizations of which they
are members, because they are not named in this suit. *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975); *Mills v. United States*, 742 F.3d 400, 406-07 (9th Cir. 2014).

1 1134 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding standing requires both a frustration of an organization’s
2 mission and diversion of resources to combat the injurious behavior). Plaintiffs have
3 failed to assert a particularized, individual harm sufficient to confer standing.

4 **B. Plaintiffs’ Asserted Injury Is Not Attributable to the Secretary.**

5 Plaintiffs’ alleged harm is a direct result of a misapprehension of the statistics
6 upon which they rely; they can only produce “discrepancies” between the CVAP and
7 registrants when they use *total* registered voters, rather than *active* registered voters.
8 Thus, for example, Plaintiffs rely upon a CVAP of 5,322,581 people in Arizona in 2022.
9 (DE 1 at 16, Table III.B.1). Comparing Plaintiffs’ CVAP with a *total* of 4,833,160
10 registrants results in the 90.8% on which Plaintiffs rely. (*id.*). However, there were only
11 4,143,929 *active* registered voters in 2022, resulting in an active registration rate of
12 77.8% using Plaintiffs’ CVAP. EAVS data reported a CVAP of 5,216,518 for Arizona,
13 producing an active registration rate of 79.4% of CVAP for the state. Whether using
14 Plaintiffs’ CVAP, or the CVAP from EAVS, Arizona’s active registrants as a percentage
15 of CVAP (77.8% or 79.4%) is significantly lower than the United States’ total active
16 registration rate of CVAP of 85.4%. Ex. 1 at 162, 168. And EAVS specifically warns
17 against Plaintiffs’ conflation of statistics, especially the use of *total* registered voters.
18 (DE 1, Ex. 1 at 146) (“However, data on registered and eligible voters as reported in the
19 EAVS should be used with caution, as these totals can include registrants who are no
20 longer eligible to vote in that state but who have not been removed from the registration
21 rolls because the removal process laid out by the NVRA can take up to two election
22 cycles to be completed.”). Indeed, Arizona reported a lower percentage of registered
23 voters compared to CVAP than all but nine other states. Ex. 1 at 162-66.

24 In short, the statistics Plaintiffs allege demonstrate Arizona’s failure to comply
25 with NVRA are directly traceable to inactive registrants. These registrants will be
26 removed (or not) according to law, but the Secretary is required to keep those voters on
27 the rolls unless NVRA or another applicable law requires their removal. *See* 52 U.S.C.
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1 § 20507(d). Plaintiffs’ asserted injury is attributable not to any inaction or malfeasance
2 by the Secretary, but is a direct result of NVRA itself.

3 **C. The Requested Order Will Not Redress Plaintiffs’ Grievances.**

4 Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks a declaration and injunction requiring the Secretary to
5 comply with NVRA, a law with which he already complies. Indeed, Arizona’s list
6 maintenance procedures go *further* than what is required by NVRA. Arizona already
7 processes and cancels deceased registrants based on monthly data obtained from the
8 Arizona Department of Health Services and other reliable sources, Ex. 2 at 37-38,
9 routinely receives lists of felons and people who are adjudicated incompetent from
10 Arizona courts and other courts, for cancellation, *id.* at 38-39, and removes ineligible
11 voters who move based on returned election mail and USPS’s NCOA service, *id.* at 45-
12 48. No injunction is required.

13 The Secretary complies with NVRA, and there is no credible allegation of harm
14 traceable to the Secretary that could remedy Plaintiffs’ claimed concerns. For these
15 reasons, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action pursuant to Article III and Rule
16 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

17 **II. There Is No Set of Facts that Would Entitle Plaintiffs to Relief.**

18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a complaint which fails to state a
19 claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
20 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
21 plausible on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted).
22 “[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of
23 entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum
24 expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v.*
25 *Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

26 “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
27 possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the
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1 pleader is entitled to relief.” *Ashcroft*, 556 U.S. at 679. Only well-plead factual
2 allegations are entitled to a presumption of veracity, and then the court must determine
3 whether these facts plausibly entitle the plaintiff to relief. *Id.* The general rule to accept
4 well-plead factual allegations as true does not apply to plainly incorrect allegations.
5 “The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly
6 subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” *Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors*, 266 F.3d
7 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

8 In assessing a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court may
9 take judicial notice of facts that cannot be reasonably disputed because they can be
10 determined “from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.
11 Evid. 201(b); *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)
12 (instructing courts to “consider matters of which a court may take judicial notice” and
13 documents incorporated into the complaint by reference when deciding a motion to
14 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). Plaintiffs rely in their Complaint and attached report⁴ on
15 U.S. Census Bureau data, Secretary of State registration data, and data from the U.S.
16 Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) for their claims. This data is appropriate for
17 judicial notice, is incorporated by reference, and can be considered in this motion to
18 dismiss without converting it a motion for summary judgment. *Khoja*, 899 F.3d at 999.
19 Plaintiffs’ report, however, does not qualify for judicial notice pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
20 201, and is not entitled to an assumption of validity at this stage. *Interstate Nat. Gas Co.*
21 *v. Southern Calif. Gas Co.*, 209 F.2d at 384; *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 8, and 10
22 (defining allowed pleadings and setting forth the appropriate scope of pleadings and
23 exhibits).

24 **A. Arizona Conducts NVRA-Compliant List Maintenance.**

25 Whatever “reasonable efforts” NVRA requires for list maintenance, Arizona
26 objectively exceeds NVRA’s standards. The fact that Arizona had 797,221 inactive

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28 ⁴ The Court should not consider the conclusions in Plaintiffs’ report at this stage when
Defendant has not had an opportunity to provide his own expert analysis. *See supra* n. 2.

1 voters as of April 2024 demonstrates that Arizona engages in “reasonable efforts to
2 remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters” when they
3 have moved out of the jurisdiction. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)-(f).⁵ The State’s list
4 maintenance efforts are demonstrated by the following four processes.

5 First, the state’s robust list maintenance program is codified by statute and
6 described in detail in the EPM. Ex. 2 at 36-54. The officers involved in voter
7 registration and list maintenance—the Secretary and the fifteen Arizona county
8 recorders—are elected officials. They each take an oath of office to uphold the U.S. and
9 Arizona constitutions. A.R.S. § 38-231(E). Given these facts, these dedicated officials
10 are entitled to a presumption of good faith, and this Court “must be wary of plaintiffs
11 who seek to transform federal courts into ‘weapons of political warfare’ that will deliver
12 victories that eluded them ‘in the political arena.’” *Alexander v. S. Car. State Conf. Of*
13 *the NAACP*, 144 S. Ct. 1221, 1236 (2024). Even if this Court does not presume good
14 faith on the basis of the various officials responsible for list maintenance, Plaintiffs’
15 allegations would require that all these people refuse to follow the law and are willing to
16 risk criminal prosecution to do so. This is not plausible.

17 Second, Arizona’s list maintenance occurs at regular intervals as part of a
18 methodical program that goes above and beyond the list maintenance process required
19 by NVRA. For example, Arizona uses NCOA information provided by USPS to start
20 the NVRA removal process, otherwise known as NVRA’s “safe harbor” provision. 52
21 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(1) (“A State may meet the requirement of subsection (a)(4) [list
22 maintenance] by establishing a program under which change-of-address information
23 supplied by the Postal Service . . . is used to identify registrants whose addresses may
24 have changed . . .”); Ex. 2 at 45-48. Additionally, Arizona’s EPM requires list
25 maintenance to include a process to remove registrants who have moved based on
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27 ⁵ In order to cast a ballot, an inactive voter must appear at a polling place, provide voter
28 identification as required by A.R.S. § 16-579, and affirm their residence within the
jurisdiction. A.R.S. §16-583(A).

1 information obtained from other government sources indicating a registrant has moved
2 out of their county or out of the state. *Id.* at 39-45. This list maintenance is in addition
3 to the regular removal of people who die, or are adjudicated ineligible due to felony
4 convictions or court declarations of incompetence. *Id.* at 36-39. Plaintiffs' reliance on
5 the letters reporting various removal programs is misplaced. (DE 1 at ¶¶ 17, 71). The
6 quarterly letters are not a part of NVRA "list-maintenance duty" and are a creation of
7 very recent statutory change still in active litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 71). The A.R.S. § 16-
8 165(M) letters which Plaintiffs cite are inapposite. In short, Arizona's list maintenance
9 programs are robust, exceeding the list maintenance requirements of NVRA.

10 Third, the reported data confirms that Arizona election officials comply with the
11 statutory and regulatory requirements regarding list maintenance activities. According to
12 EAVS, Arizona sent 991,282 NVRA notices to Arizona registrants in 2022, a rate higher
13 than any other state except Washington. *Ex. 1* at 182-83. In 2022 alone, Arizona
14 removed 432,498 registrants, including 175,284 registrants who did not return a NVRA
15 notice. *Id.* at 188. This was a rate that was 45.8% higher than the national average of
16 removals for people who fail to respond to NVRA notices. *Id.* at 188-89. Notably,
17 Arizona removed a higher percentage than the national average of not only voters who
18 failed to respond to NVRA notices, but also voters who requested to be removed (11.6%
19 versus 4.5%), felons (3.5% versus 1.4%), and registrants who are adjudicated
20 incompetent (0.2% versus 0.1%). *Id.* at 190-91. As a result, Arizona removed a higher
21 percentage of voters from its rolls than the national average (8.9% versus 8.5%). And
22 2022 was not an outlier, but consistent with Arizona's robust list maintenance program.
23 The 2020 EAVS⁶ indicates Arizona removed 350,841 registrants (7.4% versus a national
24 removal rate of 8.2%), and the 2018 EAVS⁷ indicates Arizona removed 437,701

26 ⁶ Election Admin. & Voting Survey, Election Ass. Comm'n, 165-66 (2020) available at
27 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf.

28 ⁷ Election Admin. & Voting Survey, Election Ass. Comm'n, 82-83 (2018) available at
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/2018_EAVS_Report.pdf.

1 registrants, or 10.23% of registrants, compared to the national rate of 8.17% of
2 registrants. Unlike the report included by Plaintiffs as an attachment to their Complaint,
3 these data are amenable to judicial notice and may be considered by this Court when
4 ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This data clearly
5 shows that Plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim that Arizona does not conduct a
6 “reasonable effort” to ensure accurate voter rolls.

7 Finally, Arizona’s vigorous list maintenance program is evidenced by the data on
8 registrants. Active registrations as a portion of CVAP are lower in Arizona than the
9 nation as a whole. Ex. 1 at 162, 166. Indeed, the CVAP in EAVS is slightly lower than
10 the CVAP used in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and accompanying report, but active registered
11 voters are the same. *Compare* (DE 1 ¶ 77) (reporting CVAP for 2022 as 5,322,581) *with*
12 *EAVS* (providing CVAP from 2022 as 5,216,518). When the denominator shrinks, but
13 the numerator remains constant, the percentage as a whole grows. Therefore, because
14 the CVAP from EAVS is smaller than Plaintiffs’ CVAP, the EAVS data is more
15 favorable to Plaintiffs. Indeed, EAVS data provides Arizona has a rate of 79.4% of
16 active voters as a percentage of CVAP, compared to 77.8% of active voters as a
17 percentage of CVAP using Plaintiffs’ data in 2022. This is far short of the national
18 average of 85.4%. Ex. 2 at 166. In sum, there is no factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claim
19 that Arizona does not engage in “reasonable efforts” to remove ineligible voters from the
20 voter rolls. Indeed, Arizona has a well-established, rigorous list maintenance program,
21 as established by data stretching back multiple election cycles. Plaintiffs’ Complaint
22 cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and should be dismissed.

23 **B. The Facts as Alleged Do Not Support a Plausible Claim for Relief.**

24 Ultimately, the entire basis for Plaintiffs’ Complaint is that Arizona allegedly has
25 an implausibly high number of registered voters. Plaintiffs insist that *all* registrants,
26 rather than active registrants, should be compared to CVAP to determine if Arizona’s
27 voter rolls are non-compliant with NVRA. (DE 1, ¶ 80 n.6). However, as explained,
28

1 comparing total registrants rather than active registrants results in percentages that are
2 significantly higher than one might expect if people who move out of the jurisdiction
3 were automatically canceled. Ex. 1 at 140 (cautioning not to use total registered voters
4 because “these totals can include registrants who are no longer eligible to vote in the
5 state but who have not been removed from the registration rolls because the removal
6 process laid out by the NVRA can take up to two election cycles to be completed.”).
7 That is the result of the requirements of federal law and is not evidence of improper list
8 maintenance. Because NVRA does not allow the automatic cancellation of voters who
9 do not respond to notices—but *requires* the state to maintain those registrants on inactive
10 status for two federal election cycles—there will be people on Arizona’s inactive list
11 who cannot be removed, but would have to establish that they are eligible to vote if they
12 came to the polling place on election day. *See* A.R.S. § 16-583(A).

13 Plaintiffs have failed to marshal facts that establish a plausible claim for relief.
14 But comparing Plaintiffs’ reported CVAP to the active registered voters in the state
15 demonstrates that Arizona’s ratio of registrants to CVAP is not inflated. Comparing
16 Arizona’s registrants to the United States as a whole—whether the more accurate active
17 registrants as a percentage of CVAP, which is 79.4% for Arizona and 85.4% for the
18 United States, or skewed to include all registrants, including those who cannot yet be
19 removed due to the requirements of NVRA, which is 92.6% for Arizona and 94.7% for
20 the United States—belies Plaintiffs’ claims. Ex. 1 at 162, 166. As the Supreme Court
21 explained in *Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, “statistical manipulation” can be
22 “highly misleading” and “mask” the issues. 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2345 (2012).

23 The fact that Plaintiffs have included a so-called expert report does not “nudge”
24 them over the line to establish a plausible claim. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. As an
25 initial matter, the report is not part of the pleading, and therefore is not entitled to a
26 presumption of veracity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 10. As a practical matter, any plaintiff would
27 be able to survive a motion to dismiss by attaching a report to their complaint, which
28

1 would eviscerate the intentions of reducing costs and burdens on the parties and the
2 courts that animate Rule 12(b)(6). *Id.* at 557-58. But putting that aside, the facts as
3 alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Plaintiffs’ report are obviously implausible. At the
4 outset, Plaintiffs’ report states (in a footnote) that “[m]y analysis focuses on total
5 registered voters, not active registered voters, because inactive registered voters would
6 still be required to be a part of the Voting Eligible Population.” (DE 1-1 9 n.6).
7 However, inactive registrants are precisely the registrants who are most likely to have
8 moved out of the jurisdiction and thus *not be included* in the Census data. *See, e.g.* Ex. 2
9 at 45-48 (explaining the lengthy, legally-required process of maintaining a voter who has
10 moved out of the jurisdiction on the voter registration rolls as an inactive voter).

11 It is *only* by using the data this way—with CVAP as a denominator, which will
12 *not* include people who have moved out of the jurisdiction, and total registered voters as
13 the numerator, which *must* include registrants who have moved out of the jurisdiction—
14 that Plaintiffs can construct “implausibly” high voter registration rates. When inactive
15 voters, *i.e.*, those voters who were not in Arizona for the Census to count, are excluded,
16 Arizona’s voter registration rate drops to 79.4% of active voters as a percentage of
17 CVAP, slightly below the 81.4% that Plaintiffs’ report supports as reasonable for
18 Arizona based on Census reports. (DE1-1 11, ¶ 22).

19 Plaintiffs’ claims are simply not plausible under Plaintiffs’ own standards.
20 Cherry-picking statistics to create a report that appears superficially reasonable does not
21 create a plausible claim for relief that withstands review under the federal rules of civil
22 procedure. Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed.

23 CONCLUSION

24 Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing pursuant to Fed. R.
25 Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and failure to state a plausible claim for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
26 P. 12(b)(6).
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Respectfully submitted this 25th day of June, 2024.

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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL

I certify that counsel for the Plaintiffs and Defendant Arizona Secretary of State met and conferred in good faith via video and teleconference, as required by L. R. Civ. P. 12.1(c) before this Motion was filed. After discussing the arguments raised in the Motion, the conferees were unable to agree that the Plaintiffs’ pleading was curable by amendment.

DATED this 25th day of June, 2024.

/s/ Kara Karlson

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of June, 2024, I filed the forgoing document electronically through the CM/ECF system, which caused all parties or counsel of record to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing.

/s/Monica Quinonez

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Exhibit 1

Election Administration and Voting Survey 2022 Comprehensive Report

A Report from the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
to the 118th Congress

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This report by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission is the result of a contract to collect and analyze data for the 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey and Election Administration Policy Survey. The contract was carried out by Fors Marsh, an applied research company based in Arlington, VA.

Published June 2023

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200

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www.eac.gov



Executive Summary

Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The EAVS asks all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories—American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,¹ and the U.S. Virgin Islands—to provide data about the ways Americans vote and how elections are administered. Since 2008, this project has included a separate survey, the Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), that collects information about state election laws, policies, and practices.

The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state and local jurisdiction-level data about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to examine the details of the U.S. election infrastructure and to produce a generalizable understanding of core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by election officials. The survey data provide policymakers and the public with crucial information every two years about how federal elections are conducted and help the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials who use the data to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and promotional materials. The EAC also uses EAVS data to create clearinghouse resources to advance the agency's mission and to better support election officials and voters as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections.

In many ways, the 2022 general election represented a return to normal election operations, after the 2020 general election was heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic necessitated that state and local election offices adjust their election practices and navigate changing state policies, including the modes of registration used by voters, how poll workers were recruited to assist with the election, which populations could cast their ballots before Election Day or by mail, and procedures for tabulating ballots once voting had concluded. As the most comprehensive source of election administration data in the United States, the 2022 EAVS provides a unique insight into how election dynamics have and have not changed as the pandemic recedes. To this end, the EAC is pleased to present to the 118th Congress its report on the 2022 EAVS.

This report describes in detail how the 2022 federal general election was administered and how voters cast their ballots. Data from the EAVS and the accompanying Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) are used to provide an overview of each of the following aspects of the election process:

¹ Puerto Rico completed the 2022 Policy Survey but was not required to complete the 2022 EAVS because it did not hold a federal general election in November 2022.

- Turnout, voting methods, polling places, drop boxes, ballot curing, poll workers, and election technology are covered in Chapter 1, “Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2022 General Election”;
- Key laws, rules, policies, and procedures that govern U.S. elections are covered in Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey”;
- Voter registration and list maintenance are covered in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond”;
- Voting by individuals covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) is described in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in 2022: UOCAVA”; and
- Finally, the methodological procedures that the EAC followed in collecting the EAVS and Policy Survey data and a description of the survey questions are discussed in Chapter 5, “Survey Methodology.”

Voting and Election Administration Findings

Data from the 2022 EAVS show that 46.8% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) in the United States voted in the 2022 general election, including more than 112 million ballots that were cast by voters and counted. Turnout for this election decreased by approximately 5 percentage points compared to the last midterm election held in November 2018, with only nine states showing turnout increases between these two elections.

The EAVS also tracks data on how voters cast their ballots—in person on Election Day, in person before Election Day (which is known in many states as early voting), by mail, or by another mode of voting. In-person voting levels dropped for the 2020 general election (as many states expanded early voting and mail voting opportunities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic) but largely rebounded for the 2022 general election. In-person voting on Election Day returned to being the most common method for voters to cast their ballots, with just under half of voters using this mode. The use of mail voting decreased from 2020 to 2022. Nonetheless, the nearly one-third of voters who cast their ballots by mail in 2022 represents an increase over the one-quarter of voters who voted by mail for the 2018 general election. In-person early voting saw an increase for the 2020 general election, but decreased in 2022 to just over one-fifth of voters.

The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of drop boxes and ballot curing for the first time. Nearly 13,000 drop boxes were reported as being available for voters to return their mail ballots; among states able to track these data, approximately 40% of mail ballots returned by voters were returned at a drop box. Nearly 170,000 mail ballots were successfully cured by voters for this election.

Data on the ages of the poll workers who assisted with in-person voting show that after changes in the poll worker population for the 2020 general election, the age distribution of poll workers in 2022 was very similar to that of 2018. For the 2022 general election, a majority of poll workers were older than 60 years old. However, the 2022 general election continued a trend toward election officials having an easier time recruiting poll workers; this trend began with the 2020 general election. More than 80,000 individuals served as poll workers for the first time during the 2022 general election, comprising 16.7% of the poll worker population for this election.



States reported that the use of electronic poll books to assist checking in voters at in-person voting sites and the use of ballot-marking devices (BMD) and scanners to assist with casting and counting ballots increased from the 2020 to the 2022 elections. The use of direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting equipment with and without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) declined overall between these elections, despite a slight uptick in the percentage of jurisdictions that used DRE equipment without VVPAT. For the 2022 general election, only four jurisdictions in the country reported relying solely on DRE without VVPAT machines.

Election Administration Policy Survey Findings

The EAC collected data through the 2022 Policy Survey to provide context to the data that states reported in the EAVS and to track changes in election policy over time in areas that include voter registration and list maintenance, voting by mail, UOCAVA voting, in-person voting, voter identification, provisional voting, election technology, recounts, audits, and election certification.

Some of the notable findings from the 2022 Policy Survey include that a strong majority of states reported having voter registration databases that functioned in a top-down manner; 80% of states that used a bottom-up or hybrid system transmitted data from local jurisdictions to the central database in real time. The most common government agencies for states to electronically receive registration data from were agencies that handle driver's licenses, agencies that maintain death records, and agencies that maintain felony or prison records. Nearly all states allow individuals to pre-register to vote before they turn 18 years old, about three-quarters of states allow individuals to register to vote and/or update their voter registration information online, and half of states allow individuals to register to vote on the same day they cast a ballot.

The number of states that conduct an all-mail election either statewide or in certain jurisdictions—that is, automatically mailing a ballot to all registered voters or to all active registered voters without the voter having to file a mail ballot application—increased in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and remained fairly consistent at 12 states for the 2022 general election. The 2022 Policy Survey also collected data on state policies on the use of drop boxes and mail ballot curing for the first time: 39 states allowed the use of drop boxes for this election and 41 states allowed voters to cure their ballots and correct missing information or errors on their mail ballots in order for them to be counted for this election.

States also reported information on the auditing and review activities they conduct. Audits are conducted to ensure that voting systems operate accurately, election officials comply with regulations, procedures, or internal policies, and discrepancies are identified and resolved so that voters can be confident in the election administration process. The most commonly reported auditing activities were logic and accuracy testing (used in more than 90% of states) and post-election tabulation audits (used in three-quarters of states).

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) Findings

EAVS data on voter registration and list maintenance show that the percentage of the U.S. population that is registered to vote continues to grow. More than 203 million individuals were active registered voters for the 2022 general election, representing 85.4% of the CVAP and an increase of 2.8 percentage points since the 2018 general election. More than two-thirds of states reported that the active registration rate in their state increased from the 2018 to 2022 general elections.



More than 80 million registration forms were processed in the period between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election. For the first time in EAVS history, a majority of those registration forms were submitted through state motor vehicle offices. The use of online registration declined by about half between the 2020 and 2022 EAVS, and the use of mail, fax, and email to submit registration forms also decreased. Nearly half of the registration forms reported in the 2022 EAVS were updates to existing voter registration records and more than a quarter were new valid registrations.

The NVRA also requires states to review their voter registration rolls periodically and to remove the records of individuals who no longer meet eligibility requirements (e.g., have moved from the jurisdiction in which they are registered, have died, have failed to respond to a confirmation notice mailing and vote in two subsequent federal general elections, or, depending on state law, have been convicted of or incarcerated for a crime or have become mentally incapacitated). In the 2022 EAVS, states reported sending more than 26 million confirmation notices to keep their registration rolls up to date; more than half of those confirmation notices were not returned to the election office by the voter or by the U.S. Postal Service, a decrease from previous years' EAVS data. More than 19 million voter registration records were removed between 2020 and 2022, most commonly because the registrant moved out of their jurisdiction, died, or failed to respond to a confirmation notice and failed to vote in subsequent federal general elections.

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) Findings

UOCAVA outlines special voting procedures for two categories of voters: members of the uniformed services absent from their voting residence and their eligible family members, and U.S. citizens living overseas. The 2022 EAVS data show that the voting residences of UOCAVA voters tend to be highly concentrated: 57.5% of these voters held legal voting residence in just three states, and more than 60% of EAVS jurisdictions had 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters. Continuing a trend that began with the 2016 EAVS, 2022 data show that overseas citizens made up a larger share of the UOCAVA voting population than did uniformed services voters.

Of the more than 650,000 ballots that election offices transmitted to UOCAVA voters for the 2022 general election, about one-third were transmitted to uniformed services members and two-thirds were transmitted to overseas citizens. Email was the most common method election offices used to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters, although a majority of uniformed services ballots were transmitted by postal mail. Slightly more than 40% of transmitted UOCAVA ballots were returned by voters, representing a decrease of almost 25% in the number of returned UOCAVA ballots compared to the 2018 general election. Nationwide, more than 96% of returned UOCAVA ballots were counted and less than 4% were rejected, most commonly because the ballot was received after the state's deadline for returning ballots.

UOCAVA voters can use Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) as a backup ballot in case their regular absentee ballot cannot be received and returned in time. States reported that more than 4,000 FWABs were submitted by voters for the 2022 general election. This represents a decrease of more than 25% from the number of FWABs received for the 2018 general election. The FWAB allowed nearly 3,500 additional UOCAVA voters to have their ballots counted for the 2022 general election; more than three-quarters of counted FWABs were received from overseas citizens and less than one-quarter were from uniformed services voters.



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Chapter 1. Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2022 General Election

Key Findings

The 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on ballots cast, voter registration, overseas and military voting, voting technology, and other important issues related to voting and election administration. Notable findings from the 2022 EAVS include:

- More than 203 million individuals were active registered voters for the 2022 general election.
- Voter turnout for the 2022 general election was 46.8% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) nationwide, a decrease of 5.1 percentage points from the 2018 general election. Only nine states saw their turnout levels increase from the 2018 to 2022 general elections. More than 112 million voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2022 general election.
- Although the use of mail voting decreased in 2022 compared to the 2020 general election, mail voting rates remained higher than pre-pandemic levels, at 31.9% of voters participating in the 2022 election who cast their ballots by mail. Almost half of all voters voted in person on Election Day. More than two-thirds of voters cast their ballots in person (either on or before Election Day) for the 2022 general election.
- The 2022 EAVS collected data on drop boxes and ballot curing for the first time. Among states that reported data on drop boxes, nearly 40% of mail ballots were returned at drop boxes. Among states that reported this data, less than 1% of mail ballots that were returned by voters and counted in the election were cured (meaning they were rejected for an error, but the voter corrected the error and the ballot was ultimately counted).
- The age distribution of poll workers skewed younger in 2020, but 2022 EAVS data show that this distribution has returned to pre-pandemic levels. States reported that 16.7% of the poll workers who assisted with the 2022 general election were new poll workers who had not served in previous elections. In the 2020 and 2022 EAVS, election officials reported that recruiting poll workers was less difficult compared to what was reported by election officials in the 2018 EAVS.
- The most common types of voting equipment reported for the 2022 general election were ballot-marking devices (BMD) and scanners, which were used in nearly 90% of EAVS jurisdictions. Ballot scanners often process both hand marked ballots and ballots that have been marked by a BMD. These devices are often used together, even in jurisdictions where a majority of voters are marking ballots by hand. The use of direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines continues to decline overall.
- The use of electronic poll books increased from 2020 to 2022, with more than one-third of EAVS jurisdictions reporting having used an e-poll book for the 2022 general election.

Election Administration in the United States

The United States holds elections for many different levels of government, including federal, state, and local offices. However, responsibility for administering these elections and tabulating, reporting, and certifying election results is largely exercised by local jurisdictions, with oversight from states and in accordance with federal law. The U.S. Constitution and various federal laws govern specific aspects of federal elections and a small number of federal agencies—such as the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)—play a supportive role in election administration. Broad legal and procedural authority rests with the states,¹ territories, the District of Columbia, and local jurisdictions. As a result, wide variation exists among and within state election policies and practices, and the policies and practices for conducting elections are constantly changing. Nevertheless, U.S. elections generally follow a standard process. As shown in Figure 1, the election process can be viewed as a cycle.


1. The legal and procedural framework for elections is generally established in advance of a general election. This legal framework determines which individuals are eligible to vote in an election; how, when, and where voters may cast their ballots for the election; and what technology will be used to support elections. Supported by state election offices, most of these policies and procedures are implemented by election officials at the local level (e.g., county, township, or municipality).
2. To participate in elections, eligible citizens typically must register to vote pursuant to the eligibility rules established by federal law and by their state.² In many states, voters must register in advance of a set registration deadline; in others, eligible individuals may register on the same day they cast their ballot, whether during an early voting period or on Election Day. Depending on state policy, eligible citizens may have multiple avenues for submitting their registration applications, including by mail, fax, or email; online registration websites; in person at an election office, at a motor vehicle office, at other state government agency offices, or at an armed forces recruitment office; or through a registration drive. States are also required to periodically examine their voter registration rolls and remove the records of voters who are no longer eligible; for instance, because the voter no longer resides in the state or jurisdiction in which they are registered, the voter has failed to respond to a notice sent to them by mail and has not voted in the two most recent federal general elections, the voter is deceased, or the voter is incarcerated or has received a criminal conviction that disqualifies them from voting. The process of updating voter registration rolls and removing ineligible voters is referred to as list maintenance.

¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data.

² North Dakota is the only state that does not require citizens to register before casting a ballot in an election.



Figure 1. The U.S. Election Process



1. When a federal general election is approaching, voting begins well in advance of Election Day for many voters, including eligible military voters and overseas citizens who are absent from their voting residence, for whom the right to participate in federal elections is protected under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). In addition, all states provide avenues for voters to cast ballots before Election Day. This may include voting by using a ballot that is mailed to them by an election office, casting a ballot in person at a dedicated voting site before Election Day (often called early voting), or receiving and casting a ballot at an election office. Some states allow any eligible voter to cast their ballot before Election Day, whereas others limit it only to certain segments of the population, such as voters who are absent from their home jurisdiction on Election Day, voters with illnesses or disabilities, voters over a certain age, or voters who provide a statutorily valid excuse. The voting options that are available to voters and the timelines for mail voting and in-person voting vary by state and by local jurisdiction.

2. Voters who do not cast ballots beforehand may vote on Election Day at in-person voting sites. In most states, individuals whose eligibility to vote cannot be verified at the time of voting may cast a provisional ballot. Election officials then investigate the eligibility of individuals who cast provisional ballots to determine whether their ballots should be counted, either in full or in part, or rejected.
3. After the polls close on Election Day, the process of counting ballots to determine the final election results begins. This may also be referred to as tabulation or canvassing. State policies vary on when counting may begin—some states may begin pre-processing mail ballots (e.g., verifying the mail voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot, opening envelopes, removing the ballots from secrecy envelopes to prepare them for counting) before Election Day, whereas other states require that in-person polls must be closed before any mail ballots can be processed. Some states also accept mail ballots, particularly those cast by UOCAVA voters, if they are received after Election Day, so long as they were postmarked on or before Election Day. Depending on state law and on what equipment is used to process the ballots, ballot counting may take several days to weeks to complete.
4. Once the unofficial results of an election are known, state and local election officials review the results for accuracy and certify them as final. Many states conduct audits of their election results and voting equipment to ensure that the established election procedures were followed and that the equipment functioned correctly. Certain election races may also be recounted if the margin of victory is close; if a candidate, party, or other authorized group requests a recount; if a court orders a recount to be conducted; or for other reasons specified by state law.

The election process can be viewed as a cycle in the sense that the experiences from previous elections are used to inform decision-making for the legal and procedural framework for subsequent elections. Often, the successful approaches and innovations implemented in one state or local jurisdiction during an election are adopted by other states or localities in subsequent elections. As this process begins anew with each federal election cycle, policymakers and administrators at every level benefit from the insights available in the state and local election data the EAC publishes in the EAVS.

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Since 2004, the EAC has conducted the EAVS following each federal general election.³ The EAVS collects data from all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the five U.S. territories—American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,⁴ and the U.S. Virgin Islands—on the ways in which Americans vote and how elections are administered. Data are provided at the jurisdiction level.⁵

³ The EAVS does not collect data on primary elections, run-off elections, or special elections. The data provided by states were only for the November 8, 2022 federal general election.

⁴ For 2022, Puerto Rico provided only a Policy Survey submission because the territory does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

⁵ What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chooses to provide data. For the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data at the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to



The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state- and local jurisdiction-level data about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to examine the details of the U.S. elections infrastructure and to produce a generalizable understanding of the core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by election officials at the state and local level. The survey provides policymakers and the public with crucial information every two years about how federal elections are conducted, and it helps the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials themselves. These officials use the EAVS to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and outreach materials.

The EAC also uses the EAVS data to create research and clearinghouse resources to advance the agency's mission and to better support election officials and voters, as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections. The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and to review procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections. The EAVS sections related to voter registration and UOCAVA voting allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established, respectively, by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA. The EAVS also helps FVAP fulfill its obligations under UOCAVA to reduce obstacles to ensure military and overseas voting success by collecting data about how UOCAVA voters participate in elections.

Collectively, the EAVS project consists of two separately administered surveys. The Policy Survey, which is administered to each state or territory election office in advance of each federal general election, collects data on the election laws and policies in the states and territories. These data are used to provide context for states' EAVS submissions and to reduce the response burden associated with the EAVS. The EAVS, which is due after each federal general election is complete, collects data at the jurisdiction level. The data collected include information on voter registration, UOCAVA voters, mail voting, in-person voting operations, provisional ballots, voter participation, and election technology. Although the EAVS collects data at the jurisdiction level, providing these data is frequently a joint task undertaken by state and local election officials. Twenty-five states were able to provide all EAVS data from the state's centralized election database, whereas 31 states relied on local jurisdictions to provide data for some or all of the EAVS questions. The full scope of the data collection procedures for both the Policy Survey and EAVS are detailed in Chapter 5 of this report.

Chapter 1 of this report covers turnout and modes of voting in the 2022 general election, polling places and poll workers, and election technology. This chapter also comprises a non-exhaustive

counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town levels. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village levels. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data on the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data at the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao's data are included with Maui's data.



overview of the data provided by states and jurisdictions in the EAVS. State election policies and practices are featured in Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey.” Voter registration is covered in greater detail in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond.” UOCAVA voting is discussed further in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in the 2022 General Election: UOCAVA.”

EAVS Response Rates

The analysis in this report is based on information and data submitted and certified by the 50 U.S. states, five territories, and the District of Columbia. These 56 entities comprise 6,460 jurisdictions. Because Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in November 2022, the territory provided data for the Policy Survey only. The state-level response rate for the EAVS was 100% (55 of 55 states, territories, and districts provided data) and the jurisdiction-level response rate was 100% (6,460 of 6,460 jurisdictions provided data).⁶ During the data collection period, efforts were made to maximize the completeness and accuracy of the data reported. These efforts are outlined in the methodology of this report (Chapter 5). Instances when a state’s data were not included in a calculation because of missing data or data quality issues are described in the footnotes and source notes that accompany the analysis in this report.

Turnout in the 2022 General Election

According to the EAVS data submitted by states, there were 226,339,980 individuals who were registered to vote in the United States as of November 8, 2022. Of this number, 203,660,564 individuals were classified as active registered voters, meaning they had no additional processing requirements to fulfill before voting, and 22,794,555 were considered inactive voters, meaning they required address verification under the provisions of the NVRA before they would be permitted to vote.⁷ As a percentage of the 2021 CVAP estimate calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau, 85.4% of voting age citizens were registered as active voters for the 2022 general election.⁸ This represents an increase of 2.8 percentage points over the active voter registration rate for the 2018 general election (82.5%).⁹ Further details about voter registration, including how voters registered to vote, the use of same-day voter registration (SDR), and list maintenance, can be found in Chapter 3 of this report.

⁶ Appendix A of Chapter 5 of this report contains an analysis of state-level response rates to each section of the EAVS. Although 100% of EAVS jurisdictions provided a response, there is variance in the completeness of those responses to each section and to specific questions of the survey.

⁷ The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a of the EAVS. Data on active registered voters were collected in A1b and data on inactive registered voters were collected in A1c. The number of active and inactive registered voters did not sum exactly to the total number of registered voters in all jurisdictions that reported these data. According to Q10 of the 2022 Policy Survey, six states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming) did not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their registration records. These states were not required to provide data in item A1c of the EAVS.

⁸ This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2021 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were not available by the time this report was finalized.

⁹ The active CVAP registration rate for 2018 and 2022 was calculated as A1b/CVAP x 100. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in this calculation because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate a CVAP for these territories. North Dakota was not included in this calculation because this state does not have voter registration. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.



Calculating Turnout Rates


There are several valid ways of calculating turnout, or the percentage of a population that voted in an election. The EAVS provides a measure of the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted for a general election in F1a, but there are multiple possible denominators.

- **Number of registered voters or active voters.** States report the number of individuals in their state who are registered and eligible to vote in A1a, and some states separately report the number of active voters (who have no additional processing requirements to fulfill before voting) in A1b. This number is available for states and sub-state EAVS jurisdictions.
- **Citizen voting age population (CVAP).** The U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) estimates the estimate of the total number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older. This number is available for states and most sub-state EAVS jurisdictions but not for U.S. territories, except for Puerto Rico.
- **Voting-eligible population (VEP).** This measure uses the CVAP but excludes those who are ineligible to vote (such as individuals with disqualifying felony convictions) and individuals who are in the military or who are citizens living overseas. This number is available for states, but not territories or for sub-state jurisdictions.

Relying on the number of registered or active voters can be problematic for calculating turnout because it is often challenging for states to keep voter registration rolls fully up to date (see Chapter 3 of this report for a discussion of list maintenance practices). Using VEP as the denominator in turnout calculations would overrepresent voter turnout—since EAVS data explicitly include individuals covered by UOCAVA—and would restrict the ability to estimate turnout for sub-state jurisdictions. Using the CVAP as a denominator provides greater coverage of sub-state jurisdictions but also includes citizens over the age of 18 who are ineligible to vote due to certain state laws. Although each denominator has its limitations, the EAC uses CVAP to calculate turnout in this report because of its availability for the majority of jurisdictions that report EAVS data and because it provides a more accurate picture of the population covered by the EAVS. Appendix D of Chapter 5 of this report includes recommendations on how to calculate additional EAVS rates.



Figure 2. Turnout Decreased in Most States from 2018 to 2022



Source: CVAP turnout was calculated as F1a/CVAP x 100 for 2018 and 2022. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not shown as CVAP is not available for these territories. Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in 2018 or 2022. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national turnout level. Turnout change between 2018 and 2022 is measured in percentage points.



States also reported that 112,054,124 voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2022 general election. This represents a CVAP turnout rate of 46.8% nationwide, which is the second highest turnout for a midterm election since the EAVS began collecting these data following the 2006 midterm election.¹⁰ Turnout for the 2022 general election decreased by 5.1 percentage points from the 2018 CVAP turnout rate of 52%,¹¹ but increased by 8.4 percentage points from the 2014 CVAP turnout of 38.4%.¹²

Figure 2 shows the change in CVAP turnout among states between the 2018 and 2022 general elections. The majority of states saw their turnout decrease between these elections. The largest decreases were in California, Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Tennessee—all of which saw double-digit turnout decreases. However, nine states—Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Vermont—saw turnout increases that ranged between 0.5 percentage points and 4.3 percentage points. In addition, 15 states had more than half of their citizen voting age population vote in the 2022 general election.

EAVS data also show that the ways American voters cast their general election ballots have changed significantly in the last three election cycles. Figure 3 shows the percentage of voters who cast their ballots in person on Election Day, by mail, in person during early voting, and by other modes of voting (including UOCAVA voting and provisional voting). Prior to the 2020 general election, a majority of voters tended to cast their votes at an in-person polling place on Election Day; 58.2% of voters chose this mode of voting for the 2018 general election. However, the COVID-19 pandemic that affected the 2020 general election appears to have had lasting effects on how voters cast their general election ballots. For the 2020 general election, the most common mode of voting was casting a ballot by mail (43% of voters), with in-person voting on Election Day and early voting each comprising 30.5% of the population of voters. The use of mail voting decreased for the 2022 general election, at 31.9% of voters, but remains higher than the 25.6% of voters who voted by mail in the 2018 general election. Although use of in-person early voting increased in the 2020 general election to 30.5%, it decreased to 22.2% in the 2022 general election, similar to the level of in-person early voting seen for the 2018 general election.


¹⁰ The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was reported in item F1a of the EAVS. The CVAP turnout rate for 2018 and 2022 was calculated as $F1a/CVAP \times 100$. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in these calculations because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate CVAP for these territories. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

¹¹ Beginning with the 2020 EAVS, the question about voter participation was reworded. In 2018, this question collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2022, it collected data on ballots cast and counted. Thus, it is likely that the 2018 turnout calculation was higher than it would have been if the 2022 question wording had been used, thus underestimating the true turnout change from 2018 to 2022.

¹² The CVAP turnout rate for 2014 was calculated as item F1a divided by the 2013 CVAP from the 5-year ACS. Although turnout calculations for other years use the 1-year ACS, a comparable statistic for 2014 could not be found. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation; Illinois' data were excluded from the turnout rate because the state did not report F1a in the 2014 EAVS.



Figure 3. In-Person Voting Rebounded in 2022 After Decreasing in 2020



Source: Election Day turnout was calculated as $F1b/F1a \times 100$ for all years. Mail turnout was calculated as $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$ for all years. In-person early turnout was calculated as $F1f/F1a \times 100$ for all years. UOCAVA, provisional, and other turnout was calculated as $(F1c+F1e+F1h)/F1a \times 100$ for all years. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national turnout levels for each mode, and because of this, percentages for each year do not sum to 100%. Early voting includes all modes of casting a ballot in person at a polling site or election office before Election Day; see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the types of early voting available in states.

In-Person Voting

More than two-thirds of voters cast their ballots in person for the 2022 general election, either on Election Day at a polling place or before Election Day at a polling place, election office, or other designated site. All states except Pennsylvania allowed voters to cast ballots in person before Election Day.¹³ In-person early voting generally falls into two categories:

- A voter may go to a polling place or an election office before Election Day, receive a ballot, cast their ballot, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.

¹³ Information on early voting was collected in Q25 of the Policy Survey. Although this report primarily uses the terminology “early voting,” there are a variety of terms that states use to refer to the process of allowing individuals to cast their ballots in person at a polling location, vote center, or election office before Election Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a full discussion of states’ policies on early voting.



- A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the voter may be able to take their ballot home with them. In other states, however, the ballot must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.

Some states and territories offer both of these types of voting. Nine states require voters to provide a valid excuse to be permitted to vote early, whereas 46 states have no-excuse early voting that is open to any registered voter.¹⁴ For a complete discussion on state policies on in-person voting, including the length of time in-person early voting was available and the use of vote centers, see Chapter 2 of this report.

States reported that 21,322,200 ballots were cast through in-person early voting and counted for the 2022 general election, a slight increase over the 20,854,871 early voting ballots cast for the 2018 general election.¹⁵ The number of ballots cast in person on Election Day 2022 was 50,860,863, a decrease of 24.2% from the 67,133,886 ballots cast on Election Day for the 2018 general election.¹⁶

Voting by Mail

All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer their registered voters the opportunity to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections, although the number of citizens who cast their ballots using this method and the circumstances under which citizens can vote by mail vary widely among states. Some states use the term “absentee voting” instead of “mail voting.”¹⁷ For purposes of this report, mail voting refers to the process by which:

1. An individual receives a ballot in the mail before an election. In some states or jurisdictions, election offices automatically send a mail ballot to all registered voters (often referred to as “all-mail elections”), whereas others automatically send mail ballots only to individuals on a permanent mail voting list. In other states, individuals must file an application to request a ballot for each election for which they wish to vote using a mail ballot. Some states require an individual to provide a valid excuse to be able to receive a mail ballot.
2. The individual marks the mail ballot with their preferences at home instead of at an election office or polling location.
3. The individual returns the voted ballot to election officials, typically by sending the voted ballot through the mail, by returning the voted ballot to an in-person voting site or election office, or by depositing the voted ballot in a secure designated drop box. The options that voters have for returning their voted mail ballots are dictated by state policy.

¹⁴ Information on whether an excuse was required for early voting was collected in Q25a of the Policy Survey.

¹⁵ Data on early voting ballots were collected in item F1f of the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. For 2018, the definition of this question included only ballots cast, whereas the 2022 definition included ballots cast and counted.

¹⁶ Data on ballots cast in person on Election Day were collected in item F1b of the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. For 2018, the definition of this question included only ballots cast, whereas the 2022 definition included ballots cast and counted.

¹⁷ In recognition of the fact that many states no longer require a person to be absent from their election jurisdiction in order to be permitted to cast a ballot by mail, the EAVS uses the term “mail voting.”



Chapter 2 of this report describes a full analysis of the laws that states had in place regarding mail voting for the 2022 general election. In total, 17 states required an excuse to vote by mail, whereas 38 states did not.¹⁸ Twelve states conducted all-mail elections for the 2022 general election—nine of these states did so statewide and three in certain jurisdictions only.¹⁹ In 23 states, voters could be placed on a permanent absentee voting list.²⁰

The number of voters in the United States who have participated in federal general elections using mail voting has changed significantly in the past three election cycles. In the 2018 EAVS, states reported 30,700,831 ballots cast by mail. That number more than doubled to 69,337,349 in the 2020 EAVS, as many states expanded opportunities to vote by mail in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. For the 2022 EAVS, states reported that 35,316,617 ballots were cast by mail and counted.²¹

The EAVS also collected data on mail ballots transmitted to voters (excluding military and overseas voters covered by UOCAVA) from election offices, returned by voters, counted, and rejected. States reported transmitting 61,460,139 mail ballots for the 2022 general election, of which 36,683,450 were returned by voters, for a rate of 59.7% of transmitted mail ballots being returned by voters.²² Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 35,718,700 were reported as being counted and 549,824 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 97.4% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.5% of the mail ballots that were returned.²³ The mail ballot return rate for the 2022 EAVS was statistically significantly lower compared to what was reported in the 2018 and 2020 EAVS (71.6% and 77.8%, respectively). Although there was no statistically significant difference in the mail ballot count and rejection rate between the 2022 and 2020 EAVS, comparisons show that the mail ballot count rate for the 2022 EAVS was significantly higher than what was reported for the 2018 EAVS (92.4%). However, the percentage of mail ballots that were counted and rejected was not significantly different

¹⁸ Data on requiring an excuse to vote by mail were collected in item Q16 of the 2022 Policy Survey. Puerto Rico was excluded from this analysis because it did not conduct a general election in November 2022.

¹⁹ Data on all-mail elections were collected in items Q17 and Q17a of the 2022 Policy Survey. All-mail elections are defined as elections for which all registered voters or all active registered voters are automatically sent a mail ballot without having to file a mail ballot request. Some in-person voting may take place in an all-mail election.

²⁰ Data on permanent absentee voting policies were collected in item Q18 of the 2022 Policy Survey. Voters who received a mail ballot because they resided in a state or jurisdiction that automatically sent mail ballots to all registered voters (or to all active registered voters) were excluded from being considered permanent absentee voters.

²¹ The number of ballots cast by mail and counted was the sum of F1d and F1g for all years. For the 2018 EAVS, these items collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2020 and 2022, they collected data on ballots cast and counted.

²² Data on the number of mail ballots transmitted were collected in item C1a and data on mail ballots returned were collected in item C1b of the 2022 EAVS. The return rate was calculated as $C1b/C1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level. American Samoa did not report data in C1a, and American Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data in C1b for the 2022 EAVS.

²³ Data on the number of mail ballots counted were collected in item C8a and data on mail ballots rejected were collected in item C9a of the 2022 EAVS. The count rate was calculated as $C8a/C1b \times 100$ and the rejection rate was calculated as $C9a/C1b \times 100$ for the 2022 EAVS. For the 2018 and 2020 EAVS, the count rate was calculated as $C3a/C1b \times 100$, and the rejection rate was calculated as $C4a/C1b \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level; the count and rejection rate may not sum to 100% because of the casewise deletion and due to rounding. American Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data for C8a, and Alabama, American Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data for C9a for the 2022 EAVS.



between states that conducted an all-mail election statewide in the 2022 general election and states that did not.²⁴

Table 1. Most Common Reason for Mail Ballot Rejection was “Other”

Reason	Percentage of Rejected Mail Ballots
Other reason not listed	32.7%
Ballot had a non-matching or incomplete signature	26.9%
Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline	23.1%
Ballot did not have a voter signature	9.8%
Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope	8.3%
Ballot did not have a witness signature	5.6%
Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted (by mail or in person)	3.6%
Voter did not provide the required documentation (such as identification, affidavit, or statement) or documentation was incomplete	2.7%
Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction	2.5%
Voter was deceased	1.1%
Ballot was missing from the envelope	0.7%
Envelope was not sealed	0.6%
No resident address was on the envelope	0.4%
Returned ballot did not have required postmark	0.3%
Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope	0.3%
Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope	0.1%
No ballot application on record	0.1%

Source: Other reasons not listed was calculated as $(C9r+C9s+C9t)/C9a \times 100$. Ballot had a non-matching or incomplete signature was calculated as $C9e/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was received late was calculated as $C9b/C9a \times 100$. Ballot did not have a voter signature was calculated as $C9c/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope was calculated as $C9h/C9a \times 100$. Ballot did not have a witness signature was calculated as $C9d/C9a \times 100$. Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted was calculated as $C9n/C9a \times 100$. Voter did not provide or provided incomplete documentation was calculated as $C9o/C9a \times 100$. Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction was calculated as $C9p/C9a \times 100$. Voter was deceased was calculated as $C9m/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was missing from the envelope was calculated as $C9g/C9a \times 100$. Envelope was not sealed was calculated as $C9j/C9a \times 100$. No resident address was on the envelope was calculated as $C9l/C9a \times 100$. Returned ballot did not have required postmark was calculated as $C9k/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope was calculated as $C9f/C9a \times 100$. Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope was calculated as $C9i/C9a \times 100$. No ballot application on record was calculated as $C9q/C9a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

²⁴ T tests that were noted as being statistically significant were significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.



Table 1 shows the most common reasons that states reported for rejecting mail ballots for the 2022 general election. Although states were asked to report data on 16 different reasons why mail ballots were rejected, the most common reason for rejecting mail ballots was for reasons not listed in the survey question. The states with the largest number of ballots rejected for other reasons were California (118,490 ballots), Oregon (26,942 ballots), Delaware (2,480 ballots), Wisconsin (2,125 ballots), and Florida (1,870 ballots);²⁵ the states with the highest percentages of mail ballots rejected for other reasons were Oregon (93.4%), Delaware (85.6%), Maine (60.3%), Wisconsin (53.3%), and California (48.7%).²⁶ The most common other reasons reported were “Undeliverable/Void/Final Not Counted” (comprising approximately half of mail ballots rejected for other reasons) and “All Signature Issues” (comprising approximately one-quarter of mail ballots rejected for other reasons).

The next most common reason states reported for rejecting a mail ballot was that the ballot returned by the voter had a signature that did not match what was on file or was incomplete, followed by the ballot not being received by the deadline to be considered for counting. Together, these three reasons accounted for nearly seven out of 10 of the ballots rejected for the 2022 general election.

Drop Boxes

The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of drop boxes for the first time in 2022. Drop boxes are locked containers (located either indoors or outdoors) where voters (or voters’ authorized representatives, if allowed by state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. Drop boxes are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate from ballot boxes, which are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots immediately after voting in person. Some states use other terminology for what the EAVS survey questions call drop boxes, including “place of deposit” or “secure ballot intake station.”

Of the 39 states that reported using drop boxes for this election,²⁷ seven states (Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin) did not track or were otherwise unable to report data on the number of drop boxes that were in use for the 2022 general election. The 32 remaining states reported deploying a total of 12,917 drop boxes throughout the voting period for the 2022 general election, with 11,858 drop boxes being available on Election Day and 8,386 available during the early voting period.²⁸ States also reported whether drop boxes were located at election offices or at other sites such as at non-election office polling places, county government buildings, or other locations that are conveniently accessible to voters. States reported that 28.2% of Election Day drop boxes were located at election offices and 71.8% were

²⁵ The number of mail ballots rejected for other reasons by state was calculated as the sum of C9r, C9s, and C9t.

²⁶ Idaho and West Virginia were excluded from the list of states with the highest reported percentages of mail ballots rejected for other reasons because of erroneous data reporting.

²⁷ Data on whether states allowed the use of drop boxes were collected in item Q19 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

²⁸ The total number of drop boxes was reported in item C3a. The number of Election Day drop boxes was reported in item C4a. The number of early voting drop boxes was reported in C5a. The question instructions specified that each drop box should be reported only once in C3a, regardless of the number of days of voting during which it was available. Thus, because some drop boxes were available both during early voting and on Election Day, the sum of C4a and C5a often does not match C3a on a state or a jurisdiction level.



located at other sites. For early voting drop boxes, 40.1% were located at election offices and 59.8% were located at other sites.²⁹

The 2022 EAVS also collected data on the number of mail ballots that were returned by drop box. Fifteen of the states that use drop boxes did not track these data or were otherwise unable to report how many of the mail ballots returned by voters were returned by drop box (Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin). The 24 states that were able to report these data reported that 11,473,653 mail ballots were returned by drop box, comprising 39.7% of the mail ballots returned by voters in these states and 20.9% of all ballots cast in those states.³⁰ States that conducted their elections entirely by mail at the state or jurisdiction level, including Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Utah, California, the District of Columbia, and Nebraska, tended to have the highest average number of mail ballots returned by drop box.

Ballot Curing

The 2022 EAVS also collected for the first time data on the ballot curing process. When voters return their mail ballots to election offices, election workers verify that the envelope has all the required voter information and that the ballot is eligible to be counted. This process varies by state, but can include comparing the voter's signature with the one on file at the election office and verifying the date the ballot envelope was signed as well as other information. If this information is missing, if it does not match the records on file in the election office, or if it is otherwise incomplete, then each state and territory has laws and procedures on how to treat these ballots. A certain percentage of those ballots may initially be rejected for counting—for instance, because the voter forgot to sign the ballot envelope so the election office was unable to verify their identity; or because the voter's signature does not match the signature that the election office has on file; or because the voter neglected to include a required affidavit, statement, or copy of their identification to assist in verifying their identity and ability to cast a mail ballot. According to the 2022 Policy Survey, 41 states³¹ allowed voters to cure their mail ballots for the 2022 general election—that is, making their ballot eligible to be counted for the election by correcting missing information or signature errors. Fourteen other states did not allow mail ballots to be cured by voters for this election.³²

Of the 41 states that allowed voters to cure their mail ballots, 16 states (Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) did not track information on the number of ballots that were successfully cured (i.e., the voter corrected the error or supplied the required information and their ballot was ultimately counted for the election). The 2022 EAVS only

²⁹ For Election Day drop boxes, the percentage located at election offices was calculated as C4b/C4a x 100 and the percentage located at other sites was calculated as C4c/C4a x 100. For early voting drop boxes, the percentage located at election offices was calculated as C5b/C5a x 100 and the percentage located at other sites was calculated as C5c/C5a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level; percentages may not sum to 100% because of this casewise deletion or because of rounding.

³⁰ The number of mail ballots returned by drop box was reported in item C6a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of mail ballots returned by drop box was calculated as C6a/C1b x 100. The percentage of all ballots cast that were returned by drop box was calculated as C6a/F1a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

³¹ Information on state ballot curing policy was collected in item Q20 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

³² Puerto Rico is not included in this analysis because this territory did not conduct a federal general election in November 2022.



collected data on the number of ballots that were successfully cured and not the number that were eligible for curing or were rejected because they were not cured. The 25 states that tracked information on successfully cured mail ballots reported curing a total of 169,540 mail ballots for the 2022 general election.³³ Nationally, this number comprised 0.7% of both mail ballots returned and mail ballots counted.³⁴

Additional information about mail voting in the 2022 general election, including statistics by state, can be found in Appendix A of this chapter.

Provisional Voting

HAVA expanded and standardized the use of provisional voting as a way for a voter to cast a ballot when their registration status cannot be verified at the time of voting, when there is some indication that the voter may have already cast another ballot (e.g., by mail), or when the voter's eligibility to vote in an election is challenged. Provisional ballots are kept separate from other election ballots and are later fully counted, partially counted, or rejected depending on whether the provisional voter's eligibility can be verified in the days following the election according to the state's rules for this process. The provisional ballot process helps ensure each qualified voter casts only one ballot that is counted and allows the voter additional time to prove their eligibility to vote if necessary. Five states—Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—are exempt from HAVA's provisional ballot requirements because they allowed for SDR (i.e., the ability to register to vote and cast a ballot on the same day) at the time the law was enacted, although Wisconsin and Wyoming do issue provisional ballots. North Dakota is exempt from this HAVA provision because it does not require citizens to register to vote. In addition, some states that are subject to HAVA use provisional ballots as an SDR method, including California, Nevada, and Virginia.

In the 2022 Policy Survey, most states and territories reported offering provisional ballots to voters. Only six states and territories—Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Vermont—did not.³⁵ Chapter 2 of this report includes a detailed analysis of additional policies on provisional voting, including under which circumstances a state may offer a provisional ballot to a voter, the deadline for election officials to adjudicate provisional ballots for the 2022 general election, how states handle provisional ballots cast by a voter who is in the wrong precinct, and how states review provisional ballots for eligibility and to determine whether they should be counted.

The percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters has been steadily declining over the past three election cycles; 2018 EAVS data show that 1.3% of voters who cast a ballot did so by provisional ballot, and that percentage declined to 0.8% of the electorate in the 2020 EAVS and 0.5% for the 2022 EAVS.³⁶ The total number of provisional ballots cast has declined

³³ The number of successfully cured mail ballots was collected in item C7a of the 2022 EAVS.

³⁴ The percentage of mail ballots returned by voters that were successfully cured was calculated as $C7a/C1b \times 100$. The percentage of mail ballots counted that were successfully cured was calculated as $C7a/C8a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

³⁵ Information on states' use of provisional voting was collected in item Q33 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

³⁶ The percentage of provisional voters is calculated as $F1e/F1a \times 100$ for all years. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. For the 2018 EAVS, F1 collected data on all ballots cast, regardless of outcome, whereas the 2020 and 2022 versions of F1 collected data on ballots cast and counted.



correspondingly, from 1,852,476 in the 2018 EAVS to 1,712,857 in the 2020 EAVS to 702,042 in the 2022 EAVS.³⁷ Data from the 2022 EAVS show that 78.6% of provisional ballots cast were counted (either fully or partially), whereas 21.3% were rejected and 0.4% reached some other adjudication;³⁸ analysis showed that these percentages have not changed significantly compared to the 2018 or 2020 EAVS.³⁹

Table 2. Most Common Reason for Voters to Cast Provisional Ballots Was Not Being on Eligible Voter List

Reason	Percentage of Provisional Ballots Cast
Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters	30.9%
Other reasons not listed	20.8%
Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person	17.9%
Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote	16.9%
Voter's registration was not updated with their current name or address	7.9%
Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law)	2.0%
Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote	1.7%
A federal or state judge extended the polling place hours for the election	0.6%
Another person (not an election official) challenged the voter's qualifications and poll workers were not able to resolve the challenge	0.1%

Source: Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters was calculated as $E2a/E1a \times 100$. Other reasons not listed was calculated as $(E2i+E2j+E2k)/E1a \times 100$. Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person was calculated as $E2g/E1a \times 100$. Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote was calculated as $E2e/E1a \times 100$. Voter's registration was not updated with their current name or address was calculated as $E2f/E1a \times 100$. Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law) was calculated as $E2b/E1a \times 100$. Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote was calculated as $E2c/E1a \times 100$. A federal or state judge extended the polling place hours for the election was calculated as $E2h/E1a \times 100$. Another person (not an election official) challenged the voter's qualifications and poll workers were not able to resolve the challenge was calculated as $E2d/E1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

³⁷ The total number of provisional ballots cast by voters was collected in item E1a for all years.

³⁸ The percentage of counted provisional ballots was calculated as $(E1b+E1c)/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) \times 100$. The percentage of rejected provisional ballots was calculated as $E1d/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) \times 100$. The percentage of provisional ballots that reached another adjudication was calculated as $E1e/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

³⁹ T tests were statistically insignificant at $p > 0.05$.



For the first time, the EAVS collected data on the reasons why provisional ballots were cast for the 2022 general election. These data are shown in Table 2. Eight states that use provisional voting were unable to track data on the reasons why provisional ballots were cast (Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, and New Mexico). Of the states that did report these data, the most common reason for a voter being invited to cast a provisional ballot was that the voter was not on the list of eligible voters at their voting site. The next most common reason was a reason not listed in the survey question,⁴⁰ followed by the voter having received a mail ballot but then deciding to vote in person and not surrendering the mail ballot at the voting site, followed by the voter not being a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote. The additional reasons that EAVS collects data on—including the voter’s registration not being up to date, the voter not having an acceptable identification for their state, an election official or other person asserting the voter was not eligible to vote, or a federal or state judge extending polling place hours for the election—were comparatively rare.

The EAVS also collects data on the reasons why provisional ballots are rejected. By far, the most common reason states reported for rejecting provisional ballots was that the voter who cast the provisional ballot was not registered in the state; this reason alone accounted for 45.4% of the provisional ballots that were reported as rejected by states. The next most common reason was a reason that was not listed in the survey question. These ballots comprised 16.7% of rejected provisional ballots. Other common reasons for rejecting provisional ballots included the voter being registered in the state but attempting to vote in the wrong jurisdiction (14.8% of rejections), the voter being registered in the state but attempting to vote in the wrong precinct (6.8% of rejections), and the voter failing to provide sufficient identification (6.2% of rejections). Additional reasons for rejecting provisional ballots that the EAVS collects data on—the voter already having voted, the envelope and/or ballot being incomplete and/or illegible, the ballot envelope not having a signature, the ballot envelope having a non-matching signature, and the ballot being missing from the envelope—each comprised 5.0% of provisional ballot rejections or less for the 2022 general election.⁴¹

UOCAVA and Other Methods of Voting

Absentee and mail voting have long been used to facilitate participation in federal elections for individuals in the military, eligible family members of service members, and U.S. citizens who live overseas. The distinct needs of members of the uniformed services and overseas citizens remain an area of focus in election administration, and these individuals are given special voting

⁴⁰ The most common other reasons for casting provisional ballots were because of SDR (24% of these ballots) and because the voter was marked in the poll book as having requested an absentee ballot but was attempting to vote in person (14.7%).

⁴¹ Voter was not registered in the state was calculated as $E3b/E3a \times 100$. Other reasons not listed was calculated as $(E3k+E3l+E3m)/E3a \times 100$. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction was calculated as $E3c/E3a \times 100$. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to vote in the wrong precinct was calculated as $E3d/E3a \times 100$. Voter failed to provide sufficient identification was calculated as $E3e/E3a \times 100$. Voter already voted was calculated as $E3j/E3a \times 100$. Envelope and/or ballot was incomplete and/or illegible was calculated as $E3f/E3a \times 100$. Ballot did not have a signature was calculated as $E3h/E3a \times 100$. Ballot had a non-matching signature was calculated as $E3i/E3a \times 100$. Ballot was missing from the envelope was calculated as $E3g/E3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100% for this reason.



protections under UOCAVA and its amendments.⁴² UOCAVA voters are provided certain rights to fully participate in federal elections and are given special considerations as to when their ballots are sent, how their blank ballots can be transmitted, and how and when they may return their voted ballots.

Both the number of UOCAVA ballots that were cast and counted and the percentage of the electorate who cast their ballots through UOCAVA decreased for the 2022 general election compared to 2018. Data from the 2018 EAVS show that 358,137 UOCAVA ballots were cast, comprising 0.3% of the electorate. For the 2022 general election, 254,721 UOCAVA ballots were cast and counted, comprising 0.2% of the voting population. The number of UOCAVA ballots cast and percentage of voters who cast UOCAVA ballots both surged for the 2020 general election, to 938,297 and 0.6%, respectively, but for 2022 they declined below pre-pandemic levels.⁴³ Nationwide, for the 2022 general election, states reported transmitting 654,786 ballots, of which 267,403 were returned by voters for a return rate of 40.9%.⁴⁴ Of the ballots that were returned, 257,657 were counted and 10,456 were rejected, yielding a count rate of 96.4% and a rejection rate of 3.9%.⁴⁵ This is in addition to 4,089 Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) that were sent to election offices by UOCAVA voters, of which 3,447 were counted.⁴⁶

Chapter 4 of this report contains a complete discussion of the EAC's history of collecting data on voters covered by UOCAVA; a full analysis of the data collected about these voters and their ballots in 2022, including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and the use of the FWAB. Chapter 2 of this report contains a complete discussion of state policies regarding UOCAVA voting.

In addition to ballots that were cast at a physical polling place either on Election Day or during the early voting period, by mail, by provisional voting, and by UOCAVA voters, states reported data on any other modes of voting that were offered in the state in 2022. Just over 5% of the ballots that were cast and counted in 2022 were reported as another mode of voting, an increase from the 2.5% that was reported for the 2020 general election and the 0.2% that was reported for the

⁴² The uniformed services are the armed forces—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space Force), and Coast Guard—and the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned Corps, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Officer Corps, and the U.S. Merchant Marine. Uniformed services members, their spouses, and their eligible dependents are, together, referred to as uniformed services voters. Overseas citizens are U.S. citizens living outside of the United States who are not uniformed services voters but who are also protected by UOCAVA.

⁴³ The number of UOCAVA ballots cast and counted was collected in item F1c for all years; the percentage of voters who cast UOCAVA ballots was calculated as $F1c/F1a \times 100$. For 2018, this item collected data on ballots cast regardless of outcome; for 2020 and 2022, it collected data on ballots cast and counted.

⁴⁴ The number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted was collected in B5a and the number of UOCAVA ballots returned was collected in item B9a. The UOCAVA ballot return rate was calculated as $B9a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

⁴⁵ The number of UOCAVA ballots counted was collected in B14a and the number of UOCAVA ballots rejected was collected in B18a. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots counted was calculated as $B14a/B9a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected was calculated as $B18a/B9a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

⁴⁶ The number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters was collected in item B23a. The number of counted FWABs was collected in item B24a.



2018 general election.⁴⁷ This is primarily due to New Jersey reporting 75.4% of its voters in this item, which the state said comprised Election Day and early voting location ballots counted. Other states that reported significant turnout in this item included Mississippi (6.5% of turnout, comprising absentee ballots counted), North Carolina (2.2% of turnout, comprising “other”), the U.S. Virgin Islands (1.9% of turnout, comprising walk-in absentee voters), and Delaware (1.1% of voters, comprising “all other methods”).⁴⁸ Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin also reported other modes of voting that comprised less than 1% of the turnout in each state.

Polling Places and Poll Workers

To organize elections, registered voters are assigned to precincts according to the residential addresses listed in their voter registration records. These precincts are contiguous, bounded geographic areas that form the basis for determining the contests and issues on which the voters legally residing in that area are eligible to vote.⁴⁹ Precincts are then assigned to polling locations, which are physical locations where in-person voting takes place. One precinct may be assigned to a polling place, or multiple precincts may vote together at a single polling place. Some states use a vote center model, which allows people to vote at any polling location within their jurisdiction rather than at a specifically assigned polling place.

For the 2022 general election, states reported having 181,790 precincts in use and operating 94,793 physical polling places.⁵⁰ A total of 80,124 polling places were reported as being operated on Election Day 2022 and 15,309 were reported as being in use during in-person early voting before Election Day.⁵¹ Among Election Day polling places, 2.6% were reported by states as being located at an election office and 97.8% were reported as being located at another site, such as a library, school, or a mobile voting location. For early voting polling places, 44.9% were located at election offices and 66.6% were located at other sites.⁵²

⁴⁷ The percentage of ballots cast by another mode and counted was calculated as $F1h/F1a \times 100$ for all years. Casewise deletion was used in calculating the national percentage. For 2018, this item collected data on ballots cast regardless of outcome; for 2020 and 2022, it collected data on ballots cast and counted.

⁴⁸ The description of states’ other mode of voting was based on what the state submitted in item F1h_Other of the 2022 EAVS.

⁴⁹ Some states use the terms “ward” or “voting district” to describe their voting precincts.

⁵⁰ The number of precincts was collected in item D1a, and the total number of polling places was collected in D2a. The instructions for D2a stated that each polling place was to be counted only once, regardless of the number of voting days it was open for.

⁵¹ The total number of Election Day polling places was collected in D3a, and the total number of early voting polling places was collected in D4a. Illinois and Virginia were excluded from the reported total number of Election Day polling places due to erroneous data reporting. Washington did not report data in D3a because the state has no polling places—only vote centers and voting by mail. Three states did not report data in D4a: Missouri because it was unavailable, New Hampshire because in-person absentee is only permitted at town or city clerk’s offices over the counter, and Pennsylvania because in-person early voting was not available for this election. The EAC cautions against doing a year-over-year analysis of polling places as reported in the EAVS because these items have been underreported in previous years.

⁵² The percentage of Election Day polling places at election offices was calculated as $D3c/(D3b+D3c) \times 100$. The percentage of Election Day polling places at other sites was calculated as $D3b/(D3b+D3c) \times 100$. The percentage of early voting polling places at election offices was calculated as $D4c/(D4b+D4c) \times 100$. The percentage of early voting polling places at other sites was calculated as $D4b/(D4b+D4c) \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages; the percentages for



In-person voters who vote at polling places are often assisted by poll workers. These poll workers are typically not full-time election workers or employees of election offices; rather, they are recruited and trained to assist temporarily during election periods. Typical activities that poll workers perform include checking in voters, setting up voting equipment and providing ballots to voters, and performing other functions as dictated by the state or local election authority.⁵³ States reported that 645,219 poll workers assisted with in-person voting for the 2022 general election, with 608,758 poll workers assisting with voting on Election Day and 98,140 assisting with early voting.⁵⁴

Thirty-six states also reported data on the age breakdown of the poll workers who assisted with the 2022 general election.⁵⁵ Among these states, a majority of poll workers were reported as being age 61 or older. The age distribution of poll workers in the 2018, 2020, and 2022 general elections is shown in Figure 4. This figure shows a clear increase in poll workers between the ages of 18 and 40 for the 2020 general election and a decrease in poll workers over the age of 61. However, the age distribution of poll workers for the 2022 general election is remarkably similar to that of the 2018 general election. In comparing 2020 to 2022, the proportion of poll workers ages 18 and under, 26 to 40, and 41 to 60 decreased, while the proportion of poll workers ages 61 to 70 and 71 and older increased.⁵⁶ The 2022 EAVS also collected data on poll workers who served for the first time in the 2022 general election; states reported 80,708 new poll workers, comprising 16.7% of the poll workers who assisted with this election.⁵⁷

each election period may not sum to 100% because of this. Georgia and Missouri did not report data on where Election Day polling sites were located; Georgia and Wisconsin did not report data on where early voting polling sites were located. “Early voting” refers to any in-person voting that took place before Election Day.

⁵³ Some states and jurisdictions use other titles for poll workers, such as election judges, booth workers, wardens, or commissioners. The EAVS instructions stated that observers stationed at polling places, regular office staff who did not fulfill poll worker functions during the election, or temporary election staff who were not hired specifically to serve voters in either early or Election Day voting should not be counted as poll workers for purposes of the EAVS. However, regular office staff who performed poll worker duties during early voting or on Election Day were to be counted as poll workers in these survey items.

⁵⁴ The total number of poll workers was collected in item D7a. The total number of Election Day poll workers was collected in item D5a. The total number of early voting poll workers was collected in item D6a. D7a was not intended to match the sum of D5a and D6a because the instructions in D7 were to count each poll worker only once, regardless of the number of days of voting the poll worker assisted with. Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin were unable to report data on poll workers in any of these three items. Colorado and North Dakota reported data in D7a but not in D5a or D6a; Alabama, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania reported data in D5a and D7a but not in D6a.


⁵⁵ Data on poll workers’ ages were collected in items D7b–D7g of the 2022 EAVS. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin were not able to report age data.

⁵⁶ Comparisons for age categories between 2020 and 2022 were significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. The comparison for poll workers ages 18 to 25 was insignificant at $p > 0.05$.

⁵⁷ Data on new poll workers were collected in item D9a of the 2022 EAVS; the percentage of new poll workers was calculated as $D9a/D7a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. Twenty-three states (Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Guam, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) were unable to track data on new poll workers.



Figure 4. Age Distribution of 2022 Poll Workers Was Very Similar to 2018




Source: Percentage of poll workers under age 18 was calculated as $D7b / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022 and as $D8b / (D8b + D8c + D8d + D8e + D8f + D8g) \times 100$ for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 18–25 was calculated as $D7c / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022 and as $D8c / (D8b + D8c + D8d + D8e + D8f + D8g) \times 100$ for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 26–40 was calculated as $D7d / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022 and as $D8d / (D8b + D8c + D8d + D8e + D8f + D8g) \times 100$ for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 41–60 was calculated as $D7e / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022 and as $D8e / (D8b + D8c + D8d + D8e + D8f + D8g) \times 100$ for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 61–70 was calculated as $D7f / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022 and as $D8f / (D8b + D8c + D8d + D8e + D8f + D8g) \times 100$ for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 71 or older was calculated as $D7g / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022 and as $D8g / (D8b + D8c + D8d + D8e + D8f + D8g) \times 100$ for 2018. Data for Alaska and South Carolina have been excluded from these calculations because these states only track data on poll workers under 18 years of age. Casewise deletion was used at the state level for calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

The EAVS also collected data on how easy or difficult it was for jurisdictions to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers for the 2022 general election. These data show that poll worker recruitment remains a challenge for many election officials, with more than half of jurisdictions that responded to this question reporting that it was very or somewhat difficult and just under



one-quarter of jurisdictions reporting it was somewhat or very easy.⁵⁸ However, historical comparisons show that recruitment has become somewhat easier in the past two election cycles, as shown in Figure 5. For the 2018 EAVS, more than two-thirds of jurisdictions reported that poll worker recruitment was very or somewhat difficult and only 15.3% reported that recruitment was somewhat or very easy. Beginning with the 2020 EAVS, the percentage of jurisdictions that found recruitment to be difficult began to decrease and the percentage that found it easy began to increase, a trend that continued with the 2022 EAVS. Analysis shows that although the ease of poll worker recruitment fell in 2022 compared to 2020, recruitment was still easier in 2022 than it was in 2018.⁵⁹ Ease of poll worker recruitment is also highly correlated with the size of the jurisdiction, with jurisdictions having 10,000 or fewer total registered voters reporting that recruitment was easier compared to jurisdictions with more than 10,000 total registered voters.⁶⁰

Figure 5. Poll Worker Recruitment Was Less Difficult in 2020 and 2022 Than in 2018



Source: Ease of recruiting poll workers was collected in item D8 in the 2020 and 2022 EAVS and D9 in the 2018 EAVS. For all years, jurisdictions that responded “Not enough information to answer,” “Data not available,” “Does not apply,” or left this item blank were excluded from this analysis.

⁵⁸ Data on the ease of recruiting poll workers were collected in item D8 of the 2020 and 2022 EAVS and item D9 of the 2018 EAVS. In 2022, 3,164 of 6,460 jurisdictions (49%) responded “Not enough information to answer,” “Data not available,” “Does not apply,” or left this item blank; these responses have been excluded from the analysis.

⁵⁹ *T* tests comparing D8 for 2022 and 2020 and D8 for 2022 and D9 for 2018 were statistically significant at $p < 0.01$.

⁶⁰ For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as reported in item A1a of the 2022 EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at $p < 0.001$.



Approximately half of EAVS jurisdictions provided comments that explained their experiences with recruiting poll workers for the 2022 general election.⁶¹ Overall, some of the most significant challenges jurisdictions experienced in recruiting poll workers included lingering concerns about COVID (especially among older poll workers), long work hours and relatively low pay for poll workers, issues obtaining a sufficient political party balance of poll workers (in states and jurisdictions where this is a requirement), concerns about safety and the general political climate toward elections, and last-minute cancellations causing difficulties with filling those slots. Among jurisdictions reporting that poll worker recruitment was somewhat or very easy, the most commonly cited strategies included relying on local networks—such as high schools or colleges, political parties, and local government offices or organizations—or current poll workers to recruit additional workers. Some jurisdictions found success in switching to a vote center model, thereby reducing the number of poll workers necessary to administer an election. Other successful strategies included relying on election staff to fill vacant poll worker positions and holding multiple poll worker orientation and training sessions to accommodate different schedules.

Election Technology

The use of technology in polling places and vote tally locations varies widely across and within states. The 2022 EAVS collected data on the type of voting equipment that is used and the type of voting that the equipment is used for, the specific makes and models of the equipment and how many were deployed for the election, and whether electronic poll books (or e-poll books) were used to assist at polling places. The voting equipment landscape continues to evolve with each election.

Voting Equipment

The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of four types of voting equipment that voters use to mark or cast their ballots in elections or that can be used to tabulate ballots cast by voters:

- Direct-recording electronic (DRE) devices that are not equipped with a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT);
- DRE voting devices that are equipped with a VVPAT;
- Electronic systems that produce a paper record but do not tabulate votes, often referred to as ballot-marking devices (BMD); and
- Scanners (either optical or digital) that tabulate paper records that voters mark by hand or via a BMD.

The EAVS also collected information on whether jurisdictions counted ballots by hand without the use of any optical or digital scanning system.⁶²

⁶¹ Open-ended comments on poll worker recruitment experiences were provided in the D8 Comment item of the 2022 EAVS. Responses that did not include substantive comments—such as “No information to share” or “Data not available”—were excluded from the analysis.

⁶² Information on DREs without VVPAT was collected in F5 of the 2022 EAVS. Information on DREs with VVPAT was collected in F6. Information on BMDs was collected in F7. Information on scanners was collected in F8. Information on hand counting was collected in F9. Eight jurisdictions in Kansas, two jurisdictions in Kentucky, four jurisdictions in Missouri, and two jurisdictions in West Virginia did not respond to questions on the use of scanners in F8. No jurisdiction in Kansas responded to questions on the use of hand counting in F9. Previously, the EAVS also collected information on the use of punch card and



Nationally, states reported deploying 334,382 voting machines to assist with the 2022 general election.⁶³ Figure 6 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that reported using each type of voting equipment in the 2020 and 2022 EAVS. The most commonly used types of voting equipment in EAVS jurisdictions were BMDs and scanners, which were used in 88.4% and 86.2% of jurisdictions, respectively. The use of both types of equipment increased from the 2020 election to the 2022 election: the use of BMDs increased by 18.6 percentage points and the use of scanners increased by 7.8 percentage points. Hand counting, on the other hand, was used by 17.8% of jurisdictions for the 2022 general election, a slight decrease from 2020. Use of hand counting to tabulate ballots for the 2022 general election was highly correlated with jurisdiction size. Among jurisdictions with 10,000 or fewer registered voters, 20.6% reported hand counting ballots, whereas only 13.3% of jurisdictions with more than 10,000 registered voters reported hand counting ballots.⁶⁴ DREs continue to be the least-used type of voting equipment in the United States, with only 6.7% of jurisdictions using DREs without VVPAT and 5.5% using DREs with VVPAT.

DREs without VVPAT are of special concern to some experts, because these machines do not include a paper record of the votes that are cast, which raises security concerns and can make it difficult to conduct certain types of post-election audits. The percentage of jurisdictions that used these machines increased slightly overall between 2020 and 2022 due to 217 jurisdictions (four in Illinois, 14 in Indiana, seven in Kentucky, 18 in Texas, and 174 in Vermont) that reported using this equipment in 2022 but not in 2020. However, there were another 193 jurisdictions (five in Arkansas, 14 in Indiana, one in Kansas, 43 in Kentucky, 50 in Mississippi, 11 in New Jersey, 12 in Tennessee, and 57 in Texas) that reported phasing out DREs without VVPAT between the 2020 and 2022 general elections.


lever voting machines; for the 2022 EAVS, these questions were eliminated because no jurisdiction in the United States had reported using either of these types of equipment since the 2016 EAVS, marking three election cycles in which no jurisdiction reported using this equipment.

⁶³ The number of voting machines deployed was calculated as the sum of F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3 in the 2022 EAVS.

⁶⁴ For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as reported in item A1a of the 2022 EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at $p < 0.001$. Jurisdictions that did not provide a response in F9a of the 2022 EAVS were excluded from this analysis. The vast majority of jurisdictions that used hand counting reported using some other form of voting equipment to assist with ballot casting or tabulation. Only 30 jurisdictions used only hand counting; these jurisdictions were in American Samoa, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Texas.



Figure 6. Percentage of EAVS Jurisdictions Using BMDs and Scanners Increased from 2020 to 2022; Use of DREs Decreased



Source: Data on use of BMDs were collected in item F7a for both years. Data on use of scanners were collected in item F8a for both years. Data on use of hand counting were collected in item F11a for 2020 and F9a for 2022. Data on use of DRE without VVPAT were collected in item F5a for both years. Data on use of DRE with VVPAT were collected in item F6a for both years. Percentages were calculated as the number of jurisdictions responding “Yes” to the listed item divided by the total number of EAVS jurisdictions.

In addition, the number of jurisdictions that use DRE without VVPAT *only*, without any other equipment available for voters to cast their ballots, decreased significantly. For the 2020 general election, 32 jurisdictions (12 in Indiana, one in Tennessee, and 19 in Texas) used only DRE without VVPAT; for the 2022 general election, that number decreased to only four jurisdictions (one in Tennessee and three in Texas).

Electronic Poll Books

When voters go into polling places to cast ballots in person, their identity is checked against voter registration information that is contained in poll books to ensure the voters are registered to vote and did not already cast a ballot (either in person or by mail). These poll books can be paper based and printed before the election, or they can be electronic. The use of e-poll books has steadily increased in recent elections. For the 2020 general election, 38 states reported that at least one jurisdiction in their state used e-poll books; this number increased to 40 for the 2022



general election, comprising 35.1% of all EAVS jurisdictions (an increase of 4.3 percentage points compared to the 2020 general election).⁶⁵ Colorado, Hawaii, and New Jersey reported adopting e-poll books between the 2020 and 2022 elections.

Jurisdictions also provided data on how the e-poll books in their jurisdictions were used—to sign voters in, to update voter history, to look up polling places, to assist with same-day registration, to check a voter’s mail ballot status, or for other uses (see Table 3). The most commonly reported usages of e-poll books were to sign voters in, update voter history, look up polling places, and check voters’ mail ballot status. Of the jurisdictions that used e-poll books, approximately three-quarters or more of jurisdictions used the e-poll books for these purposes. Less-common uses of e-poll books included to assist with same-day voter registration and for other uses. Compared to how jurisdictions use paper poll books, it was more common for a jurisdiction to use an e-poll book to look up polling places and for other uses. It was also more common for jurisdictions to use a paper poll book to update voter history, check voters’ mail ballot status, and assist with same-day registration than it was for jurisdictions to use e-poll books to assist with these tasks.⁶⁶

Table 3. E-Poll Books Most Commonly Used to Sign Voters in, Update History, Look Up Polling Places, and Check Mail Ballot Status

Poll Book Use	Percentage of E-Poll Book Jurisdictions That Used Them To...	Percentage of Paper Poll Book Jurisdictions That Used Them To...
Sign voters in	96.0%	96.1%
Update voter history	89.3%	93.0%
Look up polling places	84.7%	23.1%
Check voters’ mail ballot status	74.4%	87.7%
Assist with same-day registration	33.7%	70.3%
Other uses	27.3%	12.4%

Source: Data on use of poll books to sign voters in were collected in items F3a and F4a. Data on use of poll books to update voter history were collected in items F3b and F4b. Data on use of poll books to look up polling places were collected in items F3c and F4c. Data on use of poll books to check voter’s mail ballot status were collected in items F3e and F4e. Data on use of poll books to assist with same-day registration were collected in items F3d and F4d. Data on other uses of poll books were collected in items F3f and F4f. Percentages are calculated as the percentage of jurisdictions that used each type of poll book that reported using the poll book to assist with the stated election task divided by the number of jurisdictions that reported using each type of poll book.

⁶⁵ Data on the use of e-poll books were collected in items F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F3e, and F3f of the 2022 EAVS and items F3a, F3b, F3c, and F3d of the 2020 EAVS. A jurisdiction was considered to have used an e-poll book if it answered “Yes” to at least one of those questions. Puerto Rico reported using e-pollbooks in the 2020 EAVS but was excluded from the count of states using them in 2022 because it was not required to respond to the 2022 EAVS.

⁶⁶ Differences for all poll book uses for the 2022 general election except for signing voters in were statistically significant at $p < 0.01$.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Overview Table 1: 2022 EAVS at a Glance

State	Total EAVS Jurisdictions	Total Active Registered Voters	Total CVAP	Total Voter Turnout	Turnout as % of Active Registration	Turnout as % of CVAP
Alabama [1]	67	3,283,842	3,829,788	1,424,087	43.4%	37.2%
Alaska	1	601,795	533,852	267,047	44.4%	50.0%
American Samoa	1	14,314	–	7,460	52.1%	–
Arizona [2]	15	4,143,929	5,216,518	2,592,375	62.6%	49.7%
Arkansas	75	1,475,838	2,237,649	896,423	60.7%	40.1%
California	58	21,958,218	26,028,290	11,146,561	50.8%	42.8%
Colorado	64	3,839,814	4,303,604	2,539,897	66.1%	59.0%
Connecticut [3]	169	2,259,575	2,659,979	1,297,811	57.4%	48.8%
Delaware	3	702,029	754,114	325,828	46.4%	43.2%
District of Columbia [4]	1	508,855	502,670	205,774	40.4%	40.9%
Florida	67	14,497,121	15,855,982	7,798,866	53.8%	49.2%
Georgia	159	6,955,386	7,786,111	3,963,152	57.0%	50.9%
Guam	1	60,463	–	34,074	56.4%	–
Hawaii	5	764,102	1,044,019	423,443	55.4%	40.6%
Idaho	44	1,004,608	1,373,714	595,350	59.3%	43.3%
Illinois [5]	108	7,899,591	9,037,338	4,175,767	52.9%	46.0%
Indiana	92	4,197,437	5,030,200	1,893,022	45.1%	37.6%
Iowa [6]	99	1,880,415	2,379,570	1,230,143	65.4%	51.7%
Kansas	105	1,830,216	2,128,111	997,607	54.5%	46.9%
Kentucky	120	3,137,031	3,405,618	1,500,419	47.8%	44.1%
Louisiana	64	2,830,594	3,439,830	1,410,597	49.8%	41.0%
Maine	497	929,124	1,100,974	680,909	73.3%	61.8%
Maryland	24	4,149,909	4,417,293	2,028,850	48.9%	45.9%
Massachusetts	351	4,173,942	5,121,488	2,511,460	60.2%	49.0%
Michigan	83	7,297,900	7,640,514	4,500,400	61.7%	58.9%
Minnesota	87	3,624,200	4,221,515	2,526,646	69.7%	59.9%
Mississippi [7]	82	1,922,707	2,226,474	708,585	36.9%	31.8%
Missouri	116	3,816,663	4,675,531	2,304,250	60.4%	49.3%
Montana	56	661,320	857,649	468,326	70.8%	54.6%
Nebraska [8]	93	1,141,470	1,411,320	682,741	59.8%	48.4%
Nevada	17	1,840,748	2,193,360	1,021,780	55.5%	46.6%
New Hampshire [9]	320	909,067	1,103,239	626,931	69.0%	56.8%
New Jersey [10]	21	5,934,029	6,433,068	2,658,149	44.8%	41.3%
New Mexico	33	1,198,896	1,545,938	709,556	59.2%	45.9%
New York	62	12,125,966	14,109,037	5,886,371	48.5%	41.7%
North Carolina	100	6,488,756	7,808,186	3,789,932	58.4%	48.5%
North Dakota	53	–	576,588	242,566	–	42.1%



State	Total EAVS Jurisdictions	Total Active Registered Voters	Total CVAP	Total Voter Turnout	Turnout as % of Active Registration	Turnout as % of CVAP
Northern Mariana Islands	1	19,272	--	13,376	69.4%	--
Ohio	88	8,029,950	8,943,128	4,201,368	52.3%	47.0%
Oklahoma	77	2,021,787	2,903,864	1,153,203	57.0%	39.7%
Oregon	36	2,985,820	3,200,314	1,968,717	65.9%	61.5%
Pennsylvania	67	8,033,385	9,918,163	5,410,022	67.3%	54.5%
Rhode Island	39	722,684	827,415	361,275	50.0%	43.7%
South Carolina	46	3,376,917	3,940,745	1,718,519	50.9%	43.6%
South Dakota	66	599,919	659,768	354,605	59.1%	53.7%
Tennessee	95	4,218,165	5,248,512	1,756,397	41.6%	33.5%
Texas	254	15,847,341	19,375,866	8,151,590	51.4%	42.1%
U.S. Virgin Islands [11]	1	39,910	--	22,557	56.5%	--
Utah	29	1,690,442	2,251,328	1,074,344	63.6%	47.7%
Vermont	247	446,098	518,387	236,300	64.2%	55.2%
Virginia	133	5,736,016	6,354,439	3,074,762	53.6%	48.4%
Washington [12]	39	4,805,394	5,529,508	3,067,686	63.8%	55.5%
West Virginia	55	1,055,475	1,408,767	493,581	46.8%	35.0%
Wisconsin [13]	1,851	3,670,188	4,480,576	2,673,154	72.8%	59.7%
Wyoming	23	301,931	436,049	199,513	66.1%	45.8%
U.S. Total	6,460	203,660,564	239,035,960	112,054,124	54.9%	46.8%

RETRIEVED FROM ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION



State	Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA)	Total In-Person Ballots Cast Before Election Day and Counted	Total Polling Places	Total Poll Workers
Alabama [1]	1,373,247	32,577	--	2,014	5,564
Alaska	167,829	38,889	47,298	555	2,447
American Samoa	6,583	15	845	42	225
Arizona [2]	473,550	2,075,970	27,705	767	7,156
Arkansas	378,667	15,949	501,915	1,005	5,200
California	1,059,250	9,743,427	216,732	3,876	35,053
Colorado	93,149	2,406,246	27,022	370	5,367
Connecticut [3]	1,134,493	150,284	--	718	3,590
Delaware	247,043	19,027	55,639	273	2,884
District of Columbia [4]	59,538	130,287	15,438	90	2,025
Florida	2,727,051	2,759,432	2,271,845	4,134	37,099
Georgia	1,420,392	248,487	2,290,459	2,763	18,439
Guam	25,687	163	7,995	21	358
Hawaii	5,789	402,243	10,879	11	44
Idaho	401,184	128,723	65,129	734	4,071
Illinois [5]	1,926,270	568,728	605,392	6,293	28,785
Indiana	1,196,206	154,882	538,699	1,674	13,950
Iowa [6]	859,562	368,907	--	1,653	7,330
Kansas	577,607	131,633	273,287	1,110	7,653
Kentucky	1,150,303	72,663	269,572	1,540	11,478
Louisiana	1,034,781	102,618	272,260	2,052	15,314
Maine	438,658	171,940	68,458	521	5,170
Maryland	1,046,153	536,285	380,874	1,588	18,311
Massachusetts	1,386,373	922,559	197,288	1,524	9,540
Michigan	2,614,123	1,656,814	223,644	3,287	33,331
Minnesota	1,853,310	339,396	330,809	2,655	31,307
Mississippi [7]	656,874	--	--	1,765	5,295
Missouri	1,834,916	278,539	184,687	2,281	15,759
Montana	--	--	--	409	3,906
Nebraska [8]	412,213	242,009	21,944	1,072	6,909
Nevada	210,325	518,398	281,760	271	3,698
New Hampshire [9]	568,276	56,971	--	308	--
New Jersey [10]	--	581,955	--	5,111	12,454
New Mexico	256,438	97,746	353,476	760	2,999
New York	4,250,739	382,926	1,158,391	5,258	65,103
North Carolina	1,578,581	179,280	1,929,870	3,204	23,221
North Dakota	136,304	69,399	36,513	181	1,481
Northern Mariana Islands	6,408	--	6,968	16	32
Ohio	2,654,497	911,517	550,092	3,637	39,888



State	Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA)	Total In-Person Ballots Cast Before Election Day and Counted	Total Polling Places	Total Poll Workers
Oklahoma	949,235	68,697	132,591	1,842	6,258
Oregon	--	1,961,760	--	36	--
Pennsylvania	4,126,903	1,234,943	--	9,154	48,340
Rhode Island	254,334	33,556	71,737	383	2,700
South Carolina	1,096,154	54,911	561,597	1,993	12,117
South Dakota	183,663	97,472	72,705	497	2,596
Tennessee	864,965	44,097	844,429	1,925	13,978
Texas	2,590,664	356,987	5,176,910	6,286	35,936
U.S. Virgin Islands [11]	9,671	532	11,851	11	225
Utah	56,264	970,274	12,942	116	751
Vermont	91,637	193,618	--	262	--
Virginia	2,033,530	289,428	711,206	2,535	19,922
Washington [12]	--	3,037,023	3,079	65	--
West Virginia	350,187	12,301	128,799	1,395	7,871
Wisconsin [13]	1,909,173	425,970	332,001	2,541	--
Wyoming	122,114	38,164	38,368	209	2,089
U.S. Total	50,860,863	35,316,617	21,322,200	94,793	645,219

Overview Table 1 Calculation Notes:

Total EAJS Jurisdictions uses a count of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code by state.

Total Active Registered Voters uses question A1b.

Total CVAP uses the 2021 1-year estimate of the CVAP from the U.S. Census Bureau.

Total Voter Turnout uses question F1a.

Turnout as % of Active Registration uses $F1a/A1b \times 100$.

Turnout as % of CVAP uses $F1a/CVAP \times 100$.

Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted uses question F1b.

Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA) uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.

Total In-Person Ballots Cast Before Election Day and Counted uses question F1f.

Total Polling Places uses question D2a.

Total Poll Workers uses question D7a.

Overview Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation. For example, since there was no CVAP estimate for most U.S. territories, their turnout data (F1a) were not used for the calculation of "Turnout as % of CVAP" at the national level.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.



- The CVAP is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older in the state. This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2021 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the year 2022 was not available by the time this report was finalized. Some states may have reported more active registered voters than CVAP because the 2021 CVAP is being compared to 2022 data.
- The Total Voter Turnout column includes voters who cast a ballot that was counted.

- [1] Data on absentee in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS), which resulted in a discrepancy in the data reported in question F1.
- [2] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1 of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.
- [3] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person.
- [4] The District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) sent a ballot to every registered voter for the November 2022 general election. Since the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was passed to permanently make the District of Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction.
- [5] The data reported in the 2022 EAVS was obtained from the individual jurisdictions within the state of Illinois. For questions on this numerical information, please contact the jurisdictions themselves or the state board of elections for further information.
- [6] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are reported with mail ballots that are cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the actual vote tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration system. Not all jurisdictions reported data on poll workers in the 2022 EAVS.
- [7] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi could only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and mail-in ballots. The information entered into the Statewide Election Management System (SEMS) does not distinguish between the two.
- [8] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.
- [9] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk's office over the counter.
- [10] Data on in-person Election Day voters and in-person early voters is not recorded separately.
- [11] In the U.S. Virgin Islands, absentee ballots are classified as walk in or mail in, but are all counted and accepted as regular absentee ballots.
- [12] In-person ballots cast consist of county reports of voters who voted in centers with accessible voting units. Accessible voting unit ballots are not tracked separately from mail ballots. Washington is a vote-by-mail state. Data reported on in-person voters before Election Day consists of county reports of voters who voted in voting centers with accessible voting units (AVU). Ballots cast at AVUs are not tracked separately from mail ballots.
- [13] The number of jurisdictions in Wisconsin changed over the two-year period covered by the 2022 EAVS due to incorporations, mergers, and similar mechanisms. Wisconsin is not subject to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and does not have inactive registered voters. The reported registration totals include military voters, even though they are not required to "register" in Wisconsin because they still have a voter record created. Wisconsin is not a vote-by-mail state but does allow voters to request that an absentee ballot be mailed to them. Poll worker data are no longer tracked by the state. Wisconsin canvass-required data tracks individual contests, and therefore, the total ballots cast in any election is highly unlikely to match the total votes cast in any one contest. Wisconsin voters are not required to vote in each contest on the ballot and undervotes are the likely cause of data on the total ballots cast being higher than the number of votes in a contest.



Overview Table 2: Mail Voting in the 2022 General Election

State	Total Mail Voters (Excluding UOCAVA)	% Turnout by Mail	Total Mail Ballots Transmitted	Total Mail Ballots Returned	% Mail Ballots Returned	Mail Ballots Counted	
						Total	% of Returned
Alabama [1]	32,577	2.3%	28,646	24,676	86.1%	24,286	98.4%
Alaska [2]	38,889	14.6%	50,824	41,453	81.6%	40,887	98.6%
American Samoa [3]	15	0.2%	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona [4]	2,075,970	80.1%	3,272,421	2,099,724	64.2%	2,090,789	99.6%
Arkansas	15,949	1.8%	20,325	16,934	83.3%	15,372	90.8%
California	9,743,427	87.4%	22,491,229	9,986,701	44.4%	9,743,427	97.6%
Colorado	2,406,246	94.7%	3,890,522	2,431,292	62.5%	2,406,246	99.0%
Connecticut [5]	150,284	11.6%	204,840	152,803	74.6%	150,284	98.4%
Delaware [6]	19,027	5.8%	30,725	21,923	71.4%	19,027	86.8%
District of Columbia [7]	130,287	63.3%	506,456	132,829	26.2%	130,287	98.1%
Florida	2,759,432	35.4%	4,383,461	2,754,324	62.8%	2,732,621	99.2%
Georgia	248,487	6.3%	280,897	252,272	89.8%	248,487	98.5%
Guam	163	0.5%	327	191	58.4%	163	85.3%
Hawaii	402,243	95.0%	733,360	408,512	55.7%	402,233	98.4%
Idaho [8]	128,723	21.6%	144,960	128,658	88.8%	128,723	100.1%
Illinois	568,728	13.6%	1,302,195	1,013,842	77.9%	583,371	57.5%
Indiana [9]	154,882	8.2%	158,998	157,542	99.1%	154,882	98.3%
Iowa [10]	368,907	30.0%	379,302	369,801	97.5%	368,907	99.8%
Kansas	131,633	13.2%	152,208	130,720	85.9%	126,002	96.4%
Kentucky	72,663	4.8%	83,454	75,120	90.0%	72,663	96.7%
Louisiana [11]	102,618	7.3%	164,156	105,332	64.2%	102,632	97.4%
Maine	171,940	25.3%	181,719	172,990	95.2%	171,940	99.4%
Maryland	536,285	26.4%	647,747	538,558	83.1%	536,285	99.6%
Massachusetts [12]	922,559	36.7%	1,114,849	933,946	83.8%	922,559	98.8%
Michigan	1,656,814	36.8%	1,800,770	1,680,955	93.3%	1,656,814	98.6%
Minnesota	339,396	13.4%	450,413	346,772	77.0%	339,396	97.9%
Mississippi [13]	--	--	11,722	--	--	--	--
Missouri	278,539	12.1%	290,428	281,555	96.9%	278,539	98.9%
Montana [14]	--	--	505,618	377,108	74.6%	374,911	99.4%
Nebraska [15]	242,009	35.4%	269,285	243,042	90.3%	242,009	99.6%
Nevada	518,398	50.7%	1,873,813	528,753	28.2%	518,398	98.0%
New Hampshire [16]	56,971	9.1%	60,535	58,131	96.0%	56,971	98.0%
New Jersey	581,955	21.9%	947,150	588,258	62.1%	581,955	98.9%
New Mexico	97,746	13.8%	110,577	98,458	89.0%	97,746	99.3%
New York [17]	382,926	6.5%	536,171	392,942	73.3%	382,926	97.5%
North Carolina	179,280	4.7%	248,794	183,243	73.7%	179,280	97.8%
North Dakota	69,399	28.6%	76,019	69,697	91.7%	69,399	99.6%
Northern Mariana Islands [18]	--	--	2,046	--	--	--	--



State	Total Mail Voters (Excluding UOCAVA)	% Turnout by Mail	Total Mail Ballots Transmitted	Total Mail Ballots Returned	% Mail Ballots Returned	Mail Ballots Counted	
						Total	% of Returned
Ohio	911,517	21.7%	996,093	914,127	91.8%	911,517	99.7%
Oklahoma	68,697	6.0%	92,576	69,956	75.6%	68,697	98.2%
Oregon [19]	1,961,760	99.6%	2,969,563	1,990,727	67.0%	1,968,717	98.9%
Pennsylvania	1,234,943	22.8%	1,433,665	1,258,336	87.8%	1,234,943	98.1%
Rhode Island [20]	33,556	9.3%	34,361	33,850	98.5%	33,556	99.1%
South Carolina	54,911	3.2%	61,033	56,605	92.7%	54,787	96.8%
South Dakota	97,472	27.5%	99,905	97,820	97.9%	97,472	99.6%
Tennessee	44,097	2.5%	48,683	44,817	92.1%	44,097	98.4%
Texas	356,987	4.4%	444,150	369,562	83.2%	356,987	96.6%
U.S. Virgin Islands [21]	532	2.4%	532	463	87.0%	532	114.9%
Utah	970,274	90.3%	1,703,702	1,004,614	59.0%	997,442	99.3%
Vermont	193,618	67.6%	422,603	193,830	45.9%	193,583	99.9%
Virginia	289,428	9.4%	360,659	292,077	81.0%	289,428	99.1%
Washington [22]	3,037,023	99.0%	4,850,083	3,077,400	63.5%	3,040,297	98.8%
West Virginia [23]	12,301	2.5%	12,598	10,541	83.7%	10,818	102.6%
Wisconsin [24]	425,970	15.9%	478,260	431,232	90.2%	427,246	99.1%
Wyoming	38,164	19.1%	44,711	38,336	85.7%	38,164	99.6%
U.S. Total	35,316,617	31.9%	61,460,139	36,683,450	59.7%	35,718,700	97.4%



State	Mail Ballots Rejected		Total Drop Boxes	Ballots Returned by Drop Box		Mail Ballots Cured	
	Total	% of Returned		Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Alabama [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska [2]	566	1.4%	5	--	--	--	--
American Samoa [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona [4]	8,935	0.4%	391	289,431	13.8%	3,323	0.2%
Arkansas	1,144	6.8%	6	457	2.7%	851	5.0%
California	243,274	2.4%	2,035	3,592,536	36.0%	48,597	0.5%
Colorado	25,046	1.0%	411	2,111,353	86.8%	--	--
Connecticut [5]	2,519	1.6%	214	--	--	--	--
Delaware [6]	2,896	13.2%	--	--	--	12	0.1%
District of Columbia [7]	2,542	1.9%	56	74,102	55.8%	982	0.7%
Florida	22,005	0.8%	487	573,013	20.8%	13,556	0.5%
Georgia	3,785	1.5%	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	28	14.7%	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	5,078	1.2%	51	133,389	32.6%	521	0.1%
Idaho [8]	1	0.0%	6	--	--	--	--
Illinois	8,818	0.9%	527	104,168	10.3%	4,598	0.5%
Indiana [9]	2,660	1.7%	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa [10]	894	0.2%	--	13,881	3.8%	--	--
Kansas	1,382	1.1%	173	34,217	26.2%	7,398	5.7%
Kentucky	2,457	3.3%	163	24,094	32.1%	--	--
Louisiana [11]	2,700	2.6%	--	--	--	1,309	1.2%
Maine	1,050	0.6%	366	--	--	--	--
Maryland	2,273	0.4%	282	273,484	50.8%	419	0.1%
Massachusetts [12]	11,387	1.2%	500	--	--	--	--
Michigan	24,141	1.4%	1,178	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	7,376	2.1%	37	--	--	--	--
Mississippi [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	3,016	1.1%	--	--	--	--	--
Montana [14]	2,197	0.6%	--	--	--	--	--
Nebraska [15]	1,033	0.4%	118	152,951	62.9%	702	0.3%
Nevada	10,355	2.0%	511	145,179	27.5%	12,553	2.4%
New Hampshire [16]	1,160	2.0%	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey	5,901	1.0%	432	235,606	40.1%	3,640	0.6%
New Mexico	712	0.7%	72	9,059	9.2%	1,082	1.1%
New York [17]	7,240	1.8%	--	--	--	3,367	0.9%
North Carolina	3,963	2.2%	--	--	--	573	0.3%
North Dakota	298	0.4%	64	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands [18]	--	--	--	30	--	--	--
Ohio	2,610	0.3%	102	70,306	7.7%	4,449	0.5%



State	Mail Ballots Rejected		Total Drop Boxes	Ballots Returned by Drop Box		Mail Ballots Cured	
	Total	% of Returned		Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Oklahoma	1,259	1.8%	--	--	--	--	--
Oregon [19]	28,840	1.4%	318	1,135,725	57.1%	--	--
Pennsylvania	23,393	1.9%	137	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [20]	294	0.9%	415	12,582	37.2%	--	--
South Carolina	1,818	3.2%	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	356	0.4%	0	0	0.0%	--	--
Tennessee	720	1.6%	--	--	--	82	0.2%
Texas	12,575	3.4%	--	--	--	14,889	4.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands [21]	0	0.0%	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	14,859	1.5%	312	571,551	56.9%	6,555	0.7%
Vermont	247	0.1%	--	--	--	320	0.2%
Virginia	2,649	0.9%	2,992	41,142	14.1%	4,339	1.5%
Washington [22]	37,103	1.2%	548	1,871,228	60.8%	35,337	1.1%
West Virginia [23]	109	1.0%	--	--	--	86	0.8%
Wisconsin [24]	3,986	0.9%	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	174	0.5%	8	4,169	10.9%	--	--
U.S. Total	549,824	1.5%	12,917	11,473,653	39.7%	169,540	0.7%

Overview Table 2 Calculation Notes:

Total Mail Voters (Excluding UOCAVA) uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.

% Turnout by Mail uses $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$.

Total Mail Ballots Transmitted uses question C1a.

Total Mail Ballots Returned uses question C1b.

% Mail Ballots Returned uses $C1b/C1a \times 100$.

Mail Ballots Counted, Total uses question C8a.

Mail Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses $C8a/C1b \times 100$.

Mail Ballots Rejected, Total uses question C9a.

Mail Ballots Rejected, % of Returned uses $C9a/C1b \times 100$.

Total Drop Boxes uses question C3a.

Ballots Returned by Drop Box, Total uses question C6a.

Ballots Returned by Drop Box, % of Returned uses $C6a/C1b \times 100$.

Mail Ballots Cured, Total uses question C7a.

Mail Ballots Cured, % of Returned uses $C7a/C1b \times 100$.

Overview Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.



- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of mail ballots counted and rejected may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- The Total Mail Ballots Transmitted column captures the total number of mailed ballots that states reported transmitting, regardless of whether the ballot was returned or not. The number of ballots transmitted typically exceeds the number of ballots returned because some voters who were transmitted a mailed ballot choose to vote by another mode or to not vote at all. Total Mail Ballots Returned typically exceeds Total Mail Voters because some returned mailed ballots are rejected for not meeting state requirements. Mail Ballots Counted may not match Total Mail Voters because states may have different methodologies for calculating these numbers.
- The Total Mail Ballots Returned column includes both counted and rejected ballots that were returned to election offices.

- [1] Alabama has absentee voting by mail. A voter may pick up a ballot in person and return it via mail or receive a ballot in the mail and return it in person. This may cause a discrepancy. Data on absentee in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 EAVS, which resulted in a discrepancy in the data reported in question F1. The state of Alabama does not track data on the reasons that mail ballots are rejected.
- [2] Alaska does not track data on the number of ballots returned in person to division office ballot boxes. Data reported in Section C of the 2022 EAVS include ballots sent by mail and through electronic transmission (online and fax).
- [3] American Samoa does not mail ballots locally. If a voter is on the island, they either vote in person or at home with the special needs assistance program.
- [4] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1 of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.
- [5] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person.
- [6] In an October 7, 2022 order, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the Delaware statute authorizing vote by mail in the general election violated the Delaware constitution, and therefore, voting by mail and using drop boxes was not permitted for the 2022 general election. Absentee voting (which, per Delaware law, is provided for prescribed reasons) remained available and was not impacted by the Delaware Supreme Court rulings.
- [7] The DCBOE sent a ballot to every registered voter for the November 2022 general election. Since the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was passed to permanently make the District of Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction. Voters were also able to deposit mail ballots in drop boxes located in early vote centers and Election Day vote centers. These boxes were also used to deposit provisional ballots.
- [8] Idaho was not able to track data on mail ballots that were cured or the reasons why mail ballots were rejected. One county in Idaho reported counting more mail ballots in C8a than were returned in C1b.
- [9] The data in C9a was obtained from the statewide voter registration system. The data in C9b was pulled from an ad hoc report, and the data in C9c–t was pulled from the CEB-9 Section 2, a county election report compiled after each primary, general, and special election. Counties do not always track the data requested in C9c–C9t.
- [10] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are reported with mail ballots cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the actual vote tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration system.
- [11] Data reported in F1 include voters who were given credit for voting but whose ballots may have been blank or otherwise invalid for acceptance.



- [12] Vote by mail was made available to all voters, and applications to vote by mail were mailed to all voters as a result of legislation in 2022. This led to a dramatic increase in the number of voters who voted by mail in the 2022 general election.
- [13] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi could only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and mail-in ballots. The information entered into the SEMS does not distinguish between the two.
- [14] Data on ballots cast and counted in items F1b–F1f of the 2022 EAVS is properly marked as “Data not available” despite being included in previous reports. The state office is now aware that the “voter credit” data extract by the voter registration and election management system included in previous reports does not accurately reflect the number of ballots counted at the state canvass. For example, the report fails to account for various situations, such as if an empty absentee voter secrecy envelope is returned without a ballot. Montana’s 2022 submission contains the official canvass number as the most accurate number of total ballots counted. As such, Montana does not have the data available for the remaining categories. The F1a data for the 2022 EAVS uses the vote counts from the Official 2022 General Election State Canvass. Montana does not track data on drop boxes and does not track data on ballots cured in a way that can be easily extracted.
- [15] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.
- [16] All absentee ballots are handled locally, and any absentee ballots cured are not tracked. In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.
- [17] Although absentee ballots could be dropped off at polling places and/or Boards of Election, drop boxes as typically defined were not used.
- [18] As of the time of the Northern Mariana Islands’ EAVS submission, the election office was still receiving returned mailed ballots through the office mailbox.
- [19] Oregon is a vote-by-mail state. All ballots, including provisional and Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots, are considered mail ballots.
- [20] Rhode Island allows voters to cure mail ballots, but does not collect data on cured ballots.
- [21] In the U.S. Virgin Islands, absentee ballots are classified as walk in or mail in, but are all counted and accepted as regular absentee ballots. The reported number of counted mail ballots includes walk ins.
- [22] Data reported on cured ballots includes ballots cured for non-matching and missing signatures only. Data reported on in-person voters before Election Day consists of county reports of voters who voted in voting centers with AVUs. Ballots cast at AVUs are not tracked separately from mail ballots.
- [23] Two counties in West Virginia reported counting more mail ballots in C8a than were returned in C1b.
- [24] Due to a recent court challenge, the use of drop boxes “is not permitted under Wisconsin law unless the drop box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated alternate site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and the subsequent ambiguity created by the decision means that most drop boxes were either closed or moved into the clerk’s office, and reporting would be unlikely or unnecessary given the added layer of security and placement. (see *Teigen v. WEC*, 403 Wis.2d 607). Wisconsin does not gather data on if or how absentee ballots may have been returned to the clerk with missing data or if this missing data were cured.



Overview Table 3: In-Person Voting and Other Modes of Voting

State	In-Person Election Day Voters		In-Person Voters Before Election Day		Provisional Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	1,373,247	96.4%	--	--	2,796	0.2%
Alaska [2]	167,829	62.8%	47,298	17.7%	7,216	2.7%
American Samoa	6,583	88.2%	845	11.3%	0	0.0%
Arizona [3]	473,550	18.3%	27,705	1.1%	8,026	0.3%
Arkansas [4]	378,667	42.2%	501,915	56.0%	1,021	0.1%
California	1,059,250	9.5%	216,732	1.9%	66,887	0.6%
Colorado	93,149	3.7%	27,022	1.1%	54	0.0%
Connecticut [5]	1,134,493	87.4%	--	--	14	0.0%
Delaware	247,043	75.8%	55,639	17.1%	10	0.0%
District of Columbia	59,538	28.9%	15,438	7.5%	37	0.0%
Florida	2,727,051	35.0%	2,271,845	29.1%	2,809	0.0%
Georgia	1,420,392	35.8%	2,290,459	57.8%	3,814	0.1%
Guam	25,687	75.4%	7,995	23.5%	150	0.4%
Hawaii	5,789	1.4%	10,879	2.6%	1	0.0%
Idaho	401,184	67.4%	65,129	10.9%	--	--
Illinois	1,926,270	46.1%	605,992	14.5%	3,596	0.1%
Indiana	1,196,206	63.2%	538,699	28.5%	1,075	0.1%
Iowa [6]	859,562	69.9%	--	--	273	0.0%
Kansas	577,607	57.9%	273,287	27.4%	13,390	1.3%
Kentucky [7]	1,150,303	76.7%	269,572	18.0%	27	0.0%
Louisiana	1,034,781	73.4%	272,260	19.3%	173	0.0%
Maine [8]	438,658	64.4%	68,458	10.1%	90	0.0%
Maryland	1,046,153	51.6%	380,874	18.8%	60,952	3.0%
Massachusetts	1,386,373	55.2%	197,288	7.9%	889	0.0%
Michigan	2,614,123	58.1%	223,644	5.0%	8	0.0%
Minnesota	1,853,310	73.4%	330,809	13.1%	--	--
Mississippi [9]	656,874	92.7%	--	--	5,710	0.8%
Missouri	1,834,916	79.6%	184,687	8.0%	4,182	0.2%
Montana [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nebraska [11]	412,213	60.4%	21,944	3.2%	6,027	0.9%
Nevada	210,325	20.6%	281,760	27.6%	7,890	0.8%
New Hampshire [12]	568,276	90.6%	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [13]	--	--	--	--	67,894	2.6%
New Mexico	256,438	36.1%	353,476	49.8%	338	0.0%
New York	4,250,739	72.2%	1,158,391	19.7%	71,756	1.2%
North Carolina [14]	1,578,581	41.7%	1,929,870	50.9%	11,808	0.3%
North Dakota	136,304	56.2%	36,513	15.1%	--	--



State	In-Person Election Day Voters		In-Person Voters Before Election Day		Provisional Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	6,408	47.9%	6,968	52.1%	--	--
Ohio	2,654,497	63.2%	550,092	13.1%	79,830	1.9%
Oklahoma	949,235	82.3%	132,591	11.5%	1,126	0.1%
Oregon	--	--	--	--	127	0.0%
Pennsylvania	4,126,903	76.3%	--	--	40,018	0.7%
Rhode Island	254,334	70.4%	71,737	19.9%	1,074	0.3%
South Carolina	1,096,154	63.8%	561,597	32.7%	3,866	0.2%
South Dakota	183,663	51.8%	72,705	20.5%	47	0.0%
Tennessee	864,965	49.2%	844,429	48.1%	969	0.1%
Texas	2,590,664	31.8%	5,176,910	63.5%	13,750	0.2%
U.S. Virgin Islands [15]	9,671	42.9%	11,851	52.5%	79	0.4%
Utah	56,264	5.2%	12,942	1.2%	10,680	1.0%
Vermont [16]	91,637	32.0%	--	--	--	--
Virginia	2,033,530	66.1%	711,206	23.1%	33,778	1.1%
Washington [17]	--	--	3,079	0.1%	19	0.0%
West Virginia	350,187	70.9%	128,799	26.1%	2,141	0.4%
Wisconsin [18]	1,909,173	71.4%	332,001	12.4%	58	0.0%
Wyoming	122,114	61.2%	38,868	19.5%	15	0.0%
U.S. Total	50,860,863	49.0%	21,322,200	22.2%	536,490	0.5%



State	UOCAVA Voters		Other Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	714	0.1%	--	--
Alaska [2]	3,817	1.4%	1,998	0.7%
American Samoa	17	0.2%	--	--
Arizona [3]	7,121	0.3%	3	0.0%
Arkansas [4]	652	0.1%	182	0.0%
California	31,632	0.3%	28,539	0.3%
Colorado	13,426	0.5%	--	--
Connecticut [5]	1,016	0.1%	12,004	0.9%
Delaware	539	0.2%	3,570	1.1%
District of Columbia	474	0.2%	--	--
Florida	38,638	0.5%	195	0.0%
Georgia	--	--	--	--
Guam	79	0.2%	--	--
Hawaii	491	0.1%	0	0.0%
Idaho	314	0.1%	--	--
Illinois	1,601	0.0%	159	0.0%
Indiana	2,160	0.1%	--	--
Iowa [6]	1,401	0.1%	--	--
Kansas	1,683	0.2%	--	--
Kentucky [7]	838	0.1%	7,016	0.5%
Louisiana	764	0.1%	--	--
Maine [8]	1,749	0.3%	14	0.0%
Maryland	4,586	0.2%	--	--
Massachusetts	4,351	0.2%	--	--
Michigan	5,811	0.1%	--	--
Minnesota	3,131	0.1%	--	--
Mississippi [9]	211	0.0%	45,790	6.5%
Missouri	1,926	0.1%	--	--
Montana [10]	--	--	--	--
Nebraska [11]	548	0.1%	--	--
Nevada	3,407	0.3%	--	--
New Hampshire [12]	1,684	0.3%	--	--
New Jersey [13]	4,278	0.2%	2,004,022	75.4%
New Mexico	1,558	0.2%	--	--
New York	22,560	0.4%	--	--
North Carolina [14]	8,509	0.2%	81,884	2.2%
North Dakota	350	0.1%	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--
Ohio	5,432	0.1%	--	--
Oklahoma	1,554	0.1%	--	--



State	UOCAVA Voters		Other Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%
Oregon	6,830	0.3%	--	--
Pennsylvania	8,158	0.2%	--	--
Rhode Island	574	0.2%	--	--
South Carolina	1,991	0.1%	--	--
South Dakota	718	0.2%	--	--
Tennessee	1,937	0.1%	--	--
Texas	13,279	0.2%	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands [15]	0	0.0%	424	1.9%
Utah	1,959	0.2%	--	--
Vermont [16]	1,008	0.4%	33	0.0%
Virginia	6,820	0.2%	--	--
Washington [17]	27,565	0.9%	--	--
West Virginia	482	0.1%	--	--
Wisconsin [18]	4,031	0.2%	1,921	0.1%
Wyoming	347	0.2%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	254,721	0.2%	2,187,754	5.3%

Overview Table 3 Calculation Notes:

- In-Person Election Day Voters, Total** uses question F1b.
- In-Person Election Day Voters, %** uses $F1b/F1a \times 100$.
- In-Person Voters Before Election Day, Total** uses question F1f.
- In-Person Voters Before Election Day, %** uses $F1f/F1a \times 100$.
- Provisional Voters, Total** uses question F1e.
- Provisional Voters, %** uses $F1e/F1a \times 100$.
- UOCAVA Voters, Total** uses question F1c.
- UOCAVA Voters, %** uses $F1c/F1a \times 100$.
- Other Voters, Total** uses question F1h.
- Other Voters, %** uses $F1h/F1a \times 100$.

Overview Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Question F1f includes all voters who participated in the election in person prior to Election Day. This includes in-person early voting, in-person absentee voting, and any other terminology the state used to refer to in-person early voting (as reported in question Q25 of the 2022 Policy Survey).
- Question F1h was not mandatory. States only reported data in this item if they offered another mode of voting aside from those listed in questions F1b–F1g or if there were counted ballots that could not be categorized in questions F1b–F1g.



- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of turnout by mode in this table and the previous table may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

- [1] Data on absentee in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 EAVS, which resulted in a discrepancy in the data reported in question F1.
- [2] The “Other Voters” category includes ballots that were sent by electronic transmission (online and fax).
- [3] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1 of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.
- [4] Two counties reported data for other modes of voting.
- [5] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person. Other modes of voting included Election Day registration (EDR) locations.
- [6] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are reported with mail ballots cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the actual vote tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration system.
- [7] Other modes of voting were reported as “supplemental.”
- [8] The “Other Voters” category includes ballots that were not properly designated as UOCAVA voters.
- [9] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi could only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and mail-in ballots. The information entered into the SEMS does not distinguish between the two. Other modes of voting included absentee ballots counted.
- [10] Data on ballots cast and counted in items F1b–F1f of the 2022 EAVS is properly marked as “Data not available” despite being included in previous reports. The state office is now aware that the “voter credit” data extract by the voter registration and election management system included in previous reports does not accurately reflect the number of ballots counted at the state canvass. For example, the report fails to account for various situations, such as if an empty absentee voter secrecy envelope is returned without a ballot. Montana’s 2022 submission contains the official canvass number as the most accurate number of total ballots counted. As such, Montana does not have the data available for the remaining categories. The F1a data for the 2022 EAVS uses the vote counts from the Official 2022 General Election State Canvass.
- [11] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.
- [12] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.
- [13] Data on in-person Election Day voters and in-person early voters is not recorded separately. Other modes of voting included ballots counted from Election Day and early voting locations.
- [14] Other modes of voting were described as “Other.”
- [15] Other modes of voting included walk-in absentee voters.
- [16] Other modes of voting included ballots delivered by a justice of the peace.
- [17] The number of in-person voters consists of county reports of voters who voted in voting centers with accessible voting units. Accessible voting unit ballots are not tracked separately from mail ballots. Washington is a vote-by-mail state.



[18] In Wisconsin, if a UOCAVA voter is in the local area on Election Day or during in-person absentee voting, they may choose to vote through one of those methods instead of an absentee ballot by mail. In those cases, the voter is not recorded in the UOCAVA section of the EAVS but instead under the sections that apply to voting at the polls or in-person absentee. In Wisconsin, provisional ballot data has to be recorded into the database on election night, but any voters who register on Election Day are usually not entered until after Election Day; these two records then cannot be linked in the state's voter registration database. Therefore, data in the section about provisional ballots specifically will show more provisional ballots counted than the section which shows participations received by having a provisional counted. Other modes of voting included voters who voted absentee with incomplete data.

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Overview Table 4: Polling Places and Poll Workers

State	Total Precincts	Total Polling Places		Total Poll Workers	
		Election Day	Early Voting	Election Day	Early Voting
Alabama [1]	2,308	2,014	67	1,749	--
Alaska [2]	401	429	165	2,210	307
American Samoa	42	41	1	223	2
Arizona [3]	1,732	717	200	6,960	1,527
Arkansas	2,627	898	177	4,839	2,084
California [4]	25,554	3,876	1,515	33,935	16,760
Colorado	3,260	366	325	--	--
Connecticut	718	169	169	3,590	845
Delaware	512	273	14	2,847	37
District of Columbia [5]	144	90	25	940	1,085
Florida	6,063	3,995	430	35,129	10,751
Georgia	2,700	2,430	333	15,248	3,191
Guam	67	21	1	335	23
Hawaii	248	8	11	79	74
Idaho	999	734	32	3,972	127
Illinois	10,835	12,342	3,817	36,017	2,895
Indiana [6]	5,146	1,660	292	12,124	1,826
Iowa [7]	1,657	1,653	99	6,976	535
Kansas	4,015	1,080	196	7,239	1,622
Kentucky	3,546	1,469	186	10,958	1,704
Louisiana [8]	3,937	1,976	109	15,314	--
Maine	533	521	488	5,170	--
Maryland	2,074	1,532	96	17,912	5,547
Massachusetts [9]	2,325	1,226	424	9,540	--
Michigan [10]	4,672	3,286	1,544	33,331	--
Minnesota	4,103	2,562	237	29,102	2,205
Mississippi	1,765	1,765	92	5,295	--
Missouri	4,334	2,281	--	15,759	--
Montana [11]	663	409	58	3,906	--
Nebraska	1,323	998	93	6,742	248
Nevada	1,685	239	82	3,319	1,964
New Hampshire [12]	340	308	--	3,564	--
New Jersey	6,386	3,200	140	12,387	1,042
New Mexico	2,163	760	252	2,806	809
New York [13]	14,158	4,855	403	50,951	15,520
North Carolina	2,656	2,845	359	20,632	7,241
North Dakota	454	166	12	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	7	13	3	32	7



State	Total Precincts	Total Polling Places		Total Poll Workers	
		Election Day	Early Voting	Election Day	Early Voting
Ohio	8,933	3,637	88	39,888	0
Oklahoma	1,986	1,757	85	6,008	513
Oregon [14]	1,288	36	36	--	--
Pennsylvania [15]	9,155	9,154	--	48,340	--
Rhode Island [16]	414	383	39	2,700	90
South Carolina	2,305	1,955	112	13,003	1,122
South Dakota	691	488	68	2,558	155
Tennessee	1,849	1,781	222	13,611	2,448
Texas	9,541	5,627	1,227	30,581	10,781
U.S. Virgin Islands	25	11	4	185	40
Utah	2,651	108	54	734	259
Vermont	262	262	247	--	--
Virginia [17]	2,545	2,545	185	19,922	2,169
Washington [18]	8,021	--	65	--	--
West Virginia	1,701	1,326	93	8,043	491
Wisconsin [19]	3,628	2,538	318	--	--
Wyoming	583	196	19	2,053	94
U.S. Total	181,790	95,011	15,309	608,758	98,140

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State	Poll Workers' Ages						% of New Poll Workers
	% Age <18	% Age 18-25	% Age 26-40	% Age 41-60	% Age 61-70	% Age 71+	
Alabama [1]	0.3%	1.5%	4.8%	23.0%	35.9%	34.5%	0.1%
Alaska [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	0.0%	48.0%	39.6%	8.4%	4.0%	0.0%	32.4%
Arizona [3]	0.7%	2.5%	6.9%	24.7%	35.1%	30.0%	26.5%
Arkansas	0.3%	1.9%	5.1%	20.2%	36.2%	36.3%	12.0%
California [4]	9.8%	5.5%	13.3%	27.7%	24.3%	19.4%	31.5%
Colorado	1.4%	2.1%	5.5%	22.5%	46.4%	22.1%	40.2%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	1.3%	3.1%	7.1%	27.4%	35.0%	26.0%	36.8%
District of Columbia [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Florida	0.2%	1.7%	6.3%	26.2%	34.3%	31.2%	13.6%
Georgia	--	--	--	--	--	--	12.2%
Guam	0.0%	28.8%	28.5%	31.3%	9.5%	2.0%	--
Hawaii	--	--	--	--	--	--	61.4%
Idaho	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	5.5%	3.0%	5.2%	27.1%	33.9%	25.2%	9.3%
Indiana [6]	2.2%	4.7%	10.9%	24.7%	32.6%	24.9%	--
Iowa [7]	0.2%	0.8%	5.4%	18.2%	38.1%	37.4%	16.7%
Kansas	2.0%	2.0%	6.0%	20.1%	33.7%	36.1%	14.0%
Kentucky	0.1%	3.7%	10.8%	30.9%	31.5%	23.0%	8.0%
Louisiana [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	13.0%
Maine	0.9%	1.7%	7.9%	26.0%	36.8%	26.6%	--
Maryland	2.6%	2.8%	10.7%	27.9%	35.1%	20.9%	33.0%
Massachusetts [9]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Michigan [10]	0.0%	3.3%	8.1%	24.8%	35.0%	28.8%	25.2%
Minnesota	--	--	--	--	--	--	8.5%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	2.3%	2.5%	6.8%	17.2%	35.7%	35.5%	--
Montana [11]	0.0%	0.7%	4.9%	22.6%	40.0%	31.8%	--
Nebraska	0.4%	1.3%	9.3%	25.4%	34.3%	29.3%	12.0%
Nevada	1.3%	3.4%	9.7%	26.6%	31.5%	27.6%	25.8%
New Hampshire [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico	1.6%	3.6%	6.9%	21.1%	34.9%	31.8%	29.0%
New York [13]	0.1%	7.1%	16.3%	30.3%	25.8%	20.4%	12.9%
North Carolina	1.1%	2.1%	6.6%	26.4%	35.5%	28.2%	16.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Poll Workers' Ages						% of New Poll Workers
	% Age <18	% Age 18-25	% Age 26-40	% Age 41-60	% Age 61-70	% Age 71+	
Northern Mariana Islands	--	100.0%	--	--	--	--	31.3%
Ohio	1.4%	2.4%	7.6%	24.7%	35.1%	28.8%	16.9%
Oklahoma	0.0%	0.6%	3.9%	16.0%	34.0%	45.5%	4.2%
Oregon [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [15]	1.0%	7.5%	11.6%	29.8%	29.6%	20.4%	--
Rhode Island [16]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	0.4%	0.8%	4.8%	22.5%	36.3%	35.2%	8.6%
Tennessee	2.3%	2.1%	5.2%	19.7%	35.7%	35.0%	11.1%
Texas	3.6%	7.0%	10.9%	24.0%	30.4%	24.0%	19.7%
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	0.6%	3.8%	16.2%	37.7%	30.6%	11.1%	16.2%
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [17]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Washington [18]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
West Virginia	0.5%	5.1%	9.2%	29.7%	31.6%	24.0%	6.9%
Wisconsin [19]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	1.2%	1.2%	6.1%	23.8%	37.9%	29.8%	11.3%
U.S. Total	1.7%	4.2%	10.2%	26.2%	31.7%	26.1%	16.7%

Overview Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Total Precincts uses question D1a.

Total Polling Places, Election Day uses question D3a.

Total Polling Places, Early Voting uses question D4a.

Total Poll Workers, Election Day uses question D5a.

Total Poll Workers, Early Voting uses question D6a.

Poll Workers' Ages, % Age <18 uses $D7b / (\text{sum of } D7b - D7g) \times 100$.

Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 18-25 uses $D7c / (\text{sum of } D7b - D7g) \times 100$.

Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 26-40 uses $D7d / (\text{sum of } D7b - D7g) \times 100$.

Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 41-60 uses $D7e / (\text{sum of } D7b - D7g) \times 100$.

Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 61-70 uses $D7f / (\text{sum of } D7b - D7g) \times 100$.

Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 71+ uses $D7g / (\text{sum of } D7b - D7g) \times 100$.

% of New Poll Workers uses $D9a / D7a \times 100$.

Overview Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.



- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- The sum of the number of Election Day poll workers (D5a) and the number of early voting poll workers (D6a) may not equal the total number of poll workers reported (D7a) because the instructions for D7a instructed respondents to count poll workers in D7a only once regardless of how many days of voting the poll worker assisted with.
- Because percentages for each age category were calculated independently, the percentages for each age category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- In calculating percentages for poll worker age categories, the sum of questions D7b–D7g was used instead of D7a because some states did not report data in all age categories.
- States that only track data for poll workers who are under age 18 do not have data on poll worker ages displayed in this table.

- [1] Alabama offers absentee in-person voting at absentee offices before Election Day. Provisional voting is done at each polling place. Both are considered separate precincts for canvassing results.
- [2] Alaska only tracks age data for poll workers who are under 18 years old.
- [3] Several counties in Arizona do not track the ages of their poll workers.
- [4] Some California counties use vote centers only.
- [5] The 90 Election Day vote centers reported include the 25 early vote centers.
- [6] Data on poll worker ages is reported in the CEB-9 Section 2.
- [7] Satellite polling locations before Election Day are allowed in Iowa by petition, but data are not readily available to the state from each county on if or how many satellites were operated. Not all jurisdictions reported data on poll workers in the 2022 EAVS.
- [8] The Department of State cannot distinguish between poll workers who worked on Election Day and those who worked during early voting. The total in D5a includes both Election Day and early voting poll workers. The Department of State does not track data on the ages of poll workers.
- [9] Only those who worked at the polls on Election Day are referred to as “poll workers.” The reported number of poll workers is only the number of Election Day workers because staff requirements vary for early voting. There is no statutory term for individuals who assist with early voting, but they were generally referred to as “election workers.” The number of “election workers” varied for each day of early voting and was not reported by jurisdictions. Data on poll worker ages were not reported.
- [10] Early voting takes place at a clerk’s office or their satellite offices for in-person absentee voting only. Ballots are not tabulated until Election Day.
- [11] Montana does not collect information on the number of poll workers before Election Day and does not track the number of new poll workers.
- [12] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter. The town or city clerk’s office is not a polling place. The information provided on the number of poll workers is the minimum required. Actual totals vary by location.
- [13] Data on poll worker ages reflects only Election Day poll workers. Demographics on early voting poll workers were not provided.
- [14] Oregon is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional poll workers. Counties may hire temporary staff as necessary to conduct an election. The number of temporary staff is not tracked.
- [15] The data were gathered via a survey from counties and the total number may not include counties who did not submit the data. Poll worker data are not tracked systematically in Pennsylvania.
- [16] Rhode Island does not collect data on the ages of poll workers.
- [17] Virginia does not track age data for poll workers or data on new poll workers.
- [18] Washington is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional polling places. Washington has voting centers that are open for the entire voting period.



[19] Physical Election Day polling places cannot be located in election offices. Municipalities may provide information about in-person absentee voting locations with the state, but they are not required to. Therefore, data cannot be provided for all municipalities. Where these data were provided, the data cannot distinguish whether the in-person absentee voting locations are an election office or another location. Wisconsin no longer tracks data on poll workers.

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Overview Table 5: Election Technology and Voting Methods

State	Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed	DRE without VVPAT		DRE with VVPAT	
		Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions	Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions
Alabama	4,862	--	--	--	--
Alaska	680	--	--	148	100.0%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	1,746	--	--	--	--
Arkansas	5,327	--	--	824	25.3%
California	23,150	--	--	--	--
Colorado	1,632	--	--	--	--
Connecticut	2,154	--	--	--	--
Delaware	1,185	--	--	1,176	100.0%
District of Columbia	735	--	--	--	--
Florida	12,731	--	--	--	--
Georgia	24,055	--	--	--	--
Guam	6	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	106	--	--	--	--
Idaho	1,125	--	--	--	--
Illinois	6,806	49	3.7%	661	23.1%
Indiana	12,012	5,016	52.2%	1,443	59.8%
Iowa	1,234	--	--	--	--
Kansas	8,046	--	--	--	--
Kentucky	5,596	159	9.2%	654	29.2%
Louisiana	9,656	9,582	100.0%	--	--
Maine [1]	1,065	--	--	--	--
Maryland	6,451	--	--	--	--
Massachusetts [2]	4,714	--	--	--	--
Michigan	9,344	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	5,885	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	3,183	1,418	19.5%	--	--
Missouri	4,821	--	--	209	1.7%
Montana	483	--	--	--	--
Nebraska	1,441	--	--	--	--
Nevada	4,610	--	--	4,479	88.2%
New Hampshire	609	--	--	--	--
New Jersey	11,131	3,143	23.8%	--	--
New Mexico [3]	1,461	--	--	--	--
New York	18,895	--	--	--	--
North Carolina	8,566	--	--	--	--
North Dakota	524	--	--	--	--



State	Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed	DRE without VVPAT		DRE with VVPAT	
		Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions	Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions
Northern Mariana Islands	6	--	--	--	--
Ohio	23,571	--	--	5,819	13.6%
Oklahoma	2,072	--	--	--	--
Oregon	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	15,608	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [4]	893	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	13,271	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	642	--	--	--	--
Tennessee	8,400	3,499	60.0%	19	1.1%
Texas	49,591	5,725	21.3%	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	117	--	--	--	--
Utah	806	--	--	610	24.1%
Vermont	522	260	70.9%	--	--
Virginia	6,473	--	--	--	--
Washington	185	--	--	--	--
West Virginia	5,438	--	--	872	29.1%
Wisconsin [5]	--	--	--	--	8.8%
Wyoming	760	--	--	--	4.3%
U.S. Total	334,382	28,851	6.7%	16,914	5.5%



State	Ballot-Marking Devices		Scanners		Hand Counting	
	Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions	Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions	Total Jurisdictions	% of Jurisdictions
Alabama	2,044	100.0%	2,818	100.0%	0	--
Alaska	265	100.0%	267	100.0%	1	100.0%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	1	100.0%
Arizona	1,208	100.0%	538	100.0%	0	--
Arkansas	3,582	100.0%	921	100.0%	7	9.3%
California	22,009	100.0%	1,141	100.0%	0	--
Colorado	1,454	100.0%	178	98.4%	1	1.6%
Connecticut	718	100.0%	1,436	100.0%	0	--
Delaware	--	--	9	100.0%	0	--
District of Columbia	620	100.0%	115	100.0%	0	--
Florida	5,380	89.6%	7,351	98.5%	0	--
Georgia	21,297	100.0%	2,758	100.0%	0	--
Guam	6	100.0%	--	--	0	--
Hawaii	62	80.0%	44	80.0%	0	--
Idaho	606	88.6%	519	75.0%	11	25.0%
Illinois	3,213	77.8%	2,383	68.5%	0	--
Indiana	5,192	39.1%	361	100.0%	2	2.2%
Iowa	--	100.0%	1,234	100.0%	0	--
Kansas	4,887	100.0%	3,159	92.4%	--	--
Kentucky	2,240	70.8%	2,543	95.8%	6	5.0%
Louisiana	--	--	74	100.0%	64	100.0%
Maine [1]	525	99.0%	540	66.4%	163	32.8%
Maryland	3,575	100.0%	2,876	100.0%	0	--
Massachusetts [2]	2,325	100.0%	2,329	84.0%	351	100.0%
Michigan	4,672	100.0%	4,672	100.0%	0	--
Minnesota	2,898	100.0%	2,987	100.0%	4	4.6%
Mississippi	--	80.5%	1,765	100.0%	0	--
Missouri	2,291	94.8%	2,321	93.1%	1	0.9%
Montana	361	100.0%	122	82.1%	10	17.9%
Nebraska	1,284	100.0%	157	100.0%	0	--
Nevada	100	11.8%	31	100.0%	0	--
New Hampshire	308	92.8%	301	60.9%	125	39.1%
New Jersey	6,809	100.0%	1,179	100.0%	0	--
New Mexico [3]	--	--	1,461	100.0%	33	100.0%
New York	7,871	100.0%	11,024	100.0%	62	100.0%
North Carolina	5,386	100.0%	3,180	100.0%	0	--
North Dakota	260	100.0%	264	100.0%	0	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	6	100.0%	1	100.0%



State	Ballot-Marking Devices		Scanners		Hand Counting	
	Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions	Total Machines Deployed	% of Jurisdictions	Total Jurisdictions	% of Jurisdictions
Ohio	12,080	77.3%	5,672	100.0%	0	--
Oklahoma	--	--	2,072	100.0%	0	--
Oregon	--	--	--	100.0%	0	--
Pennsylvania	7,795	100.0%	7,813	100.0%	0	--
Rhode Island [4]	414	100.0%	479	100.0%	0	--
South Carolina	10,989	100.0%	2,282	100.0%	0	--
South Dakota	539	100.0%	103	98.5%	31	47.0%
Tennessee	3,552	38.9%	1,330	98.9%	9	9.5%
Texas	37,494	62.6%	6,372	94.1%	14	5.5%
U.S. Virgin Islands	68	100.0%	49	100.0%	0	--
Utah	112	75.9%	84	96.6%	0	--
Vermont	262	100.0%	--	--	73	29.6%
Virginia	3,061	100.0%	3,412	100.0%	0	--
Washington	108	100.0%	77	100.0%	0	--
West Virginia	3,619	76.4%	947	74.5%	0	--
Wisconsin [5]	--	91.8%	--	90.1%	180	9.7%
Wyoming	432	100.0%	328	91.3%	0	--
U.S. Total	194,033	88.4%	94,584	86.2%	1,150	17.8%

Overview Table 5 Calculation Notes:

Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3.

DRE without VVPAT, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F5c_1, F5c_2, and F5c_3.

DRE without VVPAT, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F5a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

DRE with VVPAT, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F6c_1, F6c_2, and F6c_3.

DRE with VVPAT, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F6a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

Ballot Marking Devices, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F7c_1, F7c_2, and F7c_3.

Ballot Marking Devices, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F7a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

Scanners, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3.

Scanners, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F8a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

Hand Counting, Total Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F9a.

Hand Counting, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F9a/number of FIPS by state x 100.



Overview Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Although other descriptive tables in this chapter used casewise deletion at the state level in calculating percentages, this table did not. When a state reported not using a type of equipment, the number of devices of that type was filled with zero to better capture at the national level the prevalence of each type of voting technology or counting method in the 2022 general election.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

- [1] Maine reports all data on UOCAVA voting at the statewide level in a separate jurisdiction in the EAVS. This UOCAVA-only jurisdiction does not have in-person voters; thus, no ballot marking device (BMD) is required.
- [2] Ballot marking devices were used for voters with disabilities. Jurisdictions that used scanners hand counted any provisional ballots.
- [3] Hand counting is possible for counting mail ballots, ballots cast during early voting, and ballots cast on Election Day if a tabulator is unable to read a ballot.
- [4] In addition to the number of machines reported, there are three machines used for counting all mail ballots at a central location.
- [5] Wisconsin does not track the number of pieces of voting equipment each municipality has, just what type they use. Wisconsin does not allow for direct-recording electronic (DRE) without a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) for any municipalities.

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Chapter 2. Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey

Key Findings

The 2022 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) provides information about the policy context in which states and territories conducted the 2022 general election. The questions in this survey asked states to identify the election laws and procedures that govern voter registration, election technology, voter eligibility, modes of voting, and election audits in their state. Notable findings from this survey include:

- In 2022, the number of states that provided Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) responses at the state level for each EAVS section was generally consistent with 2020 except for Section F, which saw fewer states reporting at the state level in 2022 compared to 2020.
- There has not been a significant decrease in the number of states that reported conducting all-mail elections for the 2022 general election compared to the 2020 general election.
- Forty-three states reported requiring a post-election tabulation audit that verifies that election voting equipment properly counts a sample of voted ballots after an election.
- Thirty-nine states reported that drop boxes were used, either statewide or in certain jurisdictions, to allow voters to return their voted mail ballots.
- Forty-one states reported allowing voters to cure their voted mail ballots; the most reported types of mail ballot errors that voters were allowed to correct were cases where a voter signature was missing.

Introduction

Although quantitative data from state¹ and local election officials provide an important window into how the 2022 general election was conducted, these data must be understood in the context of state laws and policies. In 2008, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) introduced a component of the EAVS that collects information on state election laws. Since 2018, these data have been collected through the Policy Survey,² which uses closed-ended questions to capture states' broad policies. This report provides an overview and summary of the Policy Survey's findings. Additional information about state responses is available in Appendix A of this chapter. The 2022 Policy Survey included updates to some of the 2020 items to better capture state policy nuances.

¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term "state" can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data.

² Prior to 2018, the Policy Survey was known as the Statutory Overview and required states to submit text descriptions of their election laws and policies.

The 2022 Policy Survey collected data on states' election laws, policies, and practices that would be in place for the November 2022 general election. Most states submitted this information before the election. The Policy Survey was also used to validate 2022 EAVS data prior to states certifying their data as final. The goal of the 2022 Policy Survey was to create comparisons between states across broad policy categories and to provide context to understand the EAVS data submitted by states. Because of the nature of the closed-ended survey questions, some of the nuances in state election policies could not be accounted for. It is important to remember that state election laws are nuanced, and this report simplifies them for the purpose of providing an overview of election policies that offers important context to understanding the EAVS data. States were encouraged to forward additional information and context for their Policy Survey responses to allow their data to be interpreted as accurately as possible.

The information that states and territories submitted for the 2022 Policy Survey explained the election laws and practices that applied to the federal general election that was conducted on November 8, 2022. Some states may have changed some of their policies since that election was conducted; the Policy Survey does not collect information about when an election policy change occurs or why. In addition, states may have different policies for midterm and presidential elections, for primary elections and general elections, or for elections for federal, state, or local office. Because Puerto Rico did not conduct a federal general election on November 8, 2022, the territory was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.

For further information about how the Policy Survey data were collected and used to validate EAVS data, please see Chapter 5 of this report.

Responding to the 2022 EAVS

The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to describe who provides the data for questions in each section of the EAVS: the state election office, local election offices, or both the state and local offices. In total, 25 states provided data for all six sections of the EAVS solely at the state level, whereas 31 states relied on local jurisdictions to provide some or all of a state's EAVS submission.³

For Sections B, C, E, and F, roughly half of the states provided responses at the state level, and about one-quarter of states reported that responses are provided by local officials for Sections C through E.⁴ For Section A, 59% of states reported providing responses at the state level, and 46.4% of states reported providing responses at the state level for Section D. Roughly one-quarter to one-third of the responses for each section were provided by both state and local officials, except for Section E (about one-fifth). In 2022, five fewer states provided EAVS responses at the state level for Section F, one more for Section E, and one fewer for Section A compared to 2020 (see Table 1).

³ Information on how states answer Section A of the EAVS was collected in item Q1_1 of the Policy Survey. Information on how states answer Section B of the EAVS was collected in Q1_2. Information on how states answer Section C of the EAVS was collected in Q1_3. Information on how states answer Section D of the EAVS was collected in Q1_4. Information on how states answer Section E of the EAVS was collected in Q1_5. Information on how states answer Section F of the EAVS was collected in Q1_6.

⁴ A lower proportion of states responded to Section F entirely at the local level, at 14.3%.



The findings from this question illustrate the complexities that state and local election officials face when answering the EAVS. Many states with a large number of jurisdictions reported providing EAVS data entirely at the local level. Furthermore, some states reported providing EAVS data for some sections at the state level while relying on local officials for other sections.

Table 1. States Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level

Number of States Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level			
EAVS Section	Number of States in 2018	Number of States in 2020	Number of States in 2022
Section A	31	34	33
Section B	26	28	28
Section C	27	29	29
Section D	23	26	26
Section E	25	28	29
Section F	25	33	28

Source: Information on answering the EAVS was collected in Q1 of the Policy Survey.

In almost all states, no new local jurisdictions have been created or consolidated for the purposes of EAVS reporting since the 2020 EAVS was conducted.⁵ The exceptions are New Hampshire and New Jersey, where jurisdictions were both consolidated and created, as well as Vermont and Wisconsin, where new local jurisdictions were created.

Policies on Voter Registration and List Maintenance

The primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States is the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which became effective after the 1994 general election. The NVRA expands voter registration opportunities for voters by creating more standardized registration processes and by designating more places as voter registration agencies. It also requires that states conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove from their lists the records of individuals who are no longer eligible to vote; this program is often referred to as “voter registration list maintenance.”

Congress also passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, requiring each state to adopt a computerized statewide voter registration list. States use these registration lists to determine who is eligible to participate in elections. States also face the challenge of keeping these lists up to date, as voters commonly move to different jurisdictions or states, die, or become otherwise ineligible to vote.⁶

⁵ North Carolina detailed some other changes (e.g., one municipality dissolved while others were annexed across county lines).


⁶ North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration. According to the North Dakota Office of the Secretary of State, “Precincts in North Dakota maintain a list of voters who have voted in previous elections. When a voter approaches a polling place they are asked to provide an acceptable form of identification. Then the election board will attempt to locate the voter’s name on the voting list. If the



Database Systems

States responded to the HAVA voter registration requirements in different ways. Some states adopted a single, central platform at the state level that connects to terminals in local jurisdictions. This type of system is typically referred to as a “top-down” voter registration system. Other states implemented a state voter registration database that gathers and aggregates information from their local jurisdictions’ voter registration databases. This type of system is typically referred to as a “bottom-up” system.⁷ If a system has a mix of top-down and bottom-up characteristics, then it is referred to as a “hybrid” system. The specific characteristics of hybrid systems vary state by state.

Figure 1. Over Two-Thirds of States Have Top-Down Voter Registration Systems



Source: Information on voter registration database system type was collected in Q3 of the Policy Survey. This graph shows the number of states that reported having each type of voter registration database.

voter’s name is on the list, the voter’s name and address are verified and the voter is then allowed to vote.” (<https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Portals/votereg.pdf>). Individuals who wish to vote in North Dakota must meet federal and state eligibility requirements.

⁷ For a bottom-up voter registration system to be considered a statewide system, the state database, the data, and the data flow must be defined, maintained, and administered by the state. U.S. Election Assistance Commission (2005, July). *Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists*. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/1/Implementing%20Statewide%20Voter%20Registration%20Lists.pdf.



The Policy Survey asked states to report the type of voter registration database they have and how often information is shared between states and local jurisdictions. Figure 1 shows that over a majority of states (72.7%) reported having voter registration databases that function in a top-down manner. Seven states (12.7%, a decrease from 2020) reported having a bottom-up registration system that uploads jurisdiction-level information at regular intervals to form the statewide voter registration list, and 14.6% of states reported having a hybrid system that combines elements of both.⁸ In practice, these state registration system categories can be fluid. Some top-down registration systems may implement features of a bottom-up registration system and vice versa.

States that reported having either a bottom-up or hybrid system were asked to report how often their jurisdictions transmit voter registration information to the statewide database. For these two systems, real-time data transmissions were most common (reported in 80% of the states with bottom-up or hybrid systems), whereas 33.3% of the states reported that voter registration information is transmitted daily.⁹

Data Linkages

Election officials must accomplish two primary activities related to voter registration: adding individuals to the database who are eligible to vote and maintaining the accuracy of the database.¹⁰ A state accomplishes these goals by accessing or “linking” to other databases to verify the voter registration information in its database. The NVRA and HAVA outline steps that states are required to take to keep voter registration information current and to remove ineligible voters and duplicate registrations from the voter lists. This task requires comparing voter lists to records in other databases to prevent duplicate registration records and to avoid adding individuals who are ineligible to register.¹¹

HAVA requires the chief election official in each state to attempt to verify the information for first-time voter registration applications against driver’s license numbers in that state’s motor vehicle licensing agency’s database or against the Social Security Administration’s database of social security numbers. If no match is found, election officials in most states attempt to contact the applicant for additional information, but they manage this process in various ways. HAVA requires that applicants who cannot be matched against one of these databases be allowed to vote on Election Day, provided they present appropriate identification.¹²

The Policy Survey asks state election offices how they share information electronically with other state and federal government entities.¹³ These linkages are illustrated in Figure 2. Most states reported that they link their voter registration data with the agency that handles their state’s driver’s licenses (91.1%) and with entities that maintain the death records (73.2%). The other most commonly reported linkages were with entities that maintain felony or prison records, such

⁸ Information on the type of voter registration system that states use was collected in item Q3 of the Policy Survey.

⁹ Texas noted that most jurisdictions transmit information in real time, but larger jurisdictions transmit overnight.

¹⁰ National Research Council. 2010. Improving State Voter Registration Databases: Final Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. <https://doi.org/10.17226/12788>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

¹³ Although North Dakota does not have voter registration, the state does share information electronically with other government entities and is included in these analyses.



as state courts and parole agencies (64.3%). States that reported linking with the agency that handles driver's licenses most often reported transferring voter registration data daily (64.7%), followed by in real time (17.7%) and by some other measure of time that is neither weekly nor monthly (7.8%). Of the states that reported linking with entities that maintain death records, the most common type of data transfer was monthly (56.1%), followed by weekly and other (17.1%). States that reported linking registration data with entities that maintain felony records most often reported transferring data monthly (44.4%).¹⁴

Less commonly reported linkages included with entities that maintain records of individuals who are declared mentally incompetent, state public assistance agencies, agencies for people with disabilities, other state agencies that are not required by the NVRA, federal agencies, and military recruiting offices.

Figure 2. States Most Commonly Link Voter Registration Databases with Government Agencies That Maintain Driver's Licenses and Death Records



Source: Information on the entities that are linked to state voter registration databases was collected in Q4 of the Policy Survey. This graph shows the number of states that reported linking their voter registration databases with the specified government agency.

¹⁴ Information on which entities states link their voter registration databases with and how often data transfers occur was collected in item Q4 of the Policy Survey.



Automatic and Automated Voter Registration

Beginning in 2016, states started implementing laws allowing for automatic voter registration. Automatic voter registration is a process by which eligible voters are automatically registered to vote when they interact with a government agency (e.g., a state motor vehicles agency) with an option to opt out. Another process available in some states is registration with automated features, which requires the individual to make a choice or affirmative decision to register to vote during their interaction with a government agency, rather than deciding to opt out of registration.

In 2022, about two-thirds of states reported some method of registering to vote via an automated process, whether online or in person, during a transaction with a state government agency.¹⁵ Commonly reported examples of these automated processes were processes where the option to register to vote is preselected and a person needs to deselect it during the transaction to opt out of registering to vote (39.3%) and those that authorize the potential registrant to opt in or choose to register, such as when an individual cannot proceed with a transaction without selecting whether or not they wish to be registered to vote (35.7%).

All states that have some kind of automatic or automated voter registration process linked to a state agency transaction reported that their state motor vehicles agency participates in this program, and about one-third of the states indicated that public assistance agencies also participate. Less common program participants included agencies for people with disabilities, those specifically designated by the state's chief election official or governor, and others.^{16, 17}

Pre-Registration

In the 2022 Policy Survey, most states (94.6%) reported allowing individuals under the age of 18 to pre-register to vote and become automatically registered once they turn 18 years old.¹⁸ Twenty-six states that had a pre-registration program reported that they allow individuals to pre-register at age 17, whereas 20 states reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 16. Six states reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 17 and a half.¹⁹ Some states have additional rules that apply to pre-registrations: for example, states like Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, and the Northern Mariana Islands allow a person to register to vote before the age of 18 as long as they will be 18 at the time of the next general election.

Most pre-registration applications are processed immediately, although the individual cannot vote before they turn 18 years old. In Minnesota and South Dakota, the pre-registration application is held and is not processed until the individual turns 18. Several states specified additional procedures for processing pre-registrations. For example, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Vermont, and West Virginia process pre-registration applications upon receipt, and the individual may vote in a primary election if they will be 18 years old by the date of the next general election. Kansas

¹⁵ Information on automatic and automated voter registration was collected in item Q5 of the Policy Survey.

¹⁶ Information on which state agencies participate in automatic voter registration was collected in item Q5a of the Policy Survey.

¹⁷ States specified other agencies: the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend; the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing; the Delaware Department of Labor Division of Vocational Rehabilitation; Florida offices that issue driver's licenses or state ID cards in coordination with the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles; the Illinois Department of Natural Resources; and other state agencies as designated by Maryland legislation.

¹⁸ Information on whether states allow individuals to preregister before they are 18 years old and become automatically registered to vote once they turn 18 was collected in item Q9 of the Policy Survey.

¹⁹ Puerto Rico reported that an individual may pre-register to vote at age 14.




processes the pre-registration application and places a pending status on it until the day the individual turns 18 years old, after which they are automatically added to the list of registered voters; a similar process is done in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.²⁰

State Election Office Websites

The 2022 Policy Survey also asked states which voter information search tools and other tools are available on each state's election office website. Nearly every state indicated that voters could check their registration status and check their polling site location on the state election office website. Most states reported having tools that track ballot status, including the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots (89.3%), mail ballots (85.7%), and provisional ballots (53.6%), and that check voter-specific ballot information (80.4%). Additionally, most states reported that their website allows voters to request a mail or absentee ballot (58.9%), and nine states reported some other functionality available on their state's election office website that was not listed in the survey.²¹

Figure 3. About Three-Quarters of States Offer Both Registration and Registration Updates Through a Web-Based Online System



Source: Information on online registration policy was collected in items Q6 and Q6a of the Policy Survey.

²⁰ Information on whether a preregistration application is processed immediately or held until a certain date was collected in item Q9a of the Policy Survey.

²¹ Information on state election office website lookup tools was collected in item Q7 of the Policy Survey.



Online Voter Registration

Arizona became the first state to adopt online voter registration in 2002, and by 2016, the number of states that offered online voter registration jumped to 32.²² Now, most states have a public-facing, web-based online system that interfaces with the state voter registration system. About three-quarters of states reported that through this system, voters can both register to vote and update their registration, whereas a smaller number of states (5.4%) reported that individuals can only use this online system to update their registration (see Figure 3). In most states (79.6%), a person needs to have a driver's license or other state-issued identification to register to vote or update a voter registration in this system.²³

Same-Day Registration

Instead of requiring voters to register prior to an election, some states allow individuals to register to vote and to cast a ballot on the same day. Almost half of the states reported allowing individuals to register on the same day that they cast a ballot in person or request a mail ballot (see Figure 4). This process is known as same-day registration (SDR).²⁴ Among states with SDR, about 85% reported having both SDR on Election Day and SDR during in-person early voting.²⁵

Fourteen states reported having SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration. Two states reported specific cases in which a voter may register on the same day that they cast a ballot: in North Carolina, an individual who has become eligible to vote between the close of books²⁶ and Election Day—either by being naturalized as a citizen or having citizenship rights restored after conviction of a felony—may be a same-day registrant; in Wisconsin, individuals who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the same day from the Tuesday prior to Election Day up through 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.

²² "EAVS Deep Dive: Registering to Vote," U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, September 20). <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/09/20/eavs-deep-dive-registering-to-vote>.

²³ Information on states' online voter registration policies was collected in item Q6 of the Policy Survey. Information on whether a driver's license or state-issued ID card is needed to register to vote online was collected in item Q6a of the Policy Survey.


²⁴ The timeline does not include an overlap between the mail balloting period and the close of voter registration.

²⁵ Eighteen states reporting having SDR on Election Day and during in-person early voting. Two states (Connecticut and New Hampshire) reported having SDR only on Election Day and two states (American Samoa and North Carolina) reported having SDR only during in-person early voting. Information on state SDR policies was collected in item Q8 of the Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances of SDR was collected in item Q8a of the Policy Survey.

²⁶ North Carolina did not provide clarification on what was meant by "close of books."



Figure 4. Almost Half of States Offer Some Form of Same-Day Registration



Source: Information on SDR policy was collected in items Q8 and Q8a of the Policy Survey. “ED” stands for “Election Day.” “Other Cases” includes instances in which states may allow for SDR during in-person early voting only, during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, and other specific cases.

List Maintenance

The NVRA establishes a process for states to keep their voter registration lists accurate by adding newly registered voters, updating voter records, and removing ineligible voters. Under this law, a registrant can be removed from a state’s list under the following circumstances:

- Upon the death of the registrant;
- Upon the registrant’s written confirmation that their address has changed to a location outside of the registrar’s jurisdiction;
- On the request of the registrant;
- For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;
- On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or
- On the registrant’s failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.²⁷

Under the process established by the NVRA, when a registrant appears to have moved outside of their jurisdiction, the state must follow a specific process to verify that the individual is no longer

²⁷ 52 U.S.C. § 20507.



eligible to vote. An address confirmation procedure must be followed before removing the voter from the registration list. Chapter 3 of this report includes more detail about the list maintenance process as outlined in the NVRA.

Table 2. Examples of State Definitions of Active and Inactive Voters

State	Description of Active and Inactive Voters
Alaska	<p>Active voter: qualified registered voter;</p> <p>Inactive voter: those who are not eligible to vote in an election or those who may be eligible to vote a provisional ballot in an election but whose registration was inactivated during Alaska's list maintenance process</p>
California	<p>Active voter: a registered voter who meets California voter registration eligibility requirements, who is legally entitled to vote pursuant to state law, and who is not currently deemed an “inactive voter” or a “canceled voter;”</p> <p>Inactive voter: a registered voter whose status has been changed to “inactive” in accordance with California law; an inactive voter is legally entitled to vote pursuant to California law</p>
Maryland ²⁸	<p>Active voter: a voter who is registered to vote in Maryland and is not in “pending” or “inactive” status under the provisions of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993;</p> <p>Inactive voter: a voter who is registered to vote in Maryland but has not responded to a confirmation notice</p>
Oregon	<p>Active voter: has supplied the information legally required to register to vote and the county clerk has not received evidence of a change in the information the voter used to register to vote;</p> <p>Inactive voter: the county clerk receives evidence of a change in the information the voter used to register to vote and who has been mailed a voter confirmation card</p>
Utah	<p>Active voter: a registered voter who has not been classified as an inactive voter by the county clerk (i.e., someone who has fulfilled the residency requirements and has turned in a complete voter registration form);</p> <p>Inactive voter: a voter who has all the privileges of an active voter, but the county clerk's office is unclear whether the voter still maintains a residency at an address</p>

Source: Information on state definitions of “active” and “inactive” voters was collected in item Q10a of the Policy Survey.

²⁸ While this term is not defined in Maryland state statute, §3-503 of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, specifies when a voter is placed into inactive status, how a voter is restored to active status, and when a voter is removed from the voter registration list.



The 2022 Policy Survey asked states whether they differentiate between active and inactive voters in their voter registration records. Active voters are individuals who require no additional processing before they can vote, whereas inactive voters will require address verification before being permitted to vote. Fifty states, including three territories and the District of Columbia, indicated that they differentiate between the two types of voters, although according to state comments, the definitions for an active and inactive voter vary widely.²⁹ American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming reported not distinguishing between active and inactive voters. Twenty states reported specific terminology, qualifications, and/or conditions for active and inactive voters (see Table 2). According to the NVRA, voters marked as inactive may be restored to the active voter list if they vote in one of the two federal general elections following their inactive designation or take other action to confirm to the election office that they continue to be a valid registered voter. If a voter does not cast a ballot in either of the two federal general elections following their inactive designation, the voter may be removed from their state's voter registration roll.

Thirty-five states indicated that only local officials are responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records, and 13 states reported that modifying voter registration records is done by both state and local officials.^{30, 31} Alaska, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Guam, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and the U.S. Virgin Islands all indicated that they only modify or remove records at the state level.³² Table 3 illustrates the data sources states use to identify potentially ineligible voters. Across states, the most common data sources were the state vital statistics office, reports from other states indicating a former resident registered to vote, a voter request for removal, entities that maintain prison records, and any mail (not including ballots) sent from an election office that was returned as undeliverable.³³

²⁹ Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q10 of the Policy Survey. Information on whether states use the EAC's definition of active and inactive voters was collected in item Q10a of the Policy Survey.

³⁰ North Dakota does not have voter registration and was not included in these counts.

³¹ In Georgia and Texas, all modifications are done by local officials except for deceased voters that have been systematically removed from the state voter registration system; in Maryland and North Carolina, local officials process voter registration record updates and the state assists as needed; in Maine, although only local officials modify voter registration records, state officials may conduct statewide list maintenance activities that designate certain records as inactive based on response or lack of response to the NVRA list maintenance mailing; in Michigan, both local clerks and state staff modify and correct voter registration information; in New Mexico, local officials are responsible for all but those voters who are part of the state's confidential address program, whose records are maintained by the Secretary of State; similarly, in Oklahoma, most records are handled at the local level but the state manages registrations for participants in the address confidentiality program as well as list maintenance for address confirmation deletions; in Wisconsin, local officials are responsible for all records except for when a voter does not respond to a 4-year state list maintenance confirmation notice and for when the state receives information from another state voter registration authority or through the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) that a voter has registered there.

³² Information on who is responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records was collected in item Q11 of the Policy Survey.

³³ Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item Q13 of the Policy Survey.



Table 3. States Most Often Use State Vital Statistics Office and Reports from Other States to Identify Ineligible Voters

Source of Data on Potentially Ineligible Voters	Percentage of States That Report Using Data from the Data Source
State vital statistics office death records	96.4%
Reports or notices from other states that a former resident has registered to vote	92.9%
Entities that maintain felony or prison records (e.g., state courts, state police, federal courts, pardons or paroles agencies)	83.9%
Other mail from the election office (not ballots) that is returned as undeliverable	83.9%
Requests from voters for removal from the voter registration roll	83.9%
Newspaper death notices or obituaries	73.2%
Mail ballots that are returned as undeliverable	67.9%
National Change of Address (NCOA) reports	67.9%
Motor vehicles agencies (e.g., DMV)	60.7%
Social Security Administration (SSA) death records	60.7%
Data from an interstate data-sharing compact (e.g., the Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC])	55.4%
Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent	48.2%
Applications for mail ballots	26.8%
Jury questionnaires	26.8%
Returned jury summons	19.6%
State public assistance agencies	17.9%
State agencies that serve individuals with disabilities	16.1%
Canvassing (door-to-door verification)	7.1%
Other (e.g., military recruitment offices)	7.1%
State agencies that are not specified in NVRA	3.6%
State tax filings	1.8%

Source: Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item Q13 of the Policy Survey.

Fifty-three states reported sending confirmation notices to voters to help identify individuals who may be ineligible to vote in that jurisdiction, but the reasons for sending confirmation notices differ by state. Of the states that send confirmation notices, 43 (76.8%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to Section 8 (d) (1) (B) and Section 8 (d) (2) of the NVRA, 37 states (66.1%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a state statute, and eight states



(14.3%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a formal administrative rule or guidance. Three states reported that they do not send confirmation notices.³⁴

States most commonly reported sending confirmation notices to voters whose mail from an election office was returned as undeliverable (86.8%), to voters whose addresses may have changed (79.3%), to voters who have not voted in a specified number of consecutive general elections (45.3%),³⁵ and to voters who have been convicted of a disqualifying felony (37.7%). Less than one-third of states reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have surrendered their driver's license to obtain a new license in a different state, for not having contacted the state election division for a specified number of years, for having requested removal from the voter registration list, and for having been incarcerated.

Six states (11.3%) reported that all registered voters routinely receive a non-forwardable notice during a specified increment of time; this time frame ranges from 1 to 4 years. Thirteen states reported sending confirmation notices for some other reason.³⁶ For example, some states or certain jurisdictions within states indicated that they routinely send confirmation notices as part of their specific list maintenance procedures. Delaware, which is a member of ERIC, sends confirmation notices to individuals who have been identified as having potentially moved via ERIC reports. Washington, a state in which nearly all voters cast their ballots by mail, reported that the mailing information provided by a returned or forwarded ballot serves as the start of the confirmation process.

Criminal Convictions and Voting

The NVRA allows states to remove voters from their registration lists if the registered voter receives a disqualifying criminal conviction or is incarcerated. The Policy Survey asks four questions about removing voters from registration lists due to disqualifying criminal convictions and/or incarcerations and about the restoration of voting rights:

- Which populations have their voting eligibility suspended due to a criminal conviction or incarceration?
- For how long does a person with a criminal conviction lose their right to vote?
- What happens to the removed individual's registration record in the state's voter registration database?
- How can a person whose voting rights have been affected by a conviction or incarceration become an eligible voter again?

The District of Columbia, Maine, Puerto Rico, and Vermont reported in the 2022 Policy Survey that they do not limit a person's right to vote based on a criminal conviction or incarceration. Most states (60.7%) reported that the conviction of any felony will limit a person's right to vote, whereas five states indicated that they limit the voting rights of individuals convicted only of certain felonies. Six states reported that they limit the voting rights of individuals who are

³⁴ Information on whether and how states send confirmation notices to help identify ineligible voters was collected in item Q12 of the Policy Survey.

³⁵ Most states specified either one or two consecutive federal general elections, with the exception of South Dakota, which specified four.

³⁶ Information on which voters states send confirmation notices to was collected in item Q12a of the Policy Survey.



convicted of other crimes that are not felonies (e.g., election-related crimes). Additionally, 21 states limit the right to vote for individuals who are incarcerated.³⁷

There is variation in the disqualification time periods and in the processes for restoring voting rights. Of the states that limit voting rights for these reasons, most reported revoking the right to vote during the period of incarceration (73.1%) followed by any period of probation and parole (40.4%). Some states reported revoking voting rights until the payment of outstanding fines, restitution, or penalties (19.2%), and/or during an additional length of time (9.6%) such as a statutorily mandated waiting period.³⁸

The EAVS asked states to report the number of voters removed from registration rolls due to disqualifying felony convictions between the close of registration for the November 2020 general election and the close of registration for the November 2022 general election. To provide context for this EAVS item, the 2022 Policy Survey asked what happens to registration records when the voting rights of a person in one of the populations specified above are affected. Over a third of states reported that the registration record becomes inactive, which prevents the person from voting. One-fifth of states reported that the registration record is removed from the database, and some (9.1%) reported that a hold or suspension is placed on the record, which also prevents the person from voting. Sixteen states specified some other process;³⁹ 10 of these states reported that the voter registration record is placed in “cancelled,” “removed,” or “rejected” status, and differ on the follow-up procedures. Michigan noted that if a person is incarcerated but has not yet been sentenced, then they are still able to vote.⁴⁰

The Policy Survey also asks states to indicate how disenfranchised individuals can become eligible voters again after they are permitted to under state law. Missouri and Rhode Island reported automatically restoring the previous voter registration of individuals with convictions and/or incarcerations once the period of disenfranchisement has passed, requiring no further action by the voter. Of the states that indicated requiring some type of action, 71.2% reported that a person is immediately eligible to vote and must re-register through the same process as the general public. Some states reported having other conditions, such as presenting documentation during the registration process that shows that the person has completed the voter registration requirements (17.3%) and having voting rights restored through a formal administrative process (17.3%). Eight states provided survey comments that further explained their policies.⁴¹ In Louisiana, for example, if a person is under an order of imprisonment for a felony conviction but “has not been incarcerated pursuant to the order within the last five years,” then that person is eligible to register. Iowa reported that the current process allows automatic restoration for most convictions that affect registrations, except for a specific class of homicide crimes that require an

³⁷ Information on state policies for suspending or revoking voting rights due to criminal convictions was collected in item Q38 of the Policy Survey. This item does not distinguish a felony conviction from the subsequent period of incarceration.

³⁸ Information on the length of time a disqualifying felony conviction will restrict voting rights was collected in item Q38a of the Policy Survey.

³⁹ North Dakota does not have voter registration and is not included in these counts.

⁴⁰ Information on what happens to the registration records of populations whose voting rights are affected due to criminal conviction and/or incarceration was collected in item Q38b of the Policy Survey.

⁴¹ Information on state policies for restoring voting rights to individuals with disqualifying felony convictions was collected in item Q38c of the Policy Survey.



application to the governor for registration. Maryland indicated that individuals convicted of buying or selling votes are not eligible to register to vote again in the state.

Voting by Mail

All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer at least some of their citizens the opportunity to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections.⁴² Some states use the term “absentee voting” to refer to mail voting. The 2022 Policy Survey demonstrates that there were wide variations among the states regarding which voters are eligible to vote by mail, what documentation voters must provide to receive a mail ballot, how mail ballots may be returned to election officials, and the deadlines for mail ballots to be postmarked and received by election offices in order to be counted for the 2022 general election.

In 2022, 38 states reported that they do not require voters to provide a reason for requesting a mail ballot and for why they cannot vote in person on Election Day. Conversely, about one-third of states reported requiring voters to provide an excuse.⁴³ Twenty-three states reported that voters can request to be on a permanent absentee list from which they will automatically receive ballots for all future elections. Either any registrant can request to be a permanent absentee voter (16.4% of all states) or only individuals who meet specific criteria can request to be a permanent absentee voter (25.5% of all states).⁴⁴

Some states have special criteria for individuals who request permanent absentee status.⁴⁵ Among these states, the most common requirement was that the requester must have a disability (85.7%); Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin reported that they will also grant permanent absentee status to those who are infirm, have a permanent illness, or can provide a note from a medical professional. West Virginia indicated allowing address confidentiality program participants to be permanent absentee voters, and Louisiana indicated requiring individuals to be over a specified age. Despite conducting all-mail elections, Oregon uses the term “absentee voter” for individuals who may be away from their residences when ballots are transmitted.

With the 2020 election’s overall shift toward mail voting, the number of states that conducted all-mail elections, in which all registered voters or all active registered voters are automatically sent a mail ballot, doubled between the 2018 and 2020 Policy Surveys. These numbers have stayed fairly consistent into 2022. As shown in Figure 5, twelve states have some type of vote-by-mail system; three states reported having some vote-by-mail jurisdictions, and nine states reported having statewide vote-by-mail systems.⁴⁶

⁴² Some states use the term “in-person absentee voting” to refer to the process by which a voter visits an election office to request a mail ballot, completes the ballot, and returns the ballot in one trip. However, EAVS considers this to be a form of in-person early voting and asks states to report their data as such.

⁴³ Information on whether states require an excuse for mail voting was collected in item Q16 of the Policy Survey.


⁴⁴ Information on whether states have permanent absentee voting was collected in item Q18 of the Policy Survey.

⁴⁵ Information on who can become a permanent absentee voter was collected in item Q18a of the Policy Survey.

⁴⁶ Information on which states have an all-mail or all-vote-by-mail system was collected in item Q17 of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q18 of the 2020 Policy Survey, and item Q9 of the 2018 Policy Survey.



Figure 5. Number of States Offering All-Mail Elections in 2022 Consistent with 2020



Source: Information on the policy of all-mail elections was collected in items Q17 and Q17a of the 2022 Policy Survey.

The Policy Survey also collected data on the circumstances under which voters could receive ballots through electronic means. Voters who are members of the uniformed services or who are overseas citizens who wish to receive ballots electronically are covered under UOCAVA, so this question applies specifically to non-UOCAVA voters. About one-third of states reported that domestic civilian voters cannot receive electronic ballots under any circumstances. States that do allow non-UOCAVA voters residing in the United States to receive their ballots through an electronic format do so via methods such as email, fax, an online voter registration portal, or a mobile phone app. Alaska, California,⁴⁷ Guam, Maryland, South Dakota, and Washington reported that voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstance. Other states reported having special circumstances.⁴⁸ For example, 27 states indicated allowing voters with disabilities to

Information on whether the state's all-vote-by-mail system is used only in certain jurisdictions or is statewide was collected in item Q17a of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q18a in the 2020 Policy Survey, and item Q9a of the 2018 Policy Survey. In most cases, some limited in-person voting occurs when a state or jurisdiction conducts an election entirely by mail.

⁴⁷ California allows any voter to cast a ballot using a certified remote-accessible vote-by-mail system, regardless of whether the individual is a voter with disabilities or a military or overseas voter.

⁴⁸ Information on the circumstances under which voters may receive their ballots electronically was collected in item Q24 of the Policy Survey.



receive ballots electronically, including 11 states where voters must have specific disabilities and 16 states where voters with any disability may do so.⁴⁹

Six states reported that they allow electronic ballot transmission during emergency situations that hinder in-person voting, such as a natural disaster. Nine states reported that they allowed electronic transmission for other reasons. For example, Nebraska extended requirements to emergency responders, Hawaii allows for the receipt of ballots through an electronic format when a replacement ballot is needed and is requested within five days of the election, and in the U.S. Virgin Islands, voters may receive an electronic ballot if they did not receive an absentee ballot up to two days before the election.

In states where voters with a disability may receive their ballots electronically, the process whereby the voter may access a ballot online, mark it privately and independently, and then return it to election officials is known as accessible absentee voting in 10 states and remote ballot marking in five states. Twelve states reported using specific terminology, such as accessible vote by mail, accessible ballot delivery, electronic absentee, and others. Just over three-quarters of these states allow voters with a disability to access their electronic ballot through an online portal, while 40.7% allow access through email.⁵⁰ Indiana and Louisiana specified that delivery may be via fax. Michigan and Pennsylvania voters with disabilities may receive their ballot via email and receive either a link to a secure online portal, as in the case of Michigan,⁵¹ or receive an access code for the ballot, as in the case of Pennsylvania. Most states (88.9%) that have some form of remotely accessible absentee voting process for voters with disabilities do not require a witness to be present while a voter marks their ballot in this process.

Mail Ballot Tracking and Deadlines

States reported on their deadlines for mail ballots from non-military voters residing in the United States. Ballot deadlines for voters covered by UOCAVA were reported in separate questions, as UOCAVA ballot deadlines are typically different from those for other mail ballots. The postmark deadline is Election Day for just over one-third (35.7%) of states, which is somewhat lower than in 2020;⁵² Connecticut, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah reported having a postmark deadline one day before Election Day. In 56.4% of states, mail ballots must be received by Election Day, and in 41.8% of states, mail ballots must be received by a specified number of calendar days or business days after Election Day.⁵³ Louisiana reported that mail ballots must be received by one day before Election Day.

States vary in what satisfies postmark requirements for mail ballots. In states that require postmarks, the most commonly reported required feature was a physical postmark (84.6%),

⁴⁹ New Mexico did not select response options for voters with disabilities but specified that voters with visual impairments can request a ballot that they may receive and mark electronically using screen reader software; the voter must then print and mail the ballot back.

⁵⁰ Information on the terminology states use to describe the process whereby a voter with a disability may access a ballot online, mark it privately and independently, and return it to election officials was collected in item Q24a of the Policy Survey. Information on how voters with a disability can access their ballots under that process was collected in item Q24b of the Policy Survey.

⁵¹ This ballot is then printed and returned.

⁵² Information on deadlines for returning mail ballots was collected in item Q21 of the Policy Survey.

⁵³ Eighteen states reported a specified number of calendar days after Election Day, ranging from three to 20, and five states reported a specified number of business days after Election Day, ranging from one to 10.




followed by postal processing markings (65.4%), and hand cancellation or a private express delivery service date stamp (both 57.7% respectively). Less commonly required features were intelligent barcodes (30.8%) and a date on a voter affidavit (15.4%). Some states specified other ways of satisfying postmark requirements.⁵⁴ Ohio indicated accepting an ID tag date, and Kansas and Oregon indicated accepting any other indicia from the U.S. Postal Service. In Virginia, if the intelligent mail barcode does not show that the ballot was mailed on or before Election Day, the date provided on the signed voter oath may be used to satisfy postmark requirements.

Drop Boxes

In a new series of questions, the 2022 Policy Survey asked states to report their usage of drop boxes. For the purposes of the Policy Survey, a drop box was defined as a locked container where voters or their authorized representatives may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. They are different from ballot boxes that are located at in-person polling places, where voters may place their ballots immediately after in-person voting. Drop boxes may be located either indoors or outdoors.

Figure 6. More than Two-Thirds of States Used Drop Boxes in 2022 General Election



Source: Information on whether voters were permitted to return their voted mail ballots at drop boxes was collected in item Q19 of the Policy Survey.

Thirty-nine states reported allowing drop boxes for the November 2022 general election (see Figure 6). For these states, the most commonly reported location for drop boxes was election

⁵⁴ Information on mail ballot postmark requirements was collected in item Q23 of the Policy Survey.



offices (64.1%), followed by early voting polling locations (35.9%), and Election Day polling locations (28.2%). Other sites reported by states included libraries, recreation centers, satellite county offices, tribal reservations, and college student centers. Additionally, 22 states indicated that drop box locations varied by locality, with several of them noting that drop box locations can be placed at any site at the discretion of the local jurisdiction.⁵⁵

In one-third of states that used drop boxes, drop box collections occurred once per day, whereas in three states, the collections occurred multiple times per day. Eight states listed another frequency, citing some examples where the number of collections can depend on the date and the volume of ballots. Fifteen states reported that the number of collections varies by jurisdiction.⁵⁶

Voters were able to use drop boxes at various times. The earliest date drop boxes were available for voters was September 1, 2022, in Indiana, whereas the latest dates tended to be Election Day, with the exception of North Dakota, Georgia, and South Dakota, which listed dates before Election Day. About 41% of states that used drop boxes allowed their voters to start using them sometime in September.⁵⁷

Ballot Curing

Another new set of questions in the 2022 Policy Survey asked states about ballot curing; under this process, returned mail ballots that have been rejected for containing an error or for missing required information may have the mistake corrected by the voter so that their ballot is ultimately counted. Three-quarters of states reported having this process during the 2022 general election, and among those states, the most commonly reported types of mail ballot errors that voters were allowed to correct were missing voter signatures (reported in 90.2% of these states) and non-matching voter signatures (reported in 70.7% of these states). Just over half of states reported that ballots that had a missing or incomplete required document (e.g., an affidavit, ballot statement, or copy of the voter's identification) could be cured, whereas just under one-third allowed for ballots to be cured if they were missing a witness signature.⁵⁸ Eleven states reported that there were other reasons a mail ballot may be cured; missing identification was cited by three states, and other reasons included missing statement of residence and missing witness address.^{59, 60}

Thirteen states reported that ballots needed to be cured by Election Day in order to be counted in the 2022 general election. One state, Louisiana, had a deadline that fell before Election Day, and

⁵⁵ Information on whether states, or any jurisdictions within states, allow voters to return their voted mailed ballots at drop boxes was collected in item Q19 of the Policy Survey. Information on where drop boxes were located was collected in item Q19a of the Policy Survey.

⁵⁶ Information on how often ballots will be collected from drop boxes was collected in item Q19b of the Policy Survey.

⁵⁷ Information on the dates and times voters may use drop boxes to return their ballots was collected in item Q19c of the Policy Survey.

⁵⁸ Information on whether states allow voters to cure ballots was collected in item Q20 of the Policy Survey. Information on the types of mail ballot errors that may be cured was collected in item Q20a of the Policy Survey.

⁵⁹ New Mexico treats any rejected mail ballot as a rejected provisional ballot that allows a voter to pursue a hearing to review the determination.

⁶⁰ Pennsylvania noted that the decision to allow voters to correct errors or supply missing information is currently the subject of ongoing litigation. A preliminary ruling in October permitted voters to do so in the 2022 general election.



the latest ballot curing deadlines were in December 2022 in New York and California. Some states specified that deadlines are set based on a number of business or calendar days after an action is taken.⁶¹ For example, Arizona voters must cure a missing signature by Election Day but must cure a non-matching signature within 5 business days, whereas Kansas voters must cure provisional ballots prior to the meeting of the county board of canvassers, which occurs between seven and 13 days after Election Day, and each jurisdiction sets its own date within this window. Utah also noted that the deadline varies based on the county canvass date.

UOCAVA Voting

The legal framework established by the UOCAVA law requires that all states offer uniformed services members, their eligible family members, and overseas citizens the ability to vote absentee in all federal elections. UOCAVA-protected citizens have the option of using the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), a form that serves as both a registration and ballot request application and is accepted in all U.S. states and territories. All states accept FPCAs submitted by postal mail. In addition, the 2009 Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act amended UOCAVA, requiring that all states offer an electronic means for FPCA submission. UOCAVA voters may submit their FPCA by fax, online (either by email or through the state's online voter registration portal), or by other modes as allowed by state law.

States are required to allow ballot transmission and return by postal mail for UOCAVA ballots. In 2022, the most common additional methods for transmitting UOCAVA ballots were email and fax. Email was allowed in 85.7% of states, and fax was allowed in 69.6% of states. Twenty-nine states reported accepting UOCAVA ballots submitted through the state's online ballot delivery portal. Some states reported that UOCAVA ballots can be submitted by some other method; for example, Washington and Wisconsin specified in comments that they allow in-person ballot submission, whereas Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Virginia commented that they allow some other commercial or private delivery service. After postal mail, email⁶² and fax were the two most common methods that states allowed UOCAVA voters to return their ballots (50% and 53.6% respectively), followed by the state's online voter registration portal (21.4%).⁶³

States differ in the length of time voters remain eligible to receive UOCAVA ballots after submitting an FPCA; that is, the period of time or number of elections for which a voter can retain their UOCAVA status and have an absentee ballot transmitted to them.⁶⁴ Over one-third of states reported that the length of time the FPCA will serve as a ballot request mechanism is a specified number of calendar years. In most of those states, the length of time is one year, although in North Dakota, it is two years. In other states, the length of time is measured by the number of general election cycles (12.5%); Arkansas, Arizona, Delaware, and Kentucky specified a length of one general election cycle, and Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Utah specified two general election

⁶¹ Information on the deadline by which voters must cure errors or missing information on their mailed ballots was collected in item Q20b of the Policy Survey.

⁶² Louisiana and Texas only allow email in certain special circumstances.

⁶³ Information on the methods by which a state transmits blank UOCAVA ballots was collected in item Q27 of the Policy Survey. Information on the methods a state allows UOCAVA voters to return their voted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item Q28 of the Policy Survey.

⁶⁴ Information on how long UOCAVA voters remain eligible to receive absentee ballots was collected in item Q29 of the Policy Survey.



cycles. Some states (8.9%) reported that they will use the FPCA as a ballot request mechanism until the voter moves from their residence.⁶⁵

Almost 40% of states provided a description of another length of time that was unlisted in the Policy Survey question, with some states reporting a time linked with either a specific election timeline or a length of time tied to the submission of the FPCA. Nevada reported that voters retain their status until the end of the following calendar year, and Maine reported that the status remains eligible for 18 months. American Samoa and Washington specified a timeline based on changes to a voter's registration record. California and North Carolina reported that eligibility remains permanent. Voters remain eligible to request absentee ballots for every election in Idaho until they move but must make a separate request for every election. The U.S. Virgin Islands also reported that they require absentee ballots to be requested each election cycle, and Puerto Rico indicated that voters must file absentee voting requests for each voting event.

UOCAVA Voting Deadlines

In addition to reporting deadlines for mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters, the 2022 Policy Survey asked states to report deadlines for ballots submitted by both uniformed services voters residing in the United States and overseas UOCAVA voters. States provided information on both postmark deadlines and ballot receipt deadlines as applicable. In 2022, the postmark deadline for domestic uniformed services voters was Election Day in 42.9% of states, a slight drop from 2020; however, in Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah, the postmark deadline was one day before Election Day. Just under half of the states (45.5%) reported that ballots had to have been received by Election Day. Additionally, 43.6% of the states indicated that the ballots must have been received by a specified number of calendar days after Election Day (with responses ranging from two to 20 days after Election Day), and 10.9% of states indicated that the ballots must have been received by a specified number of business days after Election Day (with responses ranging from three to 10 days after Election Day).⁶⁶

For overseas UOCAVA voters, Election Day was the postmark deadline in about half of the states (48.2%). Like above, Iowa and North Dakota also reported having a postmark deadline one day before Election Day for these voters. Ballots in 43.6% of the states were required to be received by Election Day. Additionally, 43.6% of states indicated that the ballots must have been received by a specified number of calendar days after Election Day (ranging from two to 20 days), and 12.7% of states indicated that the ballots must have been received by a specified number of business days after Election Day (ranging from three to 10 days). Eighteen states reported that they have the same postmark requirements for UOCAVA ballots and mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters. Seven states indicated that the requirements are different.^{67, 68}

⁶⁵ This information is provided by the U.S. Postal Service or the voter.

⁶⁶ Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by uniformed services members residing in the United States was collected in item Q30 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q29 of the 2020 Policy Survey.

⁶⁷ Thirty-one states did not provide a response to this item; 32 states indicated in Q21 that they did not require a postmark for returning a non-UOCAVA mail ballot.

⁶⁸ Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by overseas UOCAVA voters was collected in item Q31 in the Policy Survey. Information on the differences between postmark requirements for UOCAVA and non-UOCAVA voters was collected in item Q32 in the Policy Survey.



For more information about how UOCAVA voters participated in the 2022 general election, including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected, and the use of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB), see Chapter 4 of this report.

In-Person Voting

In the traditional image of voting in America, voters physically travel to their local polling place or election office and cast their ballots in person on Election Day. Voters may cast their ballots in person at a polling location to which they are assigned based on the address on their voter registration records, or, if state law allows, may have the option to vote at any polling location within their jurisdiction. Although other methods of voting have become common in recent years, in-person voting is still used by a majority of voters in federal general elections.

Vote Centers

Vote centers are physical locations where voters from multiple precincts may cast their ballots (i.e., voters are not assigned to one location). Jurisdictions that use vote centers allow voters to cast their ballots at any vote center in their jurisdiction rather than needing to vote at a specifically assigned polling place. The 2022 Policy Survey asked whether any of the state's jurisdictions allow voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote center in their jurisdiction and to describe how vote centers operate.

Over one-half of states (58.2%) reported allowing voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote center in the voter's jurisdiction, an increase from just over one-third in 2020. Fourteen of those states (43.8%) indicated that they require the use of vote centers statewide, a significant increase from 2020. Kansas, Tennessee, and Texas reported having vote centers, but only in jurisdictions that meet certain requirements, whereas another 15 of those states (46.9%) reported having vote centers, but jurisdictions have the option not to implement them.⁶⁹

In-Person Voting Before Election Day

Almost all states⁷⁰ reported that they allow individuals to vote in person before Election Day (not including the hand delivery of mail ballots). This type of voting generally falls into two categories:

- A voter may go to a polling place before Election Day, receive a ballot, vote their ballot while at the polling place, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.
- A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the voter may be able to take their ballot home with them, whereas in other states, the ballot must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.

The former type of voting is usually referred to as “in-person early voting” and the latter type is usually referred to as “in-person absentee voting,” although these terms are not used consistently across states. Some states use only one type of in-person voting before Election Day, while others use both. Thirty-two states (57.1%) reported having in-person early voting and 29 states (51.8%)

⁶⁹ Information on whether any jurisdictions within a state will allow voters to cast ballots at any polling location or vote center in their jurisdiction was collected in item Q26 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q25 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Information on how vote centers operate was collected in item Q26a of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q25a of the 2020 Policy Survey.

⁷⁰ Pennsylvania did not allow in-person voting before Election Day for the 2022 general election.



Table 4. Examples of Unique Descriptions of In-Person Early Voting

State	Description of In-Person Early Voting
American Samoa	Local absentee voting
Hawaii	In-person voting
Idaho	Early voting
Indiana	The in-person early voting process consists of casting an absentee ballot.
Kansas	Advance voting
Kentucky	In-person, no-excuse absentee voting
North Carolina	One-stop and early voting
Oregon	Members of specific populations can receive a ballot from their county elections office and they may choose to vote there or take it with them to return at a later date/time.
Washington	In-person voting

Source: State descriptions of in-person early voting were collected in item Q25 of the Policy Survey.

reported having in-person absentee voting; among these states, 11 reported having both.⁷¹ Nine states specified unique descriptions for early voting, as seen in Table 4. Nine states (16.1%) reported requiring an excuse to vote in person before Election Day,⁷² a decrease from 12 that reported this policy in 2020 and 15 in 2018.^{73, 74} In-person early voting tended to start in mid to late October⁷⁵ and last until early November 2022 shortly before Election Day in most states.⁷⁶ In California, Kansas, and Utah, dates varied by jurisdiction and Hawaii's dates varied by location.⁷⁷

⁷¹ Information on the terminology used to describe the process of voting in person before Election Day was collected in item Q25 of the Policy Survey.

⁷² Pennsylvania did not provide a response to this item.

⁷³ In Missouri, an excuse is required for four weeks of the absentee voting period; voters may vote with no excuse two weeks prior to the election. In Maine, voters may request an absentee ballot without a reason up to the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date through Election Day, voters who meet requirements for a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot but are required to provide an excuse. New York does not require an excuse for in-person early voting but does require an excuse for in-person absentee voting. Information on whether an excuse is required for voters to participate in voting in person prior to Election Day was collected in item Q25a of the 2022 Policy Survey, Q24a of the 2020 Policy Survey, and Q12a of the 2018 Policy Survey.

⁷⁴ In Missouri, an excuse is required for four weeks of the absentee voting period; voters may vote with not excuse two weeks prior to the election. In Maine, voters may request an absentee ballot without a reason up to the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date through Election Day, voters who meet requirements for a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot but are required to provide an excuse. New York does not require an excuse for in-person early voting but does require an excuse for in-person absentee voting.

⁷⁵ Thirteen states listed a start date between September 9, 2022 and October 7, 2022, whereas the Northern Mariana Islands and Oklahoma listed a start date in early November 2022.

⁷⁶ The U.S. Virgin Islands was the only one to list a final day that was not in November—their final day was October 31, 2022.

⁷⁷ Colorado commented that although October 24, 2022 was the first day that jurisdictions were required to have in-person polling locations open, some may choose to start in-person voting earlier than that.



Oregon, a vote-by-mail state, does not have early voting, but does allow in-person voting in specific circumstances. For example, if a voter loses or spoils their ballot, they may appear at a local elections office to be issued a new ballot; this is allowed through 8:00 p.m. on the night of the election.⁷⁸

Voter Identification

Under HAVA, Congress established minimum identification standards that an individual must meet in order to register to vote:

- Individuals who register to vote at their state’s motor vehicles agency, another government agency, or using an online registration portal are typically authenticated by presenting appropriate documentation to the government agency and by the state matching the person’s driver’s license number or last four digits of their social security number to an existing state record.
- Individuals who register by mail and who have not voted before for federal office in their state of residence are required to present, at some point before voting, either a current and valid photo identification or a copy of a utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the person’s name and address.
- Individuals who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under UOCAVA or entitled to vote other than in person under the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act or other federal law are exempt from HAVA’s identification requirements.⁷⁹

The definition of voter identification varies by state. In some states, it can mean a government-issued document with a photograph, whereas in other states, it can mean a voter-executed affidavit affirming identity. For in-person, non-first time voting, whether before or on Election Day, most states (63.6%) reported that they require voters to present an acceptable form of identification in order to cast a ballot in person. For 62.9% of those states, photo identification as proof of their identity was required.⁸⁰ In the case that a voter does not have an acceptable form of identification at the polling site, 82.9% of states that require identification reported that the voter may cast a provisional ballot. Just under half (48.6%) of states reported that the voter must return at a later time to present appropriate identification to the election officials before their ballot can be counted. In over one-fifth of states, voters can sign an affidavit affirming their identity, with no other action required for the voter to vote. Additionally, in one-fifth of states, another person may formally vouch for the voter’s identity.⁸¹ These states mentioned examples such as another voter

Wisconsin noted that the reported timeframe is when in-person voting may be held, but each municipality determines the specific days and times within the reported timeframe that they will offer the option to their voters.

⁷⁸ Information on the calendar dates for the beginning of the early voting period and end of the early voting period was collected in item Q25b of the Policy Survey.

⁷⁹ 52 USC 21083 (b)(3)(C)

⁸⁰ Information on establishing a voter’s identity during in-person voting was collected in item Q37 of the Policy Survey. Information on whether photo identification is required for voters to establish their identity for in-person voting was collected in item Q37a of the Policy Survey.

⁸¹ Information on what happens if a person does not have acceptable identification at the polling site was collected in item Q37b of the Policy Survey.



registered to vote in the same precinct, a precinct election official, an adult or poll worker who has known the voter for six months, and a village or county mayor.⁸²

In Kentucky and Massachusetts, the deadline by which voters were required to present appropriate identification to verify their identity and have their provisional ballots accepted and counted was Election Day in 2022. Fifteen other states reported deadline dates that varied from the day after Election Day (i.e., November 9, 2022) up to November 21, 2022.⁸³

Provisional Voting

The EAC has issued best practices on the development of provisional voting procedures and notice to voters to ensure provisional voting procedures are fair, transparent, effective, and consistently applied to all voters in the state. The EAC states in its *Best Practices on Provisional Voting* report:

Section 302 of HAVA creates the right for potential voters to cast provisional ballots in the event their names do not appear on the registration list or the voters' eligibility is challenged by an election official. The issuance of a provisional ballot is best described as a safety net or fail-safe for the voter, in that:

- It maintains the person's intent to vote and selections until election officials determine that the person does or does not have the right to cast a ballot in the election.
- It allows the determination of the voter's eligibility to be made at a time when more perfect or complete information is available either from the voter or from the election jurisdiction.⁸⁴

HAVA specifies minimum requirements for notice to voters and provides opportunities for voters to resolve eligibility issues. Within the federal framework, states have different methods of complying with the provisional notification to voter requirements, using different technology and different timetables. State and local election officials ultimately apply their policies, procedures, and state legal requirements when deciding whether to count a provisional ballot. For example, a state that has a stricter standard for the identification of voters than is contained in HAVA would apply its standard to determine if a given provisional ballot meets the state's ID standard.

Fifty states and territories reported using provisional ballots, and the reasons for offering provisional ballots varied.⁸⁵ The most common reason for having a voter cast a provisional ballot was that a voter's name does not appear on the list of eligible voters, followed by situations

⁸² In some of these examples, an extra step was required to verify the voter's identity (e.g., in the case where a precinct election official was vouching for the voter's identity, both parties were required to sign an affidavit).

⁸³ Information on the deadline by which voters must present the appropriate identification to verify their identity and have their provisional ballot accepted and counted was collected in item Q37c of the Policy Survey.

⁸⁴ U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, February 27). *Best Practices on Provisional Voting*. <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/02/27/eac-best-practices-on-provisional-voting/>.

⁸⁵ States that reported not using provisional ballots were largely NVRA-exempt states.



where an election official has asserted an individual is not eligible to vote.⁸⁶ Table 5 provides a full list of reasons the states use provisional ballots.

Table 5. States That Use Provisional Ballots Most Often Do So When a Voter's Name Does Not Appear on the List of Eligible Voters

Reason for Offering Voters a Provisional Ballot	Percentage of States That Use Provisional Voting and Offer Provisional Ballots for the Listed Reason
A voter's name does not appear on the list of eligible voters.	88%
An election official asserts that an individual is not eligible to vote.	82%
A voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they are attempting to vote.	80%
A voter does not have proper identification (as defined by state law).	80%
Another person (not an election official) challenges a voter's qualifications, and the poll worker is not able to resolve the challenge.	56%
A voter has changed their name or address (within the election jurisdiction) but has not updated their voter registration to reflect the new information.	54%
A federal or state judge extends the polling place hours in a federal election.	50%
A voter was issued a mail ballot, chooses to vote in person instead, and does not have the mail ballot to surrender to poll workers.	48%
Other	24%

Source: Information on the circumstances under which a state uses provisional ballots was collected in item Q33a of the Policy Survey.

After the election, many states have a limited amount of time in which to adjudicate provisional ballots and decide whether the ballots will be counted (either in full or in part) or rejected. In 27.1% of states, this deadline is by a specified date; for the November 8, 2022 general election, these dates ranged from November 8, 2022 to November 28, 2022. Thirty-five states (72.9%) indicated that this deadline is specified as a number of calendar days or business days after Election Day.^{87, 88}

⁸⁶ Information on whether states use provisional ballots was collected in item Q33 of the Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances under which a state will use provisional ballots was collected in item Q33a of the Policy Survey.

⁸⁷ Twenty-five states reported 1 to 30 calendar days after Election Day, and 10 states reported 1 to 7 business days after Election Day.

⁸⁸ Information on the deadlines for adjudicating provisional ballots was collected in item Q33b of the Policy Survey.



Five (10.2%) of the states that use provisional ballots reported provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct would be fully counted, and 40.8% of the states reported that they would be partially counted.⁸⁹ About half of the states reported that these ballots would be rejected fully. An elected or appointed group, such as a Board of Canvassers or a Board of Elections, is responsible for reviewing provisional ballot information to determine if the ballots are eligible to be counted in the majority of states (56%) that use provisional ballots. Other states report that this may be done by a single election official (14%) or more than one election official (16%). American Samoa, Arizona, Maryland, Maine, Missouri, Oregon, and Pennsylvania specified other sources.⁹⁰

In most cases, the person or entity that ultimately certifies the eligibility of provisional ballots is the same as the person or entity that reviews provisional ballots to determine if they are eligible to be counted. In 36% of states, this is not the case. Most of these states explained a process where an initial person or entity (most commonly a county clerk or local election staff) does a first review to gather information on the eligibility of a provisional ballot, and then presents these findings for final determination to a second person or entity (most commonly a review board—e.g., a board of canvassers).⁹¹

Election Technology

Voting system testing and certification are required in the majority of states (78.6%) by statute, and a few states (12.5%) indicated that they require testing and certification through a formal administrative rule or guidance. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Mississippi, and Puerto Rico reported that voting system testing and certification before the system's approval for purchase is not required. The 2022 Policy Survey then asked states to describe their policies regarding the role of the EAC and federal testing and certification. States most commonly reported requiring testing by an EAC-accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL; 49%), state and federal certification (47.1%), and/or EAC-adopted Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VMSG; 43.1%; see Figure 7).⁹²

⁸⁹ For example, a state might only count items on the ballot for which the voter would have been eligible had they voted in the correct precinct.


⁹⁰ Information on how states will treat a provisional ballot if it is cast in the wrong precinct was collected in item Q33c of the Policy Survey. Information on who is responsible for reviewing provisional ballot information to determine if the ballots are eligible to be counted was collected in item Q33d of the Policy Survey.

⁹¹ Information on whether the person verifying or certifying the eligibility of the provisional ballots and the person reviewing provisional ballots to determine if they are eligible to be counted was collected in item Q33e of the Policy Survey.

⁹² Information on voting system testing and certification policies was collected in items Q14 and Q14a of the Policy Survey.



Figure 7. States That Require Voting System Testing Most Commonly Require Testing From an EAC-Accredited VSTL



Source: Information on voting equipment testing and certification policy was collected in item Q14a of the Policy Survey.

Some states provided clarifying comments. The District of Columbia reported that it requires that voting systems must meet or exceed HAVA standards and/or be federally certified. Similarly, Oregon reported that the system must be EAC certified or examined by a federally accredited VSTL. Maine indicated that federal EAC certification according to VVSG is required or preferred, but testing based on another state certification program may be acceptable. Alaska reported that it may approve a voting system upon consideration by an election administrator,⁹³ and Wyoming required the voting system to have been implemented for use in at least two other states.

Although there is no testing or certification of electronic poll books—sometimes called e-poll books—on the federal level,⁹⁴ many states have their own process for testing or certifying these machines before approving them for purchase. Of the 41 states (73.2%) that reported using e-poll books either statewide or only in certain jurisdictions, 41.5% indicated that they do not require testing or certification before the e-poll books' approval for purchase. In another 41.5% of the states that reported having e-poll book requirements, the testing and certification are required by

⁹³ AK Stat § 15.20.910 (2016).

⁹⁴ As of the time of this report's publication, the EAC is developing a pilot program for testing and certifying e-poll books.



statute, whereas in 17.1% of the states, testing and certification are required by a formal administrative rule or guidance.⁹⁵

The 2022 Policy Survey asked whether any jurisdictions in the state use e-poll books and whether testing and certification are required before e-poll books' "approval for purchase." The Policy Survey and EAVS did not collect data on other procedures a jurisdiction may require before authorizing the use of e-poll books, including but not limited to pre-election testing, secure physical storage, contingency planning, chain-of-custody practices, and poll worker training.

Recounts, Audits, and Election Certification

Before state and local election officials certify the results of an election, they take steps to verify that all established election procedures were followed and that all voting equipment functioned properly. The Policy Survey asked states about the activities that took place after ballots were counted, special circumstances that occur when certifying election results, and the context behind these activities. Many states require additional post-election verification that the counting process was accurate. These additional verifications may take the form of a partial recount (in which ballots in randomly selected precincts are counted a second time to ensure that the initial tabulation of votes was accurate) or a more detailed audit (in which the entire voting process is reviewed and key steps are verified).

Recounts


An election recount is a repeat tabulation of votes cast in an election, and it is used to determine the accuracy of an initial count. Many recounts may be of only one contest or portions of contest. Recounts may be conducted for a variety of reasons and repeat tabulations may be conducted in a variety of ways. The 2022 Policy Survey collected data on the reasons a recount could be conducted for the 2022 general election (Figure 8); these questions did not ask if the reasons for a recount were automatic, mandatory, or triggered, or whether states actually conducted the recount for one of the specified reasons. States reported that the most common reason a recount may be conducted is at the request of an affected candidate or party (60%). Less common reasons were if the results of a contest were within a specified margin (47.3%) or that a court ordered that a recount be conducted (45.5%). Among the listed response options in the survey question, four states indicated other reasons that a jurisdiction within their state may conduct a post-election recount.⁹⁶ In Idaho, for example, the Secretary of State also conducts post-election recounts where ballots are manually counted in randomly selected jurisdictions and precincts. In Texas, a losing candidate in an election that used electronic voting systems can request a recount no matter how wide the margin. Additionally, Mississippi noted that although the state does not have recount procedures, a candidate who was on the ballot may conduct a ballot box examination within 12 days of election certification to review its contents under the supervision of a county circuit clerk; the candidate may choose to tally the votes in anticipation of a challenge to an election.

⁹⁵ Information on poll books was collected in items Q15 and Q15a of the Policy Survey. Illinois did not provide a response to this item.

⁹⁶ Information on state policies regarding election recounts was collected in item Q35 of the Policy Survey.



Figure 8. Post-Election Recounts Can Most Often Be Conducted at the Request of an Affected Candidate or Party



Source: Information on post-election recount policy was collected in item Q35 of the Policy Survey.

States conduct recounts in multiple ways. Most (60%) states reported that recounts can be conducted via a machine recount of paper ballots or voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT), whereas 51% reported a manual recount of paper ballots or VVPAT.⁹⁷ Some states explained other ways or additional circumstances that determine how recounts are done; for example, Nevada reported that recounts must be conducted in the same manner in which the election was conducted, and in Idaho, a regular recount entails manually tabulating a sample of ballots followed by a run through the electronic tabulator—if the results align within a small margin of error, then all remaining ballots are counted through the tabulator. Otherwise, all ballots are recounted manually. In some states, a candidate or a court can specify the manner in which the recount is done, or this can vary by the locality.

Audits

The 2022 Policy Survey expanded the series of questions asking states to report their auditing activities, this time focusing on specific types of audits both before and after an election. These auditing activities are defined in Table 6.

⁹⁷ Information on how recounts are conducted was collected in item Q35a of the Policy Survey.



Table 6. Auditing Activities Before and After an Election

Auditing Activity	Definition
Access audit	An assessment of whether legal procedures were followed to ensure the election’s accessibility to voters with disabilities.
Ballot design audit	An assessment of the usability of the ballot(s) in an election, often focusing particularly on voters with disabilities or voters who use ballots in languages other than English.
Ballot reconciliation audit	A comparison of the published election results with the number of voters who signed poll books during in-person voting or whose mail ballot envelopes were checked in.
Compliance audit or procedural audit	An audit that examines whether the established processes and procedures were followed throughout the election.
Eligibility audit	A process to verify that the ballots that were counted were legally cast.
Legal audit	An assessment of whether election practices comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws.
Logic and accuracy testing	A test to examine whether voting machines are tabulating votes correctly before vote tabulation begins, usually by creating a test deck of ballots and running them through the machines.
Post-election tabulation audit	A sample of ballots are selected and re-tabulated, and the results are compared to the originally reported vote totals.

Source: Information on the type of audits states conduct was collected in item Q36 of the Policy Survey. States were able to specify other types of audits that were unlisted in the question item.

Nearly all states reported conducting logic and accuracy testing (94.6%), which examines whether voting machines are tabulating votes correctly before vote tabulation begins. The majority of states (76.4%) also reported conducting some form of post-election tabulation audits, which is when a sample of ballots are selected and retabulated and the results are compared to the originally reported vote totals. The least common auditing activities were legal audits (conducted in New Hampshire and South Carolina) and ballot design audits (conducted in American Samoa).⁹⁸ Some states reported additional auditing procedures not listed in the survey options. North Carolina, for example, conducts close-contest⁹⁹ audits and audits of provisional ballots that are counted to ensure that the proper procedures were followed. As part of their auditing procedures, Maryland conducts a comprehensive audit that includes 17 separate audits of the voting system, polling place operations, and post-election conciliation. Alabama piloted a post-election audit in three jurisdictions, and Kentucky reported piloting a risk-limiting audit that will


⁹⁸ Information on the type of post-election audits states conduct was collected in item Q36 of the Policy Survey.

⁹⁹ North Carolina did not define what the threshold was for a “close contest.”



become a statewide process in 2023. Additionally, Kentucky requires the attorney general to randomly select 12 jurisdictions to conduct their own audit. Figure 9 displays the different types of auditing activities that states conduct.

Figure 9. Most Common Auditing Activities were Logic and Accuracy Testing and Post-Election Tabulation Audits



Source: Information on auditing activities was collected in item Q36 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

States that conduct post-election audits most commonly indicated that they are conducted as a statutory requirement (92.9%). Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, and Utah stated that they conduct an audit as required by a formal administrative rule or guidance.¹⁰⁰ In Oklahoma, although post-election tabulation audits are optional under state law, they will be authorized by the Secretary of State Election Board.¹⁰¹ The Policy Survey did not collect information on whether these audits were mandatory, triggered, or conducted only in certain circumstances.

The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to report which of the following post-election tabulation audits would be required for the 2022 general election. States could select multiple options as applicable:

- A traditional, manual tabulation audit that comes from a fixed percentage of randomly selected voting districts or voting machines and is compared to the results produced by the voting system;

¹⁰⁰ Information on whether states require post-election tabulation audits was collected in item Q36a of the Policy Survey.

¹⁰¹ See 26 O.S. Section 3-130.



- A traditional, machine tabulation audit that involves the same procedure as above but involves machine, rather than manual, counting;
- A risk-limiting tabulation audit that is a protocol designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect election outcome by using statistical methods to select the audit sample size; or
- Another type of audit.

Almost two-thirds of the states reported requiring a traditional manual tabulation audit, and just under one-fourth reported requiring a traditional machine tabulation audit. Additionally, about one-fifth of the states reported requiring a risk-limiting tabulation audit.¹⁰² Eleven states (26.2%) provided comments detailing alternative procedures. For example, California stated that a jurisdiction may choose to conduct a risk-limiting audit instead of a traditional tabulation audit, and Pennsylvania reported that its local jurisdictions may be performing a risk-limiting audit, but the details have not yet been finalized and are not statutorily required.

Some states reported having additional steps in their tabulation audit processes. For example, Maryland stated that it conducts a traditional manual audit as well as a completely automated tabulation audit using ballot images. New York noted that although an audit may be conducted using an automated audit tool (similar to machine tabulation), there is still a component that requires manual review based on the overall number of ballots being audited. Washington reported that local election officials can choose among several methods to meet the state post-election tabulation audit requirement, including the option for a risk-limiting audit. South Carolina detailed a process where an independent, third-party vendor uses ballot images to tabulate all ballots cast throughout the state, the results of which are compared to the results produced by the voting system vendor.

Election Certification

State and federal election results are not final until the state completes their official certification. The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to provide their election certification deadlines for the 2022 general election.¹⁰³ The range was broad,¹⁰⁴ with 47 states reporting a date between November 15, 2022 and December 8, 2022.¹⁰⁵ States provided clarifying comments on their specific policies regarding their certification deadline. For example, Delaware, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island reported not having a specific state certification deadline, and the District of Columbia and Louisiana noted that their reported dates were tentative deadlines. Additionally, Alaska commented that their reported date was a target deadline, and North Carolina noted their reported deadline was barring recounts or protests in individual races.

¹⁰² Information on the type of post-election tabulation audit that states require was collected in item Q36b of the Policy Survey.

¹⁰³ Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in 2022.

¹⁰⁴ The range was as early as November 10, 2022 in Delaware and as late as December 8, 2022 in Illinois.

¹⁰⁵ Information on deadlines for certifying the November 2022 general election results was collected in item Q34 of the Policy Survey.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Policy Survey Table 1: State Voter Registration Databases

State	Type of Database	Frequency of Information Transmission From Local Jurisdictions	Electronic Data Transfers		
			Motor Vehicle Agency	Agencies Serving People with Disabilities	State Public Assistance Agencies
Alabama	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Alaska	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
American Samoa	Top-down	--	--	--	--
Arizona	Hybrid	Real time only	Real time	--	--
Arkansas	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
California	Bottom-up	Real time only	Real time	--	--
Colorado	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Connecticut	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Delaware	Top-down	--	Real time	On demand	On demand
District of Columbia	Top-down	--	Real time	--	--
Florida	Hybrid	Real time and daily	Daily	--	--
Georgia	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Guam	Top-down	--	On demand	--	--
Hawaii	Hybrid	Real time only	Other	--	--
Idaho	Hybrid	Real time only	On demand	--	--
Illinois	Bottom-up	Daily only	Daily	Real time	Real time
Indiana	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Iowa	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Kansas	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Kentucky	Top-down	--	Real time	--	--
Louisiana	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Maine	Hybrid	Real time only	Daily	--	--
Maryland	Top-down	--	Daily	Daily	Daily
Massachusetts	Top-down	--	Daily	--	Daily
Michigan	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Minnesota	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Mississippi	Top-down	--	Real time	--	--
Missouri	Bottom-up	Real time only	Daily	--	--
Montana	Top-down	--	Weekly	--	--
Nebraska [1]	Top-down	--	Other	--	--
Nevada	Bottom-up	Daily only	Daily	--	--
New Hampshire	Top-down	--	Other	--	--
New Jersey	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
New Mexico	Top-down	--	Real time	--	--
New York	Bottom-up	Real time only	--	--	--
North Carolina	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--



State	Type of Database	Frequency of Information Transmission From Local Jurisdictions	Electronic Data Transfers		
			Motor Vehicle Agency	Agencies Serving People with Disabilities	State Public Assistance Agencies
North Dakota	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	Top-down	--	--	--	--
Ohio	Bottom-up	Real time only	Daily	--	--
Oklahoma	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Oregon	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Pennsylvania	Top-down	--	Daily	Real time	Real time
Puerto Rico [2]	N/A	N/A	--	--	--
Rhode Island	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
South Carolina	Top-down	--	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly
South Dakota	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Tennessee	Bottom-up	Daily only	Monthly	--	--
Texas [3]	Hybrid	Real time and daily	Daily	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	Top-down	--	--	--	--
Utah [4]	Hybrid	Real time only	Daily	Weekly	Weekly
Vermont	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Virginia	Top-down	--	Real time	--	--
Washington	Hybrid	Real time only	Real time	Real time	Real time
West Virginia	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--
Wisconsin [5]	Top-down	--	Other	--	--
Wyoming	Top-down	--	Daily	--	--



State	Electronic Data Transfers					
	Other State Agencies	Federal Agencies	Military Recruiting Offices	Entities that Maintain Death Records	Entities that Maintain Felony Records	Entities that Maintain Records of Individuals Declared Mentally Incompetent
Alabama	--	--	--	Daily	Daily	--
Alaska	Other	--	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Arizona	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arkansas	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
California	--	--	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
Colorado	--	--	--	Monthly	Daily	--
Connecticut	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Delaware	--	On demand	On demand	Monthly	On demand	On demand
District of Columbia	--	--	--	Other	--	--
Florida	--	--	--	Daily	Daily	--
Georgia	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	--	--	--	Monthly	--	--
Idaho	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	Real time	--	--	Other	Weekly	--
Indiana	--	--	--	Monthly	Daily	--
Iowa	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	--	--	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
Kentucky	--	--	--	--	--	--
Louisiana	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Maine	--	--	--	Monthly	--	--
Maryland	Daily	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	Other
Massachusetts	--	--	--	--	--	--
Michigan	--	--	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	Daily	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
Mississippi	--	--	--	Real time	Real time	--
Missouri	--	--	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
Montana	--	--	--	Monthly	Weekly	--
Nebraska [1]	--	--	--	Weekly	Monthly	--
Nevada	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Hampshire	--	Other	--	Other	--	--
New Jersey	--	--	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
New Mexico	--	--	--	Other	Other	--
New York	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
North Carolina	--	--	--	Monthly	Daily	--
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Electronic Data Transfers					
	Other State Agencies	Federal Agencies	Military Recruiting Offices	Entities that Maintain Death Records	Entities that Maintain Felony Records	Entities that Maintain Records of Individuals Declared Mentally Incompetent
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	Monthly	Daily	--
Ohio	--	--	--	Monthly	--	--
Oklahoma	--	--	--	--	--	--
Oregon	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	--	--	--	Other	--	--
Puerto Rico [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
South Carolina	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
South Dakota	--	--	--	Daily	Daily	Daily
Tennessee	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Texas [3]	--	--	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	On demand	--
Utah [4]	Weekly	Weekly	Monthly	Other	Monthly	Other
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia	--	--	--	Other	Monthly	Monthly
Washington	Real time	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
West Virginia	--	--	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Wisconsin [5]	--	--	--	Monthly	Daily	--
Wyoming	--	--	--	Weekly	Weekly	--

Policy Survey Table 1 Calculation Notes:

Type of Database uses question Q3.

Frequency of Information Transmission From Local Jurisdictions uses question Q3a.

Electronic Data Transfers, Motor Vehicle Agency uses question Q4a.

Electronic Data Transfers, Agencies Serving People with Disabilities uses question Q4b.

Electronic Data Transfers, State Public Assistance Agencies uses question Q4c.

Electronic Data Transfers, Other State Agencies uses question Q4d.

Electronic Data Transfers, Federal Agencies uses question Q4e.

Electronic Data Transfers, Military Recruiting Offices uses question Q4f.

Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Death Records uses question Q4g.

Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Felony Records uses question Q4h.

Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Records of Individuals Declared Mentally Incompetent uses question Q4i.

Policy Survey Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q3 and Q4 were single-select questions. Q3a allowed states to select multiple responses.



- [1] Nebraska verifies driver's license/state ID and SSN information with real-time data transfers. Voter registrations at DMV, surrendered IDs, changed IDs, SSNs needing verification from the Social Security Administration, and DMV signatures are acquired via daily transfers.
- [2] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
- [3] Most counties transmit data in real time, but larger counties transmit data overnight.
- [4] All data entry is done by the local jurisdictions. The state hosts and maintains the voter registration platform.
- [5] Wisconsin receives data from the state's motor vehicle agency in real time when a voter is completing a registration online, and receives data daily during full DMV checks run against voter registrations that were created or updated with certain data into the database in the 24 hours prior to the full DMV checks. Wisconsin receives some competency data electronically by email from the courts.

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Policy Survey Table 2: Voter Registration Policies

State	Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election				Minimum Age for Pre-Registration
	Election Day	In-Person Early Voting	Registration Overlap	Other Cases	
Alabama	--	--	--	--	17.5
Alaska	--	--	--	--	17
American Samoa [1]	No	Yes	No	No	17
Arizona	--	--	--	--	16
Arkansas [2]	--	--	--	--	17
California	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	16
Colorado	Yes	Yes	No	No	16
Connecticut	Yes	No	No	No	17
Delaware	--	--	--	--	16
District of Columbia [3]	Yes	Yes	No	No	16
Florida	--	--	--	--	16
Georgia	--	--	--	--	17.5
Guam	--	--	--	--	16
Hawaii	Yes	Yes	No	No	16
Idaho	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17
Illinois [4]	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17
Indiana [5]	--	--	--	--	17
Iowa	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17
Kansas	--	--	--	--	17
Kentucky	--	--	--	--	17
Louisiana [6]	--	--	--	--	16
Maine	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	16
Maryland	Yes	Yes	No	No	16
Massachusetts [7]	No	No	Yes	No	16
Michigan	Yes	Yes	No	No	17.5
Minnesota	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	17
Missouri	--	--	--	--	17.5
Montana [8]	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17
Nebraska	No	No	Yes	No	--
Nevada [9]	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17
New Hampshire [10]	Yes	No	No	No	17
New Jersey	--	--	--	--	17
New Mexico	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17
New York	--	--	--	--	16
North Carolina [11]	No	Yes	No	Yes	16
North Dakota [12]	--	--	--	--	--



State	Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election				Minimum Age for Pre-Registration
	Election Day	In-Person Early Voting	Registration Overlap	Other Cases	
Northern Mariana Islands [13]	--	--	--	--	17
Ohio	--	--	--	--	17
Oklahoma [14]	--	--	--	--	17.5
Oregon [15]	--	--	--	--	16
Pennsylvania [16]	--	--	--	--	17
Puerto Rico [17]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	14
Rhode Island	--	--	--	--	16
South Carolina [18]	--	--	--	--	17
South Dakota	--	--	--	--	17
Tennessee [19]	--	--	--	--	17
Texas	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	17.5
Utah	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	16
Vermont [20]	Yes	Yes	No	No	16
Virginia [21]	Yes	Yes	No	No	16
Washington	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	16
West Virginia [22]	--	--	--	--	17
Wisconsin [23]	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	17
Wyoming [24]	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	17

Policy Survey Table 2 Calculation Notes:

- Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Election Day** uses question Q8a.
- Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, In-Person Early Voting** uses question Q8a.
- Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Registration Overlap** uses question Q8a.
- Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Other Cases** uses question Q8a.
- Minimum Age for Pre-Registration** uses question Q9.

Policy Survey Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q8 and Q9 were single-select questions. Q8a allowed states to select multiple responses.
- Same-day registration (SDR) is defined as a voter registering to vote on the same day that they cast a ballot in person.

[1] A person may pre-register to vote during an election year so long as they turn 18 years old before the date of the election.

[2] Voter must be 18 years old on or before Election Day in order to vote.

[3] The District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) sent a ballot to every registered voter for the November 2022 general election. Since the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was passed to permanently make the District of Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction.



- [4] Seventeen-year-olds may register if they will be 18 by the date of the general election.
- [5] A person who is 17 years of age, but will be 18 years of age on or before the next general or municipal election in their precinct, may register to vote.
- [6] Individuals who are 16 years of age must register in person at the registrar or with their application for a driver's license. Individuals who are 17 years old may pre-register via any method.
- [7] There was a 1-week period during in-person early voting when voters were able to register and vote at the same time. Early voting in person began on October 22, 2022, and the voter registration deadline was October 29, 2022.
- [8] Due to a District Court decision and at the time that this survey was filled out by the State of Montana, SDR was not allowed. However, shortly after that decision, SDR was allowed by court order and the 2022 general election proceeded under that decision. Only precinct-to-precinct address changes within the same county or registrations that moved from inactive to active status are allowed on Election Day. Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-2-205 outlines the procedure when a prospective elector is not qualified at the time of registration (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0020/part_0020/section_0050/0130-0020-0020-0050.html).
- [9] Each county determines the available dates and hours during which drop boxes will be available based on facility, staffing, and security resources available to the county. Some counties have permanently installed drop boxes that are available to the public at all times for county business. Others will make drop boxes available starting in the hours of early voting.
- [10] Voters may pre-register to vote at age 17 as long as they will be 18 before the next scheduled election.
- [11] Same-day voter registration was only available during the early in-person voting period, which ran from October 20, 2022 to November 5, 2022. SDR was not available on Election Day.
- [12] North Dakota does not have voter registration.
- [13] Voters may pre-register to vote if they will turn 18 on or before Election Day.
- [14] Oklahoma does not accept absentee ballots by the postmark date; absentee ballots must be received by the county election board by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [15] Oregon's registration cutoff is 21 days before each election. A voter could register that day and request an absentee ballot, which would be mailed to them. Additionally, by registering to vote, an individual is requesting a mail ballot since Oregon is a vote-by-mail state.
- [16] Prior to the close of the voter registration period, a voter may go to their local county voter registration office, register to vote, apply for a mail ballot, and vote a mail ballot all in one visit. The mail ballot will then be canvassed and counted in the same manner as other mail ballots are canvassed and counted. A person may register to vote prior to their 18th birthday as long as they will be 18 by the upcoming election.
- [17] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
- [18] A person who will be 18 years old by the date of an election can begin registering 120 days prior to the voter registration deadline for the election, or if there is a primary associated with the election, 120 days prior to the voter registration deadline for the primary.
- [19] A 17-year-old who will be 18 by the next election in their jurisdiction can register to vote.
- [20] A person can register to vote as long as they will be 18 years old on or before the date of the general election.
- [21] Prior to October 1, 2022, 17-year-olds could pre-register according to VA Code § 24.2-403. On October 1, 2022, 16-year-olds became eligible to pre-register (see § 24.2-403.1).
- [22] West Virginia does not have formal pre-registration; however, voters who are 17 years of age may register and vote in a primary election as long as they are 18 by the general election.



[23] In Wisconsin, voters are allowed to register in the clerk's office any time through 5:00 p.m. the Friday before Election Day. They can also vote in-person absentee ballots from 2 weeks prior to the election through the Sunday prior to the election, so there is an overlap of time where they may register to vote and complete their absentee ballot on the same day at the clerk's office. Individuals who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the same day any time from the Tuesday prior to Election Day through 5:00 p.m. on Election Day. Individuals who are 17 years old and will be turning 18 by the next upcoming election may pre-register to vote.

[24] W.S. 22-3-102(a)(ii) states that an individual must "be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of the next general election."

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Policy Survey Table 3: State Mail Voting Policies

State	Excuse Required for Mail Voting	All-Mail Elections	Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters
Alabama	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities, Other
Alaska [1]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
American Samoa [2]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
Arizona [3]	No	--	Any registrant
Arkansas	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
California [4]	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting
Colorado	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting
Connecticut	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities
Delaware [5]	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities, Other
District of Columbia	No	Statewide	Any registrant
Florida [6]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Georgia [7]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Guam	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
Hawaii [8]	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting
Idaho	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Illinois [9]	No	--	Any registrant
Indiana	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
Iowa	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Kansas [10]	No	--	Persons with disabilities
Kentucky [11]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
Louisiana	Yes	--	Individuals over a specified age, Persons with disabilities
Maine [12]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Maryland	No	--	Any registrant
Massachusetts [13]	No	--	Other
Michigan [14]	No	--	Any registrant
Minnesota	No	Certain Jurisdictions	No permanent absentee voting
Mississippi	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities
Missouri	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities
Montana [15]	No	--	Any registrant
Nebraska [16]	No	Certain Jurisdictions	No permanent absentee voting
Nevada	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting
New Hampshire	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
New Jersey	No	--	Any registrant
New Mexico [17]	No	Certain Jurisdictions	No permanent absentee voting
New York	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities, Other
North Carolina	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
North Dakota [18]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Northern Mariana Islands	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Ohio	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Oklahoma [19]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Oregon	No	Statewide	Other



State	Excuse Required for Mail Voting	All-Mail Elections	Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters
Pennsylvania [20]	No	--	Any registrant
Puerto Rico [21]	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island	No	--	Persons with disabilities
South Carolina	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
South Dakota	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Tennessee [22]	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities, Other
Texas	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	--	No permanent absentee voting
Utah [23]	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting
Vermont	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting
Virginia [24]	No	--	Any registrant
Washington [25]	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting
West Virginia	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities, Other
Wisconsin [26]	No	--	Persons with disabilities, Other
Wyoming [27]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting

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State	State Allows Drop Boxes	Drop Box Operational Dates	
		First Date	Final Date
Alabama	No	--	--
Alaska [1]	Yes	09/26/2022	11/08/2022
American Samoa [2]	No	--	--
Arizona [3]	Yes	10/12/2022	11/08/2022
Arkansas	Yes	10/14/2022	11/08/2022
California [4]	Yes	10/11/2022	11/08/2022
Colorado	Yes	10/17/2022	11/08/2022
Connecticut	Yes	10/07/2022	11/08/2022
Delaware [5]	No	--	--
District of Columbia	Yes	10/14/2022	11/08/2022
Florida [6]	Yes	10/24/2022	11/08/2022
Georgia [7]	Yes	10/17/2022	11/04/2022
Guam	No	--	--
Hawaii [8]	Yes	10/19/2022	11/08/2022
Idaho	Yes	09/23/2022	11/08/2022
Illinois [9]	Yes	10/03/2022	11/08/2022
Indiana	Yes	09/01/2022	11/08/2022
Iowa	Yes	10/19/2022	11/08/2022
Kansas [10]	Yes	10/19/2022	11/08/2022
Kentucky [11]	Yes	09/24/2022	11/08/2022
Louisiana	No	--	--
Maine [12]	Yes	10/11/2022	11/08/2022
Maryland	Yes	09/26/2022	11/08/2022
Massachusetts [13]	Yes	09/15/2022	11/08/2022
Michigan [14]	Yes	09/24/2022	11/08/2022
Minnesota	Yes	09/23/2022	11/08/2022
Mississippi	No	--	--
Missouri	No	--	--
Montana [15]	Yes	10/11/2022	11/08/2022
Nebraska [16]	Yes	09/30/2022	11/08/2022
Nevada	Yes	10/22/2022	11/08/2022
New Hampshire	No	--	--
New Jersey	Yes	09/24/2022	11/08/2022
New Mexico [17]	Yes	10/11/2022	11/08/2022
New York	Yes	10/29/2022	11/08/2022
North Carolina	No	--	--
North Dakota [18]	Yes	10/31/2022	11/07/2022
Northern Mariana Islands	No	--	--
Ohio	Yes	10/12/2022	11/08/2022
Oklahoma [19]	No	--	--
Oregon	Yes	10/19/2022	11/08/2022
Pennsylvania [20]	Yes	09/21/2022	11/08/2022



State	State Allows Drop Boxes	Drop Box Operational Dates	
		First Date	Final Date
Puerto Rico [21]	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island	Yes	10/19/2022	11/08/2022
South Carolina	No	--	--
South Dakota	Yes	09/23/2022	11/07/2022
Tennessee [22]	No	--	--
Texas	No	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	--	--
Utah [23]	Yes	10/17/2022	11/08/2022
Vermont	Yes	09/24/2022	11/08/2022
Virginia [24]	Yes	09/23/2022	11/08/2022
Washington [25]	Yes	10/21/2022	11/08/2022
West Virginia	No	--	--
Wisconsin [26]	Yes	09/25/2022	11/08/2022
Wyoming [27]	Yes	09/23/2022	11/08/2022

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State	State Allows Mail Ballot Curing	Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots	Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots	Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots
Alabama	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Alaska [1]	No	--	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
American Samoa [2]	No	--	Election Day	Election Day
Arizona [3]	Yes	11/16/2022	Not required	Election Day
Arkansas	Yes	11/14/2022	Not required	Election Day
California [4]	Yes	12/06/2022	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day
Colorado	Yes	11/16/2022	Not required	Election Day
Connecticut	No	--	1 day before Election Day	Election Day
Delaware [5]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
District of Columbia	Yes	11/15/2022	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day
Florida [6]	Yes	11/10/2022	Not required	Election Day
Georgia [7]	Yes	11/11/2022	Not required	Election Day
Guam	No	--	Election Day	10 business days after Election Day
Hawaii [8]	Yes	11/16/2022	Not required	Election Day
Idaho	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Illinois [9]	Yes	11/11/2022	Election Day	14 calendar days after Election Day
Indiana	Yes	11/16/2022	Not required	Election Day
Iowa	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Kansas [10]	Yes	11/21/2022	Election Day	3 business days after Election Day
Kentucky [11]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Louisiana	Yes	11/07/2022	Not required	1 day before Election Day
Maine [12]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Maryland	Yes	11/18/2022	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
Massachusetts [13]	Yes	11/08/2022	Election Day	3 calendar days after Election Day
Michigan [14]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Minnesota	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Mississippi	Yes	11/18/2022	Election Day	5 business days after Election Day



State	State Allows Mail Ballot Curing	Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots	Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots	Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots
Missouri	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Montana [15]	Yes	11/09/2022	Not required	Election Day
Nebraska [16]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Nevada	Yes	11/14/2022	Election Day	4 calendar days after Election Day
New Hampshire	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
New Jersey	Yes	11/19/2022	Election Day	6 calendar days after Election Day
New Mexico [17]	Yes	11/25/2022	Not required	Election Day
New York	Yes	12/05/2022	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day
North Carolina	Yes	11/17/2022	Election Day	3 business days after Election Day
North Dakota [18]	No	--	1 day before Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day
Northern Mariana Islands	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Ohio	Yes	11/15/2022	1 day before Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
Oklahoma [19]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Oregon	Yes	11/29/2022	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day
Pennsylvania [20]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Puerto Rico [21]	N/A	N/A	Election Day	N/A
Rhode Island	Yes	11/15/2022	Not required	7 calendar days after Election Day
South Carolina	No	--	Not required	Election Day
South Dakota	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Tennessee [22]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Texas	Yes	11/14/2022	Election Day	1 business day after Election Day
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	--	Not required	10 calendar days after Election Day
Utah [23]	Yes	11/14/2022	1 day before Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day
Vermont	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day



State	State Allows Mail Ballot Curing	Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots	Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots	Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots
Virginia [24]	Yes	11/14/2022	Election Day	3 calendar days after Election Day
Washington [25]	Yes	11/28/2022	Election Day	20 calendar days after Election Day
West Virginia	Yes	11/14/2022	Election Day	6 calendar days after Election Day
Wisconsin [26]	Yes	11/08/2022	Not required	Election Day
Wyoming [27]	No	--	Not required	Election Day

Policy Survey Table 3 Calculation Notes:

Excuse Required for Mail Voting uses question Q16.

All-Mail Elections uses questions Q17 and Q17a.

Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters uses questions Q18 and Q18a.

State Allows Drop Boxes uses question Q19.

Drop Box Operational Dates, First Date uses question Q19c.

Drop Box Operational Dates, Final Date uses question Q19c.

State Allows Mail Ballot Curing uses question Q20.

Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots uses question Q20b.

Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots uses question Q21.

Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots uses question Q21.

Policy Survey Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q16, Q17, Q17a, Q18, Q19, Q19c, Q20, Q20b, and Q21 were single-select questions. Q18a allowed states to select multiple responses.
- An all-mail election is an election in which all registered voters or all active registered voters are automatically sent a mail ballot. Some in-person voting may take place during all-mail elections. All-mail elections may be conducted statewide or only in certain jurisdictions within a state.
- A drop box is a locked container (located either indoors or outdoors) where voters (or voters' authorized representatives, if allowed by state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. Drop boxes are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate from ballot boxes, which are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots immediately after voting in person.
- A cured mail ballot is defined as a returned mail ballot that was originally rejected for an error or because it was missing required information but was ultimately counted because the voter corrected the error or supplied the required information.

[1] Drop boxes are only available when election offices are open.

[2] If a mail ballot is received within 7 days after Election Day and it is postmarked on or before Election Day, the ballot may be counted.



- [3] The deadline to cure ballots with a missing signature was Election Day. The deadline to cure ballots with a non-matching signature was 5 business days after Election Day; for counties with a 4-business-day work week, this deadline fell on November 17, 2022.
- [4] Mail ballots needed to be postmarked on or before Election Day and received by November 15, 2022.
- [5] Absentee ballots were required to be received by the election office that issued the ballot by the close of polls on Election Day.
- [6] Mail ballots were required to be received no later than 7:00 p.m. local time on Election Day in the office of the supervisor of elections.
- [7] Drop boxes were available only during the dates and hours of advance voting.
- [8] Drop box availability varied by county and location. Drop boxes were closed on Election Day at 7:00 p.m. Regardless of postmark date, ballots were required to be received by the County Clerk's office by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [9] Election authorities shall accept any vote-by-mail ballot returned, including ballots returned with insufficient or no postage. Election authorities may maintain one or more secure collection sites for the postage-free return of vote-by-mail ballots. Any election authority with collection sites shall collect all ballots returned each day and process them as required, including noting the day on which the ballot was collected. Ballots returned to such collection sites after close of business shall be dated as delivered the next day, with the exception of ballots delivered on Election Day, which shall be dated as received on Election Day. Election authorities shall permit electors to return vote-by-mail ballots at any established collection site through the close of polls on Election Day. All collection sites shall be secured by locks that may be opened only by election authority personnel. The State Board of Elections shall establish additional guidelines for the security of collection sites.
- [10] Due to Veteran's Day, the 3rd business day after the 2022 general election was the Monday after Election Day.
- [11] Ballots were required to be received by 6:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [12] Ballots must be received by the municipal clerk by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [13] Voters with a letter from a physician, stating they are unable to vote in person are eligible to be permanent absentee voters. Only certain types of mail ballot errors may be cured (non-matching voter signature, missing voter signature, or missing/incomplete required document).
- [14] There is no formal start date for drop boxes.
- [15] Montana uses the term "absentee ballots" rather than "mail ballots." Montana uses "places of deposit" instead of "ballot drop boxes."
- [16] Counties with a population under 10,000 may apply to the Secretary of State to conduct all-mail elections for any or all of the precincts in the county for all future elections per Neb. Rev. Stat. §32-960. The only exception to the deadline to cure is if there is a non-matching signature. Non-matching signatures can be cured through the close of the provisional verification deadline (7 business days after the election). For the 2022 general election, the deadline to cure a non-matching signature was November 18.
- [17] Drop boxes are available to voters 24 hours a day, up until 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [18] The dates that drop boxes are available is set at the discretion of the counties.
- [19] Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.



- [20] Any registrant who is permanently disabled can request to be a permanent absentee voter. Any registrant can request to be a permanent mail-in voter. Voters must re-apply for a ballot every year. Voters with a permanent mail-in voter flag receive a ballot application from the county every year. If they complete the application and are eligible, mail ballots are granted for all elections that year. County election boards define the times drop boxes are open based on county election board decisions. This can vary from county to county and hence the first day of drop boxes is not a valid answer. For the last day of drop boxes, the counties can decide on this too. The ballots must be received no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted. This question is not meaningful for Pennsylvania. Specific dates cannot be selected in this question since the start date and end date varies by county. Counties are permitted (but not required) to allow voters to cure deficiencies.
- [21] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election. The voter shall return the voted ballots to the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission (PR-SEC) by mail. Ballots must be postmarked no later than the date of the voting event or general election. Valid ballots must be received by mail, on or before the last day of the voting event general canvass, to be counted.
- [22] Mail ballots must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.
- [23] Utah Code 20a-3a-401(5)(d)(ii) states that if an individual whose ballot is rejected because the signature on the individual's return envelope is not reasonably consistent with the individual's signature on their voter registration records, the individual should return an affidavit to the election office no later than 5:00 p.m. the day before the canvass in order for the individual to have their ballot counted.
- [24] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter's absentee ballot properly postmarked must be returned by noon on the 3rd day after the election. Since that day fell on a holiday after the 2022 general election, Virginia Code § 1-210 required changing the deadline to noon on Monday, November 14, 2022.
- [25] Ballot drop boxes closed at 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots were required to be postmarked by November 8, 2022 and received by the county elections office by November 28, 2022.
- [26] In Wisconsin, individuals may claim a need to be a permanent absentee voter for reasons of age (not specified), physical illness, infirmity, or disability for an indefinite period of time. Ballots can be cured for missing voter signature, missing witness signature, or missing witness address. They must be cured by no later than the close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day. Wisconsin does not track if a ballot requires a voter to cure a ballot or which ballots were counted after being cured. Due to a recent court challenge, the use of drop boxes "is not permitted under Wisconsin law unless the drop box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated alternate site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855." The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and the subsequent ambiguity created by the decision means that most drop boxes were either closed or moved into the clerk's office, and reporting would be unlikely or unnecessary given the added layer of security and placement. (see *Teigen v. WEC*, 403 Wis.2d 607). All ballots must be returned by close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day.
- [27] Drop boxes are not addressed in statute. Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.



Policy Survey Table 4: UOCAVA Voting

State	Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters		Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters	
	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt
Alabama	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day
Alaska	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	15 calendar days after Election Day
American Samoa	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Arizona	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Arkansas	Election Day	10 business days after Election Day	Election Day	10 business days after Election Day
California	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day
Colorado	Not required	8 calendar days after Election Day	Not required	8 calendar days after Election Day
Connecticut	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Delaware	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
District of Columbia	Election Day	7 business days after Election Day	Election Day	7 business days after Election Day
Florida [1]	Not required	Election Day	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
Georgia [2]	Election Day	3 business days after Election Day	Election Day	3 business days after Election Day
Guam	Election Day	10 business days after Election Day	Election Day	10 business days after Election Day
Hawaii	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Idaho	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Illinois	Election Day	14 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	14 calendar days after Election Day
Indiana [3]	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
Iowa	1 day before Election Day	6 calendar days after Election Day	1 day before Election Day	6 calendar days after Election Day
Kansas	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Kentucky	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Louisiana	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Maine	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Maryland [4]	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
Massachusetts	Election Day	3 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
Michigan	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Minnesota	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Mississippi	Election Day	5 business days after Election Day	Election Day	5 business days after Election Day
Missouri [5]	Not required	3 calendar days after Election Day	Not required	3 business days after Election Day
Montana [6]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Nebraska [7]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day



State	Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters		Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters	
	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt
Nevada	Election Day	4 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	4 calendar days after Election Day
New Hampshire [8]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
New Jersey	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
New Mexico [9]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
New York	Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day
North Carolina [10]	Not required	9 calendar days after Election Day	Not required	9 calendar days after Election Day
North Dakota	1 day before Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day	1 day before Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day
Northern Mariana Islands	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Ohio	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	10 calendar days after Election Day
Oklahoma [11]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Oregon	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	7 calendar days after Election Day
Pennsylvania [12]	Not required	7 calendar days after Election Day	Not required	7 calendar days after Election Day
Puerto Rico [13]	Election Day	N/A	Election Day	N/A
Rhode Island	Not required	7 calendar days after Election Day	Not required	7 calendar days after Election Day
South Carolina [14]	Not required	2 calendar days after Election Day	Not required	2 calendar days after Election Day
South Dakota	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Tennessee [15]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Texas	Not required	6 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	5 calendar days after Election Day
U.S. Virgin Islands	Not required	10 business days after Election Day	Not required	10 business days after Election Day
Utah [16]	1 day before Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	13 calendar days after Election Day
Vermont	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Virginia [17]	Election Day	3 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	3 calendar days after Election Day
Washington	Election Day	20 calendar days after Election Day	Election Day	20 calendar days after Election Day
West Virginia	Not required	6 calendar days after Election Day	Not required	6 calendar days after Election Day
Wisconsin [18]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Wyoming [19]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day



State	UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods	UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods
Alabama	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail, Online
Alaska	Postal mail, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Fax
American Samoa	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Arizona	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Arkansas	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail
California	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Other
Colorado	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Connecticut	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Delaware	Postal mail, Email, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
District of Columbia	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Florida [1]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Fax
Georgia [2]	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail
Guam	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Hawaii	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Idaho	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Illinois	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail
Indiana [3]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Iowa	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Kansas	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Kentucky	Postal mail, Email, Online	Postal mail
Louisiana	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Maine	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Maryland [4]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Massachusetts	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Michigan	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Minnesota	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Mississippi	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Missouri [5]	Postal mail, Email, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Montana [6]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Nebraska [7]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Nevada	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
New Hampshire [8]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail, Other
New Jersey	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
New Mexico [9]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
New York	Postal mail, Fax, Online	Postal mail
North Carolina [10]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
North Dakota	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Northern Mariana Islands	Postal mail	Postal mail
Ohio	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Oklahoma [11]	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail, Fax
Oregon	Postal mail, Online, Other	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Pennsylvania [12]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail



State	UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods	UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods
Puerto Rico [13]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Rhode Island	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail, Email, Fax
South Carolina [14]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
South Dakota	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Tennessee [15]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Texas	Postal mail, Email, Online	Postal mail, Other
U.S. Virgin Islands	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email
Utah [16]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Vermont	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail
Virginia [17]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail, Other
Washington	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
West Virginia	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Wisconsin [18]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other	Postal mail, Other
Wyoming [19]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail

Policy Survey Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Postmark uses question Q30.

Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Receipt uses question Q30.

Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Postmark uses question Q31.

Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Receipt uses question Q31.

UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods uses question Q27.

UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods uses question Q28.

Policy Survey Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q27 and Q28 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q30 and Q31 were single-select questions.

[1] Overseas voters (military and civilians) have up until 10 days after Election Day to have their ballot received for a presidential preference primary election and the general election.

[2] Because November 11, 2022 was a state holiday, the 3rd business day after the 2022 general election fell on November 14, 2022.

[3] If the board of elections is unable to determine the postmark date of an absentee ballot sent by mail, the absentee ballot may not be counted. An absentee ballot received from an overseas voter is not considered as arriving too late if both of the following apply: (1) the absentee ballot envelope is postmarked no later than the date of the election, and (2) the absentee ballot is received not later than noon 10 days after the election. If the postmark on the absentee ballot envelope is unclear, the county election board, by unanimous vote of the entire membership of the board, determines the postmark date. If the board is unable to determine the postmark date, the absentee ballot may not be counted.

[4] Per state regulations, ballots are considered timely if they are received at the local election office on or by 10:00 a.m. on the 2nd Friday after an election.



- [5] The law specifies the UOCAVA ballot is timely if it is received by noon on the Friday after the election. For the 2022 general election, a federal holiday on the Friday after the election meant that the deadline was the Monday after the election.
- [6] Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-21-226 outlines procedures for receipt of a voted UOCAVA ballot (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0210/part_0020/section_0260/0130-0210-0020-0260.html)
- [7] UOCAVA ballot return via email or fax requires prior approval; county election offices seek approval from the Secretary of State's office on behalf of UOCAVA voters.
- [8] All absentee ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [9] UOCAVA ballots must be received by local election administrators by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [10] UOCAVA ballots must arrive on the business day before the 10th calendar day after the election.
- [11] Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [12] Domestic military UOCAVA voters need to sign an affirmation indicating that they completed the ballot by 11:59 p.m. the day before the election. Ballots are counted as long as they are received by the county 7 days after the election at the latest.
- [13] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election. The voter shall return the voted ballots to the PR-SEC by mail. Ballots must be postmarked no later than the date of the voting event or general election. Valid ballots must be received by mail, on or before the last day of the voting event general canvass, to be counted.
- [14] UOCAVA ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. 2 days following the general election.
- [15] UOCAVA ballots must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.
- [16] UOCAVA voters may return ballots until the canvass date.
- [17] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter's absentee ballot properly postmarked must be returned by noon on the 3rd day after the election. Since that day fell on a holiday after the 2022 general election, Virginia Code § 1-210 required changing the deadline to noon on Monday, November 14, 2022.
- [18] In Wisconsin, all ballots must be returned by close of polls on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots can be transmitted by postal mail, email, fax, online, or through an appointed agent. UOCAVA ballots can be returned by postal mail or in person if the voter is local. All ballots must be returned by close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day.
- [19] Absentee ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.



Policy Survey Table 5: Electronic Ballot Transmission

State	Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances			
	No Electronic Ballot Transmission	Emergency Situations	Replacement Ballots	Voters with Disabilities
Alabama	Yes	No	No	No
Alaska	No	No	No	No
American Samoa	Yes	No	No	No
Arizona	Yes	No	No	No
Arkansas	Yes	No	No	No
California	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colorado	No	Yes	No	Yes
Connecticut	Yes	No	No	No
Delaware	No	No	No	Yes
District of Columbia	No	No	No	Yes
Florida	No	No	No	Yes
Georgia	Yes	No	No	No
Guam	No	No	No	No
Hawaii	No	No	No	Yes
Idaho	Yes	No	No	No
Illinois	No	No	No	Yes
Indiana	No	No	No	Yes
Iowa	Yes	No	No	No
Kansas	Yes	No	No	No
Kentucky	No	No	No	Yes
Louisiana	No	No	No	Yes
Maine	No	Yes	No	Yes
Maryland	No	No	No	No
Massachusetts [1]	No	No	No	Yes
Michigan	No	No	No	Yes
Minnesota	No	No	No	Yes
Mississippi	No	Yes	No	No
Missouri	Yes	No	No	No
Montana	No	No	No	Yes
Nebraska [2]	No	No	No	No
Nevada	No	No	No	Yes
New Hampshire	No	No	No	Yes
New Jersey	No	No	No	Yes
New Mexico	No	No	No	No
New York	No	Yes	No	Yes
North Carolina	No	No	No	Yes
North Dakota	Yes	No	No	No
Northern Mariana Islands	Yes	No	No	No
Ohio	No	No	No	Yes



State	Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances			
	No Electronic Ballot Transmission	Emergency Situations	Replacement Ballots	Voters with Disabilities
Oklahoma	Yes	No	No	No
Oregon	No	No	No	No
Pennsylvania	No	No	No	Yes
Puerto Rico [3]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island	No	No	No	Yes
South Carolina	Yes	No	No	No
South Dakota	No	No	No	No
Tennessee	Yes	No	No	No
Texas	Yes	No	No	No
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	No	No	No
Utah	No	No	No	Yes
Vermont	No	No	No	Yes
Virginia	No	Yes	No	Yes
Washington	No	No	No	No
West Virginia	No	No	No	Yes
Wisconsin	Yes	No	No	No
Wyoming	Yes	No	No	No

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State	Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances		Terminology for Electronic Voting by Voters with Disabilities
	Any Circumstance	Other Circumstances	
Alabama	No	No	--
Alaska	Yes	No	--
American Samoa	No	No	--
Arizona	No	No	--
Arkansas	No	No	--
California	Yes	Yes	Other
Colorado	No	No	Other
Connecticut	No	No	--
Delaware	No	Yes	Accessible absentee voting
District of Columbia	No	No	Remote ballot marking
Florida	No	Yes	Other
Georgia	No	No	--
Guam	Yes	No	--
Hawaii	No	Yes	Other
Idaho	No	No	--
Illinois	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
Indiana	No	No	Other
Iowa	No	No	--
Kansas	No	No	--
Kentucky	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
Louisiana	No	No	Other
Maine	No	No	Other
Maryland	Yes	No	--
Massachusetts [1]	No	No	Other
Michigan	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
Minnesota	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
Mississippi	No	Yes	--
Missouri	No	No	--
Montana	No	No	Other
Nebraska [2]	No	Yes	--
Nevada	No	No	Remote ballot marking
New Hampshire	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
New Jersey	No	No	Other
New Mexico	No	Yes	--
New York	No	No	Accessible absentee voting



State	Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances		Terminology for Electronic Voting by Voters with Disabilities
	Any Circumstance	Other Circumstances	
North Carolina	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
North Dakota	No	No	--
Northern Mariana Islands	No	No	--
Ohio	No	No	Remote ballot marking
Oklahoma	No	No	--
Oregon	No	Yes	--
Pennsylvania	No	No	Remote ballot marking
Puerto Rico [3]	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
South Carolina	No	No	--
South Dakota	Yes	No	--
Tennessee	No	No	--
Texas	No	No	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	Yes	--
Utah	No	No	Other
Vermont	No	No	Remote ballot marking
Virginia	No	No	Accessible absentee voting
Washington	Yes	No	--
West Virginia	No	No	Other
Wisconsin	No	No	--
Wyoming	No	No	--

Policy Survey Table 5 Calculation Notes:

- Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, No Electronic Ballot Transmission** uses question Q24.
- Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Emergency Situations** uses question Q24.
- Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Replacement Ballots** uses question Q24.
- Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Voters with Disabilities** uses question Q24.
- Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Any Circumstance** uses question Q24.
- Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Other Circumstances** uses question Q24.
- Terminology for Electronic Voting by Voters with Disabilities** uses question Q24a.

Policy Survey Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q24 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q24a was a single-select question.
- Q24 collected information on electronic ballot transmission for non-UOCAVA voters only. Voters covered by UOCAVA may receive ballots electronically under the MOVE Act.



- [1] Voters with a disability that prevents them from privately and independently marking a paper ballot may transmit ballots electronically. Massachusetts refers to electronic ballot transmission for voters with disabilities as “accessible vote by mail.”
- [2] UOCAVA ballot return via email or fax requires prior approval; county election offices seek approval from the Secretary of State’s office on behalf of UOCAVA voters.
- [3] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.

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Policy Survey Table 6: In-Person Voting Before Election Day

State	Terminology for Casting a Ballot In Person Before Election Day	Excuse Required	In-Person Voting Before Election Day	
			First Day	Last Day
Alabama	In-person absentee voting	Yes	09/14/2022	11/03/2022
Alaska [1]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/24/2022	11/07/2022
American Samoa	Other	Yes	09/09/2022	11/07/2022
Arizona [2]	In-person early voting	No	10/12/2022	11/04/2022
Arkansas	In-person early voting	No	10/24/2022	11/07/2022
California [3]	In-person early voting	No	10/10/2022	11/07/2022
Colorado [4]	In-person early voting	No	10/24/2022	11/07/2022
Connecticut	In-person absentee voting	Yes	10/07/2022	11/07/2022
Delaware	In-person early voting	No	10/28/2022	11/06/2022
District of Columbia	In-person early voting	No	10/31/2022	11/06/2022
Florida [5]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/24/2022	11/06/2022
Georgia	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/17/2022	11/04/2022
Guam	In-person absentee voting	No	10/11/2022	11/03/2022
Hawaii [6]	Other	No	10/25/2022	11/07/2022
Idaho	Other	No	10/24/2022	11/04/2022
Illinois [7]	In-person early voting	No	09/29/2022	11/07/2022
Indiana	In-person early voting, Other	No	10/12/2022	11/07/2022
Iowa	In-person absentee voting	No	10/19/2022	11/07/2022
Kansas [8]	In-person early voting, Other	No	10/19/2022	11/06/2022
Kentucky [9]	In-person absentee voting, Other	Yes	10/26/2022	11/05/2022
Louisiana	In-person early voting	No	10/25/2022	11/01/2022
Maine [10]	In-person absentee voting	No	10/11/2022	11/03/2022
Maryland [11]	In-person early voting	No	10/27/2022	11/03/2022
Massachusetts [12]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/22/2022	11/04/2022
Michigan	In-person absentee voting	No	09/29/2022	11/07/2022
Minnesota	In-person absentee voting	No	09/23/2022	11/07/2022
Mississippi	In-person absentee voting	Yes	09/24/2022	11/05/2022
Missouri [13]	In-person absentee voting	No	09/27/2022	11/07/2022
Montana [14]	In-person absentee voting	No	10/11/2022	11/07/2022
Nebraska [15]	In-person early voting	No	10/11/2022	11/07/2022
Nevada	In-person early voting	No	10/22/2022	11/04/2022
New Hampshire [16]	In-person absentee voting	Yes	09/24/2022	11/07/2022
New Jersey	In-person early voting	No	10/29/2022	11/06/2022
New Mexico	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/11/2022	11/05/2022



State	Terminology for Casting a Ballot In Person Before Election Day	Excuse Required	In-Person Voting Before Election Day	
			First Day	Last Day
New York [17]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/29/2022	11/06/2022
North Carolina	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting, Other	No	10/20/2022	11/05/2022
North Dakota	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/21/2022	11/07/2022
Northern Mariana Islands	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	Yes	11/01/2022	11/07/2022
Ohio	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/12/2022	11/07/2022
Oklahoma	In-person absentee voting	No	11/02/2022	11/05/2022
Oregon [18]	Other	Yes	10/19/2022	11/07/2022
Pennsylvania [19]	No such voting	--	--	--
Puerto Rico [20]	In-person early voting	Yes	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island	In-person early voting	No	10/19/2022	11/07/2022
South Carolina [21]	In-person early voting	No	10/24/2022	11/05/2022
South Dakota	In-person absentee voting	No	09/23/2022	11/07/2022
Tennessee	In-person early voting	No	10/19/2022	11/03/2022
Texas	In-person early voting	No	10/24/2022	11/04/2022
U.S. Virgin Islands	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/10/2022	10/31/2022
Utah [22]	In-person early voting	No	10/25/2022	11/04/2022
Vermont [23]	In-person absentee voting	No	09/24/2022	11/07/2022
Virginia [24]	In-person absentee voting	No	09/23/2022	11/05/2022
Washington	Other	No	10/21/2022	11/07/2022
West Virginia	In-person early voting	No	10/26/2022	11/05/2022
Wisconsin [25]	In-person absentee voting	No	10/25/2022	11/06/2022
Wyoming	In-person absentee voting	No	09/23/2022	11/07/2022

Policy Survey Table 6 Calculation Notes:

Terminology for Casting a Ballot In Person Before Election Day uses question Q25.

Excuse Required uses question Q25a.

In-Person Voting Before Election Day, First Day uses question Q25b.

In-Person Voting Before Election Day, Last Day uses question Q25b.

Policy Survey Table 6 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q25 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q25a and Q25b were single-select questions.

[1] There are several in-person absentee and early vote locations that are also available on Election Day. A list of these locations is available on the division's website beginning 45 days prior to the election.



- [2] Emergency voting was available from November 5, 2022 to November 7, 2022. Emergency voting required the voter to sign an affidavit attesting to the fact they were experiencing an emergency that would prevent them from voting on Election Day.
- [3] The dates that early voting was offered varied by jurisdiction.
- [4] October 24, 2022 was the first day that counties were required to have in-person polling locations open. However, some counties chose to have in-person voting open earlier than that.
- [5] Florida has 10 days of mandatory early voting with up to 5 additional days at the front end and one at the back end.
- [6] Schedules for each voting location varied. Some were open after October 25, 2022 and some closed before November 7, 2022.
- [7] The first date of early voting listed is for counties that have early voting at permanent polling places other than the office of the election authority (10 ILCS 5/19A-15). The last day listed is for early voting at the office of the election authority or at a location designated by the election authority for this purpose (10 ILCS 5/19A-15, 19A-20).
- [8] In-person early voting varies by jurisdiction. Counties may begin advance voting as early as the 20th day prior to Election Day. All counties must allow in-person early voting no later than 1 week prior to Election Day.
- [9] Kentucky had in-person absentee voting, which required an excuse. This was conducted from October 26, 2022 until November 2, 2022, excluding weekends. Afterward, there were 3 days of no-excuse absentee in-person voting in which anyone eligible to vote on Election Day could vote between November 3, 2022 and November 5, 2022.
- [10] Any voter may request and vote an absentee ballot without a reason as soon as ballots become available (at least 30 days prior to Election Day) through the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date and through Election Day, voters who meet the requirements to get a special-circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot, but they must have a reason.
- [11] §10-301.1(d)(1) of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, states that early voting centers shall be open for voting “beginning the second Thursday before a primary or general election through the Thursday before the election.”
- [12] The in-person voting period applies to in-person early voting. In-person absentee voting may occur once ballots are available until 12:00 p.m. the day before Election Day. In-person absentee voting before Election Day requires an excuse but early voting does not.
- [13] An excuse is required for 4 weeks of the absentee voting period. Two weeks prior to the election, voters can vote in person with no excuse.
- [14] In-person absentee voting is done at the county elections office. Under certain circumstances (precinct-to-precinct change within the same county or moving from inactive to active status), registration can be done on Election Day. Due to recent law changes in 2021, registration must be done by noon on the day before Election Day (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0020/part_0030/section_0040/0130-0020-0030-0040.html).
- [15] Early voting is typically only available during regular business hours on weekdays, although some jurisdictions may extend their hours or open on weekends to accommodate early voting.
- [16] New Hampshire has absentee voting, not early voting. A voter can request an absentee ballot any time during the year, but will not receive their general ballot until the ballots are ready. Absentee ballots are not opened or cast until Election Day.
- [17] In-person early voting is conducted between the dates provided and does not require an excuse. In-person absentee voting does require an excuse, and can be completed any time after ballots are available (usually not earlier than a month and a half prior to the election).
- [18] Oregon does not have early voting, but allows in-person voting in specific circumstances. For example, if the voter loses their ballot or otherwise spoils it, they can appear at the county elections office and be issued a new ballot. That happens through 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.



- [19] In-person voting on voting machines is not allowed before Election Day. Prior to the close of the mail ballot application period, a voter may go to their local county election board's office, apply for a mail ballot, and vote a mail ballot all in one visit.
- [20] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
- [21] Early voting locations are closed on Sundays.
- [22] The dates and hours of in-person voting before Election Day vary by county.
- [23] In-person early voting may only be done during the hours the town/city clerk's office is open.
- [24] Virginia Code § 24.2-701.1 requires at least 8 hours of in-person absentee voting on the 2 Saturdays before the election. Local electoral boards may provide for Sunday hours as well.
- [25] In Wisconsin, statute determines the start and end dates of when in-person absentee voting can be held; however, each municipality determines what days and times in that time frame they will offer the option to their voters. The listed dates are the time frame in which in-person absentee voting can be held.

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Policy Survey Table 7: Election Certification and Recounts

State	2022 General Election Certification Deadline	Reason State May Conduct a Recount			
		When Result Is Within Specified Margin	By Request of Affected Candidate or Party	When Result Is Within Margin AND Affected Candidate or Party Request	By Request of Other Person or Group
Alabama	11/30/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Alaska	11/29/2022	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
American Samoa	11/15/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Arizona	12/05/2022	Yes	No	No	No
Arkansas	11/23/2022	No	Yes	No	No
California	12/16/2022	No	Yes	No	Yes
Colorado	11/23/2022	Yes	Yes	No	No
Connecticut	11/29/2022	Yes	No	No	No
Delaware [1]	11/10/2022	Yes	No	No	No
District of Columbia [2]	11/30/2022	Yes	Yes	No	No
Florida [3]	11/22/2022	Yes	No	No	No
Georgia [4]	11/25/2022	No	No	Yes	No
Guam [5]	11/25/2022	Yes	No	No	No
Hawaii [6]	11/28/2022	Yes	No	No	No
Idaho	11/23/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Illinois [7]	12/09/2022	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Indiana [8]	11/21/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Iowa [9]	12/05/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Kansas [10]	12/01/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Kentucky	11/28/2022	Yes	Yes	No	No
Louisiana [11]	11/23/2022	No	No	Yes	No
Maine [12]	11/28/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Maryland [13]	12/13/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Massachusetts [14]	11/23/2022	No	Yes	Yes	No
Michigan	11/28/2022	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Minnesota	11/29/2022	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mississippi [15]	12/08/2022	No	No	No	No
Missouri [16]	12/13/2022	No	No	Yes	No
Montana [17]	12/05/2022	Yes	No	Yes	No
Nebraska	12/05/2022	Yes	Yes	No	No
Nevada [18]	11/22/2022	No	Yes	No	Yes
New Hampshire	12/07/2022	No	Yes	No	No
New Jersey	12/08/2022	No	Yes	No	No
New Mexico	11/29/2022	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
New York	12/15/2022	Yes	No	No	No
North Carolina [19]	11/29/2022	No	No	Yes	No



State	2022 General Election Certification Deadline	Reason State May Conduct a Recount			
		When Result Is Within Specified Margin	By Request of Affected Candidate or Party	When Result Is Within Margin AND Affected Candidate or Party Request	By Request of Other Person or Group
North Dakota	11/25/2022	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Northern Mariana Islands	11/28/2022	No	Yes	Yes	No
Ohio	11/29/2022	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Oklahoma [20]	11/15/2022	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Oregon	12/15/2022	Yes	Yes	No	No
Pennsylvania [21]	11/28/2022	Yes	No	No	Yes
Puerto Rico [22]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island [23]	11/22/2022	No	No	Yes	No
South Carolina	11/18/2022	Yes	No	No	No
South Dakota	11/15/2022	No	No	Yes	No
Tennessee [24]	12/08/2022	No	No	No	No
Texas	12/12/2022	No	No	Yes	No
U.S. Virgin Islands	11/18/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Utah [25]	11/29/2022	Yes	Yes	No	No
Vermont [26]	11/15/2022	No	No	Yes	No
Virginia [27]	12/05/2022	No	No	Yes	No
Washington [28]	12/08/2022	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
West Virginia [29]	12/08/2022	No	Yes	No	No
Wisconsin [30]	12/01/2022	Yes	No	Yes	No
Wyoming [31]	11/16/2022	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes



State	Reason State May Conduct a Recount			Recount Methods
	By Court Order	By Order of Election Authority	Other Circumstances	
Alabama	Yes	No	Yes	Machine
Alaska	No	No	No	Manual, Machine
American Samoa	No	No	No	Manual
Arizona	Yes	No	No	Machine
Arkansas	No	No	No	Machine
California	Yes	Yes	No	Manual, Machine
Colorado	No	No	No	Machine
Connecticut	Yes	No	No	Manual, Machine
Delaware [1]	No	No	No	Manual
District of Columbia [2]	No	No	No	Manual, Machine
Florida [3]	Yes	No	No	Manual, Machine
Georgia [4]	Yes	Yes	No	Machine
Guam [5]	Yes	No	No	Machine
Hawaii [6]	Yes	No	No	Machine
Idaho	No	No	Yes	Other
Illinois [7]	Yes	No	No	Machine, Other
Indiana [8]	No	No	No	Manual, Machine
Iowa [9]	Yes	Yes	No	Manual, Machine
Kansas [10]	Yes	Yes	No	Manual, Machine
Kentucky	Yes	Yes	No	Manual, Machine
Louisiana [11]	Yes	No	No	Other
Maine [12]	No	No	No	Manual
Maryland [13]	No	No	No	Manual, Machine
Massachusetts [14]	No	No	No	Manual
Michigan	Yes	No	No	Manual, Machine
Minnesota	Yes	No	No	Manual
Mississippi [15]	No	No	Yes	Other
Missouri [16]	No	No	No	Machine
Montana [17]	Yes	No	No	Manual
Nebraska	No	No	No	Machine
Nevada [18]	No	No	No	Other
New Hampshire	No	No	No	Manual
New Jersey	Yes	No	No	Manual, Machine
New Mexico	Yes	Yes	No	Manual, Machine
New York	Yes	Yes	No	Manual
North Carolina [19]	No	Yes	No	Manual, Machine
North Dakota	No	No	No	Manual, Machine



State	Reason State May Conduct a Recount			Recount Methods
	By Court Order	By Order of Election Authority	Other Circumstances	
Northern Mariana Islands	No	No	No	Manual
Ohio	No	No	No	Manual
Oklahoma [20]	No	No	No	Manual, Machine
Oregon	Yes	Yes	No	Manual
Pennsylvania [21]	No	No	No	Other
Puerto Rico [22]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island [23]	No	No	No	Machine
South Carolina	Yes	No	No	Machine
South Dakota	No	No	No	Machine
Tennessee [24]	Yes	No	No	Other
Texas	No	No	Yes	Other
U.S. Virgin Islands	Yes	No	No	Machine
Utah [25]	No	No	No	Other
Vermont [26]	No	No	No	Machine
Virginia [27]	No	No	No	Machine
Washington [28]	No	Yes	No	Other
West Virginia [29]	No	No	No	Manual
Wisconsin [30]	Yes	No	No	Other
Wyoming [31]	Yes	Yes	No	Machine

Policy Survey Table 7 Calculation Notes:

2022 General Election Certification Deadline uses question Q34.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, When Result Is Within Specified Margin uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Request of Affected Candidate or Party uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, When Result Is Within Margin AND Affected Candidate or Party Request uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Request of Other Person or Group uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Court Order uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Order of Election Authority uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, Other Circumstances uses question Q35.

Recount Methods uses question Q35a.



Policy Survey Table 7 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q34 was a single-select question. Q35 and Q35a allowed states to select multiple responses.
- Election certification refers to a written statement attesting that the tabulation and canvassing of an election are complete and accurate, or the act of confirming the final official results of a jurisdiction's election. This event occurs after results from valid ballots are tallied from all voting methods and results are validated and approved by those legally responsible.
- A recount is a repeat tabulation of the votes cast in an election to determine the accuracy of the reported results of an election. Recounts may be conducted for a variety of reasons, and the repeat tabulation may be conducted by hand or by machine, depending on local laws and procedures.

- [1] The date listed (10:00 a.m. on the Thursday following the day of the general election) is the date that the Board of Canvass convenes. Delaware law does not specify a deadline by which the Board of Canvass must complete its work. Per Delaware Code, the margin for a recount is one-half of 1% difference between the candidate receiving the most votes and the candidate receiving the next highest number of notes (or fewer than 1,000 votes for a statewide election).
- [2] There is no required deadline. The date reported is the date the DCBOE was tentatively scheduled to certify the November 2022 general election as of the date the 2022 Policy Survey was submitted.
- [3] The applicable state or local canvassing entity has to issue a recount order once the threshold is triggered. For a manual recount, the recount consists solely of overvotes and undervotes and only if the difference is fewer than the number of votes needed to change the outcome of the election, according to Section 102.166, F.S. (http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100-0199/0102/Sections/0102.166.html).
- [4] The deadline for certifying the election is 17 days after the election. Manual recount of paper ballots is only allowable under court order or if no scanner passes pre-recount logic and accuracy testing.
- [5] In every election, except a primary election, the Guam Election Commission (GEC) shall not certify the election results until the GEC makes a determination on all election complaints or causes for contest brought to the attention of the GEC within 15 calendar days of the election. Thereafter, as soon as all the votes are counted and the ballots are sealed, the GEC shall certify the results of the election. The GEC Board may order a hand recount if warranted.
- [6] There was no set deadline to certify the results of the 2022 general election. If no election contests were filed with the Supreme Court within 20 days of the election, the results were certified after that date.
- [7] The local canvassing deadline for the 2022 general election was November 29, 2022, and the State Board of Elections deadline was December 9, 2022; however, judges took the oath of office on December 5, 2022 so the state canvassed by that date.
- [8] For 2022, the Indiana Election Division (IED) tabulated the final results for all federal offices no later than the second Monday following the general election (November 21, 2022) and prepared a certificate of election to the Secretary of State. IED tabulated all statewide and judicial offices not later than the last Tuesday in November (November 29, 2022). The Secretary of State (SOS) certified immediately after IED finished the tabulation. IED tabulated all state legislative offices no later than the second Monday following the general election (November 21, 2022). SOS signed the certificate of elections and delivered to each person elected to a state legislative office.
- [9] The appointed recount board determines if a recount is conducted by hand counting or machine counting.
- [10] A County Board of Canvassers has authority to order a recount in extraordinary circumstances. The person making the recount request specifies the manner and location of ballots to be recounted.
- [11] The certification deadline reported in the 2022 Policy Survey was tentative based upon election contest suits and appeal delays. See La. R.S. 18:1405 and 1409.



- [12] The Secretary of State must submit the official tabulation of the votes to the Governor by the 20th day after the election.
- [13] §11-503(a)(1)(ii) of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland requires that the Board of State Canvassers must convene within 35 days to certify the results for federal and state offices. Only an affected candidate can request a recount. A party cannot request a recount. The candidate requesting the recount specifies the type of recount they want.
- [14] Local election officials must certify their election results and transmit them to the Secretary of the Commonwealth within 15 days after the election. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Commonwealth tabulates the totals and presents them to the governor and the council for certification. There are two types of recounts, both of which require a candidate to file a petition, but depending on the type, the signature requirements vary. If the difference between the two leading candidates is less than one-half of 1%, the candidate can petition for a district-wide or statewide recount. If the difference is greater than one-half of 1%, a candidate can petition for recounts by ward and precinct. Any registered Massachusetts voter can petition for a recount of ballot questions.
- [15] Mississippi does not have recount procedures. However, within 12 days of certification of the election, a candidate who was on the ballot may conduct a ballot box examination to review the contents of the ballot box while under the supervision of the county circuit clerk. The candidate may choose to tally the votes they review in anticipation of a challenge to an election.
- [16] A recount conducted in cases of a close race will use a machine recount but also review voter intent on paper ballots. A 5% manual recount is conducted after each election from a randomly selected precinct.
- [17] Within 27 days after the election, or sooner if the returns are all received, the state auditor, superintendent of public instruction, and attorney general shall meet as a board of state canvassers in the office of the secretary of state and determine the vote. The secretary of state shall serve as secretary of the board, keep minutes of the meeting of the board, and file them in the official records of the secretary of state's office. (See https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0150/part_0050/section_0020/0130-0150-0050-0020.html). Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-16-201 outlines the conditions under which recounts are to be conducted (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0160/part_0020/section_0010/0130-0160-0020-0010.html). Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-16-412 outlines the procedure for recounting paper ballots (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0160/part_0040/section_0120/0130-0160-0040-0120.html).
- [18] The reported state election certification is the date of the Nevada Supreme Court's canvass pursuant to Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 293.395. The 17 county Boards of County Commissioners must certify their county elections before the Nevada Supreme Court canvass and this must be done no later than November 18 pursuant to NRS 293.387. NRS 293.403 allows that, "Any voter at an election may demand and receive a recount of the vote for a ballot question." Recounts must be conducted in the same manner in which the election was conducted.
- [19] The listed certification date was barring recounts and/or protests in individual races. A machine recount is the first recount authorized, and a manual recount triggered by certain requirements may follow.
- [20] The Oklahoma State Election Board met on November 15, 2022 to certify the results of the 2022 general election. State law requires that if a recount or contest is filed that has not been resolved by the certification date, all other races or elections not subject to the contest will be certified. A separate meeting to certify the contested election may need to be scheduled.
- [21] November 28, 2022 was the last day for county board of elections to file certified results with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. There is no statutory deadline for the state to certify results.
- [22] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.



- [23] There is no definitive date, but the law mandates that a risk-limiting audit must be conducted prior to certifying the election.
- [24] By statute, the state officials must certify the statewide election results “...as soon as the returns are received.” December 8, 2022 was an approximate date for when the state officials met to certify federal elections.
- [25] The state certification happens on the third Tuesday after the election.
- [26] According to 17 V.S.A. § 2601 (a), “(1) In an election for federal office, statewide office, county office, or State Senator, if the difference between the number of votes cast for a winning candidate and the number of votes cast for a losing candidate is two percent or less of the total votes cast for all the candidates for an office, divided by the number of persons to be elected, that losing candidate shall have the right to have the votes for that office recounted. (2) In an election for State Representative, if the difference between the number of votes cast for a winning candidate and the number of votes cast for a losing candidate is five percent or less of the total votes cast for all the candidates for an office, divided by the number of persons to be elected, that losing candidate shall have the right to have the votes for that office recounted.”
- [27] Virginia Code § 24.2-800 governs who may request a recount. The Section does not include automatic recount provisions. Also, only a losing candidate may request a recount. There are different allowable margins to request a recount for write-in candidates and for recounting a referendum or issue election. Optical scan ballots that cannot be read by a scanner for any reason and/or emailed ballots from UOCAVA voters, military voters, or print-disabled voters that also cannot be read by a scanner are manually recounted in accordance with the “Virginia’s Guide to Hand-Counting Ballots” document.
- [28] County canvassing boards certified their county results on November 29, 2022. The Secretary of State certified all results by December 8, 2022.
- [29] The clerk shall transmit a copy to the Secretary of State within 30 days from the date of the election, except in the case of a recount, in which the clerk shall transmit a copy of the results 30 days from the date of the completion of the recount.
- [30] Wisconsin law permits a recount to occur under a wide variety of circumstances within specified margins, by candidate request within specified margins, or when ordered by a court of law. When conducting a recount, the Board of Canvassers may decide between hand count or machine count and can also choose that one reporting unit is done one way while another reporting unit is done another way. A court may order the count be done in a particular way if a reason can be proven by a petitioner.
- [31] Recounts may be conducted in cases of ballot proposition.



Policy Survey Table 8: Election Audits

State	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election				
	Access Audit	Ballot Design Audit	Ballot Reconciliation Audit	Compliance Audit or Procedural Audit	Eligibility Audit
Alabama	No	No	No	No	No
Alaska	No	No	Yes	No	No
American Samoa	No	Yes	No	No	No
Arizona	No	No	No	No	No
Arkansas	No	No	Yes	No	No
California	No	No	No	No	No
Colorado	No	No	No	No	No
Connecticut	No	No	No	No	No
Delaware	No	No	No	No	No
District of Columbia	No	No	No	No	No
Florida	No	No	No	No	No
Georgia	No	No	Yes	No	No
Guam	No	No	Yes	No	No
Hawaii	No	No	No	No	No
Idaho	No	No	Yes	No	No
Illinois	No	No	No	No	No
Indiana	No	No	Yes	No	No
Iowa	No	No	Yes	No	No
Kansas	No	No	No	Yes	No
Kentucky	No	No	Yes	No	No
Louisiana	No	No	Yes	No	No
Maine	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Maryland	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Massachusetts	No	No	No	No	No
Michigan	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Minnesota	No	No	No	Yes	No
Mississippi	No	No	No	No	No
Missouri	No	No	No	No	No
Montana	No	No	No	No	No
Nebraska	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Nevada	No	No	No	No	Yes
New Hampshire	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
New Jersey	No	No	Yes	No	No
New Mexico	No	No	No	No	No
New York	No	No	No	No	No
North Carolina	No	No	Yes	No	No
North Dakota	No	No	Yes	No	Yes



State	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election				
	Access Audit	Ballot Design Audit	Ballot Reconciliation Audit	Compliance Audit or Procedural Audit	Eligibility Audit
Northern Mariana Islands	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Ohio	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Oklahoma	No	No	No	No	No
Oregon	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pennsylvania [1]	No	No	Yes	No	No
Puerto Rico [2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island	No	No	No	No	No
South Carolina	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
South Dakota	No	No	No	No	No
Tennessee	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Texas	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	No	No	No	No
Utah	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Vermont	No	No	No	No	No
Virginia	No	No	No	No	No
Washington	No	No	No	No	No
West Virginia	No	No	No	No	No
Wisconsin	No	No	No	No	No
Wyoming	No	No	No	No	No

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State	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election			
	Legal Audit	Logic and Accuracy Testing	Post-Election Tabulation Audit	Other
Alabama	No	No	No	Yes
Alaska	No	Yes	Yes	No
American Samoa	No	No	No	No
Arizona	No	Yes	No	No
Arkansas	No	Yes	Yes	No
California	No	Yes	Yes	No
Colorado	No	Yes	Yes	No
Connecticut	No	Yes	Yes	No
Delaware	No	Yes	Yes	No
District of Columbia	No	Yes	Yes	No
Florida	No	Yes	Yes	No
Georgia	No	Yes	Yes	No
Guam	No	Yes	No	No
Hawaii	No	Yes	Yes	No
Idaho	No	Yes	Yes	No
Illinois	No	Yes	Yes	No
Indiana	No	Yes	No	Yes
Iowa	No	Yes	Yes	No
Kansas	No	Yes	Yes	No
Kentucky	No	Yes	No	Yes
Louisiana	No	Yes	No	No
Maine	No	Yes	No	No
Maryland	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Massachusetts	No	Yes	No	No
Michigan	No	Yes	No	Yes
Minnesota	No	Yes	Yes	No
Mississippi	No	Yes	No	No
Missouri	No	Yes	Yes	No
Montana	No	Yes	Yes	No
Nebraska	No	Yes	Yes	No
Nevada	No	Yes	Yes	No
New Hampshire	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
New Jersey	No	Yes	Yes	No
New Mexico	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
New York	No	Yes	Yes	No
North Carolina	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
North Dakota	No	Yes	Yes	No
Northern Mariana Islands	No	Yes	No	No
Ohio	No	Yes	Yes	No
Oklahoma	No	Yes	Yes	No



State	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election			
	Legal Audit	Logic and Accuracy Testing	Post-Election Tabulation Audit	Other
Oregon	No	Yes	Yes	No
Pennsylvania [1]	No	Yes	Yes	No
Puerto Rico [2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rhode Island	No	Yes	Yes	No
South Carolina	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Dakota	No	Yes	No	No
Tennessee	No	Yes	Yes	No
Texas	No	Yes	Yes	No
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	Yes	Yes	No
Utah	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vermont	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Virginia	No	Yes	Yes	No
Washington	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
West Virginia	No	Yes	Yes	No
Wisconsin	No	No	Yes	No
Wyoming	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Policy Survey Table 8 Calculation Notes:

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Access Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Ballot Design Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Ballot Reconciliation Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Compliance Audit or Procedural Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Eligibility Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Legal Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Logic and Accuracy Testing uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Post-Election Tabulation Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Other uses question Q36.



Policy Survey Table 8 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q36 allowed states to select multiple responses.
- An election audit may refer to (1) A systematic, independent, documented process for obtaining records, statements of fact, or other relevant information and assessing them objectively to determine the extent to which specified requirements are fulfilled. (2) The verification of statistical or exact agreement of records from different processes or subsystems of a voting system. (3) A review of a system and its controls to determine its operational status and the accuracy of its outputs.

[1] The Secretary of the Commonwealth directed all counties to participate in a risk-limiting audit and all but one of Pennsylvania's 67 counties did so.

[2] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.

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Chapter 3. Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

Key Findings

Section A of the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on voter registration between the 2020 and 2022 general elections. Election officials were asked questions related to registration and list maintenance, including the number of people registered and eligible to vote in the 2022 general election, registration applications processed, confirmation notices sent pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and for other purposes, and records removed from the voter registration rolls. Notable findings from Section A of the 2022 EAVS include:

- State motor vehicle offices continued to be the most common source of registration and accounted for 55% of all registrations received—the highest in EAVS history.
- Online registrations were the second most common source of registration and accounted for 14% of the registrations received. However, this source dropped by 50.3% compared to online registrations reported for the 2020 EAVS.
- The percentage of in-person voter registrations and registrations received by mail, fax, and email continued to decrease and obtained the lowest results of the past election cycles. In-person voter registration accounted for 5.9% of all registrations, whereas mail, fax, and email registrations combined accounted for 9.1%.
- The total number of active registrations for the 2022 general election was more than 203 million, accounting for 85.4% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP). Over two-thirds of the states reported a higher active registration rate in 2022 than in 2018.
- Nearly 81 million registration applications were processed for the 2022 general election. The most common types of registration applications submitted by voters were changes to the voter's record (44.1%) and new valid registrations (27.9%).
- States reported sending 26.6 million confirmation notices between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election. More than half of these confirmation notices were not returned by voters.

Introduction

Voter registration is required in 49 states,¹ all U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia, making registration the first step toward election participation for most voters.² Registration serves multiple purposes: it allows election officials to confirm if a person is eligible to vote; permits officials to efficiently allocate resources such as ballots, poll workers, and voting

¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 56 states, U.S. territories, and federal districts that submit Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico did not submit data for the 2022 EAVS because it did not hold a federal general election in November 2022.

² North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration.

equipment, depending on the number of registrants per precinct and jurisdiction;³ and allows the tracking of voter participation.

Congress passed the NVRA in 1993 to “establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for federal office.”⁴ This act, commonly known as the “Motor Voter Law,” requires that states offer the opportunity to register to vote at their motor vehicle offices (known as the Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV] in many states) and when residents are applying for a driver’s license—including renewals. The law also requires states to offer voter registration at offices that provide public assistance or state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to individuals with disabilities, and at armed services recruitment offices. The NVRA also provides guidelines on registration list maintenance and sets limits on how voters can be removed from the rolls.

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 charged the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) with collecting data on voter registration and list maintenance procedures. The EAC meets its statutory requirement to report to Congress on the impact of the NVRA via Section A of EAVS.⁵ This chapter of the EAVS not only fulfills this requirement, but also provides insight on the changes in registration behaviors of Americans during federal elections and the state policies affecting the registration process.

Federal Laws Regulating Voter Registration

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993

The NVRA is the primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States. In this law, Congress provides a clear statement regarding the importance of voter registration:

- “(1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right;
- (2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of that right; and
- (3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.”⁶

³ What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data at the town or township level. Maine also reported its Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.

⁴ 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

⁵ Before 2016, the EAC administered a separate survey called the NVRA Survey, which collected similar information. This survey was consolidated with the EAVS for the 2016 elections. Before the creation of the EAC, the NVRA Survey was administered by the Federal Election Commission.

⁶ 52 U.S.C. § 20501.



The primary purposes of the NVRA are:

- “(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office;
- (2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act [NVRA] in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office;
- (3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and
- (4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.”⁷

The NVRA was fully implemented after the 1994 general election. Several states are not covered by the NVRA. North Dakota is exempt because it does not have voter registration. U.S. territories are also not subject to the NVRA, and the states of Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are exempt because they had same-day registration (SDR) in 1993 and have continued to make this option available to voters uninterrupted since that time.

The NVRA’s first purpose is to expand opportunities for voters to register by creating more uniform processes for voter registration and designating more places and methods to register to vote. The NVRA requires that states allow multiple methods and places to register to vote, including: (1) motor vehicle offices when a person obtains, renews, or updates the address on their driver’s license; (2) through the mail, using a standard registration application;⁸ (3) at all state offices providing public assistance (e.g., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]); (4) at all offices that provide state-funded programs focused on providing services to people with disabilities; (5) at recruitment offices of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (6) at other state-designated offices such as public libraries and local government offices. All of these offices are mandated under the NVRA to provide their users with information on voter registration, to assist in the registration process when required, and offer to transmit completed voter registration applications to the appropriate election official.

The NVRA also sets some fundamental guidelines on voter registration that states must follow. For example, states may set their own deadline for citizens to register to vote in a general election for federal offices, but that deadline can never be more than 30 days before the date of the election. The NVRA also sets the process that states need to follow to maintain and update their voter registration rolls and to conduct removal processes.

Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)

HAVA was enacted with the goal of updating the voting administration system in the United States and creating a commission to assist in the administration of federal elections. In addition to legislating the update of the administration process for federal elections in the United States, HAVA mandates that states create and maintain a “computerized statewide voter registration list” that serves as “the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for Federal office

⁷ 52 U.S.C. § 20507.

⁸ States can make available the standard National Mail Voter Registration Form provided by the EAC (https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf) or their own version of a mail registration form following the NVRA’s requirements.



in the State.”⁹ The computerized registration list must be centralized and “defined, maintained and administered at the State level.”¹⁰ However, although the registration list is administered at the state level, any local election official must have access to the registration list and is required to enter any updated voter registration information in the computerized system. HAVA also specifies that the maintenance of the implemented computerized registration list will be carried out according to the NVRA’s mandates, and that duplicate names or registrations will be removed from the state’s registration list.

State Voter Registration Policies

States have wide latitude on how to conduct their voter registration activities, as long as state policies comply with federal laws like the NVRA and HAVA. This flexibility allows states to adapt their laws as they see appropriate to better serve the interests of their citizens and permits them to adapt when unforeseen circumstances arise.

During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, some states implemented laws to expand voter registration opportunities by allowing residents to register to vote online, at the polls, or by extending the deadline to register to vote. In some cases, these changes have been maintained for the 2022 general election. For example, in 2020, Massachusetts extended its voter registration deadline from 20 days before the election to 10 days before the election—which also created an overlap between open voter registration and early voting, allowing residents to register to vote and cast a ballot on the same day—and maintained this registration deadline for the 2022 general election.¹¹

However, voter registration laws usually take years from when they are first proposed to when they are fully implemented. For example, in April 2020—well before the November 2020 general election—Virginia’s legislature approved the use of SDR for “any person who is qualified to register to vote.”¹² However, this law did not become effective until October 1, 2022, making the 2022 general election the first election in which Virginians were allowed to register to vote at the polls on Election Day.¹³

The Registration Process

The typical voter registration process is depicted in Figure 1. Citizens in the United States can register to vote using different methods—some of them mandated by federal law (e.g., mail registration) and others offered at the discretion of the state (e.g., online registration). Once a registration application is completed and submitted, the state or local election office must confirm the eligibility of the applicant.¹⁴ Eligible applicants are added to the voter registration rolls and notified of their registration status, whereas applicants who submitted ineligible or incomplete applications are contacted for further information to complete their applications.

⁹ 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ <https://www.sec.state.ma.us/divisions/elections/voter-resources/registering-to-vote.htm>


¹² VA Code § 24.2-420.1 <https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+ful+CHAP1153&201+ful+CHAP1153>.

¹³ For a more complete overview of states’ registration policies, see Chapter 2 of this report.

¹⁴ In order to be eligible to register to vote for federal elections, federal law requires that individuals must be U.S. citizens and be at least 18 years old. Some states have additional eligibility requirements, such as requiring individuals to have resided within the state or jurisdiction for a certain period of time before they may register to vote.



Figure 1. The Voter Registration Process



Voter registration also serves to assign each voter to a precinct—a bounded geographic area to which voters are assigned according to their residential address as listed on their voter registration record—so that voters receive the correct ballot in an election. The voter registration system tracks each voter’s electoral participation so that an individual can be given credit for voting in an election, which helps ensure that each registered voter casts only one ballot that is counted per election.

Every person with a valid registration is considered an active, registered voter. However, at times, a question arises as to whether a person still resides at the address at which they are registered. The election official may receive a notification via the U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address service that the voter has a new residential address. In these situations, the state or local election office may send the registrant a confirmation of address notice. If the person responds to the confirmation notice, the election office will take action as directed by the recipient. In many states, if the person fails to return the form or the form is returned to the election office as undeliverable, the person is placed on a list of inactive voters. Inactive voters



are still part of the registration rolls and included in the registration totals in most jurisdictions.¹⁵ However, before they can vote, inactive voters are typically required to show approved documentation of their eligibility (most commonly, proof that they live at an address within the voting jurisdiction). In some cases, inactive voters may be required to cast a provisional ballot when their eligibility cannot be established at the polls.

The NVRA also requires states to maintain their voter registration rolls by removing registrants who are no longer eligible to vote. This process is referred to as “list maintenance.” When an individual is removed from the voter registration roll because of a change in residence under the NVRA process, this is called “address list maintenance.” More details about list maintenance processes and procedures are available in the “Registration List Maintenance” section of this chapter. Election offices may share data with other state agencies or entities that maintain death records or felony and prison records for the purposes of identifying potentially ineligible voters.¹⁶

Voter Registration Rates for the 2022 General Election

The NVRA requires each state to report its total number of registered and eligible, active, and inactive registrants for each federal general election.¹⁷ Most states report the total “registered and eligible” voters as the sum of active and inactive registrants. However, data on registered and eligible voters as reported in the EAVS should be used with caution, as these totals can include registrants who are no longer eligible to vote in that state but who have not been removed from the registration rolls because the removal process laid out by the NVRA can take up to two election cycles to be completed.^{18, 19}

¹⁵ Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q10 of the Policy Survey. According to the 2022 Policy Survey, six states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming) do not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their registration records. In survey comments in EAVS, Minnesota reported “Minnesota is NVRA exempt. Minnesota does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.” Nebraska reported “Nebraska does not have ‘Inactive’ voters. The numbers in line A1c reflect the number of voters who were sent a Section 8(d)(2) notice and have not responded.” Oregon reported “Do not track number of inactive voters,” and Wisconsin reported “Wisconsin is NVRA exempt; Wisconsin does not have inactive registered voters.”

¹⁶ More information about state policies on voter registration database linkages is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

¹⁷ Eleven states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) reported only active registrants. North Dakota does not have voter registration and thus did not have any data to report.

¹⁸ Utah reported 199,315 fewer “registered and eligible” voters in their state (item A1a of the EAVS) than the sum of active and inactive registrants (items A1b and A1c of the EAVS). This discrepancy is mainly the result of two of this state’s counties not reporting data in A1a for total registrations but reporting data in A1b for total active registrations. Illinois reported 84,176 more “registered and eligible” voters than the sum of active and inactive registrants. This discrepancy is the result of seven of this state’s counties reporting data in A1a for total registrations but not reporting data in A1b for total active registrations and/or A1c for total inactive registrations.

¹⁹ New Hampshire reported zero registered voters in 18 of its 320 jurisdictions and stated in comments: “Unincorporated place – No voters.” Wisconsin reported zero registered voters in three of its 1,851 jurisdictions because these jurisdictions were incorporated or annexed into new municipalities where they reported the corresponding registration data. Kalawao County in Hawaii did not report registered voters because Maui County administers Kalawao County’s elections, and Maui’s registrants are reported in Kalawao’s data. Two counties in Utah (Davis County and Morgan County) responded “Data not available” to the number of registered voters in the county. North Dakota did not report the number of registered voters because the state does not require voter registration.



Calculating Registration Rates

As with voter turnout, there are different ways to calculate voter registration rates.

Registration Rate Numerator

- **Total Registrants.** The number of people that states reported as being registered and eligible to vote (A1a in the EAVS). This total includes active and inactive registrants. This metric overrepresents the actual number of registrants within a state, since some of the people included (particularly inactive registrants) may not be eligible to vote in that jurisdiction.
- **Active Registrants.** The number of people that states reported as being eligible to cast a ballot without the need to provide additional eligibility evidence at the polls (A1b in the EAVS). This total excludes inactive registrants.

Registration Rate Denominator

- **Voting Age Population (VAP).** The estimate of the number of individuals ages 18 or older provided by the Census Bureau.
- **Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP).** The estimate of the number of American citizens ages 18 or older provided by the Census Bureau. This estimate is more accurate than the VAP in that it restricts the inclusion criteria to being a U.S. citizen, which is mandatory to vote in federal elections.
- **Voting-Eligible Population (VEP).** The estimate created by subtracting from the CVAP the citizens that are ineligible to vote (e.g., individuals with disqualifying felony convictions) and individuals who are in the military or citizens living overseas. This estimate is provided by the U.S. Elections Project and is available at the state level but not at the jurisdiction level like the VAP and the CVAP estimates.

The combination of active registrants and the CVAP to calculate the registration rate in the EAVS provides a higher level of accuracy than using the total registrations and/or the VAP to calculate the rate at the jurisdiction level when needed, as opposed to the use of the VEP. This calculation has some limitations, such as the potential overrepresentation of total registrants in the active registrant list due to challenges for states to keep their voter registration rolls fully up to date. When analyzing EAVS data, the EAC recommends using the following method to calculate voter registration rates:

$$\frac{A1b \text{ of EAVS}}{CVAP} \times 100 = \text{Active CVAP Voter Registration Rate}$$

See Chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of state policies on voter registration and list maintenance.

For the 2022 general election, states reported that 226,339,980 citizens were registered to vote, either as active or inactive voters.²⁰ This represents a 7% increase compared to the number of people who were registered to vote for the 2018 general election.²¹ Nationally, 90% of all

²⁰ The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a in the 2022 EAVS.

²¹ The percentage change in total number of registered voters between 2018 and 2022 was calculated as $A1a(2022)/A1a(2018)$. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.



registrants were designated as active, and 11.1% of registrants were designated as inactive.²² The total number of active registrants exceeded the 200 million mark for the first time in EAVS history in 2020 and continued to exceed that mark with 203,660,564 active registrations reported in 2022, accounting for 85.4% of the 2021 CVAP.^{23, 24} The majority of states reported active registration rates of 80% or more of their 2021 CVAP (see Table 1 of Appendix A in this chapter).²⁵ Compared to the active registration rates in 2018, 68.6% of the states reported a higher active registration rate in 2022.²⁶

There was a 2.8-percentage-point increase in the active registration rates at the national level (from 82.5% in 2018 to 85.4% in 2022).²⁷ At the state level, West Virginia and Michigan reported the largest increases in active registration rates between 2018 and 2022 (11.3% and 10.1%, respectively), and Maine and New Hampshire reported the largest drops in active registration

²² The percentage of active and inactive registrants was collected in items A1b and A1c of the 2022 EAVS, respectively, and the two data points were each divided by the total number of registered voters (item A1a of EAVS). North Dakota was not included in these calculations because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming did not provide data about inactive voters in item A1c of the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages; because of this, the percentage of active and inactive registrants does not sum to 100%. Casewise deletion only uses data from states that provide information for the numerator and the denominator of the calculation and, in the case of inactive registrations, there are several states that do not have or track data on inactive registrations. They were thus excluded from the percentage of inactive voter calculation, whereas all states were included in the percentage of active registrations.

²³ The total number of active registrants was collected in item A1b in the 2022 EAVS. The active CVAP voter registration rate was calculated as $A1b / CVAP \times 100$. North Dakota was not included in the calculation because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation because there is no CVAP information from the Census Bureau for these territories. For more information on the rationale to use these numbers to create the active CVAP voter registration rate, see the callout box “Calculating Registration Rates” in this chapter. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

²⁴ This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2021 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were not available by the time this report was finalized.

²⁵ The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated as $A1b / CVAP \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.


²⁶ The percentage of states reporting a higher active registration rate in 2022 was calculated by subtracting the active registration rate for 2022 from the active registration rate for 2018 (both calculated as $A1b / CVAP \times 100$) and categorizing the positive results as increases and the negative results as decreases. North Dakota was not included because it does not have voter registration. The U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included because the U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate for their CVAP.

²⁷ The 2018 active CVAP registration rate uses the same calculation as 2022. The 2018 active CVAP registration rate uses the 2017 CVAP as the denominator. The percentage point change between the 2018 and 2022 active CVAP voter registration rates was calculated by subtracting the 2018 active CVAP voter registration percentage from the 2022 active CVAP voter registration percentage. New Mexico’s change in registration rate has not been highlighted because of data quality issues with the state’s A1b submission in the 2018 EAVS.



rates (14.8% and 12.5%, respectively).^{28, 29} Figure 2 shows the change in the active CVAP voter registration rate among states from the 2018 general election to the 2022 general election.

Figure 2. Most States Had an Increase in Active Citizen Voting Age Population Registration Rate from 2018 to 2022



Source: The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2022 percentage of active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2022 EAVS divided by the 2018 percentage of active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2018 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. North Dakota does not have a change rate because it does not have voter registration. Puerto Rico does not have data because it did not conduct a 2022 federal general election. The U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands do not have a change rate because the U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate for their CVAP. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to reflect states that decreased, that slightly increased, and that notably increased in terms of the active CVAP registration rate from 2018 to 2022.

²⁸ The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2022 percentage of active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2022 EAVS divided by the 2018 percentage of active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2018 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

²⁹ New Mexico reported an uncharacteristically low number of active registrations in the 2018 EAVS (698,172) compared to the active registrations reported in the general elections of 2014, 2016, and 2020 (all of which exceeded 1 million active registrations), which led to a 65.9% increase in active registrants. Because of concerns with the reliability of this result, it was not included as the largest increase in the body of the report.



How Americans Registered to Vote for the 2022 General Election

Americans can use different methods to register to vote as provided by their state. Voter registration applications can be used not only to register to vote for the first time in a jurisdiction, but also to update relevant voter information such as address, name, or political party affiliation. In the period between the close of voter registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election, states reported receiving 80,764,222 registration applications—909,250 more applications than were received in the same period leading up to the 2018 general election.^{30, 31} Motor vehicle offices continued to be the most common source of these registration applications, accounting for 55% of the total registrations received for the 2022 general election—the highest share of voter registrations by any method in EAVS history.³² Online registrations accounted for 14%; registrations by mail, fax, and email combined accounted for 9.1%; and in-person registrations accounted for 5.9% of the total registration applications.³³ The rest of the registration applications that were received during this period were from sources such as registration drives (2.4%), public assistance offices (1.4%), and other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA (2.6%), such as public libraries among other sources.³⁴

³⁰ The total number of registration applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal general election was reported in item A3a in the 2022 and 2018 EAVS.

³¹ Guam, Idaho, and Mississippi did not provide data on the total number of registrations received in 2022. Missouri and the Northern Mariana Islands did not provide data on the total number of registrations received in 2018. North Dakota did not provide data on the total number of registrations received because they do not require voter registration.

³² The percentage of registrations received by motor vehicle offices was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$. American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4d. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

³³ The percentage of registrations received by mail, fax, or email was calculated as $A4a/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received in person was calculated as $A4b/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received online was calculated as $A4c/A3a \times 100$. Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received by mail, fax, or email because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4a. Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Rhode Island were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received in person because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4b. American Samoa, Arkansas, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Rhode Island, South Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received online because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4c. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

³⁴ The percentage of registrations received from registration drives was calculated as $A4i/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received from public assistance offices was calculated as $A4e/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received from other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated as $A4h/A3a \times 100$. American Samoa, Connecticut, Georgia, Guam, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received from registration drives because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4i. American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at public assistance offices because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4e. American Samoa, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,



For the past four election cycles, there has been a downward trend in the percentage of Americans that register to vote in person at their election or registrar’s office—13.5% of registrations were submitted in person for the 2016 general election, and this percentage decreased in each ensuing election cycle and reached 5.9% of in-person registrations reported in 2022 (see Figure 3).³⁵ When comparing the results from the 2020 and 2022 general elections, 15 states reported increases and 33 reported decreases in the percentage of in-person registrations.³⁶ Most decreases ranged from 0.5 to 6 percentage points, whereas the majority of increases ranged from 0.4 to 10 percentage points. West Virginia reported the largest change of in-person registrations between 2020 and 2022 with an increase of 20.3 percentage points.³⁷ The percentage of registrations filed by mail, fax, or email also decreased in recent years and now account for less than 10% of all registrations for the first time in EAVS history.^{38, 39} In 2022, 77.6% of the states reported a decrease in voter registrations received by mail, fax, or email compared to 2020, with Delaware and North Carolina reporting the largest drops (decreasing by 32.8 and 20.8 percentage points, respectively).⁴⁰

Guam, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, the U.S. Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4h. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages. The instructions for this question noted that registration applications should be classified according to the mode used to submit it. For example, if the voter submits a registration application online using the state’s online voter registration portal, then this is considered an online voter registration. If the voter accessed the online voter registration system at a public library, then this would also be considered an online registration.

³⁵ The percentage of in-person registrations received for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS used the same calculation as the 2022 percentage. The percentage of in-person registrations received in 2016 was calculated as $A6b/A5b \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

³⁶ Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Rhode Island were not included in this comparison because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4b.

³⁷ The percentage point difference of in-person registrations was calculated as the percentage of in-person registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of in-person registrations in 2020.


³⁸ The percentage of mail, fax, or email registrations received for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS used the same calculation as the 2022 percentage.

³⁹ EAVS history refers to data collected by the EAC starting with the 2004 general election. Data for voter registration were reported in the EAVS starting with the 2014 general election and in a separate report (commonly known as the “NVRA Report”) before that election up to the 2004 general election. Before 2004, data on voter registration were collected by the Federal Election Commission.

⁴⁰ The percentage point difference of mail, fax, or email registrations was calculated as the percentage of mail, fax, or email registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of mail, fax, or email registrations in 2020.



Figure 3. Registrations Filed at Motor Vehicle Offices Account for More than Half of Registrations



Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$ for all years. The percentage of registrations received by other means was calculated as $(A4e+A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a \times 100$ for all years. The percentage of registrations received online was calculated as $A4c/A3a \times 100$ for all years. The percentage of registrations received by mail/fax/email was calculated as $A4a/A3a \times 100$ for all years. The percentage of registrations received in person was calculated as $A4b/A3a \times 100$ for all years. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

Online registration continues to be the second most popular method of voter registration in the United States and has been since the 2016 general election, although it decreased by 50.3% in 2022 compared to 2020.⁴¹ The steep decline in the percentage of registrations received online is likely the combination of multiple factors. One of the main reasons for this decline is that the percentage of online registrations in 2020 was unusually high and reached a record 28.2% of all registrations received, an increase of 75.2% compared to the online registrations recorded in the

⁴¹ The percentage difference in online registrations between 2022 and 2020 was calculated as the percentage of online registrations in 2022 divided by the percentage of online registrations in 2020. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.



previous election cycle.⁴² This phenomenon was likely triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, which led many states to expand remote registration opportunities to compensate for the curtailing of in-person registration (e.g., many election offices limited visitors and many motor vehicle offices limited in-person appointments). Once the distancing limitations started to ease and offices started to reopen after 2020, the use of online registration returned to levels more similar to those reported in the 2018 EAVS. In fact, the percentage of online registrations received for the 2020 general election was statistically significantly higher than the online registrations received for the 2018 and 2022 general elections, whereas the online registrations received in 2018 and 2022 were not significantly different at a $p < 0.05$ level.⁴³

In addition to changes in the percentage of Americans who used online registration, there were some states that changed their policies for this type of registration. In 2022, the number of states that offered online registration decreased for the first time since this method was first implemented in Arizona in 2002. The state of New York reported in the 2022 Policy Survey that it did not offer online registration—though the state offers an online option to register to vote through their motor vehicle office—and Oklahoma used to allow voter registration online but reported in the 2022 Policy Survey that it only allowed voter registration updates and not new voter registrations online for the 2022 general election.⁴⁴

At the state level, only Iowa, Nebraska, Texas, and South Carolina had increases in the percentage of online registrations received when comparing data from the 2020 and 2022 EAVS. The largest decreases in online registrations at the state level came from Illinois and Massachusetts (a decrease of 85.2 and 61.9 percentage points, respectively).⁴⁵

The Rise in Motor Vehicle Office Registrations

The most notable result in the 2022 EAVS in terms of voting registration method is the increase in registrations processed by motor vehicle offices. Even though it has been the most popular registration method for more than a decade, the 2022 general election is the first time in EAVS history in which registrations processed by motor vehicle offices accounted for more than half of all registrations processed in the country.⁴⁶ At the national level, 55% of Americans submitted voter registration information through a motor vehicle office, a 40.1% increase compared to the

⁴² The percentage of online registrations received for the 2020 EAVS used the same calculation as the 2022 percentage. The percentage difference in online registrations between 2020 and 2018 was calculated as the percentage of online registrations in 2020 divided by the percentage of online registrations in 2018. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

⁴³ Paired t tests were used to calculate the differences between years, and $p < 0.05$ was used as the threshold for statistical significance.

⁴⁴ Data on online registration policy were collected in item Q6 in the 2022 Policy Survey, and item Q7 in the 2020 Policy Survey. More information about states with online registration is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

⁴⁵ The percentage point difference of online registrations between 2020 and 2022 was calculated as the percentage of online registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of online registrations in 2020. Texas reported 0% online registrations in 2020. However, they did allow for online updates of voter registration in 2020 according to their response to the 2020 Policy Survey. Illinois reported an unusually high percentage of online registrations in the 2020 EAVS.

⁴⁶ The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



result in 2020.⁴⁷ At the state level, seven states reported a decrease in the percentage of registrations received through their local motor vehicle offices and 37 states reported increases when comparing the 2022 and 2020 results. The states that reported the largest increases in this type of registration were Massachusetts and Nevada (an increase of 60.3 and 47.2 percentage points, respectively).⁴⁸

Like the online registration change noted above, the large increase in the percentage of registrations processed at motor vehicle offices is likely the result of several factors—one of which is the unique circumstances leading up to the 2020 general election due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Starting in March 2020, motor vehicle offices started to close in most states due to public health concerns, and when states started to reopen these offices, they did so in a limited capacity (e.g., opening a limited number of offices, limiting the number of customers allowed in the office to ensure social distancing, limiting the hours of operation and the types of transactions allowed). These limitations were in effect for different periods of time depending on the state, and in some cases were present past the November 2020 general election. Additionally, to account for the extraordinary circumstances, most states extended the validity period for expiring driver's licenses to account for the limited-capacity operations, and some states implemented online driver's license renewal where this was previously not an option.⁴⁹ These measures likely decreased the number of registrations processed at motor vehicle offices for the 2020 general election, because many Americans who would have interacted with their motor vehicle offices in normal circumstances—and therefore would have updated or filed voter registration paperwork—between March 2020 and the 2020 general election had to wait to complete these transactions. In many cases these were likely pushed back until after November 2020 and were reported in the 2022 EAVS instead of the 2020 EAVS.

An example of the phenomenon described above is detailed in a report from the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor (ODCA) on the District of Columbia's 2020 election administration.⁵⁰ Data from the District of Columbia Board of Elections showed that the number of registrations received through motor vehicle offices effectively stopped in March 2020 and did not resume until July 2020, and when they resumed, they did so at a slower pace than before the pandemic. Meanwhile, the number of online registrations processed was not affected by the onset of the pandemic and largely increased in the month leading up to the 2020 general election.

However, when looking at the relationship between the difference in 2020 and 2022 voter registrations processed by motor vehicle offices in each state and the driver's license expiration extensions provided in each state—as a proxy for the potential backlog of 2020 driver license transactions that may have resulted in 2022 voter registrations—the results were not conclusive. Longer driver's license expiration extensions were correlated with larger increases in the

⁴⁷ The percentage difference in motor vehicle offices' registrations between 2022 and 2020 was calculated as the percentage of motor vehicle offices' registrations in 2022 divided by the percentage of motor vehicle offices' registrations in 2020. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

⁴⁸ The percentage-point difference of motor vehicle offices' registrations between 2020 and 2022 was calculated as the percentage of motor vehicle offices' registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of motor vehicle offices' registrations in 2020.

⁴⁹ <https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Policy-Scan-State-Driver's-Licenses-Expirations.pdf>

⁵⁰ <https://dcauditor.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Elections.Administration.Report.11.16.21.pdf> (pg. 22).



percentage of voter registrations through the state’s motor vehicle office, but the correlation was not statistically significant.⁵¹⁵² These results suggest that although the effects of the COVID-19 response likely had an impact on the rebound of registrations filed at state’s motor vehicle offices, additional factors such as policy changes (e.g., implementation of automatic voter registration at motor vehicle offices) may have also contributed to the increase of this type of registration.

Automatic Voter Registration

Automatic voter registration (AVR) laws allow for non-registered individuals to be added to the voter registration rolls during or after an interaction with a designated state agency, such as the motor vehicle office, unless the person specifically declines to be registered. The most common differences between the types of AVR policies are the point at which the individual must decline or “opt out” of being registered—either at the point of service or at a later time through a mailer sent to the individual—and which state agencies participate in the AVR program.

In 2016, Oregon was the first state to implement AVR at the state level. Since then, 36 additional states have begun using automatic voter registration or incorporated automated features into their voter registration processes, though the details of these automatic or automated processes vary widely among states.⁵³ A more complete analysis of states’ automatic or automated registration policies is found in Chapter 2 of this report. For the most part, states reported that individuals must opt out of AVR at the point of service. A very common example is that a person is provided the opportunity to register to vote while completing a transaction at a motor vehicle office and is asked to provide a response of “yes” or “no” to be able to continue with the voter registration transaction. Only the state of Colorado reported not asking individuals during their transactions and later requiring that they actively respond to a mailer if they do not want to be included in the voter registration rolls.⁵⁴

In total, 37 states reported using some form of AVR and 18 reported not using AVR for the 2022 general election. All states with this registration policy reported that AVR is at least offered at motor vehicle offices—with 15 states reporting additional agencies (e.g., agencies for people with disabilities, public assistance offices) participating in the AVR program in their state.⁵⁵ Figure 4 shows the percentage of registration applications processed at motor vehicle offices in 2020 and 2022 for states with and without AVR policies. In AVR states, motor vehicle office registrations accounted for a larger portion of their total registrations in both 2020 and 2022 compared to non-AVR states. Interestingly, the percentage point increase in these registrations between 2020

⁵¹ Data on driver’s license extensions came from the Department of Defense’s “COVID-19 Response State Issued Driver’s License & ID Card Extension Guidance” (https://www.cac.mil/Portals/53/Documents/DL%20Expiration%20Guidance_cac_mil.pdf?ver=2020-06-18-115456-723) and the National Governors Association memorandum “Policy Scan of States Driver’s License Rules Ahead of the Election” (<https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Policy-Scan-State-Driver-Licenses-Expirations.pdf>).

⁵² The result of the correlation was $r = 0.062$, $p = 0.695$.

⁵³ Data on state AVR policy were collected in item Q5 in the 2022 Policy Survey.


⁵⁴ Information on the point at which the individual has the opportunity to opt out of AVR was collected in item Q5 in the 2022 Policy Survey. Although Colorado was the only state that reported only using a method of AVR that requires the voter to decline registration by responding to a mailer, this “mailer opt-out” method of AVR was also used by Alaska, Illinois, and Oregon. However, these three states reported also using other AVR methods where the voter is required to opt-out during the interaction with the appropriate agency.

⁵⁵ Information on state agencies participating in the AVR program for each state was collected in item Q5a in the 2022 Policy Survey.



and 2022 was slightly higher for non-AVR states than for AVR states. It is worth noting that AVR states reported 38,532,182 registrations received at their motor vehicle offices, accounting for 87.5% of these type of registrations in the 2022 EAVS.⁵⁶

Figure 4. States With Automatic Voter Registration Had the Highest Rates of Registrations at Motor Vehicle Offices



Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022. Item Q5a in the 2022 Policy Survey was used to group states with and without AVR policies. There might be states in the AVR group that did not allow for this type of registration in 2020. Because there was a change in the AVR question in the Policy Survey from 2020 to 2022 it was impossible to consistently classify states as AVR and non-AVR in 2020 for this calculation. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the overall percentages.

Although AVR is most commonly administered through state motor vehicle offices, 15 states use additional offices to register voters through AVR. EAVS does not collect data specifically on the number of AVRs processed by states, but there are instances in which a state will report the number of registrations conducted in one of these state-funded agencies. In Alaska, the state's Permanent Fund Dividend program conducts AVR and filed a total of 760,797 voter registrations

⁵⁶ The number of registrations received at motor vehicle offices used item A4d of the 2022 EAVS. Item Q5a in the 2022 Policy Survey was used to identify states with AVR policies. The percentage of the total motor vehicle offices registrations that were filed at states with AVR policies used the sum of A4d for these states divided by the national level A4d sum multiplied by 100.



in 2022.⁵⁷ Registrations processed through the Permanent Fund Dividend accounted for 73.9% of all the registrations received in Alaska in 2022, whereas they accounted for 68.1% in 2020 and 59.8% in 2018.⁵⁸

Same-Day Registration

SDR allows voters to register to vote and cast their ballot on the same day. SDR can be offered on Election Day, in which case it may be referred to as Election Day registration, or it can be offered during in-person early voting.⁵⁹ SDR depends on local laws and, thus, is only allowed in some states and territories. Some states reported allowing SDR in very circumstances; Wisconsin, for instance, reported offering regular SDR at the polls on Election Day and during in-person early voting. In addition, Wisconsin has stated that “Individuals who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the same day anytime from the Tuesday prior to Election Day through 5 p.m. on Election Day.”⁶⁰

In 2022, 26 states reported allowing some form of SDR. Twenty-two states reported allowing voters to register to vote on Election Day, 14 states reported allowing SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, 22 states reported allowing for SDR during in-person early voting, and two states reported allowing for SDR in very specific cases.⁶¹ The states that indicated allowing SDR were mostly the same as in 2020, with the exception of Alaska, Guam, Mississippi and Rhode Island, which allowed some form of SDR for the 2020 general election but not for the 2022 general election,⁶² and Virginia, which implemented SDR in October of 2022.⁶³

⁵⁷ Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend automatically registers eligible voters unless they respond to a registration notice within a 30-day period (<https://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/PFDAVRindex.php>). Alaska reported data on the number of registrations received through the Permanent Fund Dividend program in item A4j of the 2022, 2020 and 2018 EAVS.

⁵⁸ The percentage of the total registrations that were processed through the Permanent Fund Dividend program was calculated as A4j/A3a x 100 for each year.

⁵⁹ Some states may have an overlap between their mail voting period and the close of their voter registration, during which it is possible for a person to register on the same day that they cast a mailed ballot; however, this is not considered SDR for purposes of the EAVS, and many states have noted in the past that it is not possible to track the number of mail voters who register to vote on the same day that they cast their mailed ballot. In-person early voting refers to any opportunity for voters in a state to cast a vote in person before Election Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of the different types of in-person early voting opportunities available in states.

⁶⁰ Wisconsin reported this special situation in item Q8a of the 2022 Policy Survey.

⁶¹ These results were obtained from item Q8a of the 2022 Policy Survey. More information about state policies on SDR can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.

⁶² Alaska and Rhode Island only allow SDR for voting for the U.S. president and vice president, thus they do not allow for SDR in midterms when these races are not in the ballot.

⁶³ These results were obtained from item Q8 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q9 of the 2020 Policy Survey.



The total number of SDRs recorded in 2022 was 1,019,300 and accounted for 2.7% of the total registrations received among states allowing for SDR.^{64, 65} Election Day SDRs accounted for 64.5% of all SDRs reported and pre-Election Day SDRs accounted for 38.3% of the total SDR registrations reported in states that allowed them.⁶⁶

The use of SDR varied considerably between states for the 2022 general election, and the NVRA-exempt states—which gained NVRA exemption for allowing SDR continuously since 1993⁶⁷—were among the states where SDR accounted for the largest percentages of registration applications. Wisconsin reported that 60.3% of the registrations received for the 2022 general election were SDRs, whereas New Hampshire and Wyoming reported that SDRs accounted for 16.2% and 10.9% of all the registrations received, respectively.⁶⁸ Among states subject to the provisions of the NVRA, Maine had the highest proportion of SDR registrations (20.3%); although this state was NVRA exempt when the law was first implemented because it had SDR in 1993, Maine lost its exemption in 2011 when it temporarily discontinued SDR before reinstating it later that year.

Other Modes of Registration

In addition to in-person, online, mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle office registrations, states reported data on registration applications received from other sources, which in 2022 accounted for 14.5% of the applications received at the national level.⁶⁹ Some of these modes of registration are NVRA mandated, such as registrations through armed forces recruitment offices, public assistance offices, and state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, which together accounted for 1.6% of the national registrations for the 2022 general election (see Table 2 of Appendix A in this chapter for a breakdown of registrations received by each of these methods).⁷⁰

⁶⁴ The total number of SDR applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal general election was reported in item A2a in the 2022 EAVS. The total corresponds to the 23 states that reported allowing SDR and provided data for it. American Samoa, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, which allow for SDR, did not provide data in item A2a for 2022.

⁶⁵ The percentage of registrations received that were SDRs was calculated as $A2a/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of SDR applications corresponds to the 22 states that reported allowing SDR and provided data for SDR and total registrations received. American Samoa, Idaho, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, which allow for SDR, did not provide data in item A2a and/or item A3a and were excluded from the calculation. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁶⁶ The percentage of SDRs received that were Election Day SDRs was calculated as $A2b/A2a \times 100$. The percentage of SDRs received that were pre-Election day SDRs was calculated as $A2c/A2a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. The percentage of SDRs that were Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 22 states that reported allowing Election Day SDR and provided data for it. New Mexico, which allows for Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2b for 2022. The percentage of SDRs that were pre-Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 20 states that reported allowing pre-Election Day SDR and provided data for it. American Samoa, Idaho, and Massachusetts, which allow for some form of pre-Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2c for 2022.

⁶⁷ Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are NVRA exempt for this reason. North Dakota is also NVRA exempt because it does not require voter registration, and the U.S. territories are NVRA exempt.

⁶⁸ The percentage of registration applications that were SDRs was calculated as $A2a/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁶⁹ The percentage of registrations received by other sources different than in-person, online, mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle office was calculated as $(A4e+A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a \times 100$ for the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

⁷⁰ The percentage of registrations received from NVRA-mandated sources other than in person, mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle offices was calculated as $(A4e+A4f+A4g)/A3a \times 100$ for the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.



States also reported registrations completed through other modes that are not required by the NVRA and that are authorized at the discretion of the state, such as at registration drives (2.4%) and other agencies required by the state (2.6%).⁷¹

Types of Registrations Received for the 2022 General Election

When a person submits a voter registration application, it is processed by an election office and can reach one of several outcomes. Valid applications from people who are eligible and not already registered are considered new applications and are added to the voter registration rolls. Applications submitted by people already registered to vote at the same address with the same name and personal information are considered duplicates. Applications from already-registered individuals wishing to change their name, party affiliation, or address are processed as updates to existing registrations. Applications that do not meet the requirements of eligibility are considered invalid or rejected. When allowed by state law, applications submitted by individuals under 18 years old are processed as pre-registrations so that the individual who submitted the form will be registered when they become of voting age.

All registration applications received are processed and scrutinized by election officials to ensure that the information is correct, that only eligible voters are added to the voter registration rolls, and that duplicate registration records are not created. After the application's review by election officials and following the NVRA's guidelines, states must notify the applicant of the result of their application. For example, a successful application may result in a notification in the form of a registration card mailed to the applicant or a notice of rejection or request for additional documents may be mailed to unsuccessful applicants.

Valid Registrations

Figure 5 displays information on the result of the registration applications that were received by states. Of the more than 80,764,222 registration applications received between the 2020 and 2022 federal general elections, the most common type of registration was an update to an existing record that did not involve a cross-jurisdiction change of address.⁷² These updates usually involve a change of name (such as after a marriage or divorce), party affiliation, or within-jurisdiction change of address; these updates accounted for 44.1% of the registrations processed at the national level.⁷³ New valid registrations—a registration application received from an eligible person in a jurisdiction where they were not previously registered and that resulted in a new registration record being added to the voter registration roll—made up 27.9% of the registrations received.⁷⁴

⁷¹ The percentage of registrations received from registration drives was calculated as $A4i/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received from state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated as $A4h/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.


⁷² The number of total registration applications was reported in item A3a of the 2022 EAVS.

⁷³ The percentage of registration applications received that were a change of name, party, or within-jurisdiction change of address was calculated as $A3f/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁷⁴ The percentage of registration applications that were new registrations was calculated as $A3b/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



Figure 5. Most Registration Applications Were New Applications or Within-Jurisdiction Changes



Source: The percentage of registrations received that were changes of name, party, or within-jurisdiction changes of address was calculated as $A3f/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received that were new valid registrations was calculated as $A3b/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations was calculated as $A3d/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received that were labelled as “Other” registrations was calculated as $(A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received that were cross-jurisdiction changes of address was calculated as $A3g/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected was calculated as $A3e/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of age was calculated as $A3c/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received that were not categorized was calculated as $(1 - [A3b+A3c+A3d+A3e+A3f+A3g+A3h+A3i+A3j])/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

Other types of valid registrations reported in the EAVS included a change of address that crossed local jurisdiction borders but was still within the state, which accounted for 9.7% of the total registration applications filed.⁷⁵ Some states reported allowing for underage citizens to pre-register to vote so that they are automatically added to the voter registration rolls when they turn 18 years old. These pre-registrations accounted for 1.4% of the total registrations among states that allowed them.⁷⁶ Finally, 11.1% of the registrations were labelled as “Other.” This category in

⁷⁵ The percentage of registration applications that were cross-jurisdiction change of addresses was calculated as $A3g/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁷⁶ The percentage of registration applications that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of age was calculated as $A3c/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



the EAVS is used by states to report registrations that were not covered among the standard categories, or in most cases, to report registrations that could not be broken down into the categories provided, such as a change to an existing registration record that could not be tracked as being a within-jurisdiction or cross-jurisdiction change of address.⁷⁷

Rejected and Duplicate Registrations

Some of the registration applications received by states do not result in the creation or the update of a registration record. The EAVS collects data on two types of unsuccessful registration applications: rejected and duplicate registrations. The first type includes applications that contain incomplete information, incorrect information, information that cannot be validated against existing state records, or applications from people who do not meet eligibility requirements. In the period between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election, states reported rejecting 1,873,700 applications, accounting for 2.5% of the total registration applications received. This is comparable to the percentage of registrations that were rejected in 2020 (2.9%) and 2018 (3.4%).⁷⁸

Duplicate registrations include applications that are exact matches to existing registration records; these can be applications submitted by people who did not realize they were already registered to vote or who submitted multiple applications through different modes (e.g., submitted an application with the exact same information through the mail and online). States reported receiving 9,083,395 duplicate applications between the 2020 and the 2022 general elections, which accounted for 12.7% of the total registrations received.⁷⁹ As with rejected applications, the percentage of duplicate registrations registered in 2022 was comparable to those in 2020 (9.7%) and 2018 (10.2%).⁸⁰

A majority of states provided a breakdown of the total, rejected, and duplicate registrations they received and the source of those registrations (e.g., online, in person, or at motor vehicle offices).⁸¹ With a few exceptions, the percentage of applications that were duplicates comprised at least 8% of the registrations received by each source; the exceptions were: online registrations (7.4%), registration drives (6.3%), and registrations filed at non-NVRA-mandated state agencies

⁷⁷ The percentage of registration applications that were categorized as “Other” was calculated as $(A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. Not all the applications accounted for in the “Other” category may be valid; however, they were included in this section because they cannot be fully identified as rejected or duplicate either.

⁷⁸ The total number of rejected registration applications was collected in item A3e of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected was calculated as $A3e/A3a \times 100$ for 2018, 2020, and 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages. Paired t tests between each pair of election years did not yield significant results at the $p < 0.05$ level, meaning that the results were not significantly different from each other.

⁷⁹ The total number of duplicate registration applications was collected in item A3d of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations was calculated as $A3d/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁸⁰ The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS used the same calculation as the 2022 percentage. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

⁸¹ Thirteen states did not provide the application source breakdown for duplicate registrations and 14 states did not provide the application source breakdown for rejected registrations. Data from these states were not included in the ensuing calculations in the paragraph.



(3.2%).⁸² Registrations received by methods categorized as “Other” had the largest duplicate registration rate with 18.3% of all registrations filed being classified as duplicates. For rejected registrations, most registration methods had a rejection rate between 1.9% and 4%, with the exception of registrations filed at state-funded agencies primarily serving individuals with disabilities (7.3%), registrations from registration drives (9.8%), and registrations filed at public assistance offices mandated by the NVRA (11.3%).⁸³

Registration List Maintenance

The NVRA requires states to maintain an “accurate and current voter registration roll” to “protect the integrity of the electoral process.”⁸⁴ To facilitate this maintenance, the NVRA requires that any change of address submitted to a motor vehicle office must serve as notification of a change of address for voter registration, unless the individual indicates that the change is not for voter registration purposes. The law also requires states to conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove the records of ineligible voters. States have considerable freedom to choose when, where, and how these functions are performed, but must follow the guidelines listed in the NVRA, which describe the need to use confirmation notices and to complete (with few exceptions) systematic removal programs “not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office,”⁸⁵ and to keep a detailed list of instances in which it is appropriate to remove a record from the voter registration rolls.

The NVRA’s list maintenance process, shown in Figure 6, specifies the steps that states need to follow in order to confirm eligibility from registered voters and to remove them from the voter registration rolls when registered voters are no longer eligible to vote in a jurisdiction. One key tool in this process that states may use to keep their voter registration rolls up to date is confirmation notices. These are postage-paid and pre-addressed return cards that are sent to registrants who a state suspects are no longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which they are registered. If the registrant does not return the confirmation notice, they can be added to the inactive registrant list and would typically be asked to provide proof of residency before voting. If the registrant fails to return the confirmation notice and does not participate in the subsequent

⁸² The duplicate registration rate refers to the percentage of registration applications received from a source and categorized as duplicate. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as $A6a/A4a \times 100$. For in-person registrations, this was calculated as $A6b/A4b \times 100$. For online registrations, this was calculated as $A6c/A4c \times 100$. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as $A6d/A4d \times 100$. For public assistance offices, this was calculated as $A6e/A4e \times 100$. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, this was calculated as $A6f/A4f \times 100$. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated as $A6g/A4g \times 100$. For registration drives, this was calculated as $A6i/A4i \times 100$. For other registration sources, this was calculated as $(A6j+A6k+A6l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

⁸³ The rejection rate refers to the percentage of registration applications received from a source and categorized as invalid or rejected. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as $A7a/A4a \times 100$. For in-person registrations, this was calculated as $A7b/A4b \times 100$. For online registrations, this was calculated as $A7c/A4c \times 100$. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as $A7d/A4d \times 100$. For public assistance offices, this was calculated as $A7e/A4e \times 100$. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, this was calculated as $A7f/A4f \times 100$. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated as $A7g/A4g \times 100$. For registration drives, this was calculated as $A7i/A4i \times 100$. For other registration sources, this was calculated as $(A7j+A7k+A7l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.


⁸⁴ 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

⁸⁵ 52 U.S.C. § 20507.



two consecutive federal general elections, then the NVRA grants the state the ability to remove the registrant from the voter registration roll. If the registrant has not moved out of the voting jurisdiction, they must complete and return the confirmation notice no later than the registration deadline of the next election to remain on the list of active registrants.

Figure 6. The NVRA's Voter Registration List Maintenance Process



The NVRA mandates that registrants may only be removed from the voter registration rolls in these circumstances:

- Upon the death of the registrant;
- Upon the registrant's written confirmation that their address has changed to a location outside the registrar's jurisdiction;
- On the request of the registrant;
- For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;
- On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or
- On the registrant's failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.

Because registration removal can take up to two federal general election cycles to complete for some registration records, particularly in states that are subject to the NVRA, it is inevitable that voter registration rolls will contain some number of voter records for individuals who are no longer eligible to vote.

NVRA-exempt states do not need to adhere to these guidelines to complete list maintenance of their voter registration rolls. However, they do have similar processes in place to guarantee that their voter registration rolls are up to date and only non-eligible voters are removed from their voter registration rolls. For example, Wisconsin sends mailing notices similar to the confirmation notices described above to registrants who have not voted in a four-year period and to registrants that are flagged via Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) as having outdated or inaccurate information. If the voter fails to return the mail notice within 30 days, then they are declared ineligible to vote.^{86, 87} A voter who is eligible to vote may register to vote and cast their ballot at the polls on Election Day in Wisconsin and every NVRA-exempt state.

Confirmation Notices Processed

Nationally, 26,601,983 confirmation notices were sent between the 2020 general election and the month before the 2022 general election, accounting for 13.7% of the active voters reported by states in 2022.⁸⁸ This percentage falls in the range of what was reported by states in 2020 (14.3%) and in 2018 (11.6%).⁸⁹ Table 1 shows that unreturned confirmation notices accounted for 57.4% of the total confirmation notices sent. These are confirmation notices that were not returned by the voter confirming if they were—or were not—eligible to vote, nor were these confirmation notices returned by the postal service as undeliverable. Unreturned confirmation notices allow states to move the addressees of these notices to the inactive registration list if the state uses that designation. States reported that 8.4% of confirmation notices were returned confirming the voter's continued eligibility, and 5% were returned confirming the voter was no longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction or no longer wanted to be registered to vote.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Wisconsin Statutes §§6.50 (1) and (2).

⁸⁷ <https://elections.wi.gov/statistics-data/voter-list-maintenance/electronic-registration-information-center-eric>

⁸⁸ The total number of confirmation notices sent was reported in item A8a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of active registered voters who received a confirmation notice was calculated as $A8a/A1b \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. In 2022, 48 states reported the number of confirmation notices sent during the period of registration for the 2022 general election. North Dakota does not require citizens to register to vote and, thus, does not use confirmation notices. American Samoa, Idaho, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming are NVRA exempt. Alabama reported that they did “not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.” Indiana did not provide this information because their voter registration system “is not able to track the information requested.” Forty states reported the status of the confirmation notices sent. In addition to the states that did not report on confirmation notices, Guam, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Rhode Island did not break down the number of confirmation notices sent by status.

⁸⁹ The number of confirmation notices sent as a percentage of the active registrants in 2020 and 2018 used the same calculation as 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁹⁰ The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as $A8e/A8a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming valid registration was calculated as $A8b/A8a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming registration should be invalidated was calculated as $A8c/A8a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



Table 1. Most Confirmation Notices That Were Sent Were Not Returned by Voters

Result of Confirmation Notice	Percentage of Total Confirmation Notices Sent
Unreturned (neither received back from voters nor returned as undeliverable)	57.4%
Not categorized	23.8%
Undeliverable	13.6%
Other	10.4%
Returned by voter confirming valid registration	8.4%
Returned by voter confirming invalid registration	5%

Source: The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as $A8e/A8a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were not categorized was calculated as $(1 - [A8b+A8c+A8d+A8e+A8f+A8g+A8h]/A8a) \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned undeliverable was calculated as $A8d/A8a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were labeled as “Other” was calculated as $(A8f+A8g+A8h/A8a) \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming valid registration was calculated as $A8b/A8a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming registration should be invalidated was calculated as $A8c/A8a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

Voters Removed From the Voter Registration Rolls

Between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election, states reported removing 19,260,000 records from their voter registration rolls.⁹¹ This was equal to 8.5% of the total number of voters who were registered in the United States as of the close of registration for the 2022 general election.⁹² At the state level, 60.4% of the states reported removing a number of registrants that added up to between 3% and 10% of their total registered voters. There were some exceptions to this trend: the U.S. Virgin Islands’ removals accounted for the lowest percentage of total registrants at less than 0.1%, and New Hampshire reported the highest percentage of removals at 29.5% (see Table 5 of Appendix A in this chapter).

States also reported the reasons for removing records from their voter registration rolls. These reasons for removal are shown in Figure 7. The most common reason was a cross-jurisdiction change of address, which accounted for 26.8% of all removals, followed by death of the registrant


⁹¹ The total number of registrants removed from the voter registration rolls was reported in item A9a of the 2022 EAVS. Fifty-two states reported data for the items related to voter removal. North Dakota does not require citizens to register to vote and thus does not have registrants to remove from the voter registration rolls. Idaho reported “Data not available” for all items related to registration removals. Mississippi reported the total number of registrants removed from the voter registration rolls in item A9a but responded “Data not available” to subitems A9b to A9g.

⁹² Registrants removed as a percentage of total registrants was calculated as $A9a/A1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



(25.6%). Failure to both respond to a confirmation notice and to vote in two consecutive federal general elections accounted for 25.4% of removals.⁹³

Figure 7. Three Removal Reasons Accounted for the Majority of the Voter Registration Removals



Source: The percentage of registrations removed because of a cross-jurisdiction change of address was calculated as $A9b/A9a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated as $A9c/A9a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation notices (and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as $A9e/A9a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of other reasons was calculated as $(A9f+A9h+A9i+A9j)/A9a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because the voter requested to be removed was calculated as $A9g/A9a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was calculated as $A9d/A9a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

The majority of states reported that a registrant could be removed from the voter registration rolls if the registrant received a disqualifying criminal conviction and/or was incarcerated,⁹⁴ but only

⁹³ The percentage of registrations removed because of a cross-jurisdiction change of address was calculated as $(A9b/A9a) \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated as $(A9c/A9a) \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation notices (and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as $(A9e/A9a) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁹⁴ Maine, Vermont, and the District of Columbia reported criminal conviction and/or incarceration was not a reason for voter removal in item Q38 of the 2022 Policy Survey.



1.4% of the removals were done for this reason.⁹⁵ Two states, however, reported that more than 7% of their registration removals happened due to criminal convictions or incarceration. Kentucky reported that 9.1% of registrants were removed for this reason, and New Mexico (13.3%) reported the largest percentage of this type of removal. These two states also reported that criminal convictions accounted for more than 6% of their voter registration removals in the 2020 and 2018 EAVS.⁹⁶

Upcoming Changes to Section A for the 2024 EAVS

All voter registration-related topics discussed in this chapter are covered in Section A of the EAVS. The questions in this section have changed little since the 2008 EAVS, even as the methods that states offer to register to vote and use to collect registration data have continued to evolve (e.g., implementation of online registration in most states, AVR, changes in voter registration databases).

Beginning with the 2024 EAVS, the EAC will update the vocabulary and the content of EAVS Section A to better reflect the reality of voter registration in the United States. From late 2021 to early 2022, the EAC consulted with state and local election officials from multiple states on issues they experienced in the past with Section A, their current voter registration data collection practices, and suggestions for updates to the survey questions.

The new Section A will cover the same topics discussed in this chapter and will add items covering new topics, such as reasons for sending confirmation notices and instances where voter registration records are merged. It will also transition from recording voter registration forms to voter registration transactions and will record all registration updates in one category instead of two. For a complete description of the upcoming changes and a look at the new Section A, see the EAC's "Planned Changes to 2024 EAVS" report at <https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys>.

⁹⁵ The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was calculated as $A9d/A9a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

⁹⁶ The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction in 2020 and 2018 used the same calculation as 2022. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Voter Registration Table 1: Registration History

State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs.	Active Regs.	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Regs.	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Alabama	2022	3,829,788	3,692,639	3,283,842	85.7%	88.9%	408,797	11.1%
	2020	3,731,336	3,717,798	3,438,213	92.1%	92.5%	279,585	7.5%
	2018	3,688,249	3,465,352	3,164,301	85.8%	91.3%	301,051	8.7%
Alaska	2022	533,852	648,790	601,795	112.7%	92.8%	46,995	7.2%
	2020	533,151	646,093	595,647	111.7%	92.2%	50,446	7.8%
	2018	531,653	624,467	571,851	107.6%	91.6%	52,616	8.4%
American Samoa	2022	--	14,314	14,314	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	16,341	16,341	--	100.0%	0	0.0%
	2018	--	15,527	8,462	--	54.5%	7,065	45.5%
Arizona	2022	5,216,518	4,833,160	4,143,929	79.4%	85.7%	689,231	14.3%
	2020	5,137,474	4,728,109	4,275,729	83.2%	90.4%	452,380	9.6%
	2018	4,895,706	4,276,891	3,715,624	75.9%	86.9%	561,267	13.1%
Arkansas	2022	2,237,649	1,805,777	1,475,838	66.0%	81.7%	329,939	18.3%
	2020	2,235,415	1,831,414	1,402,061	63.0%	76.9%	423,353	23.1%
	2018	2,207,894	1,786,840	1,456,887	66.0%	81.5%	329,953	18.5%
California	2022	26,028,290	26,942,532	21,958,218	84.4%	81.5%	4,984,314	18.5%
	2020	26,032,160	26,157,616	21,795,538	83.7%	83.3%	4,348,374	16.6%
	2018	25,650,455	25,103,559	19,724,297	76.9%	78.6%	5,379,262	21.4%
Colorado	2022	4,303,604	4,355,778	3,839,814	89.2%	88.2%	515,964	11.8%
	2020	4,244,210	4,211,528	3,803,762	89.6%	90.3%	407,766	9.7%
	2018	4,057,437	3,953,613	3,426,499	84.4%	86.7%	527,114	13.3%
Connecticut	2022	2,659,979	2,491,987	2,259,575	84.9%	90.7%	232,412	9.3%
	2020	2,619,474	2,524,717	2,335,860	89.2%	92.5%	188,857	7.5%
	2018	2,611,667	2,369,335	2,193,586	84.0%	92.6%	175,749	7.4%
Delaware	2022	754,114	762,908	702,029	93.1%	92.0%	60,879	8.0%
	2020	725,178	739,672	711,287	98.1%	96.2%	28,385	3.8%
	2018	709,999	695,014	672,632	94.7%	96.8%	22,382	3.2%
District of Columbia	2022	502,670	674,728	508,855	101.2%	75.4%	165,873	24.6%
	2020	536,768	625,683	517,890	96.5%	82.8%	107,793	17.2%
	2018	510,514	617,046	511,633	100.2%	82.9%	105,413	17.1%
Florida	2022	15,855,982	15,574,971	14,497,121	91.4%	93.1%	1,077,850	6.9%
	2020	15,507,315	15,231,808	14,517,002	93.6%	95.3%	701,422	4.6%
	2018	15,014,950	14,126,722	13,278,070	88.4%	94.0%	848,652	6.0%
Georgia	2022	7,786,111	7,813,860	6,955,386	89.3%	89.0%	858,474	11.0%
	2020	7,581,837	7,618,436	7,194,889	94.9%	94.4%	423,547	5.6%
	2018	7,362,615	6,944,851	6,437,524	87.4%	92.7%	507,327	7.3%
Guam	2022	--	60,463	60,463	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	55,896	55,896	--	100.0%	--	--
	2018	--	55,941	55,941	--	100.0%	--	--



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs.	Active Regs.	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Regs.	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Hawaii	2022	1,044,019	861,475	764,102	73.2%	88.7%	97,373	11.3%
	2020	1,014,035	832,466	759,971	74.9%	91.3%	72,495	8.7%
	2018	1,025,548	756,751	712,765	69.5%	94.2%	43,986	5.8%
Idaho	2022	1,373,714	1,004,608	1,004,608	73.1%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	1,282,630	1,029,763	1,029,763	80.3%	100.0%	--	--
	2018	1,219,481	917,609	917,609	75.2%	100.0%	--	--
Illinois	2022	9,087,338	8,775,224	7,899,591	86.9%	90.0%	791,457	9.0%
	2020	9,088,036	9,789,893	9,103,542	100.2%	93.0%	686,351	7.0%
	2018	9,055,927	8,751,060	8,091,045	89.3%	92.5%	660,015	7.5%
Indiana	2022	5,030,200	4,767,111	4,197,437	83.4%	88.0%	569,674	12.0%
	2020	4,978,356	4,692,091	4,170,353	83.8%	88.9%	521,738	11.1%
	2018	4,899,251	4,500,196	4,168,374	85.1%	92.6%	331,822	7.4%
Iowa	2022	2,379,570	2,234,666	1,880,415	79.0%	84.1%	354,251	15.9%
	2020	2,348,787	2,243,758	2,094,770	89.2%	93.4%	148,988	6.6%
	2018	2,325,355	2,193,813	2,037,510	87.6%	92.9%	156,297	7.1%
Kansas	2022	2,128,111	1,975,321	1,830,216	86.0%	92.7%	145,105	7.3%
	2020	2,103,748	1,924,772	1,764,949	83.9%	91.7%	148,624	7.7%
	2018	2,091,261	1,835,473	1,670,217	79.9%	91.0%	165,256	9.0%
Kentucky	2022	3,405,618	3,590,227	3,137,031	92.1%	87.4%	453,196	12.6%
	2020	3,367,502	3,565,428	3,319,307	98.6%	93.1%	246,121	6.9%
	2018	3,350,956	3,402,905	3,402,905	101.6%	100.0%	0	0.0%
Louisiana	2022	3,439,830	3,018,815	2,830,594	82.3%	93.8%	188,221	6.2%
	2020	3,463,372	3,093,004	2,963,901	85.6%	95.8%	129,103	4.2%
	2018	3,469,016	2,992,170	2,856,722	82.3%	95.5%	135,448	4.5%
Maine	2022	1,100,974	1,145,159	929,124	84.4%	81.1%	216,035	18.9%
	2020	1,078,770	1,138,576	1,135,008	105.2%	99.7%	3,568	0.3%
	2018	1,064,497	1,057,967	1,054,068	99.0%	99.6%	3,899	0.4%
Maryland	2022	4,417,293	4,440,808	4,149,909	93.9%	93.4%	290,899	6.6%
	2020	4,316,921	4,298,942	4,142,347	96.0%	96.4%	156,595	3.6%
	2018	4,310,864	3,954,027	3,954,027	91.7%	100.0%	--	--
Massachusetts	2022	5,121,488	4,884,076	4,173,942	81.5%	85.5%	710,134	14.5%
	2020	5,057,192	4,812,909	4,400,254	87.0%	91.4%	412,655	8.6%
	2018	4,993,001	4,574,967	3,947,897	79.1%	86.3%	627,070	13.7%
Michigan [1]	2022	7,640,514	8,226,745	7,297,900	95.5%	88.7%	928,845	11.3%
	2020	7,562,464	8,105,524	7,209,300	95.3%	88.9%	896,224	11.1%
	2018	7,481,928	7,471,088	6,488,823	86.7%	86.9%	982,265	13.1%
Minnesota [2]	2022	4,221,515	3,624,200	3,624,200	85.9%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	4,157,556	3,731,016	3,731,016	89.7%	100.0%	--	--
	2018	4,079,652	3,422,515	3,422,515	83.9%	100.0%	--	--
Mississippi	2022	2,226,474	2,081,999	1,922,707	86.4%	92.3%	159,292	7.7%
	2020	2,246,323	2,143,149	1,982,632	88.3%	92.5%	160,517	7.5%
	2018	2,234,722	2,079,732	1,880,197	84.1%	90.4%	199,535	9.6%



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs.	Active Regs.	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Regs.	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Missouri	2022	4,675,531	4,234,799	3,816,663	81.6%	90.1%	418,136	9.9%
	2020	4,650,318	4,338,133	3,963,980	85.2%	91.4%	374,153	8.6%
	2018	4,606,843	4,127,333	3,803,881	82.6%	92.2%	323,452	7.8%
Montana [3]	2022	857,649	757,914	661,320	77.1%	87.3%	96,594	12.7%
	2020	831,760	747,439	675,971	81.3%	90.4%	71,468	9.6%
	2018	810,760	706,173	616,642	76.1%	87.3%	89,531	12.7%
Nebraska [4]	2022	1,411,320	1,242,930	1,141,470	80.9%	91.8%	101,460	8.2%
	2020	1,388,950	1,266,730	1,168,708	84.1%	92.3%	98,022	7.7%
	2018	1,368,000	1,219,276	1,096,862	80.2%	90.0%	122,414	10.0%
Nevada	2022	2,193,360	2,200,151	1,840,748	83.9%	83.7%	359,403	16.3%
	2020	2,111,932	2,039,162	1,835,401	86.9%	90.0%	203,761	10.0%
	2018	2,031,213	1,773,566	1,563,750	77.0%	88.2%	209,816	11.8%
New Hampshire	2022	1,103,239	909,067	909,067	82.4%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	1,070,215	1,087,145	1,087,145	101.6%	100.0%	--	--
	2018	1,048,883	988,148	988,148	94.2%	100.0%	--	--
New Jersey	2022	6,433,068	6,430,740	5,934,029	92.2%	92.3%	496,711	7.7%
	2020	6,170,130	6,310,564	5,896,836	95.6%	93.4%	413,728	6.6%
	2018	6,199,409	5,869,078	5,456,506	88.0%	93.0%	412,572	7.0%
New Mexico	2022	1,545,938	1,375,200	1,198,896	77.6%	87.2%	176,304	12.8%
	2020	1,522,171	1,360,871	1,255,669	82.5%	92.3%	105,202	7.7%
	2018	1,493,318	1,261,639	698,172	46.8%	55.3%	563,467	44.7%
New York	2022	14,109,037	13,131,592	12,125,966	85.9%	92.3%	1,005,626	7.7%
	2020	13,810,830	13,555,618	12,362,997	89.5%	91.2%	1,191,845	8.8%
	2018	13,866,648	12,695,763	11,676,266	84.2%	92.0%	1,019,497	8.0%
North Carolina	2022	7,808,186	7,422,396	6,488,756	83.1%	87.4%	933,640	12.6%
	2020	7,729,644	7,372,608	6,607,121	85.5%	89.6%	765,487	10.4%
	2018	7,509,879	7,095,209	5,898,244	78.5%	83.1%	1,196,965	16.9%
North Dakota	2022	576,588	--	--	--	--	--	--
	2020	567,545	--	--	--	--	--	--
	2018	564,475	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	2022	--	19,272	19,272	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	18,526	18,526	--	100.0%	--	--
	2018	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	2022	8,943,128	8,029,950	8,029,950	89.8%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	8,879,469	8,073,829	8,073,829	90.9%	100.0%	--	--
	2018	8,830,185	8,070,917	8,070,917	91.4%	100.0%	--	--
Oklahoma	2022	2,903,864	2,295,906	2,021,787	69.6%	88.1%	274,119	11.9%
	2020	2,875,059	2,259,107	2,021,846	70.3%	89.5%	237,261	10.5%
	2018	2,835,451	2,120,843	1,857,700	65.5%	87.6%	263,143	12.4%
Oregon [5]	2022	3,200,314	2,985,820	2,985,820	93.3%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	3,162,204	2,944,588	2,944,588	93.1%	100.0%	--	--
	2018	3,060,328	2,748,232	2,748,232	89.8%	100.0%	--	--



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs.	Active Regs.	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Regs.	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Pennsylvania	2022	9,918,163	8,873,144	8,033,385	81.0%	90.5%	839,759	9.5%
	2020	9,810,201	9,035,061	8,280,348	84.4%	91.6%	754,713	8.4%
	2018	9,764,119	8,607,748	7,738,989	79.3%	89.9%	868,759	10.1%
Rhode Island	2022	827,415	815,417	722,684	87.3%	88.6%	92,733	11.4%
	2020	800,798	809,117	735,195	91.8%	90.9%	73,922	9.1%
	2018	792,337	781,478	737,419	93.1%	94.4%	44,059	5.6%
South Carolina	2022	3,940,745	3,740,723	3,376,917	85.7%	90.3%	363,806	9.7%
	2020	3,892,341	3,854,209	3,535,061	90.8%	91.7%	319,148	8.3%
	2018	3,799,298	3,538,580	3,538,580	93.1%	100.0%	396,653	11.2%
South Dakota	2022	659,768	660,327	599,919	90.9%	90.9%	60,408	9.1%
	2020	653,394	635,256	578,683	88.6%	91.1%	56,573	8.9%
	2018	641,666	594,453	539,788	84.1%	90.8%	54,665	9.2%
Tennessee	2022	5,248,512	4,549,183	4,218,165	80.4%	92.7%	331,018	7.3%
	2020	5,129,580	4,436,727	4,226,928	82.4%	95.3%	209,799	4.7%
	2018	5,016,103	4,163,359	3,764,513	75.0%	90.4%	398,846	9.6%
Texas	2022	19,375,866	17,672,143	15,847,341	81.8%	89.7%	1,824,802	10.3%
	2020	18,875,542	16,955,519	15,279,870	81.0%	90.1%	1,675,649	9.9%
	2018	18,174,345	15,615,925	13,790,247	75.9%	88.3%	1,653,986	10.6%
U.S. Virgin Islands [6]	2022	--	39,910	39,910	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	53,341	53,341	--	100.0%	--	--
	2018	--	51,095	51,095	--	100.0%	--	--
Utah	2022	2,251,328	1,614,198	1,690,442	75.1%	104.7%	123,071	7.6%
	2020	2,134,249	1,861,977	1,713,297	80.3%	92.0%	148,680	8.0%
	2018	2,028,176	1,658,457	1,433,917	70.7%	86.5%	224,540	13.5%
Vermont	2022	518,387	501,665	446,098	86.1%	88.9%	55,567	11.1%
	2020	498,705	489,277	440,920	88.4%	90.1%	48,357	9.9%
	2018	494,550	489,385	447,709	90.5%	91.5%	41,676	8.5%
Virginia	2022	6,354,439	6,105,868	5,736,016	90.3%	93.9%	369,852	6.1%
	2020	6,226,623	5,975,561	5,763,187	92.6%	96.4%	212,374	3.6%
	2018	6,145,893	5,666,627	5,272,602	85.8%	93.0%	394,025	7.0%
Washington	2022	5,529,508	5,303,997	4,805,394	86.9%	90.6%	498,603	9.4%
	2020	5,409,035	5,255,466	4,892,871	90.5%	93.1%	362,595	6.9%
	2018	5,259,892	4,841,431	4,362,480	82.9%	90.1%	478,951	9.9%
West Virginia	2022	1,408,767	1,153,208	1,055,475	74.9%	91.5%	97,733	8.5%
	2020	1,420,289	1,269,024	1,062,685	74.8%	83.7%	206,339	16.3%
	2018	1,428,859	1,245,827	961,894	67.3%	77.2%	283,933	22.8%
Wisconsin [7]	2022	4,480,576	3,670,188	3,670,188	81.9%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	4,412,888	3,834,164	3,834,164	86.9%	100.0%	--	--
	2018	4,375,063	3,442,004	3,442,004	78.7%	100.0%	--	--
Wyoming	2022	436,049	301,931	301,931	69.2%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	434,852	303,049	303,049	69.7%	100.0%	--	--
	2018	428,379	283,941	283,941	66.3%	100.0%	--	--



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs.	Active Regs.	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Regs.	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
U.S. Total	2022	239,035,960	226,339,980	203,660,564	85.4%	90.0%	22,794,555	11.1%
	2020	237,998,330	228,004,364	209,441,338	88.1%	91.8%	18,523,963	9.1%
	2018	231,416,670	211,601,918	190,662,485	82.5%	90.1%	21,164,394	11.3%

Voter Registration Table 1 Calculation Notes:

CVAP Total uses the 1-year ACS CVAP estimate. The 2022 data uses the 2021 CVAP, the 2020 data uses the 2019 CVAP, and the 2018 data uses the 2017 CVAP.

Reported Registrations uses question A1a for each year.

Active Registrations uses question A1b for each year.

Active Registrations (% of CVAP) uses $A1b/CVAP \times 100$ for each year.

Active Registrations (% of Total) uses $A1b/A1a \times 100$ for each year.

Inactive Registrations uses question A1c for each year.

Inactive Registrations (% of Total) uses $A1c/A1a \times 100$ for each year.

Voter Registration Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the active registration (% of total) and inactive registration (% of total) rates may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- The citizen voting age population (CVAP) is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens ages 18 years or older in the state. This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2021 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the year 2022 was not available by the time this report was finalized. For consistency, the CVAP for the 2018 and 2020 general elections was the 1-year ACS state estimate for 2017 and 2019, respectively.
- Some states may report an active CVAP registration rate of 100% or more. This is because the 2021 CVAP was used to calculate the 2022 registration rate and because due to federal law, some ineligible voters may take up to two full election cycles to be removed from the voter registration rolls.
- The Reported Registrations column includes both active and inactive voters (if the state uses such a distinction).

[1] Voters reported in A1 are eligible to vote. Those defined as “inactive” need only to confirm their address before receiving a ballot. Participation in past elections is not a factor in defining eligibility.

[2] Minnesota is NVRA exempt and does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.

[3] The total number of registered and eligible voters consists of active and inactive voters. Montana reports a total registered and eligible number of 762,959. The difference is provisional, late registration, and pending.



[4] Nebraska does not have “inactive” voters. The number of inactive voters reported is voters who were sent a notice in accordance with NVRA Section 8(d)(2) and have not responded.

[5] Oregon does not track the number of inactive voters.

[6] The U.S. Virgin Islands is not subject to the provisions of the NVRA.

[7] Wisconsin is not subject to the NVRA and does not have inactive registered voters. Military voters are included in the reported registration numbers even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin because they still have a voter record created.

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Voter Registration Table 2: Application Sources—Total Forms Received

State	Total Registration Applications Received	Application Source							
		Mail/Email/Fax		In Person at Election Office		Online		Motor Vehicle Agencies	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	1,132,263	23,750	2.1%	111,139	9.8%	146,809	13.0%	770,324	68.0%
Alaska	1,028,887	31,023	3.0%	71,188	6.9%	81,104	7.9%	80,024	7.8%
American Samoa [1]	1,014	0	0.0%	1,014	100.0%	--	--	--	--
Arizona	2,187,271	87,185	4.0%	92,864	4.2%	433,681	19.8%	1,295,240	59.2%
Arkansas	486,722	74,917	15.4%	74,055	15.2%	--	--	263,883	54.2%
California	10,090,697	492,619	4.9%	277,191	2.7%	2,362,300	23.4%	3,901,637	38.7%
Colorado	3,042,434	248,408	8.2%	39,533	1.3%	468,561	15.4%	2,171,174	71.4%
Connecticut	887,202	381,409	43.0%	26,535	3.0%	159,610	18.0%	301,563	34.0%
Delaware	351,944	11,369	3.2%	9,679	2.8%	26,848	7.6%	285,635	81.2%
District of Columbia	96,410	3,497	3.6%	9,920	10.3%	17,279	17.9%	60,450	62.7%
Florida	6,056,693	486,880	8.0%	350,438	5.8%	754,734	12.5%	3,457,205	57.1%
Georgia [2]	3,232,104	548,094	17.0%	86,297	2.7%	385,959	11.9%	2,149,658	66.5%
Guam [3]	--	--	--	--	--	3,268	--	60,620	--
Hawaii	151,594	12,048	7.9%	0	0.0%	30,781	20.3%	108,765	71.7%
Idaho [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	1,906,637	281,760	14.8%	63,312	3.3%	214,006	11.2%	535,072	28.1%
Indiana [5]	1,922,116	167,194	8.7%	24,288	1.3%	266,258	13.9%	830,962	43.2%
Iowa	856,747	15,435	1.8%	15,606	1.8%	24,197	2.8%	122,074	14.2%
Kansas	709,206	87,190	12.3%	70,444	9.9%	205,830	29.0%	259,418	36.6%
Kentucky	1,332,191	21,195	1.6%	142,441	10.7%	223,945	16.8%	850,572	63.8%
Louisiana [6]	594,612	90,456	15.2%	96,301	16.2%	229,120	38.5%	147,761	24.8%
Maine	185,804	15,831	8.5%	132,296	71.2%	--	--	25,562	13.8%
Maryland [7]	3,513,915	120,297	3.4%	72,222	2.1%	435,442	12.4%	2,628,953	74.8%
Massachusetts [8]	2,837,185	41,239	1.5%	28,593	1.0%	157,096	5.5%	2,370,248	83.5%
Michigan [9]	3,400,532	51,449	1.5%	127,503	3.7%	84,117	2.5%	3,080,445	90.6%
Minnesota [10]	1,158,190	27,992	2.4%	243,034	21.0%	88,971	7.7%	317,653	27.4%
Mississippi	--	36,851	--	57,701	--	--	--	146,795	--
Missouri	435,511	34,569	7.9%	26,902	6.2%	77,640	17.8%	282,727	64.9%
Montana [11]	237,013	51,854	21.9%	54,902	23.2%	--	--	93,139	39.3%
Nebraska [12]	427,117	63,743	14.9%	17,002	4.0%	145,695	34.1%	198,102	46.4%
Nevada	1,412,160	83,079	5.9%	24,335	1.7%	163,598	11.6%	1,004,394	71.1%
New Hampshire [13]	300,559	994	0.3%	299,565	99.7%	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [14]	3,927,225	14,071	0.4%	--	--	251,387	6.4%	2,056,334	52.4%
New Mexico	489,737	250,850	51.2%	26,778	5.5%	96,354	19.7%	108,316	22.1%
New York	1,748,658	303,848	17.4%	60,295	3.4%	--	--	698,361	39.9%
North Carolina	2,806,179	421,571	15.0%	423,222	15.1%	178,722	6.4%	1,401,721	50.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Total Registration Applications Received	Application Source							
		Mail/Email/Fax		In Person at Election Office		Online		Motor Vehicle Agencies	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	2,245	245	10.9%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	2,519,705	428,473	17.0%	384,938	15.3%	704,636	28.0%	720,898	28.6%
Oklahoma	614,861	116,177	18.9%	68,065	11.1%	70,713	11.5%	336,073	54.7%
Oregon	1,623,822	77,749	4.8%	29,412	1.8%	230,483	14.2%	761,559	46.9%
Pennsylvania	2,881,107	177,508	6.2%	31,101	1.1%	568,912	19.7%	1,741,745	60.5%
Rhode Island [15]	381,596	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	765,608	60,467	7.9%	55,381	7.2%	197,787	25.8%	409,922	53.5%
South Dakota	147,980	19,950	13.5%	29,365	19.8%	--	--	88,871	60.1%
Tennessee	1,138,627	105,696	9.3%	150,687	13.2%	442,107	38.8%	419,558	36.8%
Texas	5,380,314	1,271,780	23.6%	284,636	5.3%	136,343	2.5%	3,470,056	64.5%
U.S. Virgin Islands	3,213	--	--	3,213	100.0%	--	--	--	--
Utah [16]	246,112	5,338	2.2%	17,280	7.0%	29,975	12.2%	36,131	14.7%
Vermont	74,895	589	0.8%	7,462	10.0%	13,049	17.4%	47,719	63.7%
Virginia	3,382,438	85,082	2.5%	52,037	1.5%	284,897	8.4%	2,829,275	83.6%
Washington	1,709,646	319,700	18.7%	44,002	2.6%	199,685	11.7%	991,442	58.0%
West Virginia	478,216	59,979	12.5%	117,260	24.5%	50,774	10.6%	133,342	27.9%
Wisconsin [17]	393,064	23,618	6.0%	66,659	17.0%	179,328	45.6%	--	--
Wyoming [18]	74,244	5,440	7.3%	68,642	92.5%	--	--	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	80,764,222	7,340,458	9.1%	4,566,735	5.9%	10,822,001	14.0%	44,051,378	55.0%

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State	Application Source							
	Public Assistance Offices		Disability Services Offices		Armed Forces Recruitment Offices		Other State Agencies	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	37,486	3.3%	665	0.1%	109	0.0%	2,505	0.2%
Alaska	3,818	0.4%	26	0.0%	886	0.1%	21	0.0%
American Samoa [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	6,634	0.3%	141	0.0%	2,045	0.1%	1,285	0.1%
Arkansas	10,310	2.1%	294	0.1%	21	0.0%	178	0.0%
California	169,940	1.7%	1,668	0.0%	1,841	0.0%	43,785	0.4%
Colorado	24,508	0.8%	316	0.0%	13	0.0%	--	--
Connecticut	8,791	1.0%	8,791	1.0%	503	0.1%	--	--
Delaware	75	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	11,367	3.2%
District of Columbia	1,225	1.3%	103	0.1%	31	0.0%	1,417	1.5%
Florida	7,129	0.1%	13,296	0.2%	732	0.0%	36,067	0.6%
Georgia [2]	10,208	0.3%	1,661	0.1%	55	0.0%	--	--
Guam [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Idaho [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	22,780	1.2%	1,344	0.1%	132	0.0%	75,754	4.0%
Indiana [5]	8,390	0.4%	564	0.0%	0	0.0%	68	0.0%
Iowa	1,222	0.1%	19	0.0%	6	0.0%	55	0.0%
Kansas	5,914	0.8%	216	0.0%	38	0.0%	1,078	0.2%
Kentucky	88,292	6.6%	883	0.1%	865	0.1%	3,998	0.3%
Louisiana [6]	21,202	3.6%	1,940	0.3%	1,263	0.2%	0	0.0%
Maine	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland [7]	15,344	0.4%	404	0.0%	105	0.0%	87,514	2.5%
Massachusetts [8]	166,539	5.9%	488	0.0%	--	--	5,003	0.2%
Michigan [9]	644	0.0%	51	0.0%	--	--	--	--
Minnesota [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	4,808	--	308	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	13,430	3.1%	179	0.0%	36	0.0%	0	0.0%
Montana [11]	1,024	0.4%	19	0.0%	40	0.0%	0	0.0%
Nebraska [12]	225	0.1%	129	0.0%	12	0.0%	--	--
Nevada	19,882	1.4%	2,164	0.2%	55	0.0%	43	0.0%
New Hampshire [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [14]	3,050	0.1%	29,479	0.8%	1,308	0.0%	1,184,858	30.2%
New Mexico	7,331	1.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
New York	50,305	2.9%	--	--	--	--	73,225	4.2%
North Carolina	22,002	0.8%	1,331	0.0%	17	0.0%	3,547	0.1%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	145,421	5.8%	13,525	0.5%	177	0.0%	52,968	2.1%



State	Application Source							
	Public Assistance Offices		Disability Services Offices		Armed Forces Recruitment Offices		Other State Agencies	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Oklahoma	4,804	0.8%	241	0.0%	14	0.0%	33	0.0%
Oregon	1,365	0.1%	544	0.0%	--	--	2,692	0.2%
Pennsylvania	42,146	1.5%	296	0.0%	7	0.0%	--	--
Rhode Island [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	41,709	5.4%	200	0.0%	22	0.0%	--	--
South Dakota	4,588	3.1%	622	0.4%	0	0.0%	1,633	1.1%
Tennessee	9,327	0.8%	53	0.0%	3,174	0.3%	8,005	0.7%
Texas	105,936	2.0%	505	0.0%	17,628	0.3%	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah [16]	5	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--	--	151	0.2%
Virginia	1,530	0.0%	98	0.0%	14	0.0%	21,796	0.6%
Washington	23,968	1.4%	95	0.0%	2,405	0.1%	3,484	0.2%
West Virginia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wisconsin [17]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming [18]	--	--	39	0.1%	0	0.0%	13	0.0%
U.S. Total	1,113,307	1.4%	82,698	0.1%	33,554	0.0%	1,622,543	2.6%

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State	Application Source					
	Registration Drives		Other Sources		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	12,422	1.1%	4,236	0.4%	22,818	2.0%
Alaska	0	0.0%	760,797	73.9%	0	0.0%
American Samoa [1]	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Arizona	142,560	6.5%	125,636	5.7%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	9,261	1.9%	58,962	12.1%	-5,159	-1.1%
California	30,418	0.3%	1,721,297	17.1%	1,088,001	10.8%
Colorado	37,581	1.2%	52,340	1.7%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Delaware	278	0.1%	6,693	1.9%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	0	0.0%	2,488	2.6%	0	0.0%
Florida	424,144	7.0%	536,461	8.9%	-10,393	-0.2%
Georgia [2]	--	--	50,172	1.6%	0	0.0%
Guam [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Idaho [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	1,902	0.1%	264,556	13.9%	446,019	23.4%
Indiana [5]	7,997	0.4%	558,165	29.0%	58,210	3.0%
Iowa	156	0.0%	677,977	79.1%	0	0.0%
Kansas	10,154	1.4%	68,262	9.6%	662	0.1%
Kentucky	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Louisiana [6]	6,569	1.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
Maine	3,535	1.9%	8,580	4.6%	0	0.0%
Maryland [7]	--	--	153,634	4.4%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts [8]	--	--	67,979	2.4%	0	0.0%
Michigan [9]	--	--	56,323	1.7%	0	0.0%
Minnesota [10]	10,344	0.9%	470,196	40.6%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	8,515	--	--	--
Missouri	--	--	28	0.0%	0	0.0%
Montana [11]	10,628	4.5%	25,407	10.7%	0	0.0%
Nebraska [12]	--	--	2,209	0.5%	0	0.0%
Nevada	74,420	5.3%	40,190	2.8%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire [13]	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
New Jersey [14]	--	--	386,738	9.8%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	0	0.0%	--	--	108	0.0%
New York	26,897	1.5%	--	--	535,727	30.6%
North Carolina	131,014	4.7%	223,032	7.9%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	2,000	89.1%
Ohio	68,669	2.7%	--	--	0	0.0%



State	Application Source					
	Registration Drives		Other Sources		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Oklahoma	--	--	18,741	3.0%	0	0.0%
Oregon	--	--	520,018	32.0%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania	156,101	5.4%	163,291	5.7%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island [15]	--	--	--	--	381,596	100.0%
South Carolina	--	--	120	0.0%	0	0.0%
South Dakota	2,832	1.9%	104	0.1%	15	0.0%
Tennessee	20	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	--	--	93,430	1.7%	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah [16]	149	0.1%	12,674	5.1%	144,559	58.7%
Vermont	5,925	7.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Virginia	16,260	0.5%	91,449	2.7%	0	0.0%
Washington	10,160	0.6%	114,705	6.7%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	--	--	116,861	24.4%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [17]	--	--	123,459	31.4%	0	0.0%
Wyoming [18]	8	0.0%	102	0.1%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	1,200,404	2.4%	7,555,847	10.6%	2,664,163	3.3%

Voter Registration Table 2 Calculation Notes:

- Total Registration Applications Received** uses question A3a.
- Application Source, Mail/Email/Fax, Total** uses question A4a.
- Application Source, Mail/Email/Fax, %** uses $A4a/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, In Person at Election Office, Total** uses question A4b.
- Application Source, In Person at Election Office, %** uses $A4b/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Online, Total** uses question A4c.
- Application Source, Online, %** uses $A4c/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, Total** uses question A4d.
- Application Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, %** uses $A4d/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Public Assistance Offices, Total** uses question A4e.
- Application Source, Public Assistance Offices, %** uses $A4e/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Disability Services Offices, Total** uses question A4f.
- Application Source, Disability Services Offices, %** uses $A4f/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, Total** uses question A4g.
- Application Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, %** uses $A4g/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Other State Agencies, Total** uses question A4h.
- Application Source, Other State Agencies, %** uses $A4h/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Registration Drives, Total** uses question A4i.
- Application Source, Registration Drives, %** uses $A4i/A3a \times 100$.
- Application Source, Other Sources, Total** uses the sum of questions A4j, A4k, and A4l.
- Application Source, Other Sources, %** uses $(A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a \times 100$.



Application Source, Not Categorized, Total uses A3a–(sum of A4a to A4l).

Application Source, Not Categorized, % uses $(A3a - [\text{sum of A4a to A4l}]) / A3a \times 100$.

Voter Registration Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- States have latitude in which registration application sources are offered to their citizens, so long as they do not conflict with federal law. Not all states offer each of the application sources that the EAVS collects data for.
- Questions A4j, A4k, and A4l were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if they offered another application source aside from those listed in questions A4a–A4i or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A4a–A4i.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized application source indicate that the sum of registrations received for each source accounted for more than the total number of registrations reported received by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications received through each source may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

[1] American Samoa’s registration system is not web-based or online. Eligible voters who are qualified to register in absentia can access the form online, but have to send it to the election office for manual processing.

[2] Election Day registrations listed in A4j, A5j, A6j, and A7j represent applications submitted to poll workers on Election Day. Changes made through applications turned in on Election Day are effective for future elections. Georgia law does not allow SDR.

[3] Data reported in A4d and A7d include driver’s license applications where the applicant indicated that they declined to register to vote.

[4] Idaho does not track data on the sources of registration forms.

[5] The data reported in A4a–l consisted of data from CEB-9 Section 2 (A4a–b, A4i) and the statewide voter registration system (A4c–h, A4j, A4k, A4l). Counties do not always manually track the information requested in A4a–b and A4i.

[6] Voters submit registration applications for new registrations as well as for updates or changes to existing registrations. Data reported in A4 reflect both new registrations and changes to registrations.

[7] Questions A4j, A5j, A6j, and A7j include two registration categories. The first is from volunteer groups and the second is from high school registration drives. Registrations completed by “registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties” as listed in A4i are included with the registration source of “volunteer” as listed in A4j.

[8] Individuals who complete eligible transactions at some state agencies are automatically registered to vote unless they opt out.

[9] Registrations reported in A4c and A5c reflect individuals who registered online using the Michigan voter information center website. Over 800 of those registrations occurred via application programming interface (API) from advocacy groups.

[10] Minnesota did not report data for some questions because the state is exempt from the NVRA. Data reported for registrations received through mail/fax/email and online includes data on Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA) that in previous years’ surveys were reported separately.



- [11] Data reported in A4k is for online pre-registration, which requires the voter to sign and submit a registration form to their county elections office.
- [12] Registrations received from registration drives by advocacy groups or political parties in A4i and are included in the data reported in A4a.
- [13] New Hampshire is not subject to the NVRA. This state offers Election Day registration but not online voter registration.
- [14] In-person registrations in A4b are not currently tracked.
- [15] Rhode Island introduced automatic voter registration in June of 2018, which increased the number of registrations received.
- [16] Several Utah counties do not track data on the sources of voter registration applications.
- [17] Wisconsin only tracks fax or email registrations for military voters because although they are not required to register, a record is created as a registration in the system. Military voters' data may be received by fax or email, whereas non-military voters can only submit registrations by mail or in-person. Registration applications falling under other sources come from care facilities and registrations received at the polling place on Election Day. Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not receive registrations from NVRA agencies.
- [18] Wyoming is exempt from the NVRA. Wyoming has no system for web-based registration and no system for registration through motor vehicle offices or driver's license offices.

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Voter Registration Table 3: Registration Applications Processed

State	Total Registration Applications Received	Registration Category							
		New Valid Registrations		Change of Name, Party or Address (Within Jurisdiction)		Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction)		Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age)	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	1,132,263	437,156	38.6%	893,988	79.0%	--	--	--	--
Alaska	1,028,887	45,400	4.4%	969,032	94.2%	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	1,014	528	52.1%	25	2.5%	65	6.4%	0	0.0%
Arizona	2,187,271	820,015	37.5%	863,020	39.5%	10,365	0.5%	8,286	0.4%
Arkansas [2]	486,722	227,470	46.7%	262,859	54.0%	2,861	0.6%	--	--
California	10,090,697	3,084,231	30.6%	1,576,293	15.6%	592,958	5.9%	141,004	1.4%
Colorado	3,042,434	1,189,963	39.1%	1,466,226	48.2%	242,934	8.0%	77,620	2.6%
Connecticut	887,202	304,587	34.3%	562,986	63.5%	18,843	2.1%	786	0.1%
Delaware [3]	351,944	58,277	16.6%	268,097	76.2%	14,075	4.0%	6,232	1.8%
District of Columbia	96,410	60,180	62.4%	30,996	32.2%	0	0.0%	1,572	1.6%
Florida [4]	6,056,693	1,601,825	26.4%	4,241,373	70.0%	110,151	1.8%	18,816	0.3%
Georgia	3,232,104	616,690	19.1%	1,220,083	37.7%	547,977	17.0%	26,238	0.8%
Guam	--	14,687	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	151,594	56,520	37.3%	--	--	--	--	1,505	1.0%
Idaho	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	1,906,637	593,126	31.1%	573,408	30.1%	131,944	6.9%	4,538	0.2%
Indiana	1,922,116	447,414	23.3%	1,021,206	53.1%	--	--	38,617	2.0%
Iowa [5]	856,747	160,145	18.7%	--	--	--	--	13,100	1.5%
Kansas	709,206	211,448	29.8%	673,513	95.0%	--	--	--	--
Kentucky	1,332,191	159,387	12.0%	700,769	52.6%	153,261	11.5%	--	--
Louisiana [6]	594,612	159,421	26.8%	225,937	38.0%	--	--	11,943	2.0%
Maine	185,804	55,542	29.9%	55,038	29.6%	59,708	32.1%	1,034	0.6%
Maryland [7]	3,513,915	310,973	8.8%	2,994,726	85.2%	176,094	5.0%	--	--
Massachusetts	2,837,185	323,970	11.4%	1,436,784	50.6%	461,613	16.3%	73,642	2.6%
Michigan [8]	3,400,532	558,078	16.4%	652,487	19.2%	1,111,884	32.7%	41,900	1.2%
Minnesota	1,158,190	255,292	22.0%	423,388	36.6%	282,926	24.4%	6,583	0.6%
Mississippi	--	262,005	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [9]	435,511	435,511	100.0%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana	237,013	29,035	12.3%	95,495	40.3%	107,667	45.4%	664	0.3%
Nebraska [10]	427,117	128,436	30.1%	211,687	49.6%	46,112	10.8%	--	--
Nevada	1,412,160	383,357	27.1%	804,375	57.0%	1,154	0.1%	16,750	1.2%
New Hampshire [11]	300,559	52,564	17.5%	193,945	64.5%	52,283	17.4%	22	0.0%
New Jersey	3,927,225	380,156	9.7%	1,460,926	37.2%	312,155	7.9%	58,076	1.5%
New Mexico	489,737	110,197	22.5%	365,572	74.6%	5,740	1.2%	7,225	1.5%
New York [12]	1,748,658	556,051	31.8%	245,205	14.0%	598,988	34.3%	104,291	6.0%
North Carolina	2,806,179	1,021,059	36.4%	928,381	33.1%	--	--	--	--
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Total Registration Applications Received	Registration Category							
		New Valid Registrations		Change of Name, Party or Address (Within Jurisdiction)		Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction)		Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age)	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	2,245	--	--	100	4.5%	300	13.4%	--	--
Ohio	2,519,705	1,097,029	43.5%	1,006,854	40.0%	--	--	5,521	0.2%
Oklahoma [13]	614,861	350,173	57.0%	248,401	40.4%	--	--	4,028	0.7%
Oregon [14]	1,623,822	275,845	17.0%	1,302,003	80.2%	--	--	44,686	2.8%
Pennsylvania	2,881,107	462,995	16.1%	1,319,180	45.8%	462,253	16.0%	--	--
Rhode Island	381,596	46,597	12.2%	259,599	68.0%	67,450	17.7%	7,896	2.1%
South Carolina [15]	765,608	447,106	58.4%	318,502	41.6%	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	147,980	54,293	36.7%	72,686	49.1%	19,365	13.1%	1,274	0.9%
Tennessee	1,138,627	552,128	48.5%	357,262	31.4%	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	5,380,314	2,938,010	54.6%	2,323,494	43.2%	23,502	0.4%	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	3,213	3,213	100.0%	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah	246,112	80,497	32.7%	56,559	23.0%	8,465	3.4%	10,557	4.3%
Vermont	74,895	70,429	94.0%	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Virginia	3,382,438	500,541	14.8%	1,135,150	33.6%	433,479	12.8%	25,892	0.8%
Washington	1,709,646	454,968	26.6%	726,470	42.5%	94,003	5.5%	85,635	5.0%
West Virginia	478,216	79,626	16.7%	337,997	70.7%	21,033	4.4%	3,537	0.7%
Wisconsin [16]	393,064	267,393	68.0%	45,996	11.7%	70,425	17.9%	1	0.0%
Wyoming [17]	74,244	18,491	24.9%	42,789	57.6%	12,949	17.4%	2	0.0%
U.S. Total	80,764,222	22,810,030	27.9%	34,970,862	44.1%	6,254,982	9.7%	849,473	1.4%

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State	Registration Category							
	Duplicate Registrations		Invalid or Rejected Registrations		Other Registrations		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	4	0.0%	4,942	0.4%	--	--	-203,827	-18.0%
Alaska	5,326	0.5%	9,129	0.9%	--	--	0	0.0%
American Samoa	396	39.1%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Arizona	434,088	19.8%	37,850	1.7%	13,647	0.6%	0	0.0%
Arkansas [2]	129	0.0%	7,513	1.5%	--	--	-14,110	-2.9%
California	2,791,684	27.7%	277,944	2.8%	579,521	5.7%	1,047,062	10.4%
Colorado	48,865	1.6%	16,826	0.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Delaware [3]	4,738	1.3%	525	0.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	2,725	2.8%	937	1.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Florida [4]	1,449	0.0%	72,090	1.2%	9,775	0.2%	1,214	0.0%
Georgia	87,858	2.7%	1,711	0.1%	731,547	22.6%	0	0.0%
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%	93,569	61.7%
Idaho	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	165,553	8.7%	9,114	0.5%	84,416	4.4%	344,538	18.1%
Indiana	190,028	9.9%	19,587	1.0%	192,011	10.0%	13,253	0.7%
Iowa [5]	22,453	2.6%	279	0.0%	660,770	77.1%	0	0.0%
Kansas	0	0.0%	--	--	--	--	-175,755	-24.8%
Kentucky	--	--	312,774	23.9%	--	--	0	0.0%
Louisiana [6]	8,965	1.5%	8,764	1.5%	179,582	30.2%	0	0.0%
Maine	3,638	2.0%	147	0.1%	10,697	5.8%	0	0.0%
Maryland [7]	31,680	0.9%	442	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	518,767	18.3%	22,409	0.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
Michigan [8]	1,006,903	29.6%	29,280	0.9%	--	--	0	0.0%
Minnesota	189,475	16.4%	526	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [9]	--	--	12	0.0%	--	--	-12	0.0%
Montana	3,762	1.6%	390	0.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
Nebraska [10]	40,635	9.5%	247	0.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
Nevada	163,900	11.6%	42,523	3.0%	101	0.0%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire [11]	1,745	0.6%	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
New Jersey	163,002	4.2%	22,864	0.6%	1,530,046	39.0%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	0	0.0%	1,003	0.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
New York [12]	159,051	9.1%	84,886	4.9%	--	--	186	0.0%
North Carolina	699,970	24.9%	156,769	5.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	3,045	135.6%	-1,200	-53.5%



State	Registration Category							
	Duplicate Registrations		Invalid or Rejected Registrations		Other Registrations		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Ohio	294,216	11.7%	116,085	4.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
Oklahoma [13]	1,510	0.2%	10,749	1.7%	--	--	0	0.0%
Oregon [14]	1,288	0.1%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania	232,096	8.1%	372,054	12.9%	32,529	1.1%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	--	--	54	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
South Carolina [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
South Dakota	215	0.1%	27	0.0%	120	0.1%	0	0.0%
Tennessee	184,943	16.2%	44,294	3.9%	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	--	--	95,308	1.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah	2,317	0.9%	24,418	9.9%	--	--	63,299	25.7%
Vermont	2,151	2.9%	2,315	3.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Virginia	1,226,754	36.3%	60,622	1.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
Washington	348,388	20.4%	182	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
West Virginia	35,927	7.5%	96	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [16]	6,801	1.7%	--	--	2,448	0.6%	0	0.0%
Wyoming [17]	0	0.0%	13	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	9,083,395	12.7%	1,873,700	2.5%	4,030,255	11.1%	1,168,217	1.4%

Voter Registration Table 3 Calculation Notes:

Total Registration Applications Received uses question A3a.

New Valid Registrations, Total uses question A3b.

New Valid Registrations, % uses $A3b/A3a \times 100$.

Change of Name, Party, or Address (Within Jurisdiction), Total uses question A3f.

Change of Name, Party, or Address (Within Jurisdiction), % uses $A3f/A3a \times 100$.

Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction), Total uses question A3g.

Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction), % uses $A3g/A3a \times 100$.

Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), Total uses question A3c.

Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), % uses $A3c/A3a \times 100$.

Duplicate Registrations, Total uses question A3d.

Duplicate Registrations, % uses $A3d/A3a \times 100$.

Invalid or Rejected Registrations, Total uses question A3e.

Invalid or Rejected Registrations, % uses $A3e/A3a \times 100$.

Other Registrations, Total uses the sum of questions A3h, A3i, and A3j.

Other Registrations, % uses $(A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a \times 100$.

Not Categorized, Total uses $A3a - (\text{sum of } A3b \text{ to } A3j)$.

Not Categorized, % uses $(A3a - [\text{sum of } A3b \text{ to } A3j])/A3a \times 100$.



Voter Registration Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Questions A3h, A3i, and A3j were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another registration category aside from those listed in questions A3b–A3g or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A3b–A3g.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration category indicate that the sum of registrations received for each category accounted for more than the total number of registrations reported received by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration category.

- [1] Totals reported in item A3 of the 2022 EAVS are from the Election Systems & Software (ES&S) election survey. Alabama does not track data on pre-registration. Due to the way the state tracks data for changes to records, the number of changes resulting directly from registration forms could not be separated from the total number of changes made to voter's records.
- [2] Information on registrations that were address changes that crossed jurisdiction borders is included in reports of new valid registrations.
- [3] A change in the policy of how Delaware handles "invalid" or "rejected" registrations occurred since the 2020 EAVS submission was made. Invalid registrations are no longer rejected; instead, they are put in a suspense status and the registrant is contacted to correct the registration record. Some invalid registrations that go through this process may not be marked as invalid; therefore, caution should be taken in comparing Delaware's invalid registration data to previous years.
- [4] Some counties could not provide data on registrations by outcome in A3 in the way the question required.
- [5] Data reported in "Other Registrations" is due to a system limitation in reporting the transaction source of registration updates that do not involve a change from a previous listed source. Pre-registration of voters are considered valid new registrations for the purpose of reporting data according to the source of a transaction.
- [6] Address changes across jurisdictions are counted as new registrations. Citizens who are 16 and 17 years old can apply to register to vote, but they cannot vote until they are 18.
- [7] The total of A3a is the sum of A3b, A3d, and A3e. Maryland does not consider the registration changes listed in A3f and A3g as registrations, and therefore the source of these changes is not recorded. For A3c, individuals can register to vote starting at age 16; however, they are not considered "pre-registered." Sixteen- and 17-year-olds are considered registered voters who cannot vote until their 18th birthday.



- [8] In past EAVS, Michigan reported that data on the number of registration forms received for address changes that crossed a jurisdiction border was not available. However, for this year's survey, Michigan can report that over 1.1 million registration transactions were for voters who changed their city or township of residence. Additionally, the dramatic increase in the number of duplicate registrations received compared to past EAVS responses is attributed to the implementation of automatic voter registration. Automatic voter registration data received for existing voter registrations is rejected if all data already exists in the qualified voter file or otherwise merged with the existing registration.
- [9] If a voter is changing their name and updating their address, the state's voter registration system will record two changes made to one record and will track one change for each action to a voter record.
- [10] Nebraska law does not allow for pre-registrations for people not of voting age.
- [11] New Hampshire uses voter registration forms for name, party, and address changes.
- [12] The totals in A3a are numbers provided by counties.
- [13] Address changes that cross jurisdiction borders are recorded as new registrations.
- [14] Data on the number of cross-jurisdiction change of addresses is included with data on within-jurisdiction change of name, party, or address.
- [15] Cross-jurisdiction moves count as new registrations.
- [16] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not collect data on rejected registrations.
- [17] Multiple changes may occur on the same voter registration form.

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Voter Registration Table 4: Voter List Maintenance—Confirmation Notices

State	Confirmation Notices Sent		Result of Confirmation Notice					
			Confirmation Notices Received From Voter				Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable	
	Valid		Invalid					
	Total	% of Active Voters	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	--	--	1,942	--	40,598	--	208,413	--
Alaska	78,183	13.0%	302	0.4%	--	--	23,293	29.8%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	991,282	23.9%	68,611	6.9%	32,275	3.3%	57,079	5.8%
Arkansas	216,653	14.7%	28,181	13.0%	21,969	10.1%	25,017	11.5%
California	3,589,417	16.3%	404,858	11.3%	182,321	5.1%	509,518	14.2%
Colorado	651,897	17.0%	10,454	1.6%	15,733	2.4%	27,299	4.2%
Connecticut	83,937	3.7%	27,373	32.6%	--	--	56,564	67.4%
Delaware [2]	138,233	19.7%	--	--	7,782	5.6%	41,687	30.2%
District of Columbia	160,088	31.5%	6,704	4.2%	9,530	6.0%	3,858	2.4%
Florida	1,336,199	9.2%	83,078	6.2%	122,334	9.2%	190,189	14.2%
Georgia	1,135,472	16.3%	2,392	0.2%	11,437	1.0%	166,411	14.7%
Guam	8,961	14.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii [3]	63,259	8.3%	114	0.2%	203	0.3%	--	--
Idaho [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	2,710,102	34.3%	80,181	3.0%	48,261	1.8%	94,964	3.5%
Indiana [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa [6]	294,154	15.6%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	237,940	13.0%	4,338	1.8%	34,003	14.3%	20,986	8.8%
Kentucky [7]	379,501	12.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Louisiana [8]	483,961	17.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maine [9]	231,650	24.9%	6,190	2.7%	2,675	1.2%	--	--
Maryland [10]	395,112	9.5%	2,794	0.7%	38,725	9.8%	--	--
Massachusetts [11]	632,191	15.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Michigan [12]	590,172	8.1%	468	0.1%	82,814	14.0%	177,579	30.1%
Minnesota	115,653	3.2%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi [13]	140,044	7.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [14]	715,685	18.8%	2,553	0.4%	38,239	5.3%	67,888	9.5%
Montana	91,182	13.8%	4,966	5.4%	1,995	2.2%	20,274	22.2%
Nebraska	154,016	13.5%	19,828	12.9%	21,307	13.8%	14,135	9.2%
Nevada	404,874	22.0%	123,663	30.5%	32,456	8.0%	189,267	46.7%
New Hampshire [15]	9,174	1.0%	105	1.1%	0	0.0%	3,121	34.0%
New Jersey	458,898	7.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico	165,358	13.8%	0	0.0%	9	0.0%	36,190	21.9%
New York [16]	458,079	3.8%	27,311	6.0%	48,489	10.6%	22,710	5.0%
North Carolina [17]	1,058,260	16.3%	--	--	--	--	336,561	31.8%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Confirmation Notices Sent		Result of Confirmation Notice					
			Confirmation Notices Received From Voter				Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable	
	Valid		Invalid					
	Total	% of Active Voters	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	2,000	10.4%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	1,253,658	15.6%	152,174	12.1%	21,112	1.7%	153,048	12.2%
Oklahoma	245,970	12.2%	20,862	8.5%	1,907	0.8%	34,311	13.9%
Oregon	390,806	13.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [18]	964,386	12.0%	48,950	5.1%	47,021	4.9%	149,980	15.6%
Rhode Island	34,082	4.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	168,763	5.0%	6,086	3.6%	911	0.5%	1,354	0.8%
South Dakota	20,687	3.4%	141	0.7%	260	1.3%	11,963	57.8%
Tennessee	222,720	5.3%	21,773	9.8%	27,737	12.5%	56,568	25.4%
Texas	1,811,745	11.4%	593,213	32.7%	129,166	7.1%	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah [19]	150,848	8.9%	788	0.5%	8,385	5.6%	24,330	16.1%
Vermont	62,476	14.0%	16,834	26.9%	45,642	73.1%	0	0.0%
Virginia	519,512	9.1%	24,450	4.7%	--	--	18,953	3.6%
Washington	1,782,901	37.1%	1,432	0.1%	7,007	0.4%	25,009	1.4%
West Virginia	169,472	16.1%	82,347	48.6%	14,525	8.6%	--	--
Wisconsin [20]	622,370	17.0%	17,230	2.8%	--	--	299,490	48.1%
Wyoming [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	26,601,983	13.7%	1,892,686	8.4%	1,096,828	5.0%	3,068,009	13.6%

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State	Result of Confirmation Notice					
	Unreturned Confirmation Notices		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	54,588	69.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	80,923	8.2%	7	0.0%	752,387	75.9%
Arkansas	141,591	65.4%	6	0.0%	-111	-0.1%
California	1,937,283	54.0%	132,743	3.7%	422,694	11.8%
Colorado	598,411	91.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Delaware [2]	88,764	64.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	139,996	87.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Florida	930,170	69.6%	1,554	0.1%	8,874	0.7%
Georgia	904,346	79.6%	50,886	4.5%	0	0.0%
Guam	--	--	--	--	8,961	100.0%
Hawaii [3]	62,942	99.5%	--	--	0	0.0%
Idaho [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	451,420	16.7%	4,402	0.2%	2,030,874	74.9%
Indiana [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa [6]	--	--	--	--	294,154	100.0%
Kansas	63,940	26.9%	9	0.0%	114,664	48.2%
Kentucky [7]	--	--	--	--	379,501	100.0%
Louisiana [8]	--	--	--	--	483,961	100.0%
Maine [9]	--	--	222,785	96.2%	0	0.0%
Maryland [10]	353,593	89.5%	--	--	0	0.0%
Massachusetts [11]	--	--	--	--	632,191	100.0%
Michigan [12]	329,311	55.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
Minnesota	115,653	100.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Mississippi [13]	--	--	--	--	140,044	100.0%
Missouri [14]	--	--	147,187	20.6%	459,818	64.2%
Montana	61,826	67.8%	2,121	2.3%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	95,837	62.2%	2,909	1.9%	0	0.0%
Nevada	59,488	14.7%	--	--	0	0.0%
New Hampshire [15]	5,948	64.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
New Jersey	--	--	--	--	458,898	100.0%
New Mexico	129,159	78.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
New York [16]	343,514	75.0%	--	--	16,055	3.5%
North Carolina [17]	680,230	64.3%	41,469	3.9%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	2,000	100.0%	0	0.0%
Ohio	927,324	74.0%	--	--	0	0.0%



State	Result of Confirmation Notice					
	Unreturned Confirmation Notices		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Oklahoma	188,890	76.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
Oregon	--	--	390,806	100.0%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania [18]	298,880	31.0%	419,555	43.5%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	--	--	--	--	34,082	100.0%
South Carolina	160,412	95.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
South Dakota	8,323	40.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
Tennessee	116,642	52.4%	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	1,089,366	60.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah [19]	4,934	3.3%	7,404	4.9%	105,007	69.6%
Vermont	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Virginia	476,109	91.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
Washington	1,749,453	98.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
West Virginia	--	--	72,600	42.8%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [20]	305,650	49.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
Wyoming [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	12,954,916	57.4%	1,498,443	10.4%	6,342,054	23.8%

Voter Registration Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Confirmation Notices Sent, Total uses question A8a.

Confirmation Notices Sent, % of Active Voters uses $A8a/A1b \times 100$.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid, Total uses question A8b.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid, % uses $A8b/A8a \times 100$.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, Total uses question A8c.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, % uses $A8c/A8a \times 100$.

Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, Total uses question A8d.

Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, % uses $A8d/A8a \times 100$.

Unreturned Confirmation Notices, Total uses question A8e.

Unreturned Confirmation Notices, % uses $A8e/A8a \times 100$.

Other, Total uses the sum of questions A8f, A8g, and A8h.

Other, % uses $(A8f+A8g+A8h)/A8a \times 100$.

Not Categorized, Total uses $A8a - (\text{sum of A8b to A8h})$.

Not Categorized, % uses $(A8a - [\text{sum of A8b to A8h}])/A8a \times 100$.



Voter Registration Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Questions A8f, A8g, and A8h were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another confirmation notice status aside from those listed in questions A8b–A8e or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A8b–A8e.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized confirmation notices category indicate that the sum of confirmation notices for each category accounted for more than the total number of confirmation notices reported by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each confirmation notice category.
- States that are exempt from the NVRA are not required to send confirmation notices pursuant to the NVRA, although they may send confirmation notices (or other similar notices) pursuant to state law or practice. States that do not use confirmation notices typically use other sources of data to identify potentially ineligible voters.

- [1] Alabama does not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.
- [2] Delaware does not require confirmation notices to be returned. Notices are assumed correct if they are not returned.
- [3] Kauai County was the only county that logged received notices.
- [4] Idaho does not track data on the outcomes of confirmation notices.
- [5] Indiana's statewide voter registration system is not able to track data on confirmation notices.
- [6] Due to a change in state statute regarding how and when voters become inactive due to non-participation, a large portion of mail processing is done outside of the state database; this affects the ability to report data in A8e.
- [7] As of the time the EAVS data were finalized, Kentucky had not yet finished scanning and categorizing the returns.
- [8] Confirmation notices are sent pursuant to 52 USC Section §20507(d)(2). The Department of State only collects data on the total number of sent confirmation notices.
- [9] Maine conducted a statewide NVRA list maintenance mailing in 2022.
- [10] Data for A8d is included in what is reported in A8e.
- [11] Data on the result of confirmation notices is not tracked.
- [12] In 2021, the Michigan Bureau of Elections processed undeliverable mail from the first statewide elections mailing in 10 years, triggering a significantly larger amount of cancellation notices mailed than in the past.
- [13] In the lead-up to the 2020 election, the Mississippi Secretary of State's office sent postcards to every registered voter to update them on changes that had been made in election laws. Postcards that were undeliverable were returned to the local election officials and caused a confirmation card to be sent.
- [14] Missouri does not track all the requested information on confirmation notices.
- [15] New Hampshire does not send confirmation notices, but does send 30-day letters.
- [16] Some counties could not provide data on confirmation notices.



- [17] Data are not available in the statewide voter registration system showing whether confirmation notices were confirmed by the voter or not. County boards process the returned confirmation notices according to voter confirmation.
- [18] The number reported in A8a includes initial notices sent to voters who appear to have moved based upon information received pursuant to the National Change of Address program.
- [19] Several Utah counties do not track data on confirmation notices or on unreturned confirmation notices.
- [20] Wisconsin is exempt from NVRA; however, the state sent notices to voters who have not voted in a 4-year period, as well as Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) mover mailings. Notices are sent to voters who register to vote or whose voter information may be out of date.
- [21] Wyoming does not require registration confirmation notices to be sent to voters and does not have a system that tracks that information.

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Voter Registration Table 5: Voter List Maintenance—Removal Actions

State	Voters Removed		Reason for Removal							
	Total	% of Reg. Voters	Moved Out of Jurisdiction		Voter Deceased		Failure to Return Confirmation Notice		Voter's Request	
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	298,554	8.1%	20,019	6.7%	106,738	35.8%	149,982	50.2%	833	0.3%
Alaska	46,703	7.2%	2,683	5.7%	11,261	24.1%	22,937	49.1%	8,400	18.0%
American Samoa	2,736	19.1%	--	--	146	5.3%	2,590	94.7%	--	--
Arizona	432,498	8.9%	81,637	18.9%	108,103	25.0%	175,284	40.5%	50,092	11.6%
Arkansas	195,595	10.8%	10,598	5.4%	46,867	24.0%	128,798	65.8%	692	0.4%
California	977,773	3.6%	167,009	17.1%	406,702	41.6%	155,399	15.9%	137,839	14.1%
Colorado	394,628	9.1%	59,977	15.2%	99,024	25.1%	161,607	41.0%	64,478	16.3%
Connecticut	157,239	6.3%	85,519	54.4%	21,344	13.6%	49,109	31.2%	--	--
Delaware	34,092	4.5%	15,278	44.8%	16,867	49.5%	4	0.0%	553	1.6%
District of Columbia	15,974	2.4%	10,707	67.0%	4,699	29.4%	0	0.0%	568	3.6%
Florida	1,516,111	9.7%	572,346	37.8%	424,687	28.0%	379,356	25.0%	67,648	4.5%
Georgia [2]	483,386	6.2%	84,041	17.4%	175,817	36.4%	112,890	23.4%	6,142	1.3%
Guam	8,961	14.8%	--	--	--	--	8,961	100.0%	--	--
Hawaii	41,308	4.8%	2,500	6.1%	34,440	83.4%	0	0.0%	4,323	10.5%
Idaho	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	692,003	7.9%	296,037	42.8%	123,012	17.8%	79,379	11.5%	21,596	3.1%
Indiana [3]	937,145	19.7%	5,806	0.6%	0	0.0%	127,072	13.6%	--	--
Iowa	86,404	3.9%	25,516	29.5%	58,412	67.6%	1,326	1.5%	799	0.9%
Kansas	131,563	6.7%	12,819	9.7%	48,113	36.6%	60,911	46.3%	1,163	0.9%
Kentucky	131,260	3.7%	17,613	9.6%	103,997	79.2%	0	0.0%	1,752	1.3%
Louisiana [4]	266,821	8.8%	79,755	29.9%	88,094	33.0%	48,502	18.2%	14,516	5.4%
Maine	121,841	10.6%	84,069	69.0%	30,189	24.8%	1,396	1.1%	693	0.6%
Maryland	268,612	6.0%	58,085	21.6%	81,789	30.4%	123,377	45.9%	1,395	0.5%
Massachusetts	704,938	14.4%	438,479	62.2%	90,325	12.8%	108,282	15.4%	9,709	1.4%
Michigan	485,916	5.9%	71,108	14.6%	232,745	47.9%	176,788	36.4%	5,275	1.1%
Minnesota [5]	322,355	8.9%	141,242	43.8%	72,016	22.3%	107,878	33.5%	--	--
Mississippi	152,455	7.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	468,943	11.1%	134,686	28.7%	132,372	28.2%	172,224	36.7%	3,547	0.8%
Montana [6]	60,248	7.9%	8,685	14.4%	18,028	29.9%	26,067	43.3%	2,678	4.4%
Nebraska	109,749	8.8%	47,516	43.3%	31,469	28.7%	26,143	23.8%	898	0.8%
Nevada	396,616	18.0%	112,129	28.3%	70,643	17.8%	163,986	41.3%	45,117	11.4%
New Hampshire	267,896	29.5%	66,932	25.0%	4,129	1.5%	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [7]	402,607	6.3%	56,827	14.1%	118,186	29.4%	223,564	55.5%	--	--
New Mexico	50,335	3.7%	5,011	10.0%	37,570	74.6%	7	0.0%	238	0.5%
New York	391,397	3.0%	229,160	58.5%	133,075	34.0%	3,609	0.9%	28,272	7.2%
North Carolina	981,703	13.2%	368,293	37.5%	164,937	16.8%	392,851	40.0%	3,957	0.4%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	2,000	10.4%	20	1.0%	100	5.0%	--	--	5	0.3%



State	Voters Removed		Reason for Removal							
	Total	% of Reg. Voters	Moved Out of Jurisdiction		Voter Deceased		Failure to Return Confirmation Notice		Voter's Request	
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Ohio	623,116	7.8%	201,421	32.3%	215,497	34.6%	116,823	18.7%	79,383	12.7%
Oklahoma	256,672	11.2%	74,948	29.2%	56,237	21.9%	110,973	43.2%	2,369	0.9%
Oregon [8]	117,307	3.9%	9,258	7.9%	72,444	61.8%	6,870	5.9%	28,373	24.2%
Pennsylvania	993,216	11.2%	392,536	39.5%	229,763	23.1%	360,132	36.3%	9,474	1.0%
Rhode Island	56,837	7.0%	14,530	25.6%	17,606	31.0%	15,534	27.3%	4,981	8.8%
South Carolina [9]	262,015	7.0%	15,675	6.0%	101,404	38.7%	136,298	52.0%	1,625	0.6%
South Dakota	24,557	3.7%	1,234	5.0%	11,134	45.3%	9,889	40.3%	619	2.5%
Tennessee	424,647	9.3%	184,932	43.5%	125,326	29.5%	97,525	23.0%	5,979	1.4%
Texas	2,029,283	11.5%	91,966	4.5%	345,402	17.0%	56,506	2.8%	12,517	0.6%
U.S. Virgin Islands	12	0.0%	0	0.0%	12	100.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah	57,975	3.6%	18,142	31.3%	6,416	11.1%	32,917	56.8%	252	0.4%
Vermont	45,641	9.1%	0	0.0%	10,170	22.3%	20,685	45.3%	4,780	10.5%
Virginia	837,061	13.7%	556,858	66.5%	125,655	15.0%	114,945	13.7%	26,243	3.1%
Washington	628,840	11.9%	89,171	14.2%	128,774	20.5%	174,538	27.8%	97,607	15.5%
West Virginia	197,429	17.1%	1,065	0.5%	14,899	7.5%	150,079	76.0%	112	0.1%
Wisconsin [10]	643,975	17.5%	98,027	15.2%	337,081	52.3%	166,433	25.8%	830	0.1%
Wyoming	23,052	7.6%	1,097	4.8%	4,909	21.3%	16,280	70.6%	83	0.4%
U.S. Total	19,260,000	8.5%	5,117,961	26.8%	4,898,625	25.6%	4,776,706	25.4%	758,405	4.5%

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State	Reason for Removal							
	Felony or Conviction		Mental Incompetence		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	5,815	1.9%	145	0.0%	13,870	4.6%	1,152	0.4%
Alaska	1,422	3.0%	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
American Samoa	0	0.0%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Arizona	15,172	3.5%	717	0.2%	1,493	0.3%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	3,391	1.7%	57	0.0%	5,192	2.7%	0	0.0%
California	18,657	1.9%	980	0.1%	53,166	5.4%	38,021	3.9%
Colorado	9,480	2.4%	--	--	62	0.0%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	1,267	0.8%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Delaware	1,390	4.1%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Florida	18,314	1.2%	1,812	0.1%	51,916	3.4%	32	0.0%
Georgia [2]	32,273	6.7%	373	0.1%	71,850	14.9%	0	0.0%
Guam	0	0.0%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Hawaii	42	0.1%	1	0.0%	2	0.0%	0	0.0%
Idaho	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	4,497	0.6%	29	0.0%	23,003	3.3%	144,450	20.9%
Indiana [3]	1	0.0%	--	--	2,584	0.3%	801,682	85.5%
Iowa	244	0.3%	75	0.1%	32	0.0%	0	0.0%
Kansas	1,543	1.2%	30	0.0%	6,586	5.0%	399	0.3%
Kentucky	11,932	9.1%	966	0.7%	--	--	0	0.0%
Louisiana [4]	11,165	4.2%	200	0.1%	24,589	9.2%	0	0.0%
Maine	--	--	--	--	5,494	4.5%	0	0.0%
Maryland	2,444	0.9%	40	0.0%	1,482	0.6%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	244	0.0%	--	--	57,899	8.2%	0	0.0%
Michigan	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Minnesota [5]	--	--	--	--	1,219	0.4%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	152,455	100.0%
Missouri	12,630	2.7%	1,916	0.4%	11,568	2.5%	0	0.0%
Montana [6]	171	0.3%	3	0.0%	4,616	7.7%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	2,909	2.7%	0	0.0%	814	0.7%	0	0.0%
Nevada	4,696	1.2%	41	0.0%	4	0.0%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	13	0.0%	--	--	196,822	73.5%	0	0.0%
New Jersey [7]	22	0.0%	0	0.0%	4,008	1.0%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	7,509	14.9%	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
New York	2,874	0.7%	68	0.0%	--	--	-5,661	-1.4%
North Carolina	14,078	1.4%	--	--	37,587	3.8%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	50	2.5%	0	0.0%	2,000	100.0%	-175	-8.7%
Ohio	9,989	1.6%	3	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%



State	Reason for Removal							
	Felony or Conviction		Mental Incompetence		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Oklahoma	3,063	1.2%	231	0.1%	8,851	3.4%	0	0.0%
Oregon [8]	--	--	--	--	362	0.3%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania	122	0.0%	--	--	1,189	0.1%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	961	1.7%	1	0.0%	3,223	5.7%	1	0.0%
South Carolina [9]	7,013	2.7%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
South Dakota	1,658	6.8%	0	0.0%	23	0.1%	0	0.0%
Tennessee	8,227	1.9%	1	0.0%	2,657	0.6%	0	0.0%
Texas	4,563	0.2%	756	0.0%	1,517,573	74.8%	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah	2	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	245	0.4%
Vermont	--	--	--	--	10,006	21.9%	0	0.0%
Virginia	9,740	1.2%	1,178	0.1%	2,442	0.3%	0	0.0%
Washington	6,389	1.0%	281	0.0%	132,080	21.0%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	--	--	0	0.0%	31,274	15.8%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [10]	4,851	0.8%	728	0.1%	36,025	5.6%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	64	0.3%	4	0.0%	615	2.7%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	240,887	1.4%	10,637	0.1%	2,324,178	13.8%	1,132,601	5.9%

Voter Registration Table 5 Calculation Notes:

- Voters Removed, %** of Registered Voters uses A9a/A1a x 100.
- Moved Out of Jurisdiction, Total** uses question A9b.
- Moved Out of Jurisdiction, %** uses A9b/A9a x 100.
- Voter Deceased, Total** uses question A9c.
- Voter Deceased, %** uses A9c/A9a x 100.
- Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, Total** uses question A9e.
- Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, %** uses A9e/A9a x 100.
- Voter's Request, Total** uses question A9g.
- Voter's Request, %** uses question A9g/A9a x 100.
- Felony or Conviction, Total** uses question A9d.
- Felony or Conviction, %** uses A9d/A9a x 100.
- Mental Incompetence, Total** uses question A9f.
- Mental Incompetence, %** uses question A9f/A9a x 100.
- Other, Total** uses the sum of questions A9h, A9i, and A9j.
- Other, %** uses (A9h+A9i+A9j)/A9a x 100.
- Not Categorized, Total** uses A9a-(sum of A9b to A9j).
- Not Categorized, %** uses (A9a-[sum of A9b to A9j])/A9a x 100.

Voter Registration Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.



- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Questions A9h, A9i, and A9j were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another reason for registration removals aside from those listed in questions A9b–A9g or if there were registration removals that could not be categorized in questions A9b–A9g.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration removals category indicate that the sum of registration removals for each category accounted for more than the total number of registration removals reported received by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration removal category. In addition, not all states may remove registrations for the listed reason.

- [1] Data reported in the “Other” category includes duplicate profiles for voters who were already registered and reasons not listed.
- [2] Data reported in A9b represents voters who moved out of state.
- [3] The data reported in A9b–j consisted of data from an ad hoc report (A9b–d, A9g–j) and the statewide voter registration system (A9e). Indiana provided the number of voter records cancelled due to being in inactive status for more than two federal general elections for question A9e. These statistics represent the majority of cancellations for this reason, based on county users selecting the option to run this process in batch. County users have the option to also cancel voters one by one for this reason, but those statistics are not included in the counts for question A9e.
- [4] Irregularities include voters that were cancelled by the Registrar of Voters because the registrant provided insufficient or incorrect data or a user processing error. Challenge 21 includes voters who were registered in another state or not a United States citizen, or were otherwise not qualified to be registered for reasons other than change of address.
- [5] Pertaining to the number of removals reported because the voter received a disqualifying criminal conviction or was declared mentally incompetent, these voters are not removed, but their status is changed to “challenged.” For removals for a failure to respond to a confirmation notice and a failure to vote, this includes data on individuals who did not vote or update their registration in the prior 4 years. Data on removals because of voter request is not tracked separately and is included as an “other” reason for removal.
- [6] Data reported in A9d includes felony cancellations as reported in the statewide voter registration database. Data reported in A9j includes cancellations for which no reason was specified.
- [7] There are no records for voters removed due to mental incompetence. “Administrative action” was erroneously recorded with removals at the voter’s request in previous years.
- [8] Data reported on removals at the voter’s request may include other reasons listed. Individuals who receive a felony or criminal conviction are inactivated, not removed from the voter rolls.
- [9] Tracking of voters removed for mental incompetence was implemented after the time period covered by the 2022 EAVS.
- [10] In Wisconsin, voters are only included in the data on voter registration removals if they remain removed as of the time the data for this report was pulled. Voters who were removed during the period and subsequently reregistered during the period are not included. Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions. Only active voters are registered and eligible to vote in Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s count of registered voters for this report includes military voters, even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin.





Chapter 4. Military and Overseas Voting in 2022: UOCAVA

Key Findings

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Section B collected data from states and municipalities on individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) during the 2022 federal general election. Election officials were asked a variety of questions relating to UOCAVA voting practices, including the total number of registered UOCAVA voters, the use of the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), the quantity of and methods by which ballots were transmitted to and returned by UOCAVA voters, and the use of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).¹ Notable findings from EAVS Section B include:

- Over 57% of registered UOCAVA voters held legal voting residence in three states: Florida (182,506), California (137,273), and Washington (103,996). California and Florida had more overseas citizens than uniformed services members²; Washington had more uniformed services members than overseas citizens. More than 60% of EAVS jurisdictions had 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters and 85% of jurisdictions had at least one registered UOCAVA voter.
- Continuing a trend that has been ongoing for several election cycles, overseas citizens made up a larger percentage of registered UOCAVA voters than did uniformed services members. In 2022, the number of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was nearly double the number of ballots transmitted to voters who were uniformed services members.
- Email was the most popular mode for states to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters for the 2022 general election (48.5%), followed by postal mail (38.4%), and other methods such as fax or online systems (12.6%). The percentage of ballots transmitted via email dropped by about 8 percentage points from 2018 (56.6%). Transmission via other modes saw a sizable increase between 2018 and 2022.
- The majority (52.8%) of overseas citizens received their ballot via email, compared to just over a third of uniformed service members (36.6%). About 267,403 (41%) of transmitted ballots for the 2022 general election were returned to election offices. This is about 22.4% lower than the 344,392 returned ballots from 2018.
- Most UOCAVA voters returned ballots via postal mail (61.5%). This was particularly true for uniformed services members (73.6%). A total of 257,657 UOCAVA voter ballots were counted in 2022.
- Usage of the FWAB decreased by 26.8% compared to 2018. Usage of the FWAB resulted in an additional 3,447 UOCAVA voters' ballots being counted in the 2022 election and 655

¹ The response rate among local jurisdictions for EAVS Section B was 99.9%; five counties in Arkansas did not provide Section B data. In addition, the response rate for individual items varied. Results reported in this chapter include only states for which data are available for a given question. State and national totals include all available jurisdiction-level data. National-level percentages reported in this chapter used casewise deletion.

² Per UOCAVA, uniformed service members include both active duty military and their eligible family members.

FWABs were not counted in the 2022 election. Of this number, 159 FWABs were not counted because they were replaced by a regular absentee ballot, making the backup ballot unnecessary.

Introduction

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) to collect data from states³ and to report on absentee voting by uniformed services members and overseas citizens.⁴ Since 2014, the EAC has fulfilled this reporting mandate in partnership with the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the agency designated to administer UOCAVA on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Through a memorandum of understanding between the EAC and FVAP, Section B of the EAVS is administered on behalf of both agencies. This agreement allows both the EAC and FVAP to fulfill congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voting while reducing the data collection and reporting burden on state and local election officials. States are required to report certain election data to the EAC after each federal election.⁵

This chapter examines UOCAVA data from the 2022 EAVS, including use of the FPCA by UOCAVA voters, ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by states, ballots returned by UOCAVA voters, UOCAVA ballots counted, UOCAVA ballots rejected, and usage of the FWAB by UOCAVA voters. Where appropriate, information about state laws and procedures related to UOCAVA voting, collected as part of the EAC's 2022 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), is presented to provide context for the EAVS results. Chapter 2 of this report contains a full analysis of all UOCAVA data collected in the 2022 Policy Survey.

Federal Laws Regulating Military and Overseas Voting

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA)

UOCAVA protects the voting rights of active duty military members who are stationed away from their voting residence, the spouses and other eligible family of active duty military members, U.S. citizens residing outside of the United States, and other uniformed services members. UOCAVA requires all states, territories, and the District of Columbia to allow these citizens to register to vote and to cast an absentee ballot for all federal elections.⁶ For the estimated 1.33 million active duty members and approximately 573,000 military spouses and voting-age dependents stationed away from their legal voting residence⁷—as well as the estimated 2.6 million voting-age U.S.

³ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and four U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is not available from this territory.

⁴ The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 20901. The EAC works with FVAP to collect comprehensive data from the states on all of the ballots sent and received by voters covered under UOCAVA (52 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(11)).

⁵ Section 703(a) HAVA amended section 102 of UOCAVA.

⁶ Throughout this report, the term “uniformed services voter” refers to U.S. citizens who are active members of the uniformed services or a spouse or dependent family member thereof. “Overseas citizen” refers to non-military U.S. citizens who reside overseas.

⁷ Information was provided by FVAP to Fors Marsh via email on April 6, 2023, and was current as of October 2022.



citizens who live, study, or work overseas⁸—the absentee voting process is different from and can be more challenging than the voting process for non-military voters residing in the United States.

Citizens protected by UOCAVA include:

- Members of the uniformed services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space Force), Coast Guard, U.S. Public Health Service [USPHS] Commissioned Corps, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] Commissioned Officer Corps) who are stationed away from their legal voting residence;
- Members of the U.S. Merchant Marine;
- Eligible family members of the above; and
- U.S. citizens residing outside of the United States

Among the challenges UOCAVA sought to address was the wide variability in rules and procedures governing registration and voting across states, which made it difficult for uniformed services members and overseas citizens to navigate the voting process.⁹ UOCAVA established the FPCA, which serves as a combination registration and ballot request application that is accepted in all U.S. states and territories. In addition, the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be cast by UOCAVA voters who make a timely request for, but do not receive, a regular absentee ballot.¹⁰ Some, but not all, states consider the FWAB to be both a registration form and ballot request application.

Although states and localities still maintain and administer elections according to their own laws and procedures for registration and absentee voting among uniformed services members and overseas citizens, the provisions of UOCAVA established some uniformity in the absentee voting process for these voters.

The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009

Historically, UOCAVA ballots were transmitted from election offices to voters primarily through the mail. Given long mailing times and high mobility rates for this population of voters, this practice meant that many UOCAVA voters were unable to receive and return their absentee ballot before state ballot return deadlines. The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act amended UOCAVA to establish additional requirements to protect military and overseas citizens' voting rights.¹¹ These new rules required that all states, territories, and the District of Columbia provide UOCAVA voters with an option to request and receive registration and absentee ballot request materials electronically, directed states to establish an electronic means of transmitting

⁸ Federal Voting Assistance Program, "Comparing Models for Estimating the Total Overseas Citizen Population, the Overseas Citizen Voting-Age Population, and Voting Rates," at https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/OCPA-Research-Note_Final.pdf. The 2022 Overseas Citizen Population Analysis (OCPA) also estimates the number of overseas U.S. citizens, but results from this survey were not available at the time of this report's publication.

⁹ The U.S. Department of Justice. (2020, February 18). *The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act*. <https://www.justice.gov/crt/uniformed-and-overseas-citizens-absentee-voting-act>.

¹⁰ Section 103 of UOCAVA provides a mechanism for uniformed services members and overseas citizens to cast a FWAB (see 52 U.S.C. § 20303).

¹¹ Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 statutory language can be found at <https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Policies/moveact.pdf>. State specific information can be found at <https://www.fvap.gov/guide>.




blank ballots to UOCAVA voters, and required states to provide free access to a system whereby voters can verify the status of their ballot. Additionally, absentee ballots must be transmitted no less than 45 days before a federal election to all UOCAVA voters who submit an absentee ballot request before this deadline. These additional provisions aimed to ensure uniformed services members and overseas citizens not only have the right to vote, but that they have sufficient time to receive and return their absentee ballots ahead of state deadlines.

The UOCAVA Voting Process

Although the specific path may differ depending on the policies and procedures in one's state of voting residence and on a voter's particular situation and preferences, in general, the UOCAVA voting process can be summarized in six basic steps, as illustrated in Figure 1.¹²

Figure 1. The UOCAVA Voting Process



¹² Adapted from an FVAP infographic. For more detailed information about state policies related to UOCAVA voting, see Chapter 2 of this report.



1. Register and request an absentee ballot: UOCAVA-eligible citizens can do this either by completing a state application form or an FPCA (the federal form that functions as both a registration and absentee ballot request and is accepted in all states and U.S. territories).
2. Submit the registration and ballot request: Completed applications must be submitted to the appropriate state or local election office by mail or by an electronic means permitted by the state. All states accept FPCAs by mail; states may also accept FPCAs via email, fax, the state's online voter registration portal, or by another mode.
3. Application processing: Once received, registration and absentee ballot request applications are processed by the election office. If an application meets all requirements and is accepted, then it is valid as a registration and ballot request. UOCAVA voters can use the FPCA as a single ballot request form for all federal elections during the calendar year in which it is submitted. State laws vary on how long this request is valid beyond the initial year.
4. Ballot transmission: Election officials transmit absentee ballots to registered UOCAVA voters no later than 45 days before a federal election (ballots may be transmitted later if the ballot request is submitted by the state deadline but less than 45 days before an election).¹³ Ballots may be transmitted to a voter by mail or through some other state-approved electronic means of transmission, as requested by the voter.
5. Complete and return absentee ballot: UOCAVA voters complete and return their absentee ballot to the appropriate election office for processing. Ballots may be returned and submitted for processing either by mail or through some other electronic means allowed by a state.
6. Ballot processing and counting: Completed absentee ballots that are returned and submitted for counting to an election office must be received by state deadlines and meet other state requirements. State policies on when completed ballots must be postmarked and when they must be returned to an election office in order to be eligible to be counted vary widely.
7. Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB): The FWAB is an emergency or “back-up” ballot available for citizens covered under UOCAVA. It is used to vote in any election for federal offices and as otherwise permitted by state law. UOCAVA requires that to use a FWAB, a voter must be a member of the uniformed services or Merchant Marine (or eligible family member), or a U.S. citizen overseas who is absent from their place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to vote, and must not have received their requested regular absentee ballot from their state. Depending on state law, the FWAB may also be used to request voter registration and/or an absentee ballot.

¹³ The UOCAVA ballot transmission date is set by the MOVE Act of 2009. Because 45 days before a federal general election always falls on a Saturday, election officials may refer to this ballot transmission deadline as “UOCAVA Saturday.”



UOCAVA stipulates that voters may also return the state-issued absentee ballot after returning the FWAB, as the state ballot may offer other offices or referenda. Only one ballot is counted for each voter; if a state-issued absentee ballot is received from the voter, it supersedes the FWAB and only the official ballot is counted.

UOCAVA Registration and Ballot Requests

For the 2022 general election, registered overseas citizens outnumbered registered uniformed services members covered by UOCAVA. Uniformed services members and their eligible family members accounted for 43.1% of registered UOCAVA voters and overseas citizens accounted for 56.5% of this population.¹⁴ This continues a trend that was also seen in 2020, 2018, and 2016.

Table 1. Four Jurisdictions Accounted for 12%+ of All Registered UOCAVA Voters

Jurisdictions With More Than 15,000 UOCAVA Voters	
Jurisdiction	Number of Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters in 2022
Los Angeles County, CA	31,273
King County, WA	30,535
Miami-Dade County, FL	16,294
Pierce County, WA	15,663

Source: Information on the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was item B1a of the 2022 EAVS.

Registered UOCAVA voters' legal voting residences¹⁵ are disproportionately concentrated in just a few U.S. states. In 2022, the states with the largest numbers of registered UOCAVA voters were Florida (182,506), California (137,273), and Washington (103,996).¹⁶ Together, these three states represented 57.5% of all registered UOCAVA voters reported in the 2022 EAVS. Fourteen

¹⁴ The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2022 EAVS. The number of registered and eligible uniformed services UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1b; the percentage of uniformed services UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1b by B1a. The number of registered and eligible overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1c; the percentage of overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1c by B1a. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. In total, 754 jurisdictions in 13 states and 3 territories did not report data in B1; this count excludes jurisdictions in Maine, which reported UOCAVA data at the state level and not the jurisdiction level, and jurisdictions in North Dakota as they do not use voter registration. A total of 5,716 registered and eligible voters reported in B1a were not classified as either uniformed services members or overseas citizens. These percentages exclude the seven states that did not report the number of registered UOCAVA voters and the state and territory that did not subdivide this number by UOCAVA voter type.

¹⁵ According to FVAP's guidance for service members, "Your voting residence is within your state of legal residence or domicile. It is the address that you consider your permanent home and where you had a physical presence. Your state of legal residence is used for state income tax purposes, determines eligibility to vote for federal and state elections, and qualification for in-state tuition rates." For more information, see <https://www.fvap.gov/military-voter/voting-residence>.


¹⁶ The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters in a state was calculated by summing B1a across all jurisdictions for each state.



local jurisdictions¹⁷ reported having 10,000 or more registered UOCAVA voters, and four reported more than 15,000 registered and eligible UOCAVA voters. These four jurisdictions, shown in Table 1, accounted for 12.8% of all registered UOCAVA voters.

Conversely, of the 5,233 local jurisdictions for which the number of registered UOCAVA voters was available, 89.4% reported fewer than 100 registered UOCAVA voters, including 775 (14.8%) jurisdictions that reported having zero UOCAVA voters in 2022. Figure 2 shows the number of registered UOCAVA voters by jurisdiction.

Figure 2. Most Jurisdictions Had Fewer Than 50 Registered UOCAVA Voters



Source: Information for the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2022 EAVS.


Election offices reported receiving 309,867 FPCAs ahead of the 2022 general election, which was almost identical to the 312,437 FPCAs that states reported receiving ahead of the last

¹⁷ What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data on the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao's data are included with Maui's data.



midterm general election in 2018. Overall, 20.7% of these registration and absentee ballot requests came from uniformed services members, and 76.5% were submitted by overseas citizens.¹⁸ States reported rejecting 1.9% of the FPCAs received—21.4% of these were rejected because the election office received the form after their state’s absentee ballot request deadline.¹⁹ The FPCA rejection rate among uniformed services members was slightly higher than among overseas citizens (although not to a statistically significant degree), with 2.6% of military FPCAs rejected compared to 1.8% of FPCAs submitted by overseas citizens.²⁰

Figure 3. Ballot Transmissions Were the Highest in States with Large UOCAVA Populations



Source: Information on the number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2022 EAVS. State-level data were aggregated from jurisdiction data. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to reflect states that had the lowest and highest number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted and to differentiate among the states in between the lowest and highest UOCAVA ballot transmission numbers.

¹⁸ Data on the total number of FPCAs submitted were collected in item B2a of the 2022 EAVS. For 2022, the percentage of FPCAs received from uniformed services members was calculated as B2b/B2a x 100. The percentage of FPCAs received from overseas citizens was calculated as B2c/B2a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.

¹⁹ The total number of FPCAs rejected was collected in item B3a in the 2022 EAVS; the percentage of FPCAs rejected was calculated as B3a/B2a x 100. The percentage of FPCAs rejected because they were received late was calculated as B4a/B3a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.


²⁰ The percentage of rejected FPCAs from uniformed services voters was calculated as B3b/B2b. The percentage of rejected FPCAs from overseas citizens was calculated as B3c/B2c. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.



UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted

In 2022, election offices in the 50 states, three U.S. territories,²¹ and the District of Columbia reported transmitting 654,786 ballots to UOCAVA voters.²² Figure 3 shows the number of ballots sent out from election offices or transmitted for each state. The states colored in the darkest blue represent the states that distributed the most ballots to UOCAVA voters. The states colored in the lightest blue are the states that distributed the fewest ballots to UOCAVA voters. States on or near the West Coast such as Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, Mid-Atlantic states including New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and populous states like Florida and Texas all transmitted 10,000 or more UOCAVA ballots.

Figure 4. Steady Increase in the Percentage of UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted to Overseas Citizens Relative to Uniformed Services Members



Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as $B1b/B1a \times 100$ for 2014 and 2016 and $B5b/B5a \times 100$ for 2018, 2020, and 2022. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as $B1c/B1a \times 100$ for 2014 and 2016, and $B5c/B5a \times 100$ for 2018, 2020, and 2022. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100% for each year.

²¹ Puerto Rico was not required to report data for the 2022 EAVS because it did not hold a federal general election in November 2022. The Northern Mariana Islands did not report data on the number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters in the 2022 EAVS.

²² The number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2022 EAVS. The number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters was reported by 5,933 of 6,460 jurisdictions.



Of the UOCAVA ballots transmitted for the 2022 general election, 34.6% were sent to uniformed services members and 64.4% were transmitted to overseas citizens.²³ Figure 4 shows that the percentage of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens has continued to rise steadily over the last several election cycles, increasing by 12.8 percentage points since the 2014 general election and by 4.4 percentage points since the last midterm general election in 2018.


Although the nationwide percentage of ballots sent to overseas citizens was greater than the percentage sent to uniformed services members, the proportion of ballots sent to overseas citizens or uniformed services members varied by state. Arkansas, Montana, Tennessee, and Wyoming, for example, reported that UOCAVA ballots were split about evenly between uniformed services members and overseas citizens. However, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island all reported that more than 90% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to overseas citizens. American Samoa and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported that 100% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services voters, and more than 60% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services members in Alaska, Oklahoma, and Washington State. Figure 5 shows the percentage of ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters versus overseas citizens.

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²³ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as $B5b/B5a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as $B5c/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level when calculating national percentages. An additional 1% of the transmitted ballots could not be classified by voter type.



Figure 5. Twenty-Four States Transmitted More UOCAVA Ballots to Uniformed Services Members Than to Overseas Citizens




Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B5c/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as B5b/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of uncategorized ballots was calculated as (B5a-B5b-B5c)/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%. Iowa, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data on the number of ballots transmitted.



Modes of UOCAVA Ballot Transmission

Over the last several election cycles, the modes by which absentee ballots have been transmitted to voters have changed substantially. Since voters were given the option of how to receive their blank absentee ballot with the passage of the MOVE Act in 2009, transmission of ballots to UOCAVA voters has increasingly occurred electronically. Email was the most popular method of ballot transmission for the 2022 general election, with 48.5% of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters via email, 38.4% transmitted via postal mail, and 12.6% sent to voters through some other mode of transmission (e.g., fax or online systems).²⁴ By comparison, during the

Figure 6. Modes of Ballot Transmission to Voters Differed for Overseas Citizens and Uniformed Services Members



Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted overall were calculated as $B7a/B5a \times 100$ for email, $B6a/B5a \times 100$ for postal mail, and $B8a/B5a \times 100$ for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters were calculated as $B7b/B5b \times 100$ for email, $B6b/B5b \times 100$ for postal mail, and $B8b/B5b \times 100$ for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted for overseas citizens were calculated as $B7c/B5c \times 100$ for email, $B6c/B5c \times 100$ for postal mail, and $B8c/B5c \times 100$ for other modes. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%.

²⁴ The percentage of ballots transmitted by email was calculated as $B7a/B5a \times 100$ for the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of ballots transmitted by postal mail was calculated as $B6a/B5a \times 100$. The percentage of ballots transmitted by other modes of transmission was calculated as $B8a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.




previous midterm election cycle in 2018, among states that provided data on transmission by mode, 56.6% of ballots were transmitted via email, with 42.2% of UOCAVA ballots transmitted via postal mail. Figure 6 displays the percentage of ballots transmitted by mail, email, or other modes for the 2022 general election.

Modes of ballot transmission differed based on UOCAVA voter type. Uniformed services members used postal transmission (58.1%) more than email transmission (36.6%), and just 6.2% of uniformed services members had their ballots transmitted via other modes. For ballots transmitted to overseas citizens, most ballots were transmitted by email (52.8%) while ballots transmitted by postal mail accounted for 27.1%, and 15.8% were transmitted via other means, including fax and online ballot delivery portals.

Overall, 1.5% of all ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters were returned as undeliverable, including mailed ballots returned to sender, emailed ballots that bounced back, and ballots that were undeliverable by other modes, such as being sent to an incorrect fax number.²⁵

Figure 7. UOCAVA Ballot Return Rates Show No Distinct Geographic Pattern



Source: The percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters was calculated as $B9a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the percentages shown in this map.

²⁵ The percentage of ballots returned as undeliverable was calculated as $B13a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. States and jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they are able to capture and report undeliverable ballots, both overall and by mode of transmission.



UOCAVA Ballots Returned and Submitted for Counting

States reported 267,403 regular absentee ballots being returned and submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters for the 2022 election, comprising 40.9% of the UOCAVA ballots that were transmitted from election offices to voters.²⁶ This is a decrease of 23.2% from 2018, when 344,392 regular absentee ballots were returned by UOCAVA voters.²⁷ Figure 7 shows the UOCAVA ballot return totals by state in 2022. The states colored in dark blue represent the states that had the highest ballot return totals. The states colored in light blue were the states that had the lowest ballot return totals. The UOCAVA ballot return rate does not show any type of geographic or regional pattern.

Of the ballots returned to election offices, 31.5% were returned by uniformed services members and 65.8% were returned by overseas citizens.²⁸ Overall, 61.5% of absentee ballots returned and submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters were returned to the election office via postal mail, 37.7% were returned by email, and 17.1% were returned through some other mode (e.g., fax or an online system).²⁹ Data on email ballot returns was not available in or not provided by 21 states. Among the states that reported UOCAVA ballots returned by email, 37.7% of ballots were returned through email, and 61.5% were returned via mail.³⁰ Half of states allow UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by email.³¹

²⁶ The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a in the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned was calculated as $B9a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. FWABs were reported separately from regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and were not included in these figures. Because more than one ballot may be transmitted to an individual voter (e.g., because the original was returned undeliverable or was spoiled and replaced), this rate likely underestimates the rate of ballot return by UOCAVA voters.

²⁷ The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a for the 2018 EAVS.

²⁸ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services members was calculated as $B9b/B9a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizens was calculated as $B9c/B9a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.


²⁹ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail was calculated as $B10a/B9a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email was calculated as $B11a/B9a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by some other mode was calculated as $B12a/B9a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

³⁰ Thirty states reported at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in the 2022 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by email was calculated as $B11a/B9a \times 100$ among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in the 2022 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by mail was calculated as $B10a/B9a \times 100$ among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in 2022 EAVS). Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

³¹ Information on how UOCAVA ballots may be returned by voters was collected in item Q28 of the 2022 Policy Survey.



Figure 8. Postal Mail Was the Primary Mode of Ballot Return for UOCAVA Voters



Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode overall were calculated as $B10a/B9a \times 100$ for postal mail and $B11a/B9a \times 100$ for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for overseas citizens were calculated as $B10c/B9c \times 100$ for postal mail and $B11c/B9c \times 100$ for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for uniformed services members were calculated as $B10b/B9b \times 100$ for postal mail and $B11b/B9b \times 100$ for email. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages, and because percentages for each type of voter and each mode of return were calculated independently—and only states that reported data for a given mode of return were included in the analysis—the percentages do not sum to 100%. Other modes of ballot return are not shown here.

Although postal mail was the most common mode of ballot return for both uniformed services members and overseas citizens, uniformed services members used email return far less than overseas citizens, with just 14.6% using email to return an absentee ballot versus 52.8% of overseas citizens.³² Figure 8 displays the method of ballot return for UOCAVA voters by type.

Overall, 257,657 regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters were counted in the 2022 general election. Of these votes, 66.4% were cast by overseas citizens and 31.1% by uniformed

³² The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by uniformed services members was calculated as $B11b/B9b \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by overseas citizens was calculated as $B11c/B9c \times 100$. Of note, two of the states with the largest numbers of UOCAVA voters—California and Florida—do not allow email return of absentee ballots. Casewise deletion at the state level was used to calculate the national percentages.



services voters.³³ The overall rejection rate for regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters was 3.9%, a 46% decrease from the 5.7% reported in 2018.³⁴ The overall rejection rate did not differ significantly across UOCAVA voter types.³⁵

Figure 9 shows the number of rejected UOCAVA ballots returned and submitted by voters for counting in each state. The states that are colored in dark blue represent the states that reported the highest number of rejected ballots, and the states that are colored in light blue reported the lowest number of rejected ballots. Rejection rates were highest in southern states including Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee as well as in western states like California, Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.

Rejected ballots were divided into three reasons for rejection: missed deadline, problem with voter signature, and lacked postmark.³⁶ By far, the most common reason for rejection was that a ballot was received after a state's deadline for UOCAVA absentee ballot receipt. Of the 10,456 returned UOCAVA ballots rejected, 6,774 were rejected because they were received after the state deadline, which was 65.4% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections.³⁷ Voter signature problems were responsible for 18.1% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections, 1% of ballot rejections were the result of postmark issues, and 18% of rejections were caused by some other issue.³⁸

³³ The total number of UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and counted was collected in item B14a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of ballots that were returned by uniformed services members was calculated as $B14b/B14a \times 100$. The percentage of ballots that were returned by overseas citizens was calculated as $B14c/B14a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. An additional 8,127 (3.2%) UOCAVA absentee ballots counted were not classified by voter type.

³⁴ Before survey revisions were made in the 2018 EAVS, UOCAVA ballot rejection data included both regular absentee ballots and FWABs, making direct comparisons with years prior to 2018 complicated. The 2016 ballot rejection rate was calculated as $(B16a+B16b+B16c)/B26b$ and produced an overall rejection rate of 2.4%.

³⁵ The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as $B18a/B9a \times 100$ for the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as $B18b/B9b \times 100$. The percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as $B18c/B9c \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. The rejection rate for returned ballots was 4.3% for uniformed services members, 3.7% for overseas citizens, and 4.6% among rejected ballots not classified by voter type.

³⁶ Rhode Island did not report the number of ballots rejected. The number of ballots rejected was reported for 65.5% of jurisdictions nationwide. Most of these jurisdictions also subdivided rejected ballots by reason for rejection. Puerto Rico did not provide these data because it was not required to respond to the 2022 EAVS.

³⁷ The total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received after the state deadline was item B19a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received late was calculated as $B19a/B18a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

³⁸ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of signature issues was calculated as $B20a/B18a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of postmark issues was calculated as $B21a/B18a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons was calculated as $B22a/B18a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.



Figure 9. UOCAVA Ballot Rejection Rates Varied Significantly Across States



Source: The percentage of returned UOCAVA ballots that were rejected was calculated as $B18a/B9a \times 100$. Cutoff points in the graph are quartiles.

Uniformed services members' and overseas citizens' UOCAVA ballots were rejected for similar reasons. Missing the deadline was the most common reason for rejection among both populations—60.1% for uniformed services members and 67.4% for overseas citizens. Signature issues were the cause of 21.1% of ballot rejections for ballots returned by uniformed services members and 17.2% of ballot rejections for overseas citizens. Neither of these reasons for rejection differed significantly across UOCAVA voter types.³⁹

Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB)

If a regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time for a UOCAVA individual to vote, the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be used to vote for all federal offices and, in some states, state and local offices as well.

³⁹ The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as $B18a/B9a \times 100$ for the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as $B18b/B9b \times 100$. The percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as $B18c/B9c \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. The rejection rate for returned ballots was 4.3% for uniformed services members, 3.7% for overseas citizens, and 5.2% among rejected ballots not classified by voter type.



The FWAB is a special type of UOCAVA ballot that may be used as a backup in the event that a voter's regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time to vote. In most states, a UOCAVA voter must have registered and requested an absentee ballot in order to use the FWAB.

The 4,089 FWABs submitted in 2022 made up a relatively small proportion (1.6%) of all the UOCAVA ballots returned and represented a 26.8% decrease in the volume of FWABs reported compared to the 2018 election.⁴⁰ FWAB usage remains a relatively small proportion of the UOCAVA methods of voting among both uniformed services members and overseas citizens. However, the FWAB resulted in 3,447 additional UOCAVA voters' ballots being counted in the 2022 general election, with 22.2% of these additional voters being uniformed services members and 77.3% being overseas citizens.⁴¹ Eleven states and territories reported that they received no FWABs during the 2022 presidential election.⁴²

Nearly one in five (655 or 16%) of the 4,089 FWABs submitted in the 2022 general election were not counted. Of these, 159 FWABs—25.4% of the rejected FWABs—were replaced by a regular absentee ballot, making the backup ballot unnecessary.⁴³ The rate of uncounted FWABs returned by uniformed services members (27.2%) was more than double the rate of uncounted FWABs returned by overseas citizens (12%).⁴⁴ The other major reason FWABs went uncounted (and the only other reason states reported via the EAVS) was because they were received after the ballot receipt deadline (27.2% of rejected FWABs).⁴⁵

⁴⁰ The percentage of all ballots returned that were FWABs was calculated using the total number of FWABs received (B23a) divided by the total number of UOCAVA ballots received (the sum of B9a and B23a). Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. The total number of FWABs received was collected in item B23a in the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. In 2018, states reported receiving 7,284 FWABs. For 2022, the total number of FWABs returned was based on the 76.2% of jurisdictions for which this information was available.

⁴¹ The total number of FWABs received and counted was item B24a of the 2022 EAVS. The number of FWABs counted from uniformed services members was item B24b, and the number of FWABs counted from overseas citizens was item B24c. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by uniformed services members was calculated as $B24b/B24a \times 100$. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by overseas citizens was calculated as $B24c/B24a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

⁴² American Samoa, Colorado, Delaware, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, South Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming reported receiving zero FWABs. Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont reported FWABs with regular UOCAVA ballots because they could not separate the two types.

⁴³ The number of FWABs rejected because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted was item B26a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of FWABs that were rejected for this reason was calculated as $B26a/(B25a+B26a+B27a) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁴⁴ The total percentage of FWABs rejected was calculated as $(B25a+B26a+B27a)/B23a \times 100$. The percentage of FWABs rejected from uniformed services members was calculated as $(B25b+B26b+B27b)/B23b \times 100$. The percentage of FWABs rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as $(B25c+B26c+B27c)/B23c \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

⁴⁵ The percentage of FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the deadline was calculated as $B25a/(B25a+B26a+B27a) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

UOCAVA Table 1: Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters

State	Registered UOCAVA Voters						
	All UOCAVA Voters	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	527	273	51.8%	254	48.2%	0	0.0%
Alaska	5,153	3,322	64.5%	1,831	35.5%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	16	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Arizona	12,122	3,795	31.3%	8,327	68.7%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	1,327	774	58.3%	553	41.7%	0	0.0%
California	137,273	29,863	21.8%	107,242	78.1%	168	0.1%
Colorado	39,482	13,344	33.8%	26,138	66.2%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	1,161	192	16.5%	969	83.5%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	1,055	239	22.7%	816	77.3%	0	0.0%
Florida	182,506	123,227	67.5%	59,279	32.5%	0	0.0%
Georgia	7,494	2,457	32.8%	5,037	67.2%	0	0.0%
Guam	134	80	59.7%	54	40.3%	0	0.0%
Hawaii	809	59	7.3%	750	92.7%	0	0.0%
Idaho	347	102	29.4%	245	70.6%	0	0.0%
Illinois	3,881	830	21.4%	2,954	76.1%	97	2.5%
Indiana	21,718	10,400	47.9%	11,318	52.1%	0	0.0%
Iowa	1,920	367	19.1%	1,553	80.9%	0	0.0%
Kansas	2,070	411	19.9%	1,643	79.4%	16	0.8%
Kentucky	1,887	812	43.0%	1,075	57.0%	0	0.0%
Louisiana	1,783	792	44.4%	991	55.6%	0	0.0%
Maine	2,504	382	15.3%	2,122	84.7%	0	0.0%
Maryland	7,347	1,494	20.3%	5,853	79.7%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	5,438	166	3.1%	5,272	96.9%	0	0.0%
Michigan	7,777	1,297	16.7%	6,480	83.3%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	5,329	1,084	20.3%	4,245	79.7%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	3,954	3,680	93.1%	275	7.0%	-1	0.0%
Missouri [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana	2,737	1,192	43.6%	1,545	56.4%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	705	168	23.8%	537	76.2%	0	0.0%
Nevada	5,615	1,110	19.8%	4,505	80.2%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	2,158	597	27.7%	1,561	72.3%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	15,454	1,397	9.0%	14,057	91.0%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	2,082	659	31.7%	1,423	68.3%	0	0.0%
New York	36,600	3,961	10.8%	32,639	89.2%	0	0.0%
North Carolina	10,400	2,733	26.3%	7,667	73.7%	0	0.0%



State	Registered UOCAVA Voters						
	All UOCAVA Voters	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Oklahoma	6,888	4,372	63.5%	2,516	36.5%	0	0.0%
Oregon	16,257	4,383	27.0%	11,874	73.0%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania	11,250	2,625	23.3%	8,625	76.7%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	795	56	7.0%	739	93.0%	0	0.0%
South Carolina	2,362	784	33.2%	1,578	66.8%	0	0.0%
South Dakota	1,462	645	44.1%	817	55.9%	0	0.0%
Tennessee	2,912	1,443	49.6%	1,469	50.4%	0	0.0%
Texas	22,876	7,826	34.2%	13,277	58.0%	1,773	7.8%
U.S. Virgin Islands [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	4,398	1,261	28.7%	2,369	53.9%	768	17.5%
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia	11,570	3,723	32.2%	7,847	67.8%	0	0.0%
Washington	103,996	64,855	62.4%	39,141	37.6%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	438	180	41.1%	221	50.5%	37	8.4%
Wisconsin	20,904	14,203	67.9%	6,701	32.1%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	565	301	53.3%	264	46.7%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	737,438	317,932	43.1%	416,648	56.5%	2,858	0.4%

UOCAVA Table 1 Calculation Notes:

All UOCAVA Voters uses question B1a.

Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B1b.

Uniformed Services Members, % uses B1b/B1a x 100.

Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B1c.

Overseas Citizens, % uses B1c/B1a x 100.

Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B1a-(B1b+B1c).

Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses (B1a-[B1b + B1c])/B1a x 100.

UOCAVA Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.



- [1] Missouri's statewide voter registration system does not track UOCAVA registrations.
- [2] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is not available from this territory.
- [3] Because Ohio permits UOCAVA voters to register by several means other than a FPCA or FWAB, this state cannot accurately provide the actual number of UOCAVA voters.
- [4] The U.S. Virgin Islands does not register voters based on UOCAVA status.

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UOCAVA Table 2: Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA)

State	FPCAs Received						
	Total	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	482	227	47.1%	247	51.2%	8	1.7%
Alaska	430	200	46.5%	230	53.5%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	1	1	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Arizona	5,752	1,755	30.5%	3,997	69.5%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	117	48	41.0%	69	59.0%	0	0.0%
California	66,176	10,858	16.4%	55,301	83.6%	17	0.0%
Colorado	5,988	774	12.9%	5,214	87.1%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	1,161	192	16.5%	969	83.5%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	682	74	10.9%	608	89.1%	0	0.0%
Florida	28,392	13,285	46.8%	15,107	53.2%	0	0.0%
Georgia	934	208	22.3%	726	77.7%	0	0.0%
Guam	18	11	61.1%	7	38.9%	0	0.0%
Hawaii	809	59	7.3%	750	92.7%	0	0.0%
Idaho	347	102	29.4%	245	70.6%	0	0.0%
Illinois	8,412	961	11.4%	1,389	16.5%	6,062	72.1%
Indiana	1,999	345	17.3%	1,654	82.7%	0	0.0%
Iowa [1]	1,558	--	--	--	--	1,558	100.0%
Kansas	2,050	411	20.0%	1,643	80.1%	-4	-0.2%
Kentucky	1,517	991	65.3%	526	34.7%	0	0.0%
Louisiana [2]	89	--	--	--	--	89	100.0%
Maine [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland	7,230	1,482	20.5%	5,748	79.5%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	3,495	76	2.2%	3,419	97.8%	0	0.0%
Michigan	6,097	957	15.7%	5,140	84.3%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	5,331	1,079	20.2%	4,252	79.8%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	261	145	55.6%	116	44.4%	0	0.0%
Missouri [4]	498	--	--	--	--	498	100.0%
Montana	1,531	667	43.6%	864	56.4%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	663	150	22.6%	513	77.4%	0	0.0%
Nevada	5,578	866	15.5%	4,712	84.5%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	2,158	597	27.7%	1,561	72.3%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	14,634	1,123	7.7%	13,511	92.3%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	1,795	486	27.1%	1,309	72.9%	0	0.0%
New York	66,830	6,513	9.7%	60,317	90.3%	0	0.0%
North Carolina	8,886	2,147	24.2%	6,739	75.8%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	35	3	8.6%	32	91.4%	0	0.0%



State	FPCAs Received						
	Total	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands [5]	0	0	--	0	--	0	--
Ohio	6,324	1,514	23.9%	4,810	76.1%	0	0.0%
Oklahoma	1,023	642	62.8%	381	37.2%	0	0.0%
Oregon [6]	429	--	--	--	--	429	100.0%
Pennsylvania	10,013	2,007	20.0%	8,006	80.0%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	795	56	7.0%	739	93.0%	0	0.0%
South Carolina [7]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	6	4	66.7%	2	33.3%	0	0.0%
Tennessee	2,545	1,223	48.1%	1,322	51.9%	0	0.0%
Texas	22,878	7,826	34.2%	13,277	58.0%	1,775	7.8%
U.S. Virgin Islands	5	5	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Utah	1,026	160	15.6%	247	24.1%	619	60.3%
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia	9,715	2,774	28.6%	6,941	71.4%	0	0.0%
Washington	1,656	335	20.2%	1,321	79.8%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	324	135	41.7%	189	58.3%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [8]	1,007	71	7.1%	936	92.9%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	185	112	60.5%	73	39.5%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	309,867	63,657	20.7%	235,159	76.5%	11,051	3.6%

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State	FPCAs Rejected							
	Total	% of FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
			Total	% of Received from Uniformed Services	Total	% of Received from Overseas Citizens	Total	% of Total FPCAs Rejected
Alabama	17	3.5%	4	1.8%	11	4.5%	2	11.8%
Alaska	21	4.9%	11	5.5%	10	4.3%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--	0	--
Arizona	6	0.1%	0	0.0%	6	0.2%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
California	2,216	3.3%	728	6.7%	1,486	2.7%	2	0.1%
Colorado	44	0.7%	7	0.9%	37	0.7%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
District of Columbia	33	4.8%	4	5.4%	29	4.8%	0	0.0%
Florida	587	2.1%	438	3.3%	143	0.9%	6	1.0%
Georgia	87	9.3%	12	5.8%	75	10.3%	0	0.0%
Guam	2	11.1%	0	0.0%	2	28.6%	0	0.0%
Hawaii	5	0.6%	1	1.7%	4	0.5%	0	0.0%
Idaho	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Illinois	43	0.5%	13	1.4%	28	2.0%	2	4.7%
Indiana	25	1.3%	7	2.0%	18	1.1%	0	0.0%
Iowa [1]	0	0.0%	0	--	0	--	0	--
Kansas	11	0.5%	3	0.7%	8	0.5%	0	0.0%
Kentucky	12	0.8%	2	0.2%	10	1.9%	0	0.0%
Louisiana [2]	2	2.2%	--	--	--	--	2	100.0%
Maine [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland	19	0.3%	5	0.3%	14	0.2%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	9	0.3%	0	0.0%	9	0.3%	0	0.0%
Michigan	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Minnesota	58	1.1%	17	1.6%	41	1.0%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Missouri [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana	6	0.4%	0	0.0%	6	0.7%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	20	3.0%	4	2.7%	16	3.1%	0	0.0%
Nevada	473	8.5%	1	0.1%	472	10.0%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
New Jersey	4	0.0%	1	0.1%	3	0.0%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	9	0.5%	6	1.2%	3	0.2%	0	0.0%
New York	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
North Carolina	45	0.5%	14	0.7%	31	0.5%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	20	57.1%	0	0.0%	20	62.5%	0	0.0%



State	FPCAs Rejected							
	Total	% of FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
			Total	% of Received from Uniformed Services	Total	% of Received from Overseas Citizens	Total	% of Total FPCAs Rejected
Northern Mariana Islands [5]	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--
Ohio	77	1.2%	22	1.5%	55	1.1%	0	0.0%
Oklahoma	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Oregon [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	21	0.2%	1	0.0%	20	0.2%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	8	1.0%	1	1.8%	7	0.9%	0	0.0%
South Carolina [7]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Tennessee	56	2.2%	37	3.0%	19	1.4%	0	0.0%
Texas	639	2.8%	147	1.9%	459	3.5%	33	5.2%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--	0	--
Utah	8	0.8%	0	0.0%	5	2.0%	3	37.5%
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia	5	0.1%	3	0.1%	2	0.0%	0	0.0%
Washington	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
West Virginia	5	1.5%	1	0.7%	4	2.1%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	3	1.6%	3	2.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	4,596	1.9%	1,493	2.6%	3,053	1.8%	50	1.1%

UOCAVA Table 2 Calculation Notes:

FPCAs Received, Total uses question B2a.

FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B2b.

FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, % uses $B2b/B2a \times 100$.

FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B2c.

FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, % uses $B2c/B2a \times 100$.

FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses $B2a - (B2b + B2c)$.

FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses $(B2a - [B2b + B2c]) / B2a \times 100$.

FPCAs Rejected, Total uses question B3a.

FPCAs Rejected, % of FPCAs Received uses $B3a/B2a \times 100$.

FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B3b.

FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, % of Received from Uniformed Services uses $B3b/B2b \times 100$.

FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B3c.

FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, % of Received from Overseas Citizens uses $B3c/B2c \times 100$.

FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses $B3a - (B3b + B3c)$.

FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % of Total FPCAs Rejected uses $(B3a - [B3b + B3c]) / B3a \times 100$.



UOCAVA Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from the states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FPCAs received or rejected categories indicate that the sum of FPCAs for uniformed services members and overseas citizens in that category account for more than the total number of FPCAs reported by the state in the corresponding category.

[1] Data on FPCAs by type of UOCAVA voter is not tracked.

[2] The Department of State only collects data for totals, not for the breakdowns by type of UOCAVA voter.

[3] Maine does not distinguish FPCAs from other registration forms.

[4] Missouri's statewide voter registration system does not track data on UOCAVA voter type (uniformed services vs. overseas citizen).

[5] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is not available from this territory.

[6] Oregon does not track data on UOCAVA voter type.

[7] Data were not available to break down the type of applications for UOCAVA voters.

[8] Data on rejected FPCAs and rejected absentee applications is not tracked.

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UOCAVA Table 3: UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted, Returned, Counted, and Rejected

State	UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted	UOCAVA Ballots Returned	UOCAVA Ballots Counted		UOCAVA Ballots Rejected	
			Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Alabama	710	494	477	96.6%	10	2.0%
Alaska [1]	5,092	3,914	3,814	97.4%	100	2.6%
American Samoa	25	16	16	100.0%	0	0.0%
Arizona	12,104	6,979	6,913	99.1%	66	0.9%
Arkansas	1,304	473	426	90.1%	35	7.4%
California [2]	132,855	34,054	31,774	93.3%	2,280	6.7%
Colorado	38,736	14,289	13,426	94.0%	863	6.0%
Connecticut	2,580	1,056	1,016	96.2%	40	3.8%
Delaware	1,161	581	539	92.8%	42	7.2%
District of Columbia [3]	730	469	464	98.9%	5	1.1%
Florida	102,010	40,901	38,987	95.3%	1,849	4.5%
Georgia	7,482	5,194	4,913	94.6%	281	5.4%
Guam [4]	134	85	79	92.9%	6	7.1%
Hawaii	816	496	491	99.0%	5	1.0%
Idaho [5]	343	317	316	99.7%	1	0.3%
Illinois	3,370	2,729	2,776	101.7%	18	0.7%
Indiana	2,476	2,033	2,012	99.0%	22	1.1%
Iowa [6]	1,916	1,452	1,401	96.5%	53	3.7%
Kansas	2,054	1,684	1,678	99.6%	6	0.4%
Kentucky	1,390	893	830	92.9%	63	7.1%
Louisiana [7]	1,795	848	764	90.1%	84	9.9%
Maine	2,516	1,739	1,734	99.7%	5	0.3%
Maryland	7,603	4,763	4,551	95.5%	212	4.5%
Massachusetts	5,286	4,229	4,204	99.4%	25	0.6%
Michigan	7,994	5,869	5,727	97.6%	142	2.4%
Minnesota [8]	5,373	3,421	3,105	90.8%	316	9.2%
Mississippi	261	211	211	100.0%	0	0.0%
Missouri	3,615	1,886	1,837	97.4%	49	2.6%
Montana [9]	2,741	1,790	1,768	98.8%	22	1.2%
Nebraska	692	552	538	97.5%	14	2.5%
Nevada	6,188	3,442	3,388	98.4%	54	1.6%
New Hampshire	2,158	1,789	1,668	93.2%	121	6.8%
New Jersey	10,146	2,925	2,849	97.4%	76	2.6%
New Mexico	2,086	1,558	1,558	100.0%	0	0.0%
New York [10]	65,275	22,664	22,391	98.8%	715	3.2%
North Carolina	10,277	8,449	8,390	99.3%	59	0.7%
North Dakota	433	363	343	94.5%	20	5.5%
Northern Mariana Islands [11]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	7,148	5,323	5,238	98.4%	85	1.6%
Oklahoma	7,035	1,604	1,545	96.3%	59	3.7%
Oregon [12]	16,257	6,962	6,830	98.1%	132	1.9%



State	UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted	UOCAVA Ballots Returned	UOCAVA Ballots Counted		UOCAVA Ballots Rejected	
			Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Pennsylvania	11,593	8,416	8,069	95.9%	347	4.1%
Rhode Island [13]	630	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [14]	2,356	1,991	1,983	99.6%	8	0.4%
South Dakota	985	757	718	94.8%	39	5.2%
Tennessee	2,912	2,074	1,935	93.3%	139	6.7%
Texas	21,644	13,867	13,228	95.4%	654	4.7%
U.S. Virgin Islands	10	0	0	--	0	--
Utah	4,495	2,064	2,043	99.0%	284	13.8%
Vermont	935	543	534	98.3%	19	3.5%
Virginia	11,491	6,968	6,755	96.9%	57	0.8%
Washington	108,585	27,125	26,579	98.0%	546	2.0%
West Virginia [15]	434	287	431	150.2%	6	2.1%
Wisconsin	6,003	4,444	4,048	91.1%	396	8.9%
Wyoming [16]	546	371	347	93.5%	26	7.0%
U.S. Total	654,786	267,403	257,657	96.4%	10,456	3.9%

UOCAVA Table 3 Calculation Notes:

UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted uses question B5a.

UOCAVA Ballots Returned uses question B9a.

UOCAVA Ballots Counted, Total uses question B14a.

UOCAVA Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses B14a/B9a x 100.

UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, Total uses question B18a.

UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, % of Returned uses B18a/B9a x 100.

UOCAVA Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

[1] Alaska does not track data on the method by which UOCAVA ballots are returned. All ballots sent to voters by mail can only be returned by mail, and all electronic transmission (online or fax) ballots sent to voters may either be returned by mail or by fax. The largest number of election transmission (online or fax) ballots sent to voters are returned by mail.

[2] Some California counties accept UOCAVA ballots by fax.

[3] For the 2022 general election, the District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) transmitted ballots only to active UOCAVA voters.

[4] Guam law allows UOCAVA ballots to be transmitted to voters via email; however, these ballots must be returned via air mail.

[5] Idaho was not able to track data on rejected UOCAVA ballots and FWABs.

[6] Data on FWABs is not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.

[7] Registrars may transmit multiple ballots to a single voter in some circumstances (i.e., the voter did not receive the original ballot or the original ballot is returned to the registrar as undeliverable).



- [8] Minnesota only accepts UOCAVA ballots returned via mail.
- [9] The number of UOCAVA ballots issued may exceed the number of registered UOCAVA voters due to replacement ballots being issued.
- [10] There are circumstances under which a UOCAVA voter registered in New York may have been transmitted more than one ballot or may return more than one ballot (for instance, some county boards mail a ballot to every UOCAVA voter, regardless of their transmission preference, so voters who already received their ballot electronically, completed, and returned it may subsequently receive a physical ballot in the mail). Additional data collected by New York State Board of Elections has shown that more than 1,700 UOCAVA voters returned multiple ballots, although the data does not report how many ballots each of these voters returned.
- [11] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is not available from this territory.
- [12] Oregon statute requires ballots to be mailed to voters.
- [13] According to Rhode Island general law, all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail ballot category.
- [14] Data on FWABs are not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots. The number of UOCAVA ballots reported as counted are ballots that were received before the deadline, and the number of UOCAVA ballots reported as rejected are ballots that were returned after the deadline. No data are available on UOCAVA ballots that may have been challenged or were not counted for other reasons.
- [15] West Virginia reports a UOCAVA ballot count rate of more than 100% primarily because two counties did not report data on ballots returned but reported data on ballots counted.
- [16] UOCAVA ballots must be returned by mail.

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UOCAVA Table 4: Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB)

State	Total FWABs Received	FWABs Counted		FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot Was Accepted and Counted	
		Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received
Alabama	7	4	57.1%	0	0.0%
Alaska [1]	24	3	12.5%	4	16.7%
American Samoa	0	0	--	0	--
Arizona	224	208	92.9%	12	5.4%
Arkansas	22	17	77.3%	1	4.5%
California	189	171	90.5%	0	0.0%
Colorado	0	0	--	0	--
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	0	0	--	0	--
District of Columbia	14	14	100.0%	0	0.0%
Florida	204	134	65.7%	25	12.3%
Georgia [2]	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	0	0	--	0	--
Hawaii	0	0	--	0	--
Idaho [3]	0	0	--	0	--
Illinois	70	61	87.1%	9	12.9%
Indiana	168	148	88.1%	1	0.6%
Iowa	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	17	16	94.1%	1	5.9%
Kentucky [4]	8	--	--	--	--
Louisiana [5]	0	0	--	--	--
Maine	15	15	100.0%	0	0.0%
Maryland	63	35	55.6%	6	9.5%
Massachusetts	150	147	98.0%	0	0.0%
Michigan [6]	126	84	66.7%	41	32.5%
Minnesota	38	26	68.4%	1	2.6%
Mississippi [7]	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	40	40	100.0%	0	0.0%
Montana	3	3	100.0%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	12	10	83.3%	0	0.0%
Nevada	21	19	90.5%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	17	16	94.1%	0	0.0%
New Jersey [8]	1,442	1,429	99.1%	--	--
New Mexico	0	0	--	0	--
New York	240	169	70.4%	14	5.8%
North Carolina	120	119	99.2%	--	--
North Dakota	3	2	66.7%	0	0.0%



State	Total FWABs Received	FWABs Counted		FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot Was Accepted and Counted	
		Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received
Northern Mariana Islands [9]	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	251	216	86.1%	6	2.4%
Oklahoma	9	9	100.0%	0	0.0%
Oregon [10]	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	90	89	98.9%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island [11]	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [12]	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	0	0	--	0	--
Tennessee	17	2	11.8%	5	29.4%
Texas	269	51	19.0%	29	10.8%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0	--	0	--
Utah	21	19	90.5%	1	4.8%
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [13]	68	53	77.9%	--	--
Washington	110	107	97.3%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	4	4	100.0%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [14]	13	7	53.8%	3	23.1%
Wyoming	0	0	--	0	--
U.S. Total	4,089	3,447	84.5%	159	6.5%

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State	FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons		FWABs Not Categorized	
	Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received
Alabama	3	42.9%	0	0.0%
Alaska [1]	17	70.8%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	0	--	0	--
Arizona	4	1.8%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	5	22.7%	-1	-4.5%
California	21	11.1%	-3	-1.6%
Colorado	0	--	0	--
Connecticut	--	--	--	--
Delaware	0	--	0	--
District of Columbia	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Florida	45	22.1%	0	0.0%
Georgia [2]	--	--	--	--
Guam	0	--	0	--
Hawaii	0	--	0	--
Idaho [3]	0	--	0	--
Illinois	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Indiana	7	4.2%	12	7.1%
Iowa	--	--	--	--
Kansas	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Kentucky [4]	--	--	8	100.0%
Louisiana [5]	0	--	0	--
Maine	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Maryland	22	34.9%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	3	2.0%	0	0.0%
Michigan [6]	1	0.8%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	11	28.9%	0	0.0%
Mississippi [7]	--	--	--	--
Missouri	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Montana	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	2	16.7%	0	0.0%
Nevada	2	9.5%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	1	5.9%	0	0.0%
New Jersey [8]	13	0.9%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	0	--	0	--
New York	87	36.3%	-30	-12.5%
North Carolina	1	0.8%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	0	0.0%	1	33.3%
Northern Mariana Islands [9]	--	--	--	--
Ohio	29	11.6%	0	0.0%
Oklahoma	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Oregon [10]	--	--	--	--



State	FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons		FWABs Not Categorized	
	Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received
Pennsylvania	1	1.1%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island [11]	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [12]	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	0	--	0	--
Tennessee	10	58.8%	0	0.0%
Texas	189	70.3%	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	--	0	--
Utah	1	4.8%	0	0.0%
Vermont	--	--	--	--
Virginia [13]	15	22.1%	0	0.0%
Washington	3	2.7%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [14]	3	23.1%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	0	--	0	--
U.S. Total	496	12.2%	-13	-0.3%

UOCAVA Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Total FWABs Received uses question B23a.

FWABs Counted, Total uses question B24a.

FWABs Counted, % of Total Received uses $B24a/B23a \times 100$.

FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, Total uses question B26a.

FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, % of Total Received uses $B26a/B23a \times 100$.

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, Total uses the sum of questions B25a and B27a.

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, % of Total Received uses $(B25a+B27a)/B23a \times 100$.

FWABs Not Categorized, Total uses $B23a - (B24a+B25a+B26a+B27a)$.

FWABs Not Categorized, % of Total Received uses $(B23a - [B24a+B25a+B26a+B27a])/B23a \times 100$.

UOCAVA Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FWABs category indicate that the sum of counted and rejected FWABs accounted for more than the total number of FWABs received as reported by the state.
- The EAVS tracks data on FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the ballot receipt deadline (B25), because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted (B26), and for other reasons (B27).



- [1] The data reported in B25 of the 2022 EAVS reflects FWABs received after the deadline to apply for an absentee ballot by mail or by electronic transmission (online or fax).
- [2] Data on accepted and rejected FWABs cannot be reported separately from regular UOCAVA ballots.
- [3] Idaho was not able to track data on rejected UOCAVA ballots and FWABs.
- [4] Data on the reasons that FWABs were rejected was not tracked.
- [5] The Department of State does not track data on FWABs rejected because a valid ballot was accepted and counted.
- [6] All FWABs received were either counted, rejected because the voter's regular ballot was received, or rejected for arriving late.
- [7] FWABs are not recorded separately from UOCAVA ballots in the Statewide Election Management System (SEMS).
- [8] Rejection because a valid ballot was accepted and counted is not a recorded rejection reason.
- [9] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is not available from this territory.
- [10] Oregon does not track data on FWABs separately from regular UOCAVA ballots.
- [11] According to Rhode Island general law, all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail ballot category.
- [12] Data on FWABs is not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.
- [13] Virginia does not have a way to track FWABs rejected because a valid ballot was accepted and counted.
- [14] In Wisconsin, many jurisdictions track the return of ballots received after Election Day, but they are not required to do so. The counts reported in B25a (total number of FWABs rejected because they were received after the ballot receipt deadline) are limited to ballots in jurisdictions that recorded these in the statewide database.

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Chapter 5. Survey Methodology

Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The project collects data on election policies, voter registration, voting by individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), mail voting, in-person voting, poll workers and polling places, provisional voting, election technology, and turnout. Data from all U.S. states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are included in the EAVS.¹ The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and the review of procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections.

The EAVS collectively consists of two surveys administered separately. The 2022 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), which collected data on state election policies and procedures, was administered from August 2022 to January 2023. The information collected through the Policy Survey helps provide context to the data reported through the EAVS. The 2022 EAVS, which collected data on registrations, voters, and ballots during the 2022 general election, was administered from November 2022 to March 2023. The data collected through the EAVS allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA and provide a detailed snapshot of how general elections are administered in the United States every two years.

This report relies on EAVS and Policy Survey data submitted and certified by 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. Data for each state were collected at the jurisdiction level, with 100% of the 6,460 jurisdictions nationwide submitting at least partial data in 2022.² Appendix A of this chapter shows the number of jurisdictions and the response rate by state (overall and for each section of the EAVS).

¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years; thus, Puerto Rico completed the 2022 Policy Survey but not the 2022 EAVS. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

² What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data on the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.

Survey Questions

The 2022 Policy Survey consisted of 96 questions (38 required questions, 37 follow-up questions based on a state's responses to the required questions, and 21 optional comments boxes). Of these, 70 were single-select or multi-select questions, 25 were open-ended with a text response, and one was a hybrid single-select and text question.

The 2022 EAVS consisted of 424 questions (242 required, 59 follow-up questions based on a jurisdiction's responses to the required questions, 83 optional questions based on whether a jurisdiction had additional data to provide, one required comment box, and 39 optional comments boxes). Of these questions, 269 were fill-in-the-blank with a numerical response, 40 were item descriptions, 63 were single-select questions, and 52 were open-ended with a text response.

The content of the questions in the EAVS has largely been unchanged since the 2008 survey, although questions are periodically removed, updated, or reordered. Beginning in 2018, the Policy Survey replaced the previous Statutory Overview with a set of primarily closed-ended questions on states' election policies. The full set of EAVS and Policy Survey questions can be found at <https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys>.

The following sections detail the data collected by these surveys and the changes that were made to the survey questionnaires from the 2020 versions. In 2022, the primary changes to the survey questions involved:

- Adding Policy Survey questions that could be used to validate EAVS items.
- Adding Policy Survey and EAVS questions to gather data on new topics that had previously not been collected.
- Clarifying instructions to make completion easier for election officials and to improve data quality.

Policy Survey

Since 2008, the EAVS has been accompanied by a survey that collects information on states' election policies and practices to provide greater context for the jurisdiction-level data collected through the EAVS. This originally took the form of the Statutory Overview, which consisted of open-ended questions on statutory requirements for various parts of the election process, asking states to report information on their election laws and policies. However, the open-ended format made it difficult to interpret states' statutory language, identify patterns in election practices, and draw meaningful comparisons between states.

Beginning with the 2018 EAVS, the Statutory Overview was significantly redesigned and renamed the Policy Survey. The survey now uses closed-ended questions and is intended to capture states' broad policies rather than to represent a comprehensive overview of state statutory language. This allows for greater ease in interpreting the results, creating comparisons across states, and providing context in understanding the EAVS data. The Policy Survey questions are designed to map onto the EAVS data questions so that the two surveys can be used in concert.

The 2022 Policy Survey collected information on how the state answers the EAVS; voter registration and list maintenance; election technology; mail voting; in-person voting; UOCAVA voting; provisional voting; election certification, recounts, and audits; voter identification; and how



criminal convictions affect voting. Questions that were added to the Policy Survey for 2022 included:

New Question for 2022	Description
Q9a	When voter pre-registration forms are processed
Q10a	Whether the state's definitions of active and inactive voters match the NVRA definitions
Q19	Whether state used drop boxes for the 2022 general election
Q19a	Where drop boxes were located
Q19b	How often ballots were collected from drop boxes
Q19c	Dates and times that drop boxes were available to voters
Q19d	Drop box security measures
Q20	Whether state allowed voters to cure mail ballots
Q20a	Types of mail ballot errors that voters could cure
Q20b	Deadline for voters to cure mail ballots
Q24a	Terminology state uses for accessible absentee voting
Q24b	How voters participating in accessible absentee voting receive their ballots
Q24c	Whether a witness must be present when a voter completes their accessible absentee ballot
Q25b	Length of in-person voting period before Election Day
Q27	UOCAVA ballot transmission methods
Q28	UOCAVA ballot return methods
Q33d	What person or persons are responsible for reviewing provisional ballots within the state
Q33e	Whether provisional ballot eligibility reviewers are the same as those who count provisional ballots
Q35a	How recounts are conducted
Q36	Whether state will conduct different types of auditing activities either before or after the election
Q37a	Whether state requires photo identification for in-person voters
Q37b	How voter proves their identity if they do not have acceptable identification
Q38b	What happens to the registration record of a person whose voting rights are limited due to criminal conviction or incarceration

Questions that were significantly revised from the 2020 Policy Survey included:

Significantly Revised for 2022	Description
Q5	Types of automatic voter registrations provided to voters in the state
Q8	Whether the state offers same-day voter registration (SDR)
Q8a	Circumstances under which voters may use SDR in the state
Q12a	Which groups of voters are sent confirmation of registration notices
Q17	Whether all-mail elections are conducted within the state



Significantly Revised for 2022	Description
Q17a	Whether all-mail elections are conducted statewide or only in certain jurisdictions
Q18	Whether state allows permanent absentee voting
Q21	Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for domestic civilian (non-UOCAVA) voters
Q25	Terminology the state uses to refer to in-person voting that takes place before Election Day
Q26	Whether the state uses vote centers
Q30	Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for domestic military UOCAVA voters
Q31	Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for overseas UOCAVA voters
Q33a	Under what circumstances the state issues provisional ballots to voters
Q33b	Deadline for adjudicating provisional ballots
Q34	Deadline for certifying the 2022 general election
Q35	Reasons the state may conduct a post-election recount of ballots
Q36a	Statutory requirements for post-election tabulation audits
Q36c	Type of post-election tabulation audit conducted
Q37	Whether the state requires non-first time in-person voters to present identification
Q37c	Deadline for the voter to provide identification if the voter does not have identification at the voting location
Q38	Which groups of voters may become ineligible to vote due to criminal conviction or incarceration
Q38a	How long individuals lose the right to vote due to criminal conviction or incarceration

The following questions had no change except for renumbering and, for some, the addition of a comment section and/or option for a response of “Does not apply”:

2022 Numbering	2020 Numbering	Description
Q1	Q3	How states answer the six sections of the EAVS
Q2	Q2b	Whether the state experienced a change in its EAVS reporting jurisdiction list since the 2020 EAVS
Q3	Q4	Type of state voter registration database
Q3a	Q4a	Frequency of data transmission for states with a bottom-up or hybrid database
Q4	Q5	Government agencies that the state’s voter registration database conducts data transfers with and the frequency of the data transfers
Q5a	Q6a	Government agencies that participate in the state’s automatic voter registration program
Q6	Q7	Whether the state offers online voter registration



2022 Numbering	2020 Numbering	Description
Q6a	Q7a	Whether registrants need a state-issued identification in order to register to vote online
Q7	Q8	Voter information lookup tools available on the state's election website
Q9	Q10	Whether the state offers pre-registration to persons under the age of 18
Q10	Q11	Whether the state distinguishes between active and inactive voters in its voter registration database
Q11	Q12	Whether state and/or local election officials are responsible for modifying voter registration records
Q12	Q13	Whether the state sends confirmation of registration notices
Q13	Q14	Data sources used to identify potentially ineligible registered voters
Q14	Q15	Whether the state's voting system testing and certification is required
Q14a	Q15a	Type of voting system testing and certification conducted
Q15	Q16	Whether electronic poll books are used in the state
Q15a	Q16a	Whether electronic poll books are required to be tested and certified before purchase
Q16	Q17	Whether voters are required to provide a valid excuse in order to vote by mail
Q18a	Q19a	What groups of voters may register as permanent absentee voters
Q22	Q21	How long past the ballot receipt deadline mail ballots are tracked
Q23	Q22	Postmark requirements for mail ballots from domestic civilian voters
Q24	Q23	Circumstances under which non-UOCAVA voters may receive their ballots electronically
Q25a	Q24a	Whether voters are required to provide a valid excuse in order to vote in-person before Election Day
Q26a	Q25a	Whether vote centers are used statewide or only in certain jurisdictions
Q29	Q28	How long the FPCA remains valid as a ballot request mechanism
Q32	Q31	Whether UOCAVA ballots have different postmark requirements than mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters
Q33	Q32	Whether the state uses provisional ballots
Q33c	Q32c	How a state would adjudicate a provisional ballot cast in the wrong precinct
Q38c	Q37b	How the voting rights of individuals are restored when they are re-eligible to vote after being made ineligible due to criminal conviction or incarceration

The 2020 Policy Survey questions on election office infrastructure, how and when voters decline to be registered under automatic voter registration (if available in the voter's state), features of a state's online registration system, actions that can move an active registered voter to the inactive registration list, actions that can move an inactive voter to the active registration list, modes by



which UOCAVA voters can submit FPCAs, and the length of FPCA registration were removed for 2022.

Section A: Voter Registration

Section A of the EAVS collects data on voter registration. This includes the number of persons registered and eligible to vote in the November 2022 general election, active and inactive voters, voters who used SDR, registration forms processed between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election, confirmation notices sent, and voters removed from the voter registration rolls.

In 2022, changes made to this section included updating the definition of “same-day registration” (SDR) to match the revised definition from the Policy Survey and clarifying that both new and updated registrations received through SDR should be reported in question A2 of the EAVS; adding a definition of “confirmation notice” to the instructions of question A8 and specifying that confirmation notices not sent directly pursuant to the NVRA should be reported in this question; clarifying the instructions for questions A8d and A8e, changing the terminology used in question A8e from “status unknown” to “unreturned confirmation notices”; and clarifying that voters removed from the list of registered voters should be included in the data reported in question A9.

The EAC plans to make additional changes to Section A of the 2024 EAVS. The proposed questions and an explanation of the reasoning for these changes can be found in the “Planned Changes to 2024 EAVS” report at <https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys>.

Section B: UOCAVA

Section B of the EAVS collects data on voters covered by UOCAVA. This includes the number of registered UOCAVA voters; FPCAs received and rejected; UOCAVA ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) received, counted, and rejected. Most questions in Section B were divided by type of voter (uniformed services members and overseas citizens) and by method of ballot transmission and return (postal mail, email, and other).

In 2014, the UOCAVA section of the EAVS was expanded to include questions from the Federal Voting Assistance Program’s (FVAP) Post-Election Quantitative Survey. The goal of combining surveys was to reduce the burden on election officials by asking them to answer a single set of questions about UOCAVA voting rather than responding to two surveys that captured many of the same data points. The current format of Section B is the result of a memorandum of understanding between the EAC and FVAP that allows both agencies to collect, share, and evaluate data on the voting experiences of citizens covered under UOCAVA and to fulfill their congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voters.

In 2022, changes made to this section included modifying the language about ballot requests that originated from rejected FPCAs in question B3; removing language about eligibility for a federal-only ballot from B4; clarifying in the instructions for questions B5–B8 and B9–B13 that data on duplicate UOCAVA ballot transmissions and returns, respectively, should be reported in these questions; and clarifying in the instructions of question B21 that states should report “Does not apply” as their responses for B21a–c if the state does not reject UOCAVA ballots for lacking a postmark.



Section C: Mail Voting

Section C of the EAVS collects data on mail voting. This includes the number of mailed ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; the number of ballots sent to permanent mail voters; the number of mail ballot drop boxes and the number of mail ballots returned at drop boxes; and the number of mail ballots that were successfully cured by voters.

In 2022, the title of this section was updated from “Domestic Civilian By-Mail Voting” to “Mail Voting,” and the terminology throughout this section was standardized from “by-mail voting” to “mail voting.” This change reflects the terminology that is most commonly in use among election offices. The instructions for Section C were updated to include a definition of mail voting and to clarify that any voter who voted with a UOCAVA absentee ballot should be reported in Section B instead of Section C and that duplicate mail ballot transmissions and returns should be reported in the data for Section C.

Several of the questions within this section were also revised. For question C1b, the instructions were updated to state that mail ballots that went through the cure process should be reported with other mail ballots that were returned by voters. For C1d, the instructions were updated to specify that mail ballots that were voided so a replacement ballot could be sent should be reported in this item. For C1f, the terminology was updated from “status unknown” to “unreturned mail ballots.” For C2a, the definition of “permanent absentee voting” was updated to reflect the definition used in the Policy Survey. Several new questions were added to this section to collect data on the total number of drop boxes used (C3a), the number of drop boxes used on Election Day (C4a–c), the number of drop boxes used during in-person voting before Election Day (C5a–c), the number of mail ballots returned at drop boxes (C6a), and the number of mail ballots that were successfully cured (C7a). This caused the renumbering of the subsequent questions in this section that collected data on mail ballots returned and counted (C8) and rejected (C9). In addition, question C9 saw the reasons for mail ballot rejections revised, including eliminating one sub-question, adding additional reasons for rejection, and rewording some of the rejection reasons.

Section D: In-Person Polling Operations

Section D of the EAVS collects data on in-person polling operations. This includes the number of precincts and polling places, the number of poll workers and the level of difficulty involved in recruiting poll workers, and the number of poll workers who served for the first time in the 2022 general election.

In 2022, the title of this section was updated from “In-Person Voting and Polling Operations” to “In-Person Polling Operations” to better reflect the scope of the questions. A question on the total number of in-person voters that had been present in previous surveys was removed from the 2022 survey, as it was redundant with data collected in Section F. In its place, a question on the total number of physical polling places was added as question D2a. In the questions related to poll workers (D5–D9), the instructions were clarified to state that office staff who served as poll workers should be reported in the data for these questions, and instructions were added that respondents should report the total number of poll workers who served for the election in D7a even if they were unable to provide an age breakdown for poll workers in questions D7b–g. Lastly, the comment for question D8 was made a required item and a new item was added in D9 to collect data on the total number of new poll workers.



Section E: Provisional Ballots

Section E of the EAVS collects data on provisional voting, including provisional ballots submitted, provisional ballot adjudication, the reasons provisional ballots were cast, and reasons for rejection of provisional ballots.

In 2022, changes made to this section include the addition of a question to collect data on the number of provisional ballots cast according to the reason why the ballot was cast (E2). This caused the question on reasons for rejecting provisional ballots to be renumbered as E3.

Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies

Section F of the EAVS collects data on voter participation and election technologies. This includes total participation in the 2022 general election, how many ballots were cast and counted by mode of participation, the source of participation data, use of electronic and paper poll books, voting equipment used, and the location where votes were tallied. Respondents were also invited to share general comments regarding their state or jurisdiction's Election Day experiences, noteworthy successes, and challenges they overcame in administering the November 2022 general election.

In 2022, questions F1 and F10 were updated to use the terminology "mail ballot" to match changes made in Section C of the survey. Question F2 was updated to a multi-select question so that respondents could report multiple sources for their voter participation data in F1. Questions F3 and F4 had options added for respondents to report the use of electronic and paper poll books to assist with same-day registration and checking voters' mail ballot status at the polling place. Two questions that collected data on punch card and lever voting machines in previous years were removed from the survey, as no jurisdiction in the United States had reported using these types of voting equipment in several election cycles. This removal caused the subsequent questions in Section F to be renumbered.

Data Collection Procedures

In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the EAC submitted the questions for the 2022 Policy Survey and the EAVS for review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and for public comment. Public comments were collected from November 21, 2021, to January 28, 2022, and from March 3, 2022, to April 4, 2022. The questions were approved under OMB Control No. 3265-0006, expiration date April 30, 2025. The survey questions were made available publicly on the EAC's website on April 21, 2022. Targeted communications with state points of contact (POC) responsible for completing the surveys began on July 8, 2022 and continued regularly throughout the data collection period. These targeted communications aimed to keep states aware of data collection deadlines and resources available to assist them with completing the survey.

The following sections describe each aspect of the EAVS data collection process in more detail.

Needs Assessment

To better understand how state-level officials respond to the EAVS and where they need support, the EAC undertook a systematic assessment of the needs of EAVS POCs in September and October of 2021. The goal of these interviews was to better understand each state's EAVS reporting process (including how data are collected, which templates are used, the state's use of technical assistance resources, and data quality) and how improvements could be made to the



2022 EAVS. All state POCs that completed the 2020 EAVS were invited to participate and interviews with personnel from 27 states were completed. The EAC created semi-structured interview guides for each participant that also left room for the interviewer to probe further. During these needs assessment calls, the EAC also encouraged state POCs to review and provide comments on the draft 2022 survey questions when they were available for public comment.

The information collected through these needs assessment conversations helped the EAC's outreach plan design, shaped the training opportunities provided to each state, and identified states that needed specialized support to complete the EAVS. Based on these conversations, the EAC implemented the following changes:

- Made improvements to the design and usability of the data collection templates,
- Added supplementary instructions to clarify how respondents were to use the missing data codes in the survey,
- Introduced additional levels of data review for the 2022 EAVS and Policy Survey to assist state POCs in better understanding how their data would be reported, and
- Created an online feedback survey to be administered directly after a state finalized and certified its 2022 EAVS data to collect immediate feedback on future survey improvements and better inform the post-2022 needs assessment conversations that will take place in the fall of 2023.

Collecting the Policy Survey Data

Invitations to complete the 2022 Policy Survey were sent to POCs from the 56 states on August 1, 2022. The Policy Survey data were collected in advance of EAVS data collection to reduce respondent burden and to allow the EAC to create customized data validation rules for the 2022 EAVS data. The Policy Survey was completed through an online survey; this online data collection tool had undergone usability testing with POCs from seven states in July 2022, and edits to the survey based on the results of this testing were completed in advance of the survey's launch.³ Periodic reminders were issued to POCs during the data collection period. All 56 states, territories, and districts submitted their Policy Survey data by January 5, 2023. When the answer options within a question did not fully capture a state's policy, POCs were encouraged to provide comments with further explanation.

Once received, each Policy Survey submission was reviewed for completeness and accuracy. State and territory POCs were also able to update or correct Policy Survey responses through the end of the EAVS data collection period. The EAC made Policy Survey data updates for 36 states before the end of the EAVS data collection period.

The EAC incorporated states' Policy Survey submissions directly into the EAVS data collection template validations. This meant that a state's 2022 EAVS data collection templates could not be released until the state's Policy Survey submission was finalized.

³ Fifty-two states completed the Policy Survey via the online survey. Four states completed the survey via a paper instrument; for these states, the Policy Survey help desk assistants entered the data from the paper instrument into the online survey and asked the state to review for accuracy and submit the data.



Collecting the EAVS Data

The EAVS data collection period was opened to 44 states on November 14, 2022. The data collection was opened to the 11 remaining states once their Policy Survey submissions were received and their templates were created; all data collection templates were released to states by January 18, 2023. The EAVS data collection period ended on March 30, 2023. Data submissions from 55 states were received by that date, with a response rate of 100% of states.⁴

To build on the needs assessment conversations that were completed in September and October 2021, the EAC completed pre-survey outreach calls with officials from states that had new designated POCs for the 2022 EAVS or that had requested further follow-up after the needs assessment calls. POCs from 13 states were invited to participate in the outreach calls, and 11 calls were completed for 10 states in July and August of 2022.⁵ During these interviews, the EAC provided an overview of the project timeline and the types of data collected in the Policy Survey and the EAVS, notified the POCs of the help desk support and other resources that would be provided as part of the 2022 EAVS, and probed POCs on data issues from the 2020 EAVS. These conversations helped ensure that the EAC was prepared to provide adequate support to states as they completed their EAVS data collection.

Data Collection Templates

Given the diversity in how states respond to the EAVS, creating data templates that accommodate the needs of all states and all local jurisdictions is especially challenging. The 2022 EAVS data were collected using two data collection templates:

- The Excel template was a flat data format that allowed POCs to copy and paste large amounts of data, such as from a report generated from the state's centralized election database. Each EAVS item was listed in a column in the Excel template and each EAVS jurisdiction within the state was listed in a row. States with multiple jurisdictions were required to submit their data through the Excel template. For the first time in the 2022 EAVS, the Excel template automatically calculated selected percentages using the state's EAVS data to assist state POCs in reviewing their data for accuracy and understanding how their data would be reported.
- The online template was an item-by-item survey hosted online that guided respondents through entering their responses. This template was primarily intended to be used by jurisdictions that entered EAVS data or by states and territories that reported as a single jurisdiction. The data from the online template was exported to an Excel file that matched the format of the Excel data collection template.

Usability testing of the draft online template was completed with 8 local election officials from 5 states in September 2022, and edits to the survey based on the results of this testing were completed in advance of the online template's launch.

⁴ Puerto Rico was not required to complete the 2022 EAVS because the territory did not hold a general election in November 2022.

⁵ One state completed two outreach calls because its project personnel experienced turnover after the first call was complete and requested an additional call to assist its new POCs in learning about the EAVS.



The EAC pre-populated data into the online template for 3 states and into the Excel template for one state. Pre-fill data were provided by state POCs via the Excel template or via an email or phone request that provided details on which items were to be populated.

Both data collection templates employed a variety of error-checking data validations to reduce response burden and to increase data quality.

Data Validation

One of the key issues associated with any data collection project is ensuring that the data collected are as accurate as possible. Given the number of survey questions, their complexity and granularity, and the variety of approaches in how state and local jurisdictions track election data and provide survey responses, it can be easy to make data entry mistakes or report data in an incorrect survey item. All 2022 EAVS data collection templates included built-in internal and external validation checks that flagged specific types of potential errors within a data submission.

The validation checks were designed to flag common data issues so that respondents were aware of them before submitting their data to the EAC. In response to these validations, states and jurisdictions were encouraged to review their data, make corrections if needed, and use the comments fields to explain any peculiarities and give context to the data that were being reported.

In addition, once a state submitted data for review by the EAC, additional data reviews were conducted by trained data analysts. These reviews checked for missing data, internal math and logic issues, conflicts with Policy Survey responses, and significant changes compared to 2018 EAVS data.⁶ The results of this review were provided to state POCs in a written memo, along with a file that had sample rates and percentages calculated using their draft submission. These sample rates and percentages were provided to assist POCs with identifying results that did not align with their expectations so they could be corrected in the final submission.

A complete list of all validation checks that were built into the data collection templates and additional data validations that were conducted for draft submissions can be found in Appendices B and C of this chapter. In general, there were five types of data validations.

Math Validations

Many items in the EAVS asked respondents to report a total and then divide that total into subcategories. The math validations within the templates checked that the sum of the subcategories equaled the reported total of the overall category. For example, if the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted in the 2022 general election did not match the sum of the number of voters who used different modes of voting, then the respondent was asked to review the numbers reported in these items.⁷

Logic Validations

Logic validations identified when a value in the survey was incompatible with a response provided in another related question in the survey. For example, if the number of mail ballots that a

⁶ The 2018 EAVS was used as a point of comparison in the data reviews because it was the most recent midterm election.

⁷ The total number of voters participating in the 2022 general election was reported in item F1a in the 2022 EAVS. The number of voters who participated using different modes of voting were items F1b through F1h.



jurisdiction reported counting for the 2022 election exceeded the number of mail ballots the jurisdiction’s voters had returned, then the respondent was asked to review these items.⁸

Policy Survey Validations

These validations identified instances in which an EAVS item conflicted with the Policy Survey data that had been submitted by the state. For example, if a state reported having an online voter registration system through which an individual could submit a voter registration application, but reported “Does not apply” to EAVS items relating to the number of voter registration forms submitted through online sources, then the validations would highlight that a conflict existed between the respondent’s EAVS and Policy Survey data and would ask the respondent to review the EAVS items and contact the EAC if the Policy Survey response needed to be updated.⁹

Missing Items

With the exception of most comment boxes and “other” subcategories for reporting data beyond what was specified in a question, all items in the EAVS required a response. An alert appeared if a response to a required item was not provided. For example, if a respondent reported the total number of registered voters in their jurisdiction but not the number of active and inactive registered voters, the latter items would be flagged with a request that the respondent report “Does not apply” (if their state did not have an applicable law or policy), “Data not available” (if the data for an item were not tracked), or zero (if no instance of an item occurred for the 2022 general election) rather than leave the item blank.¹⁰

Valid Skips

The EAC introduced a valid skip code in EAVS beginning with the 2020 data set. This code was automatically filled in by the template validations when an item did not require an answer because of a response to a previous item in the survey. The use of the valid skip code is distinct from the use of the “Does not apply” code (for when a jurisdiction does not have a law or policy in place that allows for the type of election participation in the question) and the “Data not available” code (for when the data for a type of election participation is not tracked). For instance, if a jurisdiction indicated in EAVS question F5a that it did not use direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), then items F5b through F5d—relating to the make and model of equipment, the number deployed, and the usage of the equipment—were filled as “valid skip” by the template validations.

EAVS Rates

The Excel template used states’ data to calculate a select number of EAVS percentages, and data validations highlighted when these percentages fell outside of an expected threshold. For instance, if a jurisdiction’s voter turnout as a percent of the jurisdiction’s active registered voters

⁸ The number of mail ballots counted by a jurisdiction was reported in item C8a in the 2022 EAVS. The number of mail ballots returned by voters was reported in item C1b.

⁹ Data on states’ policies regarding online voter registration were reported in item Q6 of the 2022 Policy Survey. The number of total, new, duplicate, and rejected registrations received through online registration systems were reported in items A4c, A5c, A6c, and A7c, respectively, of the 2022 EAVS.

¹⁰ The total number of registered voters for the 2022 general election was reported in item A1a in the EAVS. The number of active registered voters was item A1b. The number of inactive registered voters was item A1c.



was either lower than 35% or higher than 95%, the respondent would be asked to review these items for accuracy.¹¹

Finalizing and Certifying Data Submissions

After the EAC reviewed each state's draft EAVS data submission, additional targeted data reviews were conducted on subsequent EAVS submissions until the EAC was satisfied that data quality issues had been sufficiently addressed by the state's POC(s). Once the data submission had been finalized, the EAC generated a copy of the appendix tables that appear in Chapters 1–4 of this report and how the state's data would be portrayed in those tables; this analysis was shared with the state POC(s) to conduct a final review. During this review, state POC(s) were invited to provide final data corrections, determine whether the data underlying the analysis were incorrect, and to add footnotes and explanations to be printed alongside the tables. The footnotes that were provided by state POCs to accompany the appendix tables have been printed in this report as closely as possible to the language requested by POCs, with minor edits for proofreading and clarity.

Once the state POCs approved of the analysis and provided any requested footnotes, the EAC requested that the state's chief election officer certify their state's 2022 Policy Survey and EAVS submissions as accurate and complete. Fifty-four states certified their data submissions by May 19, 2023.¹²

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance was provided through the duration of the Policy Survey and the EAVS data collection periods. Help desk support was provided for 20 hours each week from August 1, 2022, to December 30, 2022, and for 50 hours each week from January 3, 2023, to March 30, 2023. State and local EAVS respondents could request assistance via email or phone. A team of trained technical assistants provided support on all aspects of the survey data collection processes. A total of 786 support tickets were received from 55 states, territories, and districts. The most common inquiries were related to using the EAVS data collection templates, the use of the data missingness codes, and how to interpret survey instructions in questions A3 and A4–A7.

Resources for EAVS Respondents

In addition to providing direct, customized technical assistance, the EAC made a wide variety of written and video training resources available to survey respondents on demand. A website was established to house these resources and to provide a secure place for state EAVS POCs to upload data submissions and other documents for the EAC to review.

The resources on this website included PDF copies of the Policy Survey and EAVS questions; a link to the online template; six videos that outlined the questions and instructions in the six sections of the EAVS; three video webinars that provided guidance on the overall EAVS process, on collecting data from local jurisdictions, and for state POCs new to EAVS data collection; eleven newsletters that were released between August 2022 and March 2023; an extensive user guide

¹¹ The number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was item F1a and the number of active registered voters was item A1b in the 2022 EAVS. The turnout rate within the Excel template was calculated as $F1a/A1b \times 100$. Although the EAC normally recommends using CVAP as a denominator when calculating voter turnout, A1b was used in this calculation because the 2022 CVAP data were not available at the time the Excel template was being programmed.

¹² Florida and Oregon did not sign the 2022 EAVS certification form.



that provided step-by-step instructions for both data collection templates; a policy guide approved by the EAC Commissioners that provided information to election officials responsible for completing EAVS; a glossary of EAVS and Policy Survey terms and their definitions; and an Excel crosswalk that documented survey changes from 2020 to 2022.

The website also contained a section that was restricted to state POCs. This section had copies of the state's EAVS and Statutory Overview/Policy Survey submissions from 2016, 2018, and 2020; a table that tracked the online template progress for each jurisdiction within the state; and the capacity for POCs to upload files and data submissions for the EAC to review.

Data Reporting and Calculations

In 2022, most EAVS data were reported at the local jurisdiction level. For the purposes of this report, for states that have multiple jurisdictions, state totals were calculated by summing the data from all jurisdictions within a state. National totals were calculated by summing the state-level totals.

Whenever possible, this report uses percentages and rates rather than raw numbers to make comparisons across states and across election years. For these calculations, items were combined as necessary to create the numerator and denominator and to produce a percentage or rate. For example, the following formula was used to calculate the percentage of transmitted mailed ballots that were returned by voters for the 2022 general election:

$$\frac{\text{Total number of mail ballots returned by voters (C1b)}}{\text{Total number of mail ballots transmitted by election offices (C1a)}} \times 100$$

Percentages at the national level were calculated using casewise missing data deletion at the state level. Only states that had data for both the numerator and denominator for a calculation were included when reporting percentages at the national level. Responses of “Does not apply,” “Data not available,” and “Valid skip” were considered missing for purposes of creating these calculations. Casewise deletion was used in the analysis for this report to avoid overinflating the denominator of the calculations. This is especially applicable when states do not track data for a particular item, or when election policy differences mean that not all states can provide data for an item. For example, online registration is not available in every state, so the calculation of the nationwide percentage of registrations that were received online will only use data from states that reported at least one online registration. Otherwise, the national percentage would include in the denominator (in this case, the total number of registrations received) data from states that do not have online registration, thus underestimating the percentage of online registrations that were received.¹³

This decision rule means that there were instances in which the percentages reported at the national level for a given calculation in this report did not use data from every state. Because each category was calculated independently of others and only states that reported data in both

¹³ The total number of registration applications received between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election was collected in item A3a. The total number of registration applications received online between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election was collected in item A4c. The application of casewise deletion means that only states that reported at least one registration in both of these items on a statewide level were included in the calculation of the percentage of registration applications received through online sources.



the numerator and the denominator were included in the analysis, casewise deletion also created instances in which percentages do not sum to 100%. Those cases in which data were not available for every state to calculate the percentage at the national level are noted in the footnotes throughout this report.

The use of casewise deletion for calculating national percentages does not affect the state-level percentages calculated in this report.

Recommendations for Analyzing and Interpreting the EAVS Data

The most up-to-date version of the 2022 EAVS and Policy Survey data can always be found on the EAC's website (<https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys>). If the EAC is notified by a state of an error or omission in the state's data, the agency will issue the updated EAVS and Policy Survey data sets on its website with an errata note of changes that have been made to the newly issued data sets. Updated data sets will be issued on a quarterly basis.

There are four types of data missingness codes used in the 2022 Policy Survey and EAVS data:

- Valid skip (-77): This code indicates that no response is expected based on a previous survey response. For instance, in the Policy Survey, if a state answered “no” to Q6 to indicate that it does not provide an option for voters to register to vote online, then item Q6a, which collected further information on the specifics of a state's online registration system, would be marked as -77. In the EAVS, if a state indicates in item A4c, which asks for the total number of registration forms submitted online, that this question does not apply, then items A5c, A6c, and A7c, which collect data on new, duplicate, and rejected registrations submitted online, would be marked as -77.
- Does not apply (-88): This code indicates that a question does not apply to a state, because the state does not have an applicable policy in place. For instance, a response of -88 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state does not have online registration.
- Data not available (-99): This code indicates that the data for an item cannot be tracked. For instance, a response of -99 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state accepts online voter registrations but cannot track the number of these registrations that were submitted by voters.
- Refused (-100): This code indicates that a response was expected but was not provided. This code is *only* used in the Policy Survey data.

When summing the EAVS data, either on a state or a national level, analysts should take care to treat these missingness codes as missing items and not as negative numbers.

Users of the EAVS data are also encouraged to refer to the comments that accompany all of the EAVS items and many of the Policy Survey items. During data collection, the EAC encouraged all respondents to use these comments to provide context to their responses. In many cases, these comments contain valuable information about how state and jurisdiction respondents formulated their responses, why some responses do not align with the data validations outlined in this chapter, or context about how the 2022 general election was conducted in a state or jurisdiction. If data users have further questions about the data that have been submitted, they are encouraged to contact states or jurisdictions directly.



The EAC also encourages data users to take care when calculating percentages to ensure that the correct EAVS items are used. Appendix D of this chapter contains recommendations for how to calculate EAVS rates using the 2022 data. These recommendations align with how rates were calculated throughout this report.

This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimates for the 2021 citizen voting age population (CVAP) for state and nation level calculations instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. However, for any jurisdiction level analysis reported that involves the CVAP, this report used the 5-year estimate due to its better coverage of the counties in the United States. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were not available by the time this report was finalized. Once they are released by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2022 CVAP estimates can be found at <https://data.census.gov/>. Data analysts should import both state- and county-level geographies and merge them into the EAVS data using the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code. For states that have sub-county jurisdictions, these jurisdictions will need to be aggregated at the county level in order to merge in the CVAP data.¹⁴ For this report, the state-level CVAP was used for Alaska, as the state reported its data in a single EAVS jurisdiction. Finally, the Census Bureau does not provide CVAP estimates for the U.S. territories (with the exception of Puerto Rico), so no CVAP estimate was available for American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

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¹⁴ These are the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Additionally, the state of Illinois reported six cities independently of their corresponding counties (i.e., Bloomington, Chicago, Danville, East St. Louis, Galesburg, and Rockford), and Missouri reported Kansas City independently of its corresponding county.



Methodology Appendix A: Survey Response Rates

State	EAVS Response Rate	Section A Response Rate	Section B Response Rate	Section C Response Rate	Section D Response Rate	Section E Response Rate	Section F Response Rate
Alabama	99.6%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Alaska	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
American Samoa	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Arizona	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Arkansas	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	98.9%	100.0%	99.7%
California	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Colorado	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Connecticut	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Delaware	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
District of Columbia	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Florida	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.7%	100.0%	100.0%
Georgia	99.6%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Guam	99.6%	100.0%	100.0%	97.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Hawaii [1]	98.6%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	92.9%
Idaho	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Illinois	99.6%	99.9%	99.2%	99.9%	99.6%	100.0%	99.1%
Indiana	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%
Iowa	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
Kansas	94.3%	99.5%	97.2%	95.8%	91.0%	96.1%	77.2%
Kentucky	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Louisiana	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Maine [2]	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Maryland	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Massachusetts	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Michigan	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Minnesota	99.6%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mississippi	98.3%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Missouri	99.6%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Montana	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Nebraska	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Nevada	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
New Hampshire	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
New Jersey	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
New Mexico	99.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	96.4%	100.0%	100.0%
New York	99.7%	99.6%	99.9%	99.9%	99.3%	99.3%	99.9%



State	EAVS Response Rate	Section A Response Rate	Section B Response Rate	Section C Response Rate	Section D Response Rate	Section E Response Rate	Section F Response Rate
North Carolina	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
North Dakota	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Northern Mariana Islands	94.4%	100.0%	100.0%	67.6%	90.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Ohio	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Oklahoma	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Oregon	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Pennsylvania	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Rhode Island	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South Carolina	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South Dakota	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	99.8%	100.0%	100.0%
Tennessee	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Texas	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Utah	97.2%	92.8%	98.2%	99.9%	97.6%	100.0%	98.4%
Vermont	99.6%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Virginia	99.6%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Washington	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West Virginia	98.1%	100.0%	99.8%	94.0%	98.7%	92.3%	98.7%
Wisconsin	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Wyoming	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
U.S. Total	99.8%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.1%	99.9%	99.6%

Survey Response Rate Calculation Notes:

EAVS Response Rate uses responses to all items listed below.

Section A Response Rate uses responses to questions A1a, A1b, A1c, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c, A3d, A3e, A3f, A3g, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g, A5h, A5i, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i, A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, and A9g.

Section B Response Rate uses responses to questions B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c, B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B10a, B10b, B10c, B11a, B11b, B11c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B13d, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B16a, B16b, B16c, B18a, B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B23a, B23b, B23c, B24a, B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, and B26c.

Section C Response Rate uses responses to questions C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C2a, C3a, C4a, C4b, C4c, C5a, C5b, C5c, C6a, C7a, C8a, C9a, C9b, C9c, C9d, C9e, C9f, C9g, C9h, C9i, C9j, C9k, C9l, C9m, C9n, C9o, C9p, and C9q.

Section D Response Rate uses responses to questions D1a, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, D6a, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, D8, D8Comment, and D9a.



Section E Response Rate uses responses to questions E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e, E2f, E2g, E2h, E3a, E3b, E3c, E3d, E3e, E3f, E3g, E3h, E3i, and E3j.

Section F Response Rate uses responses to questions F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F2_1, F2_2, F2_3, F2_4, F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F3e, F4a, F4b, F4c, F4d, F4e, F5a, F6a, F7a, F8a, F9a, F10a, F10b, F10c, F10d, and F10e.

Survey Response Rate Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Response rates were calculated as the percentage of jurisdictional responses within a state that were not left blank (i.e., had a numerical response of zero or greater or a response of “Data not available,” “Does not apply,” or “Valid skip”). Percentages were rounded to 1 decimal place.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Item descriptions, optional “other” categories, and optional survey comments were not included in the response rate calculation.

[1] Information for Kalawao County, Hawaii was reported with Maui County.

[2] Maine reported its UOCAVA data on a statewide level, not a jurisdiction level.

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Methodology Appendix B: Data Collection Template

Validation Rules

Table 1: Math Validation Rules

Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of A1b + A1c should equal A1a	The sum of active (A1b) and inactive (A1c) registered voters should be equal to the total number of registered voters (A1a).
The sum of A2b + A2c should equal A2a	The sum of SDRs received on Election Day (A2b) and SDRs received prior to Election Day (A2c) should be equal to the total number of SDRs received (A2a).
The sum of A3b–j should equal A3a	The sum of the numbers you report in A3b–j should equal the total number of registration forms you report in A3a.
The sum of A4a–l should equal A3a	The sum of the numbers you report in A4a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3a.
The sum of A5a–l should equal A3b	The sum of the numbers you report in A5a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3b.
The sum of A6a–l should equal A3d	The sum of the numbers you report in A6a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3d.
The sum of A7a–l should equal A3e	The sum of the numbers you report in A7a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3e.
The sum of A5a + A6a + A7a should not exceed A4a	The amounts you report in A5a, A6a, and A7a should not exceed the total number of registration forms received by mail, fax, or email you reported in A4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5b + A6b + A7b should not exceed A4b	The amounts you report in A5b, A6b, and A7b should not exceed the total number of registrations in person at the election/registrar's office you reported in A4b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5c + A6c + A7c should not exceed A4c	The amounts you report in A5c, A6c, and A7c should not exceed the total number of registration forms submitted online you reported in A4c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5d + A6d + A7d should not exceed A4d	The amounts you report in A5d, A6d, and A7d should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from motor vehicle offices you reported in A4d. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5e + A6e + A7e should not exceed A4e	The amounts you report in A5e, A6e, and A7e should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from public assistance offices you reported in A4e. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5f + A6f + A7f should not exceed A4f	The amounts you report in A5f, A6f, and A7f should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from state-funded agencies you reported in A4f. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5g + A6g + A7g should not exceed A4g	The amounts you report in A5g, A6g, and A7g should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from armed forces recruitment offices you reported in A4g. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5h + A6h + A7h should not exceed A4h	The amounts you report in A5h, A6h, and A7h should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from other agencies designated by the state but not mandated by the NVRA you reported in A4h. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of A5i + A6i + A7i should not exceed A4i	The amounts you report in A5i, A6i, and A7i should not exceed the total number of forms received from registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties you reported in A4i. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5j + A6j + A7j should not exceed A4j	The amounts you report in A5j, A6j, and A7j should not exceed the total number of forms received from "Other" sources you reported in A4j. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5k + A6k + A7k should not exceed A4k	The amounts you report in A5k, A6k, and A7k should not exceed the total number of forms received from "Other" sources you reported in A4k. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5l + A6l + A7l should not exceed A4l	The amounts you report in A5l, A6l, and A7l should not exceed the total number of forms received from "Other" sources you reported in A4l. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A8b–h should equal A8a	The amounts you report in A8b–h should equal the total number of confirmation notices sent to registered voters you reported in A8a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A9b–j should equal A9a	The amounts you report in A9b–j should equal the total number of voters removed you reported in A9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B1b–c should equal B1a	The amounts you report in B1b–c should equal the total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters you reported in B1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B2b–c should equal B2a	The amounts you report in B2b–c should equal the total number of FPCAs received from UOCAVA voters you reported in B2a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B3b–c should equal B3a	The amounts you report in B3b–c should equal the total number of rejected FPCAs from UOCAVA voters you reported in B3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B5b–c should equal B5a	The amounts you report in B5b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6b–c should equal B6a	The amounts you report in B6b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by postal mail you reported in B6a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B7b–c should equal B7a	The amounts you report in B7b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by email you reported in B7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B8b–c should equal B8a	The amounts you report in B8b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by other methods you reported in B8a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6a, B7a, and B8a should equal B5a	The amounts you report in B6a, B7a, and B8a should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B6b, B7b, and B8b should equal B5b	The amounts you report in B6b, B7b, and B8b should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all uniformed services voters you reported in B5b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6c, B7c, and B8c should equal B5c	The amounts you report in B6c, B7c, and B8c should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all overseas citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B9b–c should equal B9a	The amounts you report in B9b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10b–c should equal B10a	The amounts you report in B10b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by postal mail you reported in B10a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B11b–c should equal B11a	The amounts you report in B11b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by email you reported in B11a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B12b–c should equal B12a	The amounts you report in B12b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by other methods you reported in B12a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10a, B11a, and B12a should equal B9a	The amounts you report in B10a, B11a, and B12a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10b, B11b, and B12b should equal B9b	The amounts you report in B10b, B11b, and B12b should equal the total number of transmitted ballots returned by all uniformed services voters you reported in B9b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10c, B11c, and B12c should equal B9c	The amounts you report in B10c, B11c, and B12c should equal the total number of transmitted ballots returned by all overseas citizen voters you reported in B9c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B13b–d should equal B13a	The amounts you report in B13b–d should equal the total number of ballots returned undeliverable you reported in B13a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B14b–c should equal B14a	The amounts you report in B14b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15b–c should equal B15a	The amounts you report in B15b–c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail you reported in B15a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B16b–c should equal B16a	The amounts you report in B16b–c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by email you reported in B16a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B17b–c should equal B17a	The amounts you report in B17b–c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by other methods you reported in B17a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15a, B16a, and B17a should equal B14a	The amounts you report in B15a, B16a, and B17a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15b, B16b, and B17b should equal B14b	The amounts you report in B15b, B16b, and B17b should equal the total number of uniformed services voters' ballots counted by your office you reported in B14b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15c, B16c, and B17c should equal B14c	The amounts you report in B15c, B16c, and B17c should equal the total number of overseas citizen voters' ballots counted by your office you reported in B14c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B18b–c should equal B18a	The amounts you report in B18b–c should equal the total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19b–c should equal B19a	The amounts you report in B19b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected because they were received after the deadline you reported in B19a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B20b–c should equal B20a	The amounts you report in B20b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of a problem with the voter signature you reported in B20a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B21b–c should equal B21a	The amounts you report in B21b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for lack of a postmark you reported in B21a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B22b–c should equal B22a	The amounts you report in B22b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons reported in B22a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14a and B18a should equal B9a	The sum of B14a and B18a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by voters that you reported in B9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14b and B18b should equal B9b	The sum of B14b and B18b should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services voters that you reported in B9b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14c and B18c should equal B9c	The sum of B14c and B18c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizen voters that you reported in B9c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B19a, B20a, B21a, and B22a should equal B18a	The amounts you report in B19a, B20a, B21a, and B22a should equal the total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B19b, B20b, B21b, and B22b should equal B18b	The amounts you report in B19b, B20b, B21b, and B22b should equal the total number of rejected ballots from uniformed services voters you reported in B18b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19c, B20c, B21c, and B22c should equal B18c	The sum of the amounts you report in B19c, B20c, B21c, and B22c should equal the total number of rejected ballots from overseas citizen voters you reported in B18c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B23b–c should equal B23a	The amounts you report in B23b–c should equal the total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24b–c should equal B24a	The amounts you report in B24b–c should equal the total number of FWABs counted you reported in B24a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B25b–c should equal B25a	The amounts you report in B25b–c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected because they were received after the deadline you reported in B25a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B26b–c should equal B26a	The amounts you report in B26b–c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted you reported in B26a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B27b–c should equal B27a	The amounts you report in B27b–c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected for other reasons you reported in B27a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a should equal B23a	The amounts you report in B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a should equal the total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24b, B25b, B26b, and B27b should equal B23b	The sum of the amounts you report in B24b, B25b, B26b, and B27b should equal the total number of FWABs returned by uniformed services voters you reported in B23b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24c, B25c, B26c, and B27c should equal B23c	The sum of the amounts you report in B24c, B25c, B26c, and B27c should equal the total number of FWABs returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B23c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C1b–i should equal C1a	The amounts you report in C1b–i should equal the number of total mail ballots transmitted you reported in C1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C4b–c should equal C4a (excepting responses of “Data not available” and “Does not apply”)	The number of Election Day drop boxes you report in C4b and C4c should sum to the total number of drop boxes you reported in C4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C5b–c should equal C5a (excepting responses of “Data not available” and “Does not apply”)	The number of early voting drop boxes you report in C5b and C5c should sum to the total number of drop boxes you reported in C5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of C9b–t should equal C9a	The numbers you report in C9b–t should equal the total number of rejected mail ballots you reported in C9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D3b–c should equal D3a (excepting responses of “Data not available” and “Does not apply”)	The sum of the amounts you report in D3b–c should equal the total number of physical polling places for Election Day in your jurisdiction you reported in D3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D4b–c should equal D4a (excepting responses of “Data not available” and “Does not apply”)	The sum of the amounts you report in D4b–c should equal the total number of physical polling places for early voting in your jurisdiction you report in D4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D7b–g should equal D7a (excepting responses of “Data not available” and “Does not apply”)	The numbers you report in D7b–g should equal the total number of poll workers in your jurisdiction you reported in D7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E1b–e should equal E1a	The amounts you report in E1b–e should equal the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E2a–k should equal E1a	The amounts you report in E2a–k should equal the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E3b–m should equal E3a	The amounts you report in E3b–m should equal the total number of rejected provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
E1d should be equal to E3a	The amount you report in E1d should equal the total number of rejected provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of F1b–h should equal F1a	The sum of the amounts you report in F1b–h should equal the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted you reported in F1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

Table 2: Logic Validation Rules

Validation Rule	Error Text
If A1c = Does not apply, then A1a = A1b	Because your state does not differentiate between active (A1b) and inactive voters (A1c), then A1a should equal A1b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why those two items differ.
A2a cannot exceed A1a	The number of SDRs you report in A2a cannot exceed the total number of registered voters you report in A1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in A2a exceeds the value in A1a.
B3a cannot exceed B2a	The number of rejected FPCAs you report in B3a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs received you reported in B2a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B3a exceeds the value in B2a.



Validation Rule	Error Text
B4a cannot exceed B3a	The number of FPCAs rejected because they were late that you report in B4a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs rejected you reported in B3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B4a exceeds the value in B3a.
B9a cannot exceed B5a	The number of ballots returned you report in B9a should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9a exceeds the value in B5a.
B9b cannot exceed B5b	The number of ballots returned from uniformed services members you report in B9b should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to uniformed services members you reported in B5b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9b exceeds the value in B5b.
B9c cannot exceed B5c	The number of ballots returned from overseas citizen voters you report in B9c should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to overseas citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9c exceeds the value in B5c.
B13a cannot exceed B5a	The number of ballots returned as undeliverable you report in B13a should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B13a exceeds the value in B5a.
B14a cannot exceed B9a	The total number of ballots counted you report in B14a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B9a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B14a exceeds the value in B9a.
B14b cannot exceed B9b	The total number of ballots counted you report in B14b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you reported in B9b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B14b exceeds the value in B9b.
B14c cannot exceed B9c	The total number of ballots counted you report in B14c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B9c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B14c exceeds the value in B9c.
B15a cannot exceed B10a	The number of ballots counted you report in B15a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by UOCAVA voters you reported in B10a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B15a exceeds the value in B10a.
B15b cannot exceed B10b	The number of ballots counted you report in B15b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by uniformed services members you reported in B10b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B15b exceeds the value in B10b.
B15c cannot exceed B10c	The number of ballots counted you report in B15c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by overseas citizen voters you reported in B10c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B15c exceeds the value in B10c.
B16a cannot exceed B11a	The number of ballots counted you report in B16a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by UOCAVA voters you reported in B11a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B16a exceeds the value in B11a.
B16b cannot exceed B11b	The number of ballots counted you report in B16b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by uniformed services members you reported in B11b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B16b exceeds the value in B11b.



Validation Rule	Error Text
B16c cannot exceed B11c	The number of ballots counted you report in B16c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by overseas citizen voters you reported in B11c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B16c exceeds the value in B11c.
B17a cannot exceed B12a	The number of ballots counted you report in B17a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by UOCAVA voters you reported in B12a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B17a exceeds the value in B12a.
B17b cannot exceed B12b	The number of ballots counted you report in B17b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by uniformed services members you reported in B12b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B17b exceeds the value in B12b.
B17c cannot exceed B12c	The number of ballots counted you report in B17c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by overseas citizen voters you reported in B12c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B17c exceeds the value in B12c.
B18a cannot exceed B9a	The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B9a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B18a exceeds the value in B9a.
B18b cannot exceed B9b	The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you reported in B9b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B18b exceeds the value in B9b.
B18c cannot exceed B9c	The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B9c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B18c exceeds the value in B9c.
C2a cannot exceed C1a	The number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters you report in C2a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted in C1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C2a exceeds the value in C1a.
C4a cannot exceed C3a	The number of drop boxes used during Election Day you report in C4a cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C4a exceeds the value in C3a.
C5a cannot exceed C3a	The number of drop boxes used during early voting you report in C5a cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C5a exceeds the value in C3a.
C6a cannot exceed C1b	The total number of mail ballots returned via drop box you report in C6a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b. Please review your responses or use the comments sections to explain why the value in C6a exceeds the value in C1b.
C7a cannot exceed C1b	The total number of successfully cured mail ballots you report in C7a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b. Please review your responses or use the comments sections to explain why the value in C7a exceeds the value in C1b.
The sum of C8a and C9a should equal C1b	The sum of the amounts you report in C8a and C9a should equal the number of mail ballots returned by voters you report in C1b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of C8a and C9a does not match the value in C1b.



Validation Rule	Error Text
D3a cannot exceed D2a	The number of physical polling places used during Election Day you report in D3a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D3a exceeds the value in D2a.
D4a cannot exceed D2a	The number of physical polling places used during early voting you report in D4a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D4a exceeds the value in D2a.
If D5a > 0 or D6a > 0, then D7a > 0	Because you reported using poll workers in D5a and/or D6a, you should provide the total number of poll workers used in the jurisdiction in D7a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
D5a cannot exceed D7a	The number of poll workers serving during Election Day you report in D5a cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D5a exceeds the value in D7a.
D6a cannot exceed D7a	The number of poll workers serving during early voting you report in D6a cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D6a exceeds the value in D7a.
D9a cannot exceed D7a	The number of poll workers serving for the first time in this election in D9a cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D9a exceeds the value in D7a.
The sum of B14a and B24a should equal F1c	The sum of counted absentee UOCAVA ballots reported in B14a and counted FWABs reported in B24a should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA votes reported in F1c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of B14a and B24a do not match the value in F1c.
C8a should equal F1d+F1g	The number of counted absentee ballots reported in C8a should equal the total number of counted mail votes reported in F1d and F1g. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C8a does not match the value in F1d+F1g.
If E1b > 0 or E1c > 0, then F1e > 0	Because you reported in E1b and/or E1c that your jurisdiction counted some provisional ballots, you should provide data on the number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted in F1e. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1a cannot exceed A1a	The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted, as reported in F1a, cannot exceed the total number of registered voters as reported in A1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1d cannot exceed C1a	The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted, as reported in F1d, cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted, as reported in C1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1g cannot exceed C1a	The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted in an all-mail election jurisdiction, as reported in F1g, cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted, as reported in C1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1e cannot exceed E1a	The number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted, as reported in F1e, cannot exceed the total number of provisional ballots cast, as reported in E1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
If F5a = Yes, then F5b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F5b.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If F5a = Yes, then F5c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F5c.
If F6a = Yes, then F6b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F6b.
If F6a = Yes, then F6c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F6c.
If F7a = Yes, then F7b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F7b.
If F7a = Yes, then F7c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F7c.
If F8a = Yes, then F8b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F8b.
If F8a = Yes, then F8c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply	Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F8c.

Table 3: Policy Survey Validation Rules

Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then A4c, A5c, A6c, A7c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A4c-A7c. Instead, please report the total number of online registrations received, new online registrations received, duplicate online registrations, or invalid online registrations. If that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then A4c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A4c. Instead, please report the total number of online registrations received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then A5c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A5c. Instead, please report the number of new online registrations received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then A6c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A6c. Instead, please report the number of duplicate online registrations received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then A7c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A7c. Instead, please report the total number of invalid online registrations received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q8 = 1, then A2a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having a form of same-day registration in Q8 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A2a. Instead, please report the total number of same day registrations received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q8a_1 = 1, then A2b ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having same-day registration on Election Day in Q8a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A2b. Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations received on Election Day, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q8a_2 = 1 OR Q8a_3 = 1, then A2c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having same-day registration during in-person early voting in Q8a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A2c. Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations received prior to Election Day, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q9 = 1, then A3c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported having pre-registration for persons under 18 years of age in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A3c. Instead, please report the number of pre-registrations received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q10 = 1, then A1b ≠ Does not apply and A1c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported differentiating between active and inactive voters in Q10 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A1b and A1c. Instead, please report the number of active and inactive voters in these items, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q12_1 = 1 OR Q12_2 = 1 OR Q12_3 = 1, then A8a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported using confirmation notices in Q12 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A8a. Instead, please report the total number of confirmation notices sent, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17a = 1, then F1g > 0	Because your state reported using a statewide all-vote-by-mail system in Q17a of the Policy Survey, you must report data on the number of voters who cast a ballot in a jurisdiction that votes entirely by mail in F1g. If that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18 = 2 OR Q18 = 3, then C2a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing some or all registered voters to be designated as permanent absentee voters in Q18 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to C2a. Instead, please report the number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q20 = 1, then C7a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing for mail ballot curing in Q20 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to C7a. Instead, please report the number of mail ballots that were successfully cured, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q25_4 = 0, then D4a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to D4a. Instead, please report the number of polling places used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q25_4 = 0, then D4b ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to D4b. Instead, please report the number of polling places other than election offices used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q25_4 = 0, then D4c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to D4c. Instead, please report the number of polling places located at election offices used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q25_4 = 0, then D6a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to D6a. Instead, please report the number of poll workers used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q25_4 = 0, then F1f ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to F1f. Instead, please report the number of voters who cast ballots during in-person early voting that were counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q27_1 = 1, then B6a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by postal mail in Q27 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B6a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by postal mail, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q27_2 = 1, then B7a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by email in Q27 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B7a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by email, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q27_3 = 1 OR Q27_4 = 1 OR Q27_5 = 1, then B8a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by another mode in Q27 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B8a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by other modes, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q28_1 = 1, then B10a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by postal mail in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B10a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots returned by postal mail, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q28_2 = 1, then B11a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by email in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B11a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots returned by email, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q28_3 = 1 OR Q28_4 = 1 OR Q28_5 = 1, then B12a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by another mode in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B12a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots returned by other modes, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q28_1 = 1, then B15a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by postal mail in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B15a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots returned by postal mail and counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q28_2 = 1, then B16a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by email in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B16a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots returned by email and counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q28_3 = 1 OR Q28_4 = 1 OR Q28_5 = 1, then B17a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by another mode in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B17a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots returned by other modes and counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33 = 1, then E1a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1a. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots cast, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33 = 1, then E1b ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1b. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots cast that were counted in full, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33 = 1, then E1d ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1d. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots cast that were rejected, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33a_1 = 1, then E2h ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a federal or state judge extends polling hours, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2h. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q33a_2=1, then E2c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when an election official asserts a voter is not eligible, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2c. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33a_3 = 1, then E2d ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a person who is not an election official asserts a voter is not eligible and the challenge cannot be resolved, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2d. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33a_4 = 1, then E2a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a person does not appear on the list of eligible voters, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2a. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33a_5 = 1, then E2b ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter does not have proper identification, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2b. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33a_6 = 1, then E2e ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they are attempting to vote, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2e. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33a_7 = 1, then E2f ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter’s registration has not been updated with their current name and address, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2f. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33a_8 = 1, then E2g ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter who was issued a mail ballot does not surrender the mail ballot when they wish to vote in person, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2g. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q33a_9 = 1, then E2i ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered for reasons other than those listed in E2a-E2h, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2i. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33c = 2, then E1c ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported partially counting provisional ballots in some instances in Q33c of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1c. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots counted in part, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33 = 1, then E3a ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E3a. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots rejected, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q33 = 1, then F1e ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to F1e. Instead, please report the total number of voters who cast provisional ballots that were counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q38_5 = 0, then A9d ≠ Does not apply	Because your state reported that criminal convictions or incarceration can affect individuals' voting eligibility in Q38 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A9d. Instead, please report the total number of persons who were removed from the voter rolls because of disqualifying felony conviction, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

Table 4: Policy Survey Pre-Fills

Policy Survey Response	Expected Response in EAVS
Q6 = No	A4c, A5c, A6c and A7c = Does not apply
Q8 = No	A2a, A2b, and A2c = Does not apply
Q9 = No	A3c = Does not apply
Q10 = No	A1c = Does not apply
Q12 = No	A8a–A8h = Does not apply
Q15 = No	F3a–e = No
Q17 = No	F1g = Does not apply
Q18 = No	C2a = Does not apply
Q19 = No	C3a, C4a–c, C5a–c, and C6a = Does not apply
Q20 = No	C7a = Does not apply
Q21 = Postmark not required	C9k = Does not apply
Q25 = Early voting is not allowed	D4a–c, D6a, and F1f = Does not apply
Q27 ≠ Postal mail	B6a–c = Does not apply
Q27 ≠ Email	B7a–c = Does not apply



Policy Survey Response	Expected Response in EAVS
Q27 ≠ Fax AND Q27 ≠ Online AND Q27 ≠ Other	B8a-c = Does not apply
Q28 ≠ Postal mail	B10a-c and B15a-c = Does not apply
Q28 ≠ Email	B11a-c and B16a-c = Does not apply
Q28 ≠ Fax AND Q28 ≠ Online AND Q28 ≠ Other	B12a-c and B17a-c = Does not apply
Q33 = No	E1a-e, E2a-k, E3a-m, F1e, F5d_3, F6d_3, F7d_3, F8d_3, F9d_3, and F10c = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ Voter's name does not appear on list of eligible voters	E2a = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ Voter does not have proper identification	E2b = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ An election official asserts voter is ineligible	E2c = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ Another person asserts voter is ineligible	E2d = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ Voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they attempted to vote	E2e = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ Voter's registration has outdated information	E2f = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ Voter received a mail ballot and did not surrender it at polling place to vote in person	E2g = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ When a judge extends polling place hours	E2h = Does not apply
Q33c = Fully count or partially count the provisional ballot	E3d = Does not apply
Q38 = No one; criminal convictions do not limit a person's right to vote	A9d = Does not apply

Table 5: EAVS Rates Validations

Validation Rule	Error Text
Percent of registrations that were new and valid: $(A3b/A3a) \times 100$ Threshold: 5%–95%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A3b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations that were duplicates: $(A3d/A3a) \times 100$ Threshold: 1%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A3d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations that were rejected: $(A3e/A3a) \times 100$ Threshold: 1%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A3e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations that were name, political party, or within-jurisdiction changes: $(A3f/A3a) \times 100$ Threshold: 5%–95%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A3f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.



Validation Rule	Error Text
Percent of registrations received by mail: (A4a/A3a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A4a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations received in person: (A4b/A3a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A4b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations received online: (A4c/A3a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A4c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations received at motor vehicle agencies: (A4d/A3a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A3a and A4d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Confirmation notices sent as percent of active registered voters: (A8a/A1b) x 100 Threshold: 1%–35%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A1b and A8a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of confirmation notices returned confirming valid registration: (A8b/A8a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–50%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A8a and A8b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of confirmation notices returned confirming invalid registration: (A8c/A8a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–35%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A8a and A8c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of confirmation notices returned as undeliverable: (A8d/A8a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–35%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A8a and A8d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of confirmation notices unreturned: (A8e/A8a) x 100 Threshold: 10%–80%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A8a and A8e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations removed as percent of total registrants: (A9a/A1a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items A1a and A9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of FPCAs that were rejected: (B3a/B2a) x 100 Threshold: 0.5%–99%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items B2a and B3a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned: (B9a/B5a) x 100 Threshold: 5%–95%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items B5a and B9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were counted: (B14a/B9a) x 100 Threshold: 10%–100%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items B9a and B14a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.



Validation Rule	Error Text
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were rejected: $(B18a/B9a) \times 100$ Threshold: 0.5%–90%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items B9a and B18a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of FWABs counted: $(B24a/B23a) \times 100$ Threshold: 10%–100%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items B23a and B24a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of FWABs rejected: $([B25a+B26a+B27a]/B23a) \times 100$ Threshold: 0.5%–90%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items B23a, B25a, B26a, and B27a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots returned: $(C1b/C1a) \times 100$ Threshold: 5%–95%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items C1a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots unreturned: $(C1f/C1a) \times 100$ Threshold: 5%–95%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items C1a and C1f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots returned via drop box: $(C6a/C1b) \times 100$ Threshold: >95%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items C1b and C6a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots successfully cured: $(C7a/C1b) \times 100$ Threshold: >20%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items C1b and C7a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of returned mail ballots counted: $(C8a/C1b) \times 100$ Threshold: 10%–100%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items C8a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of returned mail ballots rejected: $(C9a/C1b) \times 100$ Threshold: 0.5%–90%	This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please review items C9a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers under age 18: $(D7b/D7a) \times 100$ Threshold: >50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items D7a and D7b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 18 to 25: $(D7c/D7a) \times 100$ Threshold: >50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items D7a and D7c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 26 to 40: $(D7d/D7a) \times 100$ Threshold: >50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items D7a and D7d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 41 to 60: $(D7e/D7a) \times 100$ Threshold: >50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items D7a and D7e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.



Validation Rule	Error Text
Percent of poll workers ages 61 to 70: (D7f/D7a) x 100 Threshold: >50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items D7a and D7f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 71+: (D7g/D7a) x 100 Threshold: >50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items D7a and D7g for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers who served for first time: (D9a/D7a) x 100 Threshold: >50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items D7a and D9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of provisional ballots rejected: (E1d/E1a) x 100 Threshold: 0.5%–95%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items E1a and E1d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of turnout by active registration: (F1a/A1b) x 100 Threshold: 35%–95%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items A1b and F1a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast in person on Election Day: (F1b/F1a) x 100 Threshold: 10%–90%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items F1a and F1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast by mail: ((F1d+F1g)/F1a) x 100 Threshold: 5%–95%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items F1a, F1d, and F1g for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast in person before Election Day: (F1f/F1a) x 100 Threshold: 1%–95%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items F1a and F1f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast by UOCAVA voters: (F1c/F1a) x 100 Threshold: 0.1%–50%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items F1a and F1c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast that were provisional: (F1e/F1a) x 100 Threshold: 0.01%–25%	This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items F1a and F1e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Total number of voting machines deployed: F5c_1 + F5c_2 + F5c_3 + F6c_1 + F6c_2 + F6c_3 + F7c_1 + F7c_2 + F7c_3 + F8c_1 + F8c_2 + F8c_3 Threshold: <1	This number is lower than expected. Please review items F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3 for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments section for these items to provide context to your submission.

Table 6: Valid Skips

If...	Items Filled
A4e = Does not apply (-88)	A5e, A6e, and A7e = Valid skip (-77)
A4f = Does not apply (-88)	A5f, A6f, and A7f = Valid skip (-77)
A4g = Does not apply (-88)	A5g, A6g, and A7g = Valid skip (-77)



If...	Items Filled
A4h = Does not apply (-88)	A5h, A6h, and A7h = Valid skip (-77)
A4i = Does not apply (-88)	A5i, A6i, and A7i = Valid skip (-77)
A8a = Does not apply (-88)	A8b-h = Valid skip (-77)
A9a = Does not apply (-88)	A9b-j = Valid skip (-77)
B1a = Does not apply (-88)	B1b-c = Valid skip (-77)
B5a = 0	B5b-B22c = Valid skip (-77)
B7a = Does not apply (-88)	B7b-c = Valid skip (-77)
B8a = Does not apply (-88)	B8b-c = Valid skip (-77)
B11a = Does not apply (-88)	B11b-c = Valid skip (-77)
B12a = Does not apply (-88)	B12b-c = Valid skip (-77)
B16a = Does not apply (-88)	B16b-c = Valid skip (-77)
B17a = Does not apply (-88)	B17b-c = Valid skip (-77)
B21a = Does not apply (-88)	B21b-c = Valid skip (-77)
C4a = Does not apply (-88)	C4b-c = Valid skip (-77)
C5a = Does not apply (-88)	C5b-c = Valid skip (-77)
D3a = Does not apply (-88)	D3b-c = Valid skip (-77)
D4a = Does not apply (-88)	D4b-c = Valid skip (-77)
D7a = Does not apply (-88)	D7b-g = Valid skip (-77) and D9a = Valid skip (-77)
F5a = No	F5b_1-F5d_4 = Valid skip (-77)
F6a = No	F6b_1-F6d_4 = Valid skip (-77)
F7a = No	F7b_1-F7d_5 = Valid skip (-77)
F8a = No	F8b_1-F8d_5 = Valid skip (-77)
F9a = No	F9d_1-F9d_5 = Valid skip (-77)

Table 7: Special Conditions and Data Missingness

Validation Rule	Error Text
If state = North Dakota, then Section A = Does not apply and B1a-c = Does not apply	--
If state = Maine, then Section B = Data not available for all jurisdictions except UOCAVA-ME	--
If state = HI and jurisdiction = "Kalawao County", then all items = Data not available	--
If state = ME and jurisdiction = "UOCAVA-ME", then all items = Data not available except for Section B and contact information	--
A1a ≠ Does not apply unless the state = "ND" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County" OR jurisdiction = "MAINE - UOCAVA"	Please provide the total number of people who were registered and eligible to vote in your jurisdiction in the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."



Validation Rule	Error Text
A3a ≠ Does not apply unless the state = "ND" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County" OR jurisdiction = "MAINE - UOCAVA"	Please provide the total number of registration forms received in your jurisdiction between the close of registration for the November 2020 general election and the close of registration for the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B1a-c cannot be Does not apply unless the state = "ND" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County" OR jurisdiction = "MAINE - UOCAVA"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B2a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B3a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B4a cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B5a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B6a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B9a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B10a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B13a-d cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B14a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B15a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B18a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B19a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B20a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B23a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
B24a-c cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."



Validation Rule	Error Text
C1a cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the total number of mail ballots transmitted to voters for the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
D1a cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the total number of precincts in your jurisdiction for the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
F1a cannot be Does not apply unless state = "ME" OR jurisdiction = "Kalawao County"	Please provide the total number of voters who cast a ballot (regardless of mode) that was counted for the November 2022 general election in your jurisdiction. If that data is not tracked, respond "Data not available."
F7b_1 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking Device (Los Angeles County) unless jurisdiction = "Los Angeles County"	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F7b_2 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking Device (Los Angeles County) unless jurisdiction = "Los Angeles County"	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F7b_3 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking Device (Los Angeles County) unless jurisdiction = "Los Angeles County"	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1, F8b_2, F8b_3 cannot be IBML (Los Angeles County) or LRC-1000 (Los Angeles County) unless jurisdiction = "Los Angeles County"	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
Required items cannot be left blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter "Data not available". If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter "Does not apply" and explain in comments section.
If any of A3h to A3j is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A3h_other to A3j_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, you can leave them blank.
If any of A4j to A4l is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A4j_other to A4l_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, you can leave them blank.
If any of A5j to A5l is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A5j_other to A5l_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, you can leave them blank.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If any of A6j to A6l is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A6j_other to A6l_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of A7j to A7l is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A7j_other to A7l_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of A8f to A8h is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A8f_other to A8h_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of A9h to A9j is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A9h_other to A9j_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of B22a to B22c is filled, response to corresponding open-ended item B22_other is required and vice versa	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of B27a to B27c is filled, response to corresponding open-ended item B27_other is required and vice versa	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of C1g to C1i is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item C1g_other to C1i_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of C9r to C9t is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item C9r_other to C9t_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If E1e is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item E1e_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of E2i to E2k is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item E2i_other to E2k_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If any of E3k to E3m is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item E2k_other to E2m_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If F1h is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item F1h_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them blank.
If F2e_5 is selected in the Online Survey or Excel template, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F2_other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F3f = Yes, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F3f_other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F4f = Yes, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F4f_other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F5b_1 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F5b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F5b_2 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F5b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F5b_3 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F5b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F6b_1 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F6b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F6b_2 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F6b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
If F6b_3 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F6b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If F7b_1 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F7b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F7b_2 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F7b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F7b_3 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F7b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F8b_1 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F8b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F8b_2 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F8b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F8b_3 = Other, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F8b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F5a = Yes, then F5b_1, F5c_1, F5d_1, F5d_2, F5d_3 and F5d_4 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter "Data not available". If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter "Does not apply" and explain in the comments section.
If F6a = Yes, then F6b_1, F6c_1, F6d_1, F6d_2, F6d_3 and F6d_4 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter "Data not available". If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter "Does not apply" and explain in the comments section.
If F7a = Yes, then F7b_1, F7c_1, F7d_1, F7d_2, F7d_3, F7d_4 and F7d_5 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter "Data not available". If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter "Does not apply" and explain in the comments section.
If F8a = Yes, then F8b_1, F8c_1, F8d_1, F8d_2, F8d_3, F8d_4 and F8d_5 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter "Data not available". If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter "Does not apply" and explain in the comments section.
If F9a = Yes, then F9d_1, F9d_2, F9d_3, F9d_4 and F9d_5 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter "Data not available". If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter "Does not apply" and explain in the comments section.
Flag any negative value in numeric items	Negative numbers are not allowed as responses in EAVS. If you intended to respond "Does not apply" (-88) or "Data not available" (-99), please select the appropriate check box instead.
Flag any negative value except for -77, -88, and -99 in numeric items	Negative numbers outside of responses of "Data not available" (-99), "Does not apply" (-88), and "Valid skip" (-77) are not allowed as responses in EAVS. Please review and provide a valid response.



Validation Rule	Error Text
Flag any value with decimals in numeric items	Numbers with decimals are not allowed as valid responses. Please review your response to the item and enter a valid number.

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Methodology Appendix C: Post-Submission Validations and Sample Rates

Table 1: Sample Rates and Outlier Thresholds

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
Percent of registrations that were new and valid	$\frac{A3b}{A3a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of registrations that were duplicates	$\frac{A3d}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations that were invalid or rejected	$\frac{A3e}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations that were name, political party, or within-jurisdiction changes	$\frac{A3f}{A3a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of registrations received by mail	$\frac{A4a}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations received in person	$\frac{A4b}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations received online	$\frac{A4c}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations received at motor vehicle agencies	$\frac{A4d}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Confirmation notices sent as percent of active registered voters	$\frac{A8a}{A1b} \times 100$	<1% >35%
Percent of confirmation notices returned confirming valid registration	$\frac{A8b}{A8a} \times 100$	<1% >50%
Percent of confirmation notices returned confirming invalid registration	$\frac{A8c}{A8a} \times 100$	<1% >35%
Percent of confirmation notices returned as undeliverable	$\frac{A8d}{A8a} \times 100$	<1% >35%
Percent of confirmation notices unreturned	$\frac{A8e}{A8a} \times 100$	<10% >80%
Percent of registrations removed as percent of total registrants	$\frac{A9a}{A1a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of FPCAs that were rejected	$\frac{B3a}{B2a} \times 100$	<0.5% >99%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned	$\frac{B9a}{B5a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were counted	$\frac{B14a}{B9a} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were rejected	$\frac{B18a}{B9a} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%



EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
Percent of FWABs counted	$\frac{B24a}{B23a} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percent of FWABs rejected	$\frac{B25a + B26a + B27a}{B23a} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percent of mailed ballots returned	$\frac{C1b}{C1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of mailed ballots unreturned	$\frac{C1f}{C1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of mailed ballots returned via drop box	$\frac{C6a}{C1b} \times 100$	>95%
Percent of mailed ballots successfully cured	$\frac{C7a}{C1b} \times 100$	>20%
Percent of mailed ballots counted	$\frac{C8a}{C1b} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percent of mailed ballots rejected	$\frac{C9a}{C1b} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percent of poll workers under age 18	$\frac{D7b}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percent of poll workers ages 18 to 25	$\frac{D7c}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percent of poll workers ages 26 to 40	$\frac{D7d}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percent of poll workers ages 41 to 60	$\frac{D7e}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percent of poll workers ages 61 to 70	$\frac{D7f}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percent of poll workers ages 71+	$\frac{D7g}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percent of poll workers who served for first time	$\frac{D9a}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percent of provisional ballots rejected	$\frac{E1d}{E1a} \times 100$	<0.5% >95%
Percent of turnout by active registration	$\frac{F1a}{A1b} \times 100$	<35% >95%
Percent ballots cast in person on Election Day	$\frac{F1b}{F1a} \times 100$	<10% >90%
Percent ballots cast by mail	$\frac{F1d + F1g}{F1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent ballots cast in person before Election Day	$\frac{F1f}{F1a} \times 100$	<1% >95%
Percent ballots cast by UOCAVA voters	$\frac{F1c}{F1a} \times 100$	<0.1% >50%



EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
Percent ballots cast that were provisional	$\frac{F1e}{F1a} \times 100$	<0.01% >25%
Total number of voting machines deployed	$F5c_1 + F5c_2 + F5c_3 + F6c_1 + F6c_2 + F6c_3 + F7c_1 + F7c_2 + F7c_3 + F8c_1 + F8c_2 + F8c_3$	<1
Percent of registrants by CVAP	$\frac{A1a}{CVAP} \times 100$	<50% >130%
Percent of turnout by CVAP	$\frac{F1a}{CVAP} \times 100$	<35% >95%

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Table 2: Comparisons to the 2018 EAVS Data

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
2022 total registrations as percentage of 2018's registrations	$\frac{A1a[2022]}{A1a[2018]} \times 100$	<50% >150%
2022 registrations received as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{A3a[2022]}{A3a[2018]} \times 100$	<25% >200%
2022 registrations removed as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{A9a[2022]}{A9a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2022 UOCAVA registrants as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{B1a[2022]}{B1a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2022 UOCAVA ballots transmitted as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{B5a[2022]}{B5a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2022 UOCAVA ballots returned as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{B9a[2022]}{B9a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2022 UOCAVA ballots counted as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{B14a[2022]}{B14a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2022 mailed ballots transmitted as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{C1a[2022]}{C1a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2022 mailed ballots returned as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{C1b[2022]}{C1b[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2022 mailed ballots counted as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{C8a[2022]}{C3a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2022 provisional ballots cast as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{E1a[2022]}{E1a[2018]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2022 total turnout as percentage of 2018's	$\frac{F1a[2022]}{F1a[2018]} \times 100$	<50% >150%



Methodology Appendix D: How to Calculate Selected EAVS Rates

The EAVS item numbers in this table correspond to the question numbering for the 2022 EAVS. To determine item numbering for previous EAVS surveys, please refer to the survey instrument and data codebook for each year.

EAVS Rate	Calculation
Total CVAP registration rate	$\frac{A1a}{CVAP} \times 100$
Active CVAP registration rate	$\frac{A1b}{CVAP} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were new and valid	$\frac{A3b}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were duplicates	$\frac{A3d}{A2a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were rejected	$\frac{A3e}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were name, political party, or within-jurisdiction changes	$\frac{A3f}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were received by mail	$\frac{A4a}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were received in person at election or registrar offices	$\frac{A4b}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were submitted by individual voters through web-based online registration systems	$\frac{A4c}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were received through motor vehicle agencies	$\frac{A4d}{A3a} \times 100$
Voter registration removal rate as a percentage of total registrants	$\frac{A9a}{A1a} \times 100$
Percentage of FPCAs that were rejected	$\frac{B3a}{B2a} \times 100$
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters	$\frac{B9a}{B5a} \times 100$
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and counted	$\frac{B14a}{B9a} \times 100$
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and rejected	$\frac{B18a}{B9a} \times 100$
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were counted	$\frac{B24a}{B23a} \times 100$
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were rejected	$\frac{(B25a + B26a + B27a)}{B23a} \times 100$
Percentage of transmitted mail ballots that were returned by voters	$\frac{C1b}{C1a} \times 100$



EAVS Rate	Calculation
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were counted	$\frac{C8a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were rejected	$\frac{C9a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were returned via drop box	$\frac{C6a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were successfully cured	$\frac{C7a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of counted mail ballots that were successfully cured	$\frac{C7a}{C8a} \times 100$
Percentage of poll workers who served for the first time in the 2022 general election	$\frac{D9a}{D7a} \times 100$
Percentage of provisional ballots that were counted, either in full or in part	$\frac{(E1b + E1c)}{(E1b + E1c + E1d + E1e)} \times 100$
Percentage of provisional ballots that were rejected	$\frac{E1d}{(E1b + E1c + E1d + E1e)} \times 100$
Voter turnout rate by CVAP	$\frac{F1a}{CVAP} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast at a physical polling place on Election Day	$\frac{F1b}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast as mail ballots	$\frac{(F1d + F1g)}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast in-person before Election Day	$\frac{F1f}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast by UOCAVA voters	$\frac{F1c}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters	$\frac{F1e}{F1a} \times 100$



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Exhibit 2

State of Arizona
2023
ELECTIONS
PROCEDURES
MANUAL



ADRIAN FONTES
SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE OF ARIZONA

Arizona Department of State - Office of the Secretary of State
1700 W. Washington St., FL 7, Phoenix, Arizona 85007

azsos.gov | 1-877-THE VOTE (843-8683)

ARIZONA

ELECTIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL

A PUBLICATION OF THE ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE
ELECTIONS SERVICES DIVISION

INTRODUCTION FROM SECRETARY OF STATE ADRIAN FONTES

December 2023

I am pleased to provide you with the 2023 Elections Procedures Manual to county, city, and town election officials throughout Arizona. Updating the Election Procedures Manual has been one of my Administration's highest priorities. We worked in close partnership with County Recorders, Elections Directors, and their staff to ensure that the 2023 Elections Procedures Manual will provide the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity, and efficiency in election procedures across Arizona.

Open and honest elections are at the heart of our democratic republic. It's a process made possible by the continued dedication of election workers, from poll workers to election officers. Their efforts make for a rewarding experience for Arizona voters. Through the unrelenting dedication and vigilance of election workers throughout the State, our elections are secure, accurate, and accessible. We are deeply grateful for their invaluable contributions.

Sincerely,



Adrian Fontes
Arizona Secretary of State



STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

KATIE HOBBS
GOVERNOR

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

December 30, 2023

The Honorable Adrian Fontes
Arizona Secretary of State
1700 West Washington Street, 7th Floor
Phoenix, AZ 85007

Dear Secretary Fontes,

My Office has reviewed the 2023 Election Procedures Manual (EPM) that you submitted for final approval on December 30, 2023. In accordance with A.R.S. § 16-452(B), I hereby approve the 2023 Elections Procedures Manual.

As a former Secretary of State, I understand the immense amount of work required by state, county, and local officials to produce this important document. This Manual builds on the work done on the 2019 EPM and 2021 draft EPM to ensure our elections achieve the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency. I'm confident that Arizona's elections, as well as our voters and election officials, will benefit from this updated EPM.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "KH", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Katie Hobbs
Governor
State of Arizona



KRIS MAYES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA

December 30, 2023

The Honorable Adrian Fontes
Arizona Secretary of State
1700 W. Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Re: Approval of the 2023 Elections Procedures Manual

Dear Secretary Fontes:

My office has reviewed the Elections Procedures Manual submitted on December 30, 2023, as required by A.R.S § 16-452(B). Based upon our review, we find the submitted Manual complies with Arizona's election statutes.

An updated Elections Procedures Manual is critical to the fair, consistent, and orderly administration of elections in Arizona. Therefore, I am pleased to be able to approve the Manual as submitted on December 30, 2023.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "K. Mayes".

Kris Mayes
Attorney General
State of Arizona

cc: Governor Katie Hobbs

ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE
2023 ELECTIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL

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CHAPTER 1: VOTER REGISTRATION

I. VOTER REGISTRATION FORMS

Voter registration forms that are accepted in Arizona include:

- The state voter registration form prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-152\(C\)](#) (the “State Form”), including any low-vision/large-print version of the State Form prescribed by the Secretary of State and made available on the Secretary of State’s website.¹
- The National Mail Voter Registration Form prescribed by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the “Federal Form”).²
- Registrations electronically received from the Arizona Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Department (AZMVD) pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-112](#), whether through in-person registration at an AZMVD or AZMVD affiliate’s office or online through the MVD portal or voter registration website.
- The Federal Postcard Application prescribed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense (the “FPCA”) pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA).³
- The Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot prescribed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense pursuant to UOCAVA (the “FWAB”).⁴

A. County/State Responsibility for Supplying Forms

The County Recorder shall make available State Forms (at no cost) to all federal, state, county, local, and tribal government agencies, political parties, and private organizations located within the County Recorder’s jurisdiction that conduct voter registration activities. [A.R.S. § 16-151\(A\)](#). The County Recorder, a justice of the peace or a deputy registrar shall supply, without charge, a registration form to any qualified person requesting registration information. [A.R.S. § 16-131\(A\)](#).

¹ The latest State Form is available at <https://www.azsos.gov/elections/voting-election>.

² [52 U.S.C. § 20505\(a\)\(1\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20508\(a\)\(2\)](#). The Federal Form is available at [National Voter Registration Application Form for U.S. Citizens \(ENG\) \(eac.gov\)](#); <https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form>.

³ [A.R.S. § 16-103\(B\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20301\(b\)\(2\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20302\(a\)\(4\)](#); Executive Order 12642 (June 9, 1988). The FPCA is available at <https://www.fvap.gov/military-voter/overview>.

⁴ [A.R.S. § 16-543.02\(D\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20302\(a\)\(4\)](#). The FWAB is available at <https://www.fvap.gov/military-voter/overview>.

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The Secretary of State shall make available Federal Forms (at no cost) to all federal, state, county, local, and tribal government agencies, political parties, and private organizations that conduct voter registration activities. [A.R.S. § 16-151\(B\)](#). The Secretary of State and County Recorders may place reasonable restrictions on the number of forms to be provided to individuals or organizations depending on the type of voter registration activity to be conducted and reasonable estimates of the number of voters that the individual or group will seek to register.

Any registration form in compliance with applicable state or federal laws may be used to register to vote for the first time or amend or update an existing registration record. In addition, other documents may be used to amend or update a registrant's residence or mailing address, including but not limited to a request for an early ballot, an Active Early Voting List (AEVL) request form, or a provisional ballot envelope or affidavit. [A.R.S. § 16-135\(A\), \(E\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-544\(D\)\(1\), \(2\)](#).

B. Eligibility to Use FPCA and FWAB Forms

The following registrants temporarily absent from the State are authorized to use the FPCA for registration and the FWAB for registration and voting:

- Uniformed service members;
- Eligible family members of uniformed service members;
- Overseas voters; and
- Non-resident U.S. Citizens with parents already registered to vote in Arizona.

[52 U.S.C. § 20310](#); [A.R.S. § 16-103](#); [A.R.S. § 16-543\(C\)](#). For more information on eligibility, visit www.fvap.gov or <https://my.arizona.vote/UOCAVA2/default.aspx>.

A UOCAVA registrant may designate the method for transmission of voting materials and information on the FPCA form, including electronic transmission, fax, or regular mail. A UOCAVA registrant may designate the length of time they wish to receive voting materials, not to exceed two federal election cycles. If no designation is made, the UOCAVA registrant's request for email, fax, or electronic transmission of voting materials will be valid until immediately after the next state general election. [A.R.S. § 16-542\(B\)](#).

II. VOTER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

A person is qualified to *register* to vote in Arizona if the resident:

- Is a United States citizen;
- Will be 18 years old by the date of the next general election;
- Is a resident for at least 29 days prior to the next election, except as provided in [A.R.S. § 16-126](#);
- Can write the resident's name (or make the resident's mark), unless prevented from doing so by physical disability;

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- Has not been convicted of treason or a felony, unless their civil rights have been restored; and
- Has not been adjudicated an “incapacitated person” by a court with their voting rights revoked, as defined in [A.R.S. § 14-5101](#).

[Ariz. Const. Art. VII, § 2](#); [A.R.S. § 9-822\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-101](#); [A.R.S. § 16-126\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-152](#). Each qualification is discussed in further detail below.

A. Citizenship Requirement

A registrant must be a U.S. citizen to be qualified to register to vote. [Ariz. Const. Art. VII, § 2](#); [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(1\)](#); [18 U.S.C. § 611\(a\)](#).

U.S. citizenship must be sworn to when registering to vote. In addition, under Arizona’s bifurcated or dual-track voter registration system, an acceptable form of documentary proof of citizenship (DPOC) is required to be registered as a “full-ballot” voter. *See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.*, 570 U.S. 1 (2013). A “full-ballot” voter is entitled to vote for all federal, state, county, and local races as well as state and local ballot measures for which the voter qualifies. [Ariz. Atty Gen. Op. I13-011](#).

An otherwise eligible registrant who does not submit DPOC and whose U.S. citizenship cannot be verified via AZMVD records or other record in the statewide voter registration database is registered as a “federal-only” voter. A “federal-only” voter is eligible to vote solely in races for federal office in Arizona (including the Presidential Preference Election (PPE)).

In addition, upon receiving a Federal Form not accompanied by DPOC, a County Recorder must attempt to verify citizenship, including checking certain databases if the County has access. *See* [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(D\)](#).⁵ If citizenship is verified, the applicant must be registered; however, if the databases affirmatively show the applicant is a non-citizen, the County Recorder must (1) not register the applicant, (2) notify the applicant, and (3) if the applicant does not timely provide DPOC in response, forward the application to the County Attorney and Attorney General. *See* [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(E\)](#). This paragraph is explained further in Section II(A)(8) below.

1. Valid Forms of DPOC

The following section outlines what constitutes satisfactory DPOC under Arizona law.

a. *Driver Licenses and Identification Cards*

A registrant may submit certain state-issued driver license or non-driver identification card information as satisfactory DPOC. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)\(1\)](#).

⁵ Litigation is pending on the statutory provisions in this paragraph. *See Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB.

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i. Arizona Driver License or Non-Driver Identification Card Number


An Arizona driver license or non-driver identification card number (AZDL/ID#) issued by AZMVD after October 1, 1996 constitutes valid DPOC. To be deemed satisfactory, (1) the AZDL/ID# must be verified against AZMVD records; and (2) the verification must not return a result with an Authorized Presence Type that indicates non-citizenship.

A County Recorder may accept a copy of the registrant's AZDL/ID# as DPOC but must still enter the AZDL/ID# into the statewide voter registration database to verify citizenship with AZMVD records. AZMVD issues licenses or ID cards to those who are authorized to be physically present in the United States but who are non-citizens at the time of issuance. Because a non-citizen authorized presence designation is not apparent on the face of the license or ID card, an AZDL/ID# alone is not sufficient to prove citizenship without verification against AZMVD records.

ii. Out-of-State Driver License or Identification Card

An out-of-state driver license or identification card may constitute satisfactory DPOC if it was issued by the state's driver license-issuing agency and indicates on the face of the license or card that the person provided proof of U.S. citizenship in that state. A County Recorder may accept an approved out-of-state license or identification card at face value and need not electronically verify the license or card.

For example, enhanced driver licenses or enhanced identification cards from other states that are issued in compliance with the Departments of State and Homeland Security's Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative satisfy Arizona's DPOC requirement. These states display an American flag on the face of the license or card. Examples of an enhanced license from Michigan and New York appear below with the American flag circled.



While a County Recorder shall not accept an out-of-state driver license or identification card number alone (because the statewide voter registration database cannot electronically verify these numbers), a County Recorder may visually verify or accept a copy of these licenses or cards for DPOC purposes.

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b. Birth Certificate

A registrant may submit a legible copy of the registrant’s birth certificate from any U.S. state or territory as satisfactory DPOC. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)\(2\)](#).⁶ For U.S. citizens born abroad, a “Certification of Report of Birth” or “Consular Report of Birth Abroad” issued by a consular officer from the U.S. Department of State will suffice for a birth certificate. [22 U.S.C. § 2705\(2\)](#).

The registrant must supply supporting legal documentation (such as a marriage certificate or court-documented name change) if the name on the birth certificate or document is not the registrant’s current legal name. If the registrant cannot provide supporting legal documentation to account for a different last name, a County Recorder must accept the birth certificate or document if at least the following information matches on both the birth certificate or document and the registration form:

- First name;
- Middle name;
- Place of birth;
- Date of birth; and
- Parents’ name(s).

c. U.S. Passport

A registrant may submit a legible copy of the pertinent pages of the registrant’s U.S. passport or passport card or present the registrant’s U.S. passport or passport card to the County Recorder, as DPOC. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)\(3\)](#).

The pertinent pages of a U.S. passport are those that contain the photo, passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, gender, place of birth, and signature (if applicable). A U.S. passport card also may be accepted, which does not contain a signature.

If the County Recorder visually inspects (and does not make a copy of) the pertinent passport pages or passport card, the County Recorder must note in the registrant’s voter registration record that the passport was inspected.

d. Citizenship and Immigration Documents

A registrant may present the registrant’s original naturalization documents to the County Recorder for inspection or submit (1) a legible copy of the registrant’s Certificate of Naturalization or Certificate of Citizenship, or (2) the registrant’s Naturalization Certificate Number, Citizenship Certificate Number, or Alien Registration Number (the “A-Number”).

⁶ A registrant may also submit a legible copy of the registrant’s late or delayed birth certificate, issued pursuant to [A.R.S. § 36-333.01](#), [A.R.S. § 36-333.02](#), and/or [A.R.S. § 36-333.03](#), as satisfactory DPOC.

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If a registrant does not present originals or provide a copy of documents but just provides the registrant's Naturalization Certificate Number, Citizenship Certificate Number, or Alien Registration Number, for proof of citizenship purposes, this number must be verified against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database before the number can be deemed satisfactory. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)\(4\)](#); see [Chapter 1, Section II\(A\)\(6\)](#) for more information on SAVE verification procedures.

e. Tribal Identification Numbers and Documents

A registrant may submit a Tribal Enrollment Number, Indian Census Number, Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, or Tribal Treaty Card Number as satisfactory DPOC. These tribal identification numbers are presumed valid for voter registration purposes and need not be verified against any database. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)\(6\)](#).

A registrant may also submit a legible copy of the registrant's Tribal Certificate of Indian Blood or Tribal/Bureau of Indian Affairs Affidavit of Birth as satisfactory DPOC.

2. DPOC Requirement for "Full-Ballot" Voter Designation

Regardless of the type of voter registration form submitted, a County Recorder must make a registrant a "full-ballot" voter for the next election if:

- The registrant provides DPOC with or after submission of the registrant's voter registration application; or
- The County Recorder acquires DPOC on the registrant's behalf, including from AZMVD records or the statewide voter registration database.

[A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)](#); see also *League of United American Citizens of Arizona (LULAC) v. Reagan*, 2:17-cv-04102-DGC, Doc. 37 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2018) (the "LULAC Consent Decree").

a. Acquisition of DPOC from State Records

The Secretary of State must program or enable the statewide voter registration database to attempt to acquire DPOC for new registrants from AZMVD records. This attempt to acquire DPOC must be completed in all cases where a new registrant fails to provide DPOC with the voter registration form. The Secretary shall promptly notify the applicable County Recorder of the results of the check against AZMVD records. If DPOC is acquired, the Secretary shall promptly notify the applicable County Recorder, via the automated process in the voter registration database, to make the applicant a "full-ballot" voter. However, in no event shall an acquired Arizona driver license number with a non-citizen authorized presence designation qualify as valid DPOC.

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b. Registrant's Submission of DPOC

A registrant may provide DPOC at the time of submitting the registrant's voter registration application or by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before the election. *See* LULAC Consent Decree at page 5. The registrant is entitled to vote a "full-ballot" at the next election if:

- The registrant submitted a voter registration application by the registration deadline; and
- The registrant provided DPOC to the County Recorder with the registration application or separately by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before the election.

If a registrant does not provide DPOC with their registration application and valid DPOC otherwise cannot be electronically acquired via AZMVD records or the statewide voter registration database (and the registrant's AZMVD record is not shown to have a non-citizen authorized presence designation), a County Recorder must:

1. Designate the registrant as a "federal-only" voter; and
2. Send a letter to the registrant (including a DPOC Submission Form/"Federal Only" Notice) within 10 business days of receipt of the registration application, informing the registrant that:
 - The registrant has not satisfied the DPOC requirements;
 - The registrant must submit DPOC to become a "full-ballot" voter, and the registrant must provide DPOC by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before any given election in order to vote a "full-ballot" in that election; and
 - The registrant will remain a "federal-only" voter unless and until the registrant submits valid DPOC to become a "full-ballot" voter.

The registrant may provide separate DPOC using the DPOC Submission Form. A registrant who provides DPOC using a method other than the DPOC Submission Form sent by the County Recorder must be made a "full-ballot" voter if the County Recorder has sufficient information to link the registrant's DPOC with the registrant's form on file. If the County Recorder lacks sufficient information to link the DPOC to a registration form, the County Recorder must make a reasonable effort to follow up with the registrant to seek the necessary information. Registrants who subsequently provide the missing information necessary to link their submitted DPOC to their registration form shall be made "full-ballot" voters within 10 business days of receipt of DPOC.

If the registrant provides DPOC to the County Recorder *after* 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before the next election, the County Recorder must make the registrant a "full-ballot" voter for *future* elections within five business days after the completion of processing of provisional ballots.

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3. Procedures for Registrants with a Non-Citizen AZDL/ID#

If a registrant has not provided DPOC other than an AZDL/ID# and AZMVD records show that the registrant's AZMVD record has a non-citizen authorized presence designation, a County Recorder must:

1. Enter the registrant's information into the voter registration database with a status of "not eligible" (or functional equivalent) and a reason code of "invalid citizenship proof" (or functional equivalent).
2. Send a letter to the registrant (including a DPOC Submission Form/Non-Citizen AZDL/ID# Notice) within 10 business days of receipt of the registration application, informing the registrant that:
 - According to AZMVD records, the registrant's AZDL/ID has a non-citizen authorized presence designation and has not been registered to vote for that reason; and
 - The registrant may be registered if the registrant submits valid DPOC to the County Recorder. The registrant must provide DPOC by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before the next regular general election in order to vote in that election.
3. Maintain the registrant's information in the voter registration database with a status of "not eligible" (or functional equivalent) until the next regular general election if the registrant has not provided valid DPOC. If, after the next regular general election, the registrant still has not provided valid DPOC, the registrant's record may be changed to "not registered" (or functional equivalent). The registrant would then be required to complete a new registration form to become eligible to vote in future elections.

4. "Federal-Only" Voter Designation

Regardless of the type of form submitted, a registrant who submits an otherwise valid voter registration form to the County Recorder, but without accompanying DPOC, is entitled to be registered as a "federal-only" voter based on the registrant's sworn statement on the registration form that the registrant is a U.S. citizen. An otherwise valid voter registration form submitted to the County Recorder, but without accompanying DPOC, shall be accepted, entered into the database, and registered for federal elections (*i.e.*, made a "federal-only" voter unless and until proof of citizenship is received or acquired), so long as the registrant's AZMVD record is not shown to have a non-citizen authorized presence designation.

A "federal-only" voter shall be upgraded to a "full-ballot" voter if:

- The County Recorder acquires DPOC on the registrant's behalf from AZMVD records or the statewide voter registration database; or
- The registrant provides DPOC to the County Recorder by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before an election.

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If a “federal-only” voter has been issued a ballot-by-mail, but becomes a “full-ballot” voter prior to 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before the election, the voter may:

- Vote the “federal-only” ballot-by-mail; *or*
- Vote a regular or provisional “full-ballot” in-person during early voting or on Election Day, depending on the procedures implemented by the County Recorder or other officer in charge of elections.

If a voter is issued both an early “federal-only” ballot and an early “full-ballot,” the first ballot accepted by the County Recorder’s office is the only ballot that will be counted.

5. DPOC When Moving Between Counties

A voter who registered to vote before December 13, 2004, and was therefore exempted from the requirement of providing DPOC, must submit valid DPOC if the voter is changing voter registration from one county to another in order to be registered as a “full-ballot” voter in the new county. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(G\)](#).

Registered voters who submitted valid DPOC to the County Recorder in their county of residence need not resubmit evidence of citizenship upon moving and registering to vote in a new county in Arizona so long as a record of their previously submitted DPOC is accessible by the new County Recorder (*e.g.*, via AZMVD records or the statewide voter registration database) and can be made part of their voter registration file in the new county. While proof of voter *registration* from another state or county is not satisfactory evidence of citizenship, [A.R.S. § 16-166\(H\)](#), valid documentary proof of *citizenship* presented in one Arizona county and documented in the statewide voter registration database constitutes valid DPOC if the voter registers in another county in Arizona.

6. Verifying Citizenship/Naturalization/Alien Registration Numbers

a. SAVE Usage

Each County Recorder accesses SAVE pursuant to the Secretary of State’s Memorandum of Agreement with USCIS (the “USCIS MOA”).⁷ The Secretary of State will provide SAVE access to each County Recorder upon signing a separate agreement (the “SOS/County SAVE Agreement”) that will govern the terms of SAVE usage (and, in some cases, billing as well, though some counties have a separate Reimbursement Memorandum of Agreement with USCIS).

When a registrant provides a Naturalization Certificate Number, Citizenship Certificate Number, or Alien Registration Number as DPOC, that number must be verified through the SAVE database and the registrant must remain in “suspense” status until the SAVE verification is completed.

⁷ County Recorders who access SAVE pursuant to the Secretary of State’s USCIS MOA must comply with the conditions of use in the USCIS MOA.

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SAVE shall only be used for verification of citizenship for a new registration if the registrant provides a Naturalization Certificate Number, Citizenship Certificate Number, or Alien Registration Number as DPOC. Further, under the terms of the current USCIS MOA, SAVE shall not be used for list maintenance purposes, *i.e.* to cancel an existing registration.

i. SAVE Returns U.S. Citizen Status

If SAVE returns “United States Citizenship,” the registrant’s status must be updated to “active” in the voter registration database and the voter must be registered as a “full-ballot” voter.

ii. SAVE Returns Non-Citizen Status

If SAVE returns “Lawful Permanent Resident,” “Refugee,” “Non-Immigrant,” or “Asylee,” or other non-citizen status, the registrant must be processed like those with a non-citizen AZDL/ID#. See [Chapter 1, Section II\(A\)\(3\)](#) above. Specifically, a County Recorder must:

1. Enter the registrant’s information into the voter registration database with a status of “not eligible” (or functional equivalent).
2. Send a letter to the registrant (including a DPOC Submission Form/SAVE Non-Citizen Notice) within 10 business days, informing the registrant that:
 - According to DHS records, the registrant holds an immigration number indicating non-citizenship and has not been registered to vote for that reason; and
 - The registrant may be registered as a “full-ballot” voter if the registrant submits other valid DPOC to the County Recorder. The registrant must provide DPOC by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before the next regular general election in order to vote a “full-ballot” in that election.
4. Maintain the registrant’s information in the voter registration database with a status of “not eligible” (or functional equivalent) until the next regular general election if the registrant has not provided valid DPOC. If, after the next regular general election, the registrant still has not provided valid DPOC, the registrant’s record may be changed to “not registered” (or functional equivalent). The registrant would then be required to complete a new registration form to become eligible to vote in future elections.

iii. SAVE Returns No Match

If SAVE is unable to find a match, the registrant must be processed like any other registrant who has not provided satisfactory DPOC. See [Chapter 1, Section II\(A\)\(4\)](#). Specifically, if valid DPOC cannot be electronically acquired via AZMVD records or the statewide voter registration database (and the registrant’s AZMVD record is not shown to have a non-citizen authorized presence designation), a County Recorder must:

1. Process the voter registration application and designate the registrant as a “federal-only” voter; and
2. Send a letter to the registrant (including a DPOC Submission Form/SAVE No Match Notice) within 10 business days, informing the registrant that they have been registered

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as a “federal-only” voter and must submit other valid DPOC to become a “full-ballot” voter.

b. Naturalization Ceremonies

County Recorder representatives who conduct registration drives at naturalization ceremonies must take special precautions to ensure registration forms are properly processed.

- The County Recorder representative who receives the registrant’s completed voter registration form must write the representative’s name or initials on the form, along with the date and some indication that the form was completed at a naturalization ceremony (e.g., “NC”);
- The County Recorder representative who conducted the registration drive must ensure that the registrant’s Naturalization Certificate Number, Citizenship Certificate Number, or Alien Registration Number is written on each registration form; and
- If any registrants reside outside that county, the County Recorder representative must bundle the voter registration forms by county and send them to the applicable County Recorders, along with a cover letter affirming that the registration forms were received through a naturalization ceremony.

The County Recorder who receives the bundle may rely on this cover letter as verification of citizenship. The County Recorder need not re-check any citizenship or immigration numbers to verify citizenship and may register the newly naturalized registrants as “full-ballot” voters (assuming no other deficiencies).

c. Verifying Citizenship Near Voter Registration Deadlines

Often there is a delay between when a registrant becomes a U.S. citizen and when that registrant’s citizenship status has been updated in SAVE. Therefore, certain precautions must be taken if a County Recorder receives a voter registration form within two weeks of a registration deadline that contains a Citizenship, Naturalization, or Alien Registration Number:

- If a County Recorder receives a registration form within 14 days of a voter registration deadline, the County Recorder must, as soon as practicable, notify the registrant by telephone and/or email (or by mail if the registrant’s telephone number and email is not available) about the potential need (in case SAVE results are not ready by the deadline) to submit further DPOC to be a “full-ballot” voter for the next election. For example, the registrant may present their naturalization papers or submit a copy to the County Recorder to satisfy the DPOC requirement.
- Within 14 days of Election Day, a County Recorder must check SAVE for the results of any pending verifications to print or create precinct registers for Election Day. If any cases remain pending for additional verification at that time, the County Recorder should be prepared to supplement the precinct registers immediately preceding the election or be prepared to issue Recorder’s Certificates to any newly registered voters whose citizenship was verified at the last minute. If the County Recorder cannot obtain verification of

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citizenship from SAVE by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before Election Day, the registrant must be registered as a “federal-only” voter and the County Recorder must notify the registrant that the registrant must submit other valid DPOC in order to become a “full-ballot” voter for future elections. See [Chapter 1, Section II\(A\)\(6\)](#).

7. Preservation and Protection of Citizenship Documentation

A County Recorder must maintain all DPOC received pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)](#) in a manner that the County Recorder reasonably believes will prevent access by unauthorized persons. Documents submitted for purposes of proving citizenship may be maintained outside the voter registration database, but the County Recorder must otherwise document in the voter registration database that DPOC had been received.

A County Recorder may destroy DPOC documents two years after the date of receipt. The County Recorder must exercise reasonable diligence to ensure any DPOC documents are properly destroyed. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\), \(J\)](#).

8. Statutory Obligation to Verify Citizenship⁸

a. Database Checks

Within 10 business days after receiving a Federal Form not accompanied by DPOC, a County Recorder must attempt to verify citizenship, including checking certain databases if the County has access. [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(D\)](#).⁹ This includes:

1. “The department of transportation databases of Arizona driver licenses or nonoperating identification licenses.” [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(D\)\(1\)](#). County Recorders already currently fulfill this obligation through their voter registration process, which automatically checks AZMVD records. See [Section II\(A\)\(2\)\(a\)](#) above; [Section IV\(H\)](#) below.
2. “The United States citizenship and immigration services [USCIS] systematic alien verification for entitlements [SAVE] program, if practicable.” [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(D\)\(3\)](#). A County Recorder may fulfill this obligation by following the procedures for SAVE usage as described in this Manual. See [Section II\(A\)\(6\)](#) above.

Note: SAVE is used only if a registrant provides a Naturalization Certificate Number, Citizenship Certificate Number, or Alien Registration Number. If a registrant does not

⁸ Litigation is pending on the statutory provisions cited here. See *Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB.

⁹ A related statutory enactment states that County Recorders must reject State Forms not accompanied by DPOC. [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(C\)](#). But, at the time of publication, a federal court has declared this provision in violation of the LULAC Consent Decree, so it should not be enforced. See *Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB, Order filed 9/14/23, Dkt. 534, pgs. 21–22.

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provide such a number, the statutory obligation to check SAVE does not apply because checking SAVE is not “practicable.” [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(D\)\(3\)](#).

Although the statute lists other databases for County Recorders to check, the Secretary of State is unaware of County Recorders currently having access to those databases for citizenship verification purposes. This includes the Social Security Administration database, the National Association for Public Health Statistics Information and Systems (NAPHSIS) electronic verification of vital events system, and the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) database. See [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(D\)\(2\), \(D\)\(4\), \(D\)\(5\)](#). Because the obligation to check databases applies only when County Recorders have access to citizenship data through the database, County Recorders currently have no obligation to check these databases.

b. Results of Database Checks

After conducting the database checks described above, if the County Recorder verifies citizenship, the applicant must be registered. [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(E\)](#). For example:

- When AZMVD records confirm citizenship and the applicant is otherwise eligible, the applicant must be registered as a “full-ballot” voter. See [Section II\(A\)\(2\)\(a\)](#) above.
- When SAVE returns U.S. citizen status and the applicant is otherwise eligible, the applicant must be registered as a “full-ballot” voter. See [Section II\(A\)\(6\)\(a\)\(i\)](#) above.

If the database checks affirmatively show the applicant is a non-citizen, the County Recorder must (1) not register the applicant, (2) notify the applicant, and (3) if the applicant does not timely provide DPOC in response, forward the application to the County Attorney and Attorney General. [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(E\)](#). For example:

- When AZMVD data show that the applicant’s AZMVD record has a non-citizen authorized presence designation and no valid DPOC has been provided by the applicant or otherwise acquired, the County Recorder should follow the procedures in [Section II\(A\)\(3\)](#) above. If the applicant does not timely submit valid DPOC in response to these procedures, the County Recorder shall then forward the application to the County Attorney and Attorney General.¹⁰
- When SAVE returns non-citizen status and no valid DPOC has been provided by the applicant or otherwise acquired, the County Recorder should follow the procedures in [Section II\(A\)\(6\)\(a\)\(ii\)](#) above. If the applicant does not timely submit valid DPOC in response to these procedures, the County Recorder shall then forward the application to the County Attorney and Attorney General.

¹⁰ The fact that an AZMVD record has a non-citizen authorized presence designation generally indicates that the applicant was not a citizen at the time they obtained that AZDL/ID#. However, it is possible that the applicant has become a naturalized citizen since then.

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If the County Recorder cannot verify whether the applicant is a citizen or non-citizen but the applicant is otherwise eligible to register to vote, the County Recorder must register the applicant as a “federal-only” voter. See [Section II\(A\)\(4\)](#) above.¹¹

c. Recording Efforts to Verify Citizenship

A County Recorder must record efforts made to verify citizenship status under [Section II\(A\)\(8\)\(a\)](#) and [\(b\)](#) above. See [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(F\)](#).

B. Age Requirement for Registration

A registrant must be at least 18 years old by the next “regular general election” that occurs following their registration. [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(2\)](#). For purposes of this requirement, the next “regular general election” is the next statewide general election held pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-211](#).¹²

A minor who is qualified to register to vote is not necessarily a qualified elector for the next election. Although registered, a minor will not be eligible to vote in any elections until they turn 18 years of age as required by [Ariz. Const. Art. VII, § 2](#).

If a County Recorder receives a voter registration form from a registrant who will be at least 18 years old on or before the next statewide general election but will not be 18 years old at the time of the next election, the registrant must be entered in the voter registration database and placed in a “suspense” status with a “registrant too young” reason code (or functional equivalent).

The County Recorder, after verifying citizenship as outlined in [Chapter 1\(II\)\(A\)](#), must notify the registrant by mail within 10 business days of receipt of the registration form to: (1) inform the registrant that their registration will remain in “suspense” until the registrant turns 18; (2) specify the next election where the registrant will be eligible to vote; and (3) specify the registrant’s “full-ballot” or “federal-only ballot” designation (providing an opportunity to submit DPOC where applicable). [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(1\), \(2\), \(3\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-134\(B\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-152\(A\)\(15\)](#).

On or after the registrant’s 18th birthday, the registrant’s status must be changed to “active” to make the registrant a qualified elector for the next election. A registered minor is not eligible to sign initiative, referendum, or recall petitions, or petitions for political party recognition, until they

¹¹ Related statutory enactments state that if, after checking databases, the County Recorder cannot verify citizenship, the County Recorder must notify the applicant that the applicant cannot vote in a presidential election or by mail with an early ballot until DPOC is provided. See [A.R.S. §§ 16-121.01\(E\); 16-127](#). But, at the time of publication, a federal court has declared these provisions preempted by the NVRA and they may not be enforced. See *Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB, Order filed 9/14/23, Dkt. 534, pgs. 10–15.

¹² [A.R.S. § 16-152\(A\)\(15\)](#) requires that the state voter registration form ask whether a registrant will be 18 years old “on or before *election day*” in order to register to vote. (Emphasis added). However, this provision must be interpreted consistently with [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(2\)](#), and therefore only forbids registration if the registrant will not be at least 18 years old by the next regular general election.

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turn 18 years old. [A.R.S. § 16-321\(B\)](#); [A.R.S. § 19-121.02\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 19-208.02\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-803\(E\)](#). However, a registered minor is eligible to sign candidate nomination petitions so long as the minor will be 18 years old by the next regular general election and, at the time of signing, the minor is a registered voter (with their registration status in “suspense” due only to age) in the electoral district of the office the candidate is seeking. [A.R.S. § 16-101](#); [A.R.S. § 16-121\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-321\(B\)](#); *Simpson v. Tarver*, No. CV-20-0218-AP/EL (Ariz. Aug. 24, 2020).

In order to maintain eligibility to vote in the next general election, the registered minor must be a resident of Arizona for the 29 days preceding the election, except as provided in [A.R.S. § 16-126](#). [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(4\)](#). See also [A.R.S. § 16-593](#).

C. Residency Requirements for Registration

A new registrant must be a resident of Arizona at least 29 days before the next election. [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(3\)](#). A registrant is a “resident” if they have physical presence in the county along with an intent to remain. A registrant may be temporarily absent from the jurisdiction without losing their residency status, as long as they have an intent to return. [A.R.S. § 16-101\(B\)](#). Generally, a County Recorder has no duty to verify a registrant’s residency status and shall rely on the registrant’s documentation or affirmation of residency. However, if the registrant submits an AZDL/ID# as proof of location of residence, the County Recorder must verify that number. See [A.R.S. § 16-123](#).

Except for UOCAVA registrants, a person who registers to vote shall provide an identifying document that establishes proof of location of residence. [A.R.S. § 16-123](#).¹³ However, a person who registers using a Federal Form need not provide such documentation to vote in federal elections.¹⁴ Accordingly, a person who registers using a Federal Form and who does not provide such documentation should be registered as a “federal-only” voter and cannot be registered as a “full-ballot” voter until such documentation is provided.

Any of the identifying documents listed in [A.R.S. § 16-579\(A\)\(1\)](#) constitutes satisfactory proof of location of residence, but it is not an exhaustive list of the documents that can be used to satisfy [A.R.S. § 16-123](#).¹⁵ Further, [A.R.S. § 16-123](#) does not require tribal members or other Arizona residents to have a standard street address to satisfy [A.R.S. § 16-123](#). In addition to the documents listed in [A.R.S. § 16-579\(A\)\(1\)](#), documents satisfying the requirement in [A.R.S. § 16-123](#) include, but are not limited to:

- A valid unexpired Arizona driver license or nonoperating ID (“AZ-issued ID”), regardless of whether the address on the AZ-issued ID matches the address on the

¹³ Litigation is pending on this statutory provision. See *Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB.

¹⁴ See *Mi Familia Vota et al. v. Fontes et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB, Order filed 09/14/23, Dkt. 534, pg. 9.

¹⁵ *Mi Familia Vota, et al., v. Fontes, et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB, Order filed 09/14/23, Dkt. 534, pp. 33-34.

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ID-holder's voter registration form and even if the AZ-issued ID lists only a P.O. Box.

- Any Tribal identification document, including but not limited to a census card, an identification card issued by a tribal government, or a tribal enrollment card, regardless of whether the Tribal identification document contains a photo, a physical address, a P.O. Box, or no address.
- Written confirmation signed by the registrant that they qualify to register pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-121\(B\)](#), regarding registration of persons who do not reside at a fixed, permanent, or private structure.

If the County Recorder acquires an AZDL/ID# from AZMVD for an applicant, that AZDL/ID# satisfies the proof of location of residence requirement for a State or Federal Form. [A.R.S. § 16-123](#).

Although often interchangeable, the 29-day residency qualification ([A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(3\)](#)) is distinct from the 29-day deadline to register to vote ([A.R.S. § 16-120](#)) in advance of an election.

1. Determining Residency for Homeless/Transient Voters

A person who is otherwise qualified to register to vote shall not be refused registration or declared ineligible to vote because the person does not live in a fixed, permanent, or private structure. [A.R.S. § 16-121\(C\)](#).

Pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-121\(B\)](#), a person who does not reside at a fixed, permanent, or private structure may use any of the following places as their registration address:

1. A homeless shelter to which the registrant regularly returns;¹⁶
2. The place at which the registrant is a resident;
3. The county courthouse in the county in which the registrant resides; or
4. A general delivery address for a post office covering the location where the registrant is a resident.

2. Voting in a Presidential Election after Moving Out-of-State

Notwithstanding the 29-day residency requirement, a registrant who moves away from Arizona after the 30th day immediately preceding a presidential election may vote for presidential electors in Arizona (and for no other races or ballot questions) by early ballot in the Arizona precinct from which the registrant moved, in-person at the County Recorder's office, or by mail. [A.R.S. § 16-](#)

¹⁶ "Homeless shelter" is defined as "a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide temporary living accommodations to individuals who lack a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence." [A.R.S. § 16-121\(D\)](#).

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126(A). A registrant who votes pursuant to this provision shall have their registration promptly canceled after the election. [A.R.S. § 16-126\(B\)](#).

3. Residency Requirement for UOCAVA Voters

The only other exception to the requirement for residency prior to the election is for a UOCAVA registrant who has never resided in the United States but has at least one parent registered to vote in Arizona at the time of registration. [A.R.S. § 16-103\(E\)](#). See [Chapter 1, Section I\(B\)](#) for more information on registration and voting requirements for UOCAVA registrants.

D. Effect of Felony Conviction on Qualification to Register to Vote

A registrant may not register to vote if they have been convicted of treason or a felony, unless their civil rights have been restored. [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(5\)](#).

- If a registrant has only one felony conviction in Arizona, civil rights are automatically restored upon: (i) completion of the sentence, including probation, parole, and discharge from imprisonment; and (ii) payment of any restitution imposed. Payment of any other legal financial obligations, such as fines or court fees, is no longer required before civil rights are automatically restored after a first felony conviction. [A.R.S. § 13-907](#).¹⁷
- If a registrant has more than one Arizona felony conviction or is unable to pay restitution, they may petition the superior court in which they were convicted to restore their voting rights. If their convictions are federal, they may petition the superior court in their county of residence to restore their voting rights. [A.R.S. § 13-908](#).
- If a registrant has a felony conviction(s) from another state, they are eligible to register to vote in Arizona if their civil rights have been restored in the state of their conviction(s), assuming all other requirements for voter registration in Arizona are met. See *Parker v. City of Tucson*, 233 Ariz. 422, 431 (App. 2013).
- Those who have only misdemeanor convictions or are in pretrial detention remain eligible to register to vote assuming no other deficiencies.

A registrant must affirm under penalty of perjury that they are not barred from registering to vote due to a felony conviction. [A.R.S. § 16-152\(A\)\(16\)](#). A County Recorder has no duty to verify whether the civil rights of a registrant with felony conviction(s) have been restored and may rely on the registrant's affirmation when registering to vote.

For more information on when and how civil rights may be restored, see [A.R.S. § 13-604\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 13-905](#); [A.R.S. § 13-906](#); [A.R.S. § 13-907](#); [A.R.S. § 13-908](#); [A.R.S. § 16-1011\(C\)](#).

¹⁷ A person with a single felony conviction in Arizona is eligible for automatic rights restoration in Arizona upon completion of their sentence and payment of any restitution imposed, even if they have a felony conviction(s) in another state(s), so long as their civil rights have been restored in the other state(s). See *Parker v. City of Tucson*, 233 Ariz. 422, 431 (App. 2013) (stating that [A.R.S. § 13-912\(A\)](#) (renumbered as [A.R.S. § 13-907](#)) applies to first-time felony convictions that occurred in Arizona).

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County election officials should refer individuals who have questions regarding the impact of a criminal conviction on their eligibility to register to vote to the appropriate superior court for additional information on the rights restoration process.

E. Effect of Incapacitation on Qualification to Register to Vote

A registrant may not register to vote if they have been adjudicated mentally incapacitated by a court with their voting rights revoked. [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(6\)](#); [A.R.S. § 14-5101\(3\)](#). A registrant must affirm under penalty of perjury that they are not barred from registering to vote due to a court adjudication of mental incapacitation under [A.R.S. § 14-5101\(3\)](#). A County Recorder has no duty to verify whether a registrant has been adjudicated mentally incapacitated and may rely on the registrant's affirmation when registering to vote. For more information on findings of incapacitation and retention of voting rights, see [A.R.S. § 14-5101\(3\)](#); [A.R.S. § 14-5304.02](#).

F. Effect of Inability to Sign or Make a Mark

A person who is unable to complete, sign, or make their mark on a voter registration form due to physical disability is nonetheless eligible to register to vote. [A.R.S. § 16-101\(A\)\(4\)](#).

- In that circumstance, the voter registration form may be completed at the registrant's direction, and the person who assisted in completing the form must sign the assister's name on the State Form. [A.R.S. § 16-152\(A\)\(20\)](#).
- Even if the registrant needs assistance in filling out the form, if the registrant is able to sign or make their mark, the registrant should do so.
- If the registrant is unable to sign or make their mark, as a best practice, it is recommended (but not required) that the person assisting write "Voter Unable to Sign Due to Disability," or a substantially similar note, in the voter signature space.

III. VOTER REGISTRATION ASSISTANCE AGENCIES

A. Designated Voter Registration Assistance Agencies

Various agencies, organizations, and offices in Arizona may be designated as "voter registration assistance" agencies. An officially designated voter registration assistance agency:

- Provides assistance in registering to vote without regard to political party or affiliation;
- Develops written policies and conducts internal training to ensure compliance with federal and state voter registration laws;
- Meets with the Secretary of State and/or County Recorder, as applicable, on an as-needed basis to discuss voter registration policies and procedures;
- Receives State Forms (from the applicable County Recorder) and Federal Forms (from the Secretary of State) on a regular basis; and

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- Accepts and agrees to return completed voter registration forms to the applicable County Recorder within five business days of receipt of the completed forms.

52 U.S.C. § 20506; A.R.S. § 16-134(A); A.R.S. § 16-140; A.R.S. § 16-141.

All public assistance agencies and disabilities agencies are designated as voter registration assistance agencies under federal and state law and are subject to specified responsibilities to conduct voter registration. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(2); A.R.S. § 16-140.

- A “public assistance agency” means a state agency, division, or office that provides cash or in-kind assistance (such as access to medical care or transportation) to low-income or underserved populations. A.R.S. § 16-140(F)(3). The following agencies or divisions constitute “public assistance agencies” in Arizona:
 - Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES): Family Assistance Administration (FAA) within the Division of Benefits and Medical Eligibility (DBME)
 - Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS)
 - Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS): Division of Health Prevention
- A “disabilities agency” means a state agency, division, or office that administers state-funded programs to provide services to persons with disabilities. A.R.S. § 16-140(F)(2). The following offices or divisions constitute “disabilities agencies” in Arizona:
 - Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES):
 - a. Developmental Disabilities Division (DDD)
 - b. Employment and Rehabilitation Services Division (DERS)

Armed Forces Recruiting Centers are also designated as voter registration assistance agencies. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(c); A.R.S. § 16-140; A.R.S. § 16-141; *see also* Department of Justice guidance, available at <https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra>.

The Arizona Game and Fish Department (AGFD) is also required to assist with voter registration when accepting hunting, fishing, or trapping license applications by providing a voter registration form to each in-person applicant and referring an online applicant to the state’s voter registration website. A.R.S. § 16-132.

A County Recorder may also designate additional “voter registration volunteers” at their discretion, which could be any person, group, or entity, and may include governmental or nonprofit and other private organizations. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(3); A.R.S. § 16-140(E), (F)(1).

B. Tracking and Reporting Source of Registration

A County Recorder should ensure that State Forms provided to a public assistance or disabilities agency have the appropriate pre-populated source code to allow reliable tracking of the origin of a completed form. The source code should not be publicly decipherable but should allow a County

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Recorder to internally distinguish between public assistance versus disabilities agencies. [A.R.S. § 16-140\(D\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-152\(A\)\(22\)](#). A County Recorder must input the source of registration into each registrant's electronic registration record. See [Chapter 1, Section IV\(B\)\(2\)](#). The source code from a particular registrant's form may not be publicly disclosed and may only be used by election officials to monitor compliance with federal and state law. [A.R.S. § 16-140\(D\)](#).¹⁸

A voter registration assistance agency should ensure that the agency distributes voter registration forms with pre-populated source codes to the appropriate divisions or offices within the agency. Completed registration forms returned to the County Recorder should be distinguished between those received from public assistance versus disabilities assistance agencies, where applicable, for proper tracking. If the agency directs applicants to register to vote online (through [AZ MVD Now](#) or by downloading a registration form), the agency must utilize a reasonable method to track which applicants were directed to an online registration method, and offer to mail a paper registration form, at the applicant's request, if the applicant is unable to access online registration or unable to download and print a registration form.

The Secretary of State must report the number of registrations received through voter registration assistance agencies to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on a biennial basis. Accordingly, the County Recorders should ensure (through use of pre-populated source codes or other reliable method) that completed registration forms received from state agencies can be properly distinguished between a public assistance versus a disabilities assistance agency.

IV. VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESSING PROCEDURES

A. Statewide Voter Registration Database

Arizona operates a voter registration and election management system called the Access Voter Information Database (AVID). The statewide database is a matter of statewide concern and is not subject to modification or further regulation by a political subdivision. Maricopa and Pima County systems link to the state system through an interface. The 13 smaller counties directly use the state system. To the extent practicable, Maricopa and Pima County's systems will use the same terms, codes, and classifications as the state system. To the extent it is necessary for Maricopa and Pima to use different terms, codes, and classifications, they must correspond to the terms, codes, and classifications in the state system.

Maricopa and Pima County must file a detailed and complete explanation of their voter registration system or program and any subsequent revisions with the Secretary of State. [A.R.S. § 16-173](#). If Maricopa or Pima County anticipates needing to make substantive changes to their voter registration system that may inhibit data integration or otherwise impact compatibility with the state system, the Secretary of State's Office must be timely notified to enable consideration of compatibility with, and any necessary modifications to, the state system. Prior to implementation,

¹⁸ If, under certain circumstances, pre-populated source codes are not practicable, a County Recorder should develop another reliable method to receive, and track completed voter registration forms directly received from voter registration assistance and disabilities agencies.

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any substantive changes to the Maricopa or Pima County voter registration systems must be approved by the Secretary of State for compatibility with the statewide voter registration system. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(J\)](#).

B. Registration Codes in the Statewide Voter Registration Database

A County Recorder must assign the appropriate status, reason, source, and form code to each registrant's record.

1. Registration Status and Reason Codes

There are eight (8) recognized "status" codes that may be selected in the statewide voter registration database: active, inactive, suspense, canceled, not eligible, merged, archived, and not registered. Each status code has its own set of "reason" codes that provide further detail on the reason the particular status code was assigned. County Recorders must track the registration status and reason codes using statewide uniform codes as defined by the Secretary of State in consultation with County Recorders.

2. Registration Source Codes

A registration "source" code describes the source from which a voter registration form was received by the County Recorder or the source that circulated the registration form.

The following sources must be tracked in the voter registration database:

Source
Registration form was received from NVRA-mandated public assistance agencies
Registration form was completed in-person or dropped off at the County Recorder's Office counter
Registration form was received from voter registration efforts or volunteers designated by the County Recorder
Registration form was received from Armed Forces recruitment offices
Registration form was received from state-funded agencies primarily serving persons with disabilities
Registration form was received from a Naturalization ceremony
Registration form was received from a political party or third-party organization's voter registration drive
Registration form was received from other public agencies designated by the state or county but not mandated by NVRA (e.g., city clerks, libraries, post offices, Arizona Game and Fish Department, Native Health)
Registration form was received through an in-person MVD transaction
Registration form was received through an online MVD transaction

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Registration form was received through Arizona’s stand-alone online voter registration website
Form was received directly from the registrant (Federal Post Card Application)
Form was received directly from the registrant (Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot)
Form was received together with a Provisional Ballot
Registration form was received through voter registration efforts by the Secretary of State’s Office
Other

County Recorders must track the registration sources using statewide uniform source codes as defined by the Secretary of State in consultation with County Recorders. County Recorders and staff may obtain the exact source codes associated with specific sources from the Secretary of State’s Office and must keep that information confidential to avoid public disclosure of the source of a particular voter’s registration.

C. Minimum Required Information on Registration Forms

A State, Federal, FPCA, and FWAB Form must contain the following minimum information to be considered complete:

- registrant’s name;
- residential address or description of residence location;
- date of birth (DOB);
- place of birth (for State Forms only);¹⁹
- proof of location of residence ([A.R.S. § 16-123](#); [A.R.S. § 16-579\(A\)\(1\)](#); [Chapter 1, Section II\(C\)](#));²⁰
- a checkmark or other appropriate mark in the “yes” box next to the question regarding citizenship. Notwithstanding [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(A\)](#), a County Recorder may not reject a voter registration application that does not contain a checkmark in the box next to the question regarding citizenship when the person provides DPOC and is otherwise eligible to vote; and
- signature or other statement indicating that the affidavit was completed at the registrant’s direction ([A.R.S. § 16-152 \(A\)\(19\)-\(20\)](#)).

If the registrant possesses an AZDL/ID# or Social Security number (SSN), the registrant’s AZDL/ID# or the last four digits of the SSN (SSN4) should be provided as well. If the registrant does not list an AZDL/ID# or SSN4 on the State Form, the registrant is nonetheless permitted to

¹⁹ Litigation is pending on the “place of birth” requirement. *Mi Familia Vota, et al., v. Fontes, et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB.

²⁰ In the context of a Federal Form, failure to provide proof of residence location shall not prevent a person from being registered to vote in federal elections. *See Mi Familia Vota, et al., v. Fontes, et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB, Order filed 09/14/23, Dkt. 534, pg. 9.

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register to vote. The registrant will be assigned a unique identifying number by the statewide voter registration database that will serve as a voter identification number.

The state-specific instructions accompanying the Federal Form explain that “[i]f you do not have a current and valid driver license or non-operating identification license or a social security number, please write ‘NONE’ on the form.” However, a County Recorder may not reject a Federal Form for failure to write “NONE.” Similarly, for the FPCA and the FWAB, if the registrant does not list an AZDL/ID# or SSN4, the registrant is directed to write “I do not have a Social Security Number or State issued ID number.” However, failure to write this statement does not affect the registrant’s ability to register to vote. A unique identifying number will be assigned to the registrant by the statewide voter registration database for identification purposes.

If the minimum requirements listed above have been met, the form should be processed and the registrant should be entered into the voter registration database in an “active” status if they otherwise meet the requirements for registration. If the minimum requirements have not been met, the County Recorder must: (i) follow-up with the registrant and seek the missing information (if the County Recorder has the registrant’s address, telephone number, or email address); or (ii) place the registrant in “not registered” status if the County Recorder has no reasonable means to contact the registrant.

[A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-152\(A\)\(2\)-\(3\), \(8\), \(12\), \(14\), \(19\)-\(20\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-166\(F\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 21083\(a\)\(1\)\(A\)\(iii\)](#).

If the registration form does not contain the registrant’s name, residence address or description of residence location, DOB, or signature (or assisting person’s signature), but the County Recorder has a mailing address, telephone number, or email address to contact the registrant to request the incomplete information, the registrant should be entered into the voter registration database in a “suspense” status until the incomplete information or a new voter registration form is received.²¹ If contact information is missing, a County Recorder must, if practicable, use reasonable efforts to research and acquire contact information for the registrant through any appropriate means.

- If the information on the form is incomplete or illegible, and the County Recorder has contact information for the registrant, the County Recorder shall notify the registrant within 10 business days of receipt of the form, request the missing or illegible information, and inform the registrant that they will remain in “suspense” status, with the reason code “registrant-waiting verification” (or functional equivalent) until the information is received.
- If a County Recorder does not have the necessary information to contact the registrant by mail, telephone, or email, the registration form should be set aside and/or the record should

²¹ A registrant should not be placed in a “suspense” status solely for providing a description of residence location or other nonstandard residence address. In such cases, County Recorders should make all reasonable efforts to ascertain the registrant’s physical residence location and should only deem the residence address field “incomplete” after such reasonable efforts failed.

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be entered in the voter registration database using the status code “suspense” and the reason code “insufficient information on registration form” (or functional equivalent).

If the County Recorder receives the missing, incomplete, or illegible information by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day, the registrant is deemed to have been registered on the date the registration was first received or dated. [A.R.S. § 16-134\(B\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-121.01\(A\)](#). Otherwise, the registrant’s status must remain in “suspense” (or functional equivalent). If, after the next regular general election, the registrant still has not provided the missing information, the registrant’s record may be changed to “not registered” (or functional equivalent). After the statewide voter registration system archives the record, the registrant would be required to complete a new registration form to become eligible to vote in future elections.

D. Political Party Preference

A registrant may select a political party preference by checking one of four boxes on the State Form: (1) Republican; (2) Democratic; (3) Other _____; or (4) None or No Party.²²

If the “Other” box is checked and the registrant writes a political party preference, the registrant’s selection should be entered in the voter registration database as follows:

- Republican: “Republican,” “Rep,” “GOP,” or any substantially similar designation
- Democratic: “Democratic,” “Democrat,” “Dem,” or any substantially similar designation
- Libertarian: “Libertarian,” “LBT,” “LIB,” or any substantially similar designation
- No Labels: “No Labels,” “NOL,” or any substantially similar designation
- Green: “Green,” “GRN,” or any substantially similar designation
- Independent: “Independent,” “IND,” or any substantially similar designation
- Other: Any other non-recognized political party
- PND: “Party Not Designated,” “PND,” “No Preference,” “Unaffiliated,” “No Party,” “None,” or any substantially similar designation.

If a *new* registrant leaves the political party preference field blank, the registrant’s party preference will be “Party Not Designated” or “PND.” If an *existing* registrant leaves the political party preference field blank, however, the registrant’s existing political party preference will be retained, and no changes should be made.

For previously recognized political parties that have since lost recognition (at the state or local level), the County Recorder may continue to use the party designation for registrants in the voter registration database if the registrant entered that party affiliation on their registration application.

²² [A.R.S. § 16-152\(A\)\(5\)](#) requires that the two largest political parties entitled to continued representation on the ballot shall be listed on the voter registration form, and the form shall include a blank line for other party preference options.

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However, for the purposes of reporting voter registration statistics, *see* [Chapter 1, Section IX](#), these registrants shall be reported as “Other.”

A registrant wishing to change their political party preference from the one indicated in the registration record must reregister. [A.R.S. § 16-136](#).

E. Date of Registration

A mailed paper registration form is deemed to be timely received for an election if: (1) the form is postmarked on or before the voter registration deadline and received by the County Recorder by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day; or (2) the form is dated on or before the voter registration deadline and received by the County Recorder within five calendar days after the voter registration deadline. [A.R.S. § 16-134\(C\)](#).

The registration effective date will be the date the original voter registration form was dated. If a registration form was submitted without a date, a County Recorder must use the postmark date as the date of registration, unless the postmark date is illegible or otherwise unavailable, in which case the date of receipt shall be used as the date of registration. [A.R.S. § 16-134\(C\), \(D\)](#).

If a paper registration form is missing any of the required minimum information or DPOC, or is otherwise placed in “suspense” status, and the registrant later provides that missing information or DPOC, the County Recorder must deem the date of registration to be the date the registration form was dated. If the registration form was not dated, the postmark date shall be the date of registration unless the postmark date is illegible or unavailable, in which case the date of receipt shall be used as the date of registration. DPOC must be provided by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before Election Day for the voter to be eligible to vote a “full-ballot” in that election. *See* [Chapter 1, Section II\(A\)](#). Any other required information on the form must be provided by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day for the voter to be eligible to vote in that election. [A.R.S. § 16-134\(C\)](#). If necessary supplemental information is provided by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day, the registrant is a qualified elector for that election, even if the supplemental information is provided after the voter registration deadline for that election.

However, in order for a petition signature to be deemed valid, any necessary missing information on the voter registration form, and DPOC for non-federal petitions, must be received by the County Recorder by the date the filing officer transmits the petition signature sheets to the County Recorder for verification.

F. Initial Duplicate Checking Within the County

Before a new registration record is entered into the voter registration database, a County Recorder must first conduct a search of the voter records to determine whether there is already an existing record for the registrant *within the county*. A County Recorder may use any appropriate criteria to identify potential matches, including (but not limited to) any information in the voter’s record.

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If a County Recorder ultimately determines that the registration form was submitted by an existing registrant in the county, the County Recorder must update the registrant's existing record with the new registration information in lieu of creating a new record. In other words, the new registration form is treated as a request to update the registrant's existing/original record. If the initial duplicate search indicates that the registrant does not already have a record in that county, the County Recorder must create a new record.

If a County Recorder overlooks an existing/original record and inadvertently creates a new record for the registrant, the statewide voter registration system will flag the records for the County Recorder to resolve.

G. Electronic Verification Procedures

Once a new or amended voter registration record is entered into the statewide voter registration database, the system automatically checks the registrant's information against AZMVD records and, if necessary, the Social Security Administration (SSA) database.

Verifying records against AZMVD and/or SSA data serves multiple functions:

1. If the registrant provided an AZDL/ID#, a match against AZMVD records validates proof of citizenship (unless the match is to a non-citizen AZDL/ID# or an AZDL/ID# issued before October 1, 1996).
2. If the registrant failed to provide either an AZDL/ID# or SSN4, but the registrant's provided information matches against AZMVD or SSA data, the system will "acquire" the missing AZDL/ID# or SSN4 from those sources and import that information into the registrant's record.
3. A match against AZMVD records or SSA database confirms the registrant's identity and helps ensure the integrity of registration rolls.

The registrant's new or amended record is also automatically verified against existing records in the statewide voter registration database for the purpose of identifying (and potentially canceling) any duplicate record. The details of the electronic verification procedures are defined in the statewide voter registration system.

Voter registrations electronically transmitted from AZMVD to the statewide voter registration are generated for registrants who register through AZMVD, whether online at www.azmvdnow.gov or in-person at an AZMVD (or authorized third-party provider) office. [52 U.S.C. § 20504](#); [A.R.S. § 16-112](#).

All AZMVD records for a particular county are populated to an interface, where each record is individually processed by the County Recorder. If there is no match against an existing registrant's record in the county, the County Recorder should create a new registration record and import the AZMVD record into the new registration record. Once the new record is saved, the statewide voter registration system will conduct the same automatic AZMVD/SSA verification and statewide duplicate checking that occurs when a paper form has been entered.

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If a County Recorder finds a match between an AZMVD and an existing registration record, the County Recorder should apply the AZMVD updates to the existing record.

H. Issuance of Voter Registration Cards

A County Recorder shall issue a voter registration card to any new registrants and may, at the discretion of the County Recorder, issue a new card to existing registrants who update their name, address, or political party preference. [A.R.S. § 16-163\(B\)](#). New voter registration cards should also be issued to any registrants affected by redistricting or re-precincting. A new voter registration card need not be issued if a registrant makes other changes to their registration information, including opting into the electronic publicity pamphlet.

A voter registration card should be labeled “Voter Identification Card” or “Voter Registration Card” and contain the following information:

1. Registrant’s full name;
2. Registrant’s residence address or a description of residence location;
3. Registrant’s political party preference;
4. Registrant’s date of registration (and/or effective date of change);
5. Registrant’s voter registration ID number;
6. Registrant’s precinct name and/or number;
7. Registrant’s district information:
 - a. Congressional district (all registrants);
 - b. Legislative district (only “full-ballot” voters); and
 - c. Any additional optional district information;
8. County name;
9. Contact information for the County Recorder; and
10. If the registrant is a “federal-only” voter, a clear indication of “federal-only” voter designation.

The mailer that accompanies the voter registration card should contain the same information on the card and the following additional information:

1. Information stating that a new voter registration card is enclosed and instructions to discard the old card;
2. Information on use of the voter registration card (*e.g.*, as one piece of non-photo identification at the voting location);
3. How to contact the County Recorder if information on the card is incorrect;

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4. Instructions on how to find one’s voting location;
5. If the registrant is a “federal-only” voter, information about what “federal-only” means, what limitations apply (including voting, signing petitions, etc.), and how the voter can become a “full-ballot” voter by providing DPOC;
6. Information about identification requirements at the voting location;
7. Information about how to request an early ballot or be placed on the AEVL; and
8. Outline of the reasons why a person would need to re-register.

The County Recorder shall send a voter registration card to the voter’s designated mailing address, if different than residential address, within 30 days of information being entered into the voter registration database for new registrants or registrants with new information. [A.R.S. § 16-163\(B\)](#). Return of an undeliverable voter registration card may be grounds to initiate the “NVRA process” by mailing another notice. [A.R.S. § 16-163\(C\)](#). See [Chapter 1, Section IX\(D\)](#).

I. Help America Vote Act Identification Requirements

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires a first-time voter to prove identity to vote in a federal election if the voter registered to vote by mail or through a third-party registration drive (*i.e.*, the registration form was not completed in-person at the County Recorder’s office or other designated voter registration agency). [52 U.S.C. § 21083\(b\)\(1\)-\(3\)](#).

The identification requirement under HAVA for in-person voting is the same as the identification requirement under state law for in-person early, emergency, and Election Day voting. Therefore, all in-person voters are subject to the same identification requirements. [A.R.S. § 16-579\(A\)\(1\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20505\(c\)\(1\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 21083\(b\)\(2\)\(A\)\(i\)](#).

HAVA requires identity to be proven in one of the following ways for a first-time voter to vote by mail:

- Verification of a registrant’s AZDL/ID# or SSN4;
- Presentation of a registrant’s current and valid photo identification; or
- Presentation of a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the registrant.

[52 U.S.C. § 21083\(b\)](#). For purposes of HAVA compliance, verification of a registrant’s AZDL/ID# or SSN4 will be deemed sufficient proof of identity. If a registrant has not satisfied HAVA’s identification requirement for first-time voters who registered by mail, the registrant must be entered into the statewide voter registration database with a designation of “FED” (or functional equivalent). After the registrant proves identity by presenting a photo identification or utility bill/bank statement/government document with the voter’s name and address, the designation must be changed to “FEDI” (or functional equivalent) to indicate that the voter’s identity has been verified in compliance with HAVA.

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V. PROTECTION OF SECURED REGISTRANTS

The following eligible registrants are entitled to have their registration record generally shielded from public disclosure, beyond the standard confidentiality protections available to all registrants:

- Registrants with a government background who demonstrate to a court that sealing their registration record will reduce a danger to the registrant’s life or safety (collectively “protected government officials”), [A.R.S. § 16-153\(A\), \(B\)\(3\), \(K\)](#);
- Registrants subject to an Order of Protection or Injunction against Harassment (collectively “protected victims”), [A.R.S. § 16-153\(A\), \(J\), \(K\)\(4\)](#);
- Registrants enrolled in the Secretary of State’s Address Confidentiality Program (ACP). ACP participants typically include victims of domestic violence, sexual offenses, or stalking offenses. The Secretary of State provides ACP participants a substitute address for public disclosure purposes and redirects mail from the substitute address to the ACP’s participant’s actual address, or if applicable, other designated address for receiving mail, [A.R.S. § 41-161\(2\)](#); [A.R.S § 41-162](#).

Protected government officials, protected victims, and ACP participants are collectively referred to as “secured registrants” with “secured records.” Other persons who reside with secured registrants are also entitled to request to have their registration record secured. A registrant seeking secured status may obtain an application from the Administrative Office of the Courts at <http://www.azcourts.gov/selfservicecenter/Self-Service-Forms/Personal-Information-Redaction>.

A protected government official or protected victim who is not an existing registered voter, but seeks to have their record sealed upon registering for the first time, should contact the County Recorder to coordinate the appropriate procedure. See [A.R.S. § 16-153](#).

An ACP participant who seeks to register to vote must initiate the process through the Secretary of State’s ACP Division. See [A.R.S § 41-162](#). The ACP participant will be provided a Protected Voter Registration Packet, which includes a State Form and a Participant Protected Voter Records Form (PVR Form) and instructions.²³ Upon receipt of the ACP participant’s completed Protected Voter Registration Packet from the Secretary of State’s ACP Division, the designated County Recorder official must process the registration form within five business days and complete the following steps: (i) mark the registrant’s record as secured, (ii) include the registrant on the AEVL;²⁴ and (iii) scan the State Form into the voter registration database so only the registrant’s name and signature will be visible, and ensure the original State Form is protected from unauthorized access.

²³ More information on the process is available at <https://azsos.gov/services/acp>.

²⁴ The Secretary of State’s ACP Division requires that ACP participants be added to the AEVL to maintain the confidentiality of the ACP participant’s voting precinct and will therefore ensure the “AEVL” box is selected on the State Form.

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When a person with an existing Active, Inactive and Suspense voter registration record becomes an ACP participant, the Secretary of State must secure the participant's voter registration record in AVID and notify the County Recorder of the participant's:

- Secured status;
- Current residence address or description of residence location; and
- Substitute address for the County Recorder to revise the participant's voter registration record. Which includes adding the substitute address as the participant's mailing address. The residence address cannot be changed in the voter registration record until the participant re-registers to vote.
- The Secretary of State will secure new participants with a cancelled voter registration record and send notice to the appropriate county that the voter registration record has been secured.

An ACP participant who is not already registered to vote may register to vote using the substitute address and must provide the participant's actual residence address for precinct designation purposes when returning their voter registration forms that will be forwarded to the election official by the Address Confidentiality Program/Secretary of State's Office, once received by the participant. An ACP participant's substitute address shall not be used as an actual residence address for voter registration purposes. [A.R.S. § 41-166\(E\)](#).

A. Marking Secured Records

A secured record in the voter registration database must be visually distinguishable from non-secured records. A County Recorder shall implement additional security protocols to limit employee access to secured records.

B. Responding to Public Records Requests

Protected government officials and protected victims (and any registered voter who resides at the same residence who has requested and received protected status) are entitled to have their identifying information, including any of that person's documents and voting precinct number, shielded from public disclosure. [A.R.S. § 16-153\(A\)](#).

ACP participants are entitled to have their "actual address" shielded from public disclosure, which includes the ACP participant's actual residential address, work address, school address, telephone number, county of registration, and precinct number. [A.R.S. § 41-161\(1\)](#); [A.R.S. § 41-165\(E\)](#).

Neither the Secretary of State nor a County Recorder may disclose an ACP participant as a registered voter because doing so would reveal the ACP participant's county of residence in violation of [A.R.S. § 41-161\(1\)](#) and [A.R.S. § 41-162\(A\)](#). The Secretary of State and/or County Recorder may also exclude protected government officials and protected victims from a response to a public records request for registrant records, if separating protected government officials/protected victims from ACP participants would present an undue burden.

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However, nothing in this Section precludes the Secretary of State or County Recorder from: (1) providing non-sealed information about a protected government official or protected victim if otherwise required by law or a court order; or (2) including secured registrants in statistical reports.

C. Creating Signature Rosters or Uploading E-Pollbook Data

County Recorders may not include secured registrants, whether an ACP participant or protected government official or protected victim, on a signature roster or in an e-pollbook. If a county uses a tablet or computer terminal that has live access to the voter registration database via a secure virtual private network (VPN) connection, the system must be capable of shielding secured registrants' information from public view (or providing view access only to the secured registrant).

In the event a secured registrant attempts to vote provisionally at a polling place (and informs the poll worker of their secured status), the poll worker should undertake any additional or necessary precautions, including but not limited to:

- Confirming the correct ballot style;
- Ensuring that a protected government official or protected victim lists their actual residential address on the provisional ballot envelope;
- Making a notation about secured registrant status on the provisional ballot envelope; and/or
- Limiting the signature roster to the registrant's voter ID number and the notation "address protected."

D. Issuance of Official Mail and Election Documents

A protected government official or protected victim should receive all official election mail and be issued any voter registration cards using the registrant's actual information. An ACP participant should receive all official election mail and be issued any voter registration cards using the substitute address (and excluding the precinct name or number). [A.R.S. § 41-166\(E\)](#).

E. Signing Candidate, Initiative, Referendum, or Recall Petitions

Secured registrants are encouraged not to sign petitions if they wish to maximize protection of the confidentiality of their identifying information and residential address.

The Secretary of State and County Recorders have no obligation to redact an address or other identifying information from a candidate, initiative, referendum, recall, or new party recognition petition signed by a secured registrant. Nor is the Secretary of State or a County Recorder required to research an ACP participant's actual address if a substitute address is placed on a petition. However, a secured registrant who signs a petition and indicates "protected address," "secured registrant," or other substantially similar designation in the address line shall not have the registrant's petition signature invalidated solely based on the failure to provide the registrant's actual address. *See* [A.R.S. § 16-321\(E\)](#). In such cases, the County Recorder may verify the petition signature based on the registrant's address in the voter registration record. Verification of the

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petition signature, however, may necessarily disclose the secured registrant’s district and/or county of residence. In addition, the registrant’s identifying information, including residential address, may appear on other petition-related records, which may be disclosed through a public records request or court challenge relating to the petition. For these reasons, secured registrants are encouraged not to sign petitions if they wish to maximize the confidentiality of their residential address.

F. Terminating Secured Registrant Status

A protected government official’s or protected victim’s registration record remains sealed for a period of five years, to expire by January 5 of the following year, unless judicially renewed. A County Recorder must mail a notice to the protected government official or protected victim at least six months prior to the January 5th expiration date of their secured status. [A.R.S. § 16-153\(F\)](#). A County Recorder may extend the protected government official’s or protected victim’s secured status upon receipt of a new court order. Otherwise, a County Recorder will remove the secured status from the registrant’s record after January 5 if the County Recorder does not timely receive a new court order.

An ACP participant’s registration record remains sealed indefinitely unless a County Recorder is notified by the registrant or the Secretary of State’s ACP Division that the registrant is no longer a participant in the ACP program. Upon receipt of such notice, a County Recorder should remove the secured status from the registrant’s record and send all future correspondence to the registrant’s actual residential address previously provided on the registration form (not the substitute address previously utilized for confidentiality purposes).

VI. REGISTRATION PROCESSING DURING “BOOKS CLOSED”

The period between the last day to register to vote for an election and Election Day is known as the “books closed” period. Historically, unless the specific changes were requested by the registrant before the voter registration deadline, County Recorders refrained from making substantive changes to voter registration records during the “books closed” period in order to ensure that the creation of signature rosters, e-pollbook rosters, and the verification of provisional ballots are based on records of eligible voters as of the last day to register to vote. However, voter registration processing may continue during the “books closed” period if the County Recorder has other means of identifying records of eligible voters as of the last day to register (*e.g.*, the voter registration system is able to sort by effective eligibility date).

Even if a County Recorder chooses to suspend voter registration processing during the “books closed” period, the following updates should continue to be processed:

- **Address Updates:** If an existing registrant updates their residence or mailing address after the voter registration deadline but prior to the finalization of the signature or e-pollbook rosters, a County Recorder may update the registrant’s record with the updated address. Registrants who updated their residence address would be permitted to vote a regular ballot at their new voting precinct (if different from their prior precinct). (Voters who registered

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prior to the voter registration deadline but failed to notify the County Recorder of a change in residence address prior to the date of the election are eligible to vote a provisional ballot and may update their residence address at their *new* voting precinct.)

- **Name Changes:** If an existing registrant updates their name after the voter registration deadline but prior to the finalization of signature rosters or e-pollbook rosters, a County Recorder may update the registrant’s record with the new name.
- **DPOC Changes:** If a “federal-only” voter provides satisfactory DPOC to the County Recorder by 5:00 p.m. on the Thursday before Election Day, the registrant’s designation must be updated to “full-ballot” voter. See [Chapter 1, Section II\(A\)\(2\)](#).
- **Adding Supplemental Information to Incomplete Registration:** If a voter submitted a voter registration application by the applicable registration deadline but the application was missing the minimum required information to be considered complete, see [Chapter 1, Section IV\(C\)](#), the voter has until 7:00 p.m. on Election Day to provide the missing information to be eligible to vote in that election, and the County Recorder must update the registrant’s record with the missing information if provided by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day. [A.R.S. § 16-134\(B\)](#).

VII. ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE

To be eligible to vote, a registrant must be both: (1) timely registered for a particular election (*i.e.*, registered in the jurisdiction at least 29 days before the date of the election), and (2) a qualified elector in a particular jurisdiction.

In general, a “qualified elector” is a person who is:

- Qualified to register to vote and is properly registered to vote (*i.e.*, included on the voter registration rolls) in the jurisdiction in question; and
- Will be at least 18 years old on or before the date of the election.

A registrant remains a qualified elector unless the registrant moves to another jurisdiction, has their voting rights revoked due to felony conviction or incapacity, or has their registration canceled pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)](#). [A.R.S. § 16-121\(A\)](#). The definition of a “qualified elector,” however, may differ in a Special Taxing District as prescribed in Title 48, Arizona Revised Statutes.

A. Age Requirements to Vote in the Next Election

To be eligible to vote in the next election held pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-204](#), a registrant must be 18 years old on or before the date of that next election. [A.R.S. § 16-121\(A\)](#).

If a registrant will be at least 18 years old on or before the next statewide general election but will not be at least 18 years old by the next election held in a particular jurisdiction, the registrant remains qualified to *register* to vote but is not a *qualified elector* for that next election. For example, if a registrant will turn 18 years old before the general election but will be 17 years old

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at the time of the primary election, the registrant may register but is not entitled to vote in the primary election.

B. Residency Requirements to Vote in the Next Election

To be eligible to vote in the next election, a registrant generally must have residency within the boundaries (or proposed boundaries) of a particular jurisdiction for the 29-day period preceding that election. [A.R.S. § 16-120\(A\)](#). For example, to vote in a city or town election, a registrant must be a resident of that city or town at least 29 days before that election. [A.R.S. § 9-822\(A\)](#). A registrant may be temporarily absent from the jurisdiction without losing their residency status, as long as the registrant has an intent to return. [A.R.S. § 16-101\(B\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-103](#).

1. Residency Requirements When Jurisdictional Boundaries Change

If jurisdictional boundaries change during the 29-day period preceding the next election, a registrant must have residency within the new boundaries in order to vote in the next election in that new jurisdiction. This applies to boundary changes brought about by annexation.

For example, a registrant who previously resided in a county island, but whose property was annexed into a city or town during the 29-day period preceding an election, is qualified to vote in the city or town's next election if the registrant resided in the city or town's new boundaries during the 29-day period before the election. [A.R.S. § 9-822\(B\)](#).

2. Eligibility to Vote When Registrant Moves Within 29-Day Period

If a registrant moves to a different precinct within the same county during the 29-day period preceding the next election, the registrant remains a qualified elector for the next election. If the registrant updates their residence address prior to the creation of the signature rosters or e-pollbook rosters, a County Recorder may update the registrant's record with the updated residence address in the voter registration database and the voter will be permitted to vote a regular ballot at their *new* voting precinct. The registrant is also entitled to update their address at the appropriate polling place for the voter's new address and then vote a provisional ballot on Election Day. [A.R.S. § 16-122](#), [A.R.S. § 16-135](#), [A.R.S. § 16-584](#).

If a registrant moves to a different county during the 29-day period preceding the next election, the registrant remains a qualified elector in the former county for that election and must vote in the *former* county. [A.R.S. § 16-125](#).

If a registrant moves to a different state during the 29-day period preceding the next election, the registrant is not a qualified elector (and is therefore ineligible to vote) in Arizona. However, a registrant retains the right to vote in Arizona for President of the United States (and no other races) at the general election during a Presidential election year. [A.R.S. § 16-126](#). Requesting a presidential-only ballot requires the County Recorder to cancel the registrant's record "promptly" following the general election. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(6\)](#).

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3. Exceptions to the 29-Day Residency Requirement

a. *Military and Overseas Voters*

Military and overseas registrants temporarily absent from the state are permitted to register and vote up until 7:00 p.m. on Election Day despite not physically residing in Arizona during the 29-day period preceding the election. [A.R.S. § 16-103](#); [A.R.S. § 16-543.02\(B\)](#). This exception also applies to a U.S. citizen who has never resided in the United States but whose parent is registered in Arizona and is a qualified elector for the next election. [A.R.S. § 16-103\(E\)](#).

b. *Public Officers Posted in Different County*

If a state employee or officer is posted to a duty station in a county other than the county from which they were appointed or elected, they (along with their spouse and dependents who reside in the household) remain qualified electors in the county of appointment or election, even if they physically reside in the county where the duty post is located. [A.R.S. § 16-124](#).

VIII. REGISTRATION DEADLINE TO VOTE IN NEXT ELECTION

A registrant who registers to vote at least 29 days before the next election (and is otherwise a qualified elector in that jurisdiction) is entitled to vote at the next election. [A.R.S. § 16-120\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-134\(C\)](#).

A. Date of Receipt of Voter Registrations

For online EZ Voter registrations, a registration is timely received if the registrant completes the online registration by 11:59 p.m. on the last day to register to vote. The time of registration is the time identified on the registrant's EZ Voter confirmation receipt.

For paper registrations submitted at a County Recorder's office, the Secretary of State's Office, an AZMVD office or affiliate, a voter registration assistance agency, or an authorized voter registration volunteer's office, a registration is timely if the registrant completes or delivers the registration form before the office closes for business on the last day to register to vote.

For paper registration forms that are mailed to a County Recorder's office or the Secretary of State's Office, a registration is timely if:

- The registration form is postmarked on or before the voter registration deadline and received by the County Recorder by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day; or
- The registration form is dated on or before the voter registration deadline and received by the County Recorder within five calendar days after the voter registration deadline.

[A.R.S. § 16-134\(C\)](#).

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For UOCAVA registrants using an FPCA or FWAB, a registration form is timely if received by the County Recorder's or Secretary of State's Office via mail, email, or fax by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day. [A.R.S. § 16-103\(C\)](#).

B. Voter Registration Form Received After Deadline

A registrant who registers to vote within 29 days of an election is eligible to vote at the election after the next election. [A.R.S. § 16-120\(A\)](#). For example, a person who registers 10 days before the primary election is not eligible to vote in the primary election but is eligible to vote in the general election.

If the County Recorder receives a new voter registration form less than 29 days before an election, and the registrant is not a military or overseas voter using the FPCA or FWAB registration form, the County Recorder may either:

- Enter the registrant's information in the voter registration database; or
- Refrain from entering the registrant's information in the voter registration database until after the next election.

If a County Recorder receives a voter registration form less than 29 days before an election from an existing registrant, the County Recorder may update the record prior to Election Day if the registrant will be a qualified elector in the precinct where the registrant resides.

C. When Registration Deadline Falls on a Weekend or Holiday

If the 29-day registration deadline falls on a weekend or state holiday (regardless of whether a particular county office is open for business), the registration deadline is extended to the next business day for state government. For example, if the registration deadline falls on Columbus Day (a Monday), a registrant is qualified to vote in the next election if they register on the following Tuesday. [A.R.S. § 16-120\(B\)](#); see also [A.R.S. § 1-301](#) (listing state holidays).

IX. VOTER REGISTRATION LIST MAINTENANCE

A. Deceased, Felon, and Incapacitated Registrants

Though the Secretary of State does not directly cancel any registration records, the Secretary of State is responsible for importing certain information received from federal and state officials into the statewide voter registration database, pursuant to which the statewide voter registration system will automatically cancel "hard matches" on the following limited bases:

1. The registrant is deceased;
2. The registrant was convicted of a felony in court; or
3. The registrant was adjudicated mentally incapacitated by a court.

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1. Deceased Registrants

The Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) provides the Secretary of State with a file each month (along with a combined file each year) that contains the name, DOB, SSN, date of death, father's name (if available), mother's maiden name, and last known address of deceased Arizona resident who passed away during the applicable period. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(E\)](#). Upon receipt, the Secretary of State shall upload the deceased registrant file into the statewide voter registration system for comparison against voter records. The system then initiates a matching process against registrant records in the statewide voter registration database.

a. Hard Match Criteria for Deceased Registrant Verification

For the purpose of verifying deceased resident records against the statewide voter registration database, a "hard match" occurs if the first three letters of the first and last name, DOB, and SSN4 match in both records. If the statewide voter registration system finds a "hard match," the registrant's record is automatically placed in "canceled" status with a reason code of "deceased-automatic resolution" (or functional equivalent). After canceling a registration, the County Recorder shall send a notice by forwardable mail informing the person that the person's registration has been canceled, the reason for cancellation, the qualifications of electors pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-101](#) and instructions to contact the County Recorder if the cancellation was in error. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(L\)](#).

b. Soft Match Criteria for Deceased Registrant Verification

For the purpose of verifying deceased resident records against the statewide voter registration database, a "soft match" occurs if the first three letters of the first and last name and DOB match in both records or there is a "hard match" against more than one existing registrant record.

If the system finds a "soft match" between the deceased record and a registrant record, it will flag the records and notify the appropriate County Recorder of the need to review and compare the records. The County Recorder must conduct an individualized inquiry and determine whether a "true match" exists between the records.

If a County Recorder determines that a "true match" exists, the County Recorder must select "match" in the system. The registrant's record will be automatically updated to "canceled" status with a reason code of "deceased." The County Recorder shall send a letter confirming the cancellation to the registrant's mailing address on record, with instructions to contact the County Recorder if the cancellation was in error.

If the County Recorder determines that a "true match" does not exist, the County Recorder must select "no match" in the system. The registrant's record will remain in its existing status without being placed in "canceled" status in the statewide voter registration database.

A County Recorder should follow the same procedures if the county directly receives deceased registrant information directly from ADHS instead of the Secretary of State.

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c. Other Sources of Information on Deceased Registrants

A County Recorder may also cancel a registrant's record if the County Recorder determines that the registrant is deceased based on other reliable sources, *see* [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(2\)](#), including, but not limited to, death notices received by the County Recorder's office and an affidavit of death from the registrant's next of kin. A County Recorder should match as much information as possible (including first name, last name, maiden name (if applicable), year of birth, place of birth, and city or town of residence) and be reasonably certain that a "true match" exists before canceling a registrant. For example, newspaper or online obituaries alone may not suffice to cancel a registrant record without additional research and confirmation. In cases where the County Recorder cannot confirm a "soft match," the County Recorder may send a letter to the registrant asking to confirm the information. Upon canceling a registrant based on other reliable sources of death, the County Recorder should send a letter, to the registrant's mailing address on record, confirming the cancellation and providing instructions for correcting an erroneous cancellation.

A registrant who passes away after casting a valid ballot is entitled to have their ballot tabulated and votes counted.

2. Registrants Convicted of a Felony or Found Mentally Incapacitated

The Secretary of State is responsible for receiving felony conviction and mental incapacitation information from federal and state officials and processing the information through the statewide voter registration system.

a. Sources of Felony Conviction and Incapacitation Information

The Secretary of State electronically receives periodic files from Arizona superior courts, including the Maricopa County Superior Court, containing the name, DOB, and SSN4 of Arizona residents recently convicted of a felony or found mentally incapacitated in that jurisdiction. Upon receipt and confirmation of proper formatting, the Secretary of State imports the files into the statewide voter registration system.

The Secretary of State also receives in various non-electronic formats: (1) additional felony conviction information from Arizona superior courts and the U.S. Department of Justice; and (2) additional mental incapacitation information from Arizona superior courts. Upon receipt, the Secretary of State converts these records into the proper electronic format and imports these files into the statewide voter registration system.

b. Processing Felony Conviction and Incapacitation Information

The statewide voter registration system compares the felony and mental incapacitation records against the statewide voter registration database for potential matches.

A "hard match" occurs when the first three letters of the first and last name, DOB, and SSN4 match an existing registrant record. In this case, the registrant's record is automatically placed in

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“canceled” status with the reason code of “felony–automatic resolution” or “declared incapacitated–automatic resolution” (or functional equivalent).

A “soft match” occurs when the first three letters of the first and last name and DOB match an existing registrant record (or there is a “hard match” against more than one existing record in the database). In this case, the system will flag the record for individual resolution by the applicable County Recorder. If the County Recorder finds a “true match,” the record may be placed in “canceled” status with the reason code “felony” or “declared incapacitated” (or functional equivalent).

The County Recorder must send a letter to the registrant confirming any cancellation based on a felony conviction or finding of mental incapacitation, and such notice letters should inform the registrant of where to get additional information about rights restoration.

A County Recorder should follow the same procedures if the county directly receives felony conviction or mental incapacitation information from a court instead of the Secretary of State. A County Recorder may reinstate a registrant’s record if the registrant was erroneously canceled based on mental incapacitation, but the registrant retained the right to vote by court order. If the registrant was canceled based on a felony conviction but later had their civil rights restored, the registrant must submit a new voter registration in order to be re-registered.

B. Secretary of State Duties to Forward Registrant Information

The Secretary of State also periodically receives registrant information that must be processed and forwarded to County Recorders for final resolution as described below.

1. Information Received from Out-of-State Jurisdictions

The Secretary of State occasionally receives correspondence from out-of-state jurisdictions providing information about Arizona registrants. The Secretary of State will promptly forward the correspondence to the applicable County Recorder(s) by email. The Secretary of State may not cancel any registration records or otherwise initiate any process through the statewide voter registration system based on the out-of-state correspondence. A County Recorder should treat the information as a “soft match” and conduct an individualized inquiry before canceling any registration record.

2. Information Received Through Multi-State Compacts

Arizona is a member of the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC). The Secretary of State is responsible for acquiring, sorting, and distributing registrant information received from ERIC to the County Recorders and providing guidance on processing ERIC data.

3. Juror Disclosure of Felony Conviction

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When election officials receive court records or information regarding prospective jurors who self-report a felony conviction on a signed juror questionnaire that is completed pursuant to [A.R.S. § 21-314](#), the County Recorder must cancel any registrant record that is a “true match” against the juror information, using the reason code “juror questionnaire - felony” (or functional equivalent). [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(4\)](#). The County Recorder must also send a letter informing the registrant of the cancellation and providing instructions on how to notify the County Recorder if the cancellation was in error.

A County Recorder must ensure that a registration is not canceled twice for the same felony conviction. For example, the statewide voter registration system might have automatically canceled the registration upon being notified of the felony conviction through court records pursuant to [Chapter 1, Section IX\(A\)\(2\)](#), and the registrant could have re-registered (following restoration of their civil rights) before the juror questionnaire information was provided to the County Recorder about the same felony conviction. Thus, before canceling a registration record based on a juror questionnaire, the County Recorder should confirm that the registrant did not have a prior registration record recently canceled on account of a felony conviction.

4. Department of Transportation List of Persons Issued Out-of-State Licenses²⁵

Each month the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) shall furnish to the Secretary of State a list of persons who the Department has been notified have been issued a driver’s license or the equivalent of an Arizona nonoperating identification license in another state (an “out-of-state license”). Within ten days after receiving the list, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate County Recorder a list of registered voters in that county who have been issued an out-of-state license. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(F\)](#). The list maintenance procedures for County Recorders to follow based on this out-of-state license information are explained below.

5. Department of Transportation Driver License Database Comparison²⁶

Each month the Secretary of State shall compare the statewide voter registration database to the driver license database maintained by ADOT. The Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate County Recorder if a person who is registered to vote in that county has changed the person’s residence address or is not a United States citizen according to the driver license database. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(G\)](#). The list maintenance procedures for County Recorders to follow based on this citizenship information are explained below.

²⁵ Litigation is pending on the statutory provision in this paragraph. *Mi Familia Vota, et al., v. Fontes, et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB.

²⁶ Litigation is pending on the statutory provision in this paragraph. *Mi Familia Vota, et al., v. Fontes, et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB.

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C. County Recorders' Duty to Cancel Registrant Information

The County Recorders periodically receive registrant information from governmental entities or official sources that must be processed and potentially lead to the cancellation of a person's voter registration as described below. This process is frequently referred to as "list maintenance." The County Recorder shall scan or retain any record which would commence the removal process and any written response from the voter, which will be included in the voter registration record, and shall update the voter registration address as needed.²⁷

1. Summary report from the jury commissioner or jury manager of voters who are not residents of the county or state

The jury commissioner or jury manager shall use a questionnaire to determine whether a person is qualified to serve or has valid grounds to be excused or postponed from service. [A.R.S. § 21-314\(A\)](#). The juror questionnaire shall inform the person that disqualification from jury duty as a result of responding to the questionnaire that the person is not a resident of the county or is not a United States citizen will result in the person's voter registration being canceled. [A.R.S. § 21-314\(B\)](#).

The jury commissioner or jury manager shall forward to the Secretary of State and the County Recorder a summary report derived from juror questionnaire data that contains information that indicates that a person is not a United States citizen or does not reside in the county. The report shall only contain the information that is necessary for the County Recorder to accurately identify the person in the voter registration database. [A.R.S. § 21-314\(F\)](#).

When the County Recorder receives a summary report from the jury commissioner or jury manager indicating that the person has stated on the juror questionnaire that the person is not a resident of the county, the County Recorder shall verify that the person listed on the summary report is a true match to a person listed on the statewide voter registration database. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(9\)\(b\)](#).

If there is a true match, the County Recorder shall send the person notice by forwardable mail and a postage prepaid, preaddressed return form requesting the person confirm by signing under penalty of perjury that the person is a resident of the county and is not knowingly registered to vote in another county or another state. The notice shall inform the person that failure to return the form within thirty-five days will result in the person's registration being put into inactive status and may ultimately lead to cancellation of their voter registration.

If the person is already in inactive status, a notice shall not be sent, and a new NVRA start time should not be initiated. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(a\)\(4\)\(B\)](#).

²⁷ Litigation is pending related to this Subsection C. *Mi Familia Vota, et al., v. Fontes, et al.*, CV-22-00509-PHX-SRB.

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a. County Recorder sends an initial notice allowing 35 days for voters to cure

The County Recorder shall send each registrant found to be a true match an initial notice giving the person 35 days to explain the information provided on the jury questionnaire. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(9\)\(b\)](#). If the registrant responds in writing to the notice by confirming that the person is a resident of the county and is not knowingly registered to vote in another county or another state, the County Recorder shall maintain the person's voter registration in active status. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(9\)\(b\)](#). If the registrant responds to the notice by stating that the registrant is not a resident of either the county or the state, the County Recorder shall change the voter's status to canceled. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(8\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20507 \(d\)\(1\)\(a\)](#).

b. If the voter does not respond to the notice, the County Recorder shall contact the voter 35 days after the notice is sent

If the person fails to respond to the notice after thirty-five days, the voter's registration status will be changed to inactive. [A.R.S. 16-166\(A\)](#). The voter's record will enter the NVRA "inactive cycle period." If the registrant does not confirm their registration address or vote for two federal/statewide general election cycles after being placed in inactive status, the registrant's voter registration may be canceled. [52 U.S. C. § 20507\(d\)\(1\)\(B\)\(i\)-\(ii\)](#).

c. Post-cancellation notice

After canceling a registration, the County Recorder shall send a notice by forwardable mail informing the person that:

- The person's registration has been cancelled,
- The reason for the cancellation,
- The qualifications required for a person to register to vote, and
- Instructions on registering to vote if the person is qualified.

2. Information that a person registered is not a United States Citizen.

When a County Recorder obtains information pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-165](#) and confirms that a registrant is not a U.S. citizen, the County Recorder must notify the registrant that registration will be canceled in 35 days unless the registrant provides documentary proof of citizenship ("DPOC"). If the registrant does not provide DPOC in 35 days, the County Recorder must cancel the registration, notify the registrant, and notify the County Attorney and Attorney General. *See* [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(10\), \(L\)](#). These steps are described below.

a. Obtaining non-citizenship information

There are several ways in which a County Recorder may obtain information pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-165](#) that a registrant is not a U.S. citizen. However, third-party allegations of non-citizenship are not enough to initiate this process. For example:

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1. The County Recorder may receive a summary report from a jury commissioner or jury manager indicating that the person has stated that the person is not a U.S. citizen. See [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(10\)](#).
2. The County Recorder may receive notice from the Secretary of State, based on a review of the AZMVD database, that a registrant is not a citizen. See [A.R.S. § 16-165\(G\)](#).

Although the statute lists other sources of information for County Recorders to check, the Secretary of State is not aware that County Recorders currently have access to those databases for citizenship review purposes. This includes the Social Security Administration database, the USCIS SAVE program,²⁸ and the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS) electronic verification of vital events system. See [A.R.S. § 16-165\(H\), \(I\), \(J\)](#). Because the obligation to check these sources applies only to the extent practicable (or, in the case of NAPHSIS, only if accessible), County Recorders currently have no obligation to check these databases.

b. Confirming non-citizenship

After obtaining non-citizenship information, the County Recorder must confirm non-citizenship before initiating the cancellation process under [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(10\)](#).

The County Recorder shall first verify that the person at issue is a true match to a person listed on the statewide voter registration database.

If there is a true match, the County Recorder shall determine whether the voter has previously provided DPOC. If the person has previously provided DPOC,²⁹ the County Recorder shall not cancel the registration. The jury commissioner or jury manager may investigate the accuracy of the answers to the questionnaire and may call on law enforcement agencies and the county attorney for assistance in an investigation. [A.R.S. § 21-314\(E\)](#).

If a person has not previously provided DPOC, confirmation also includes reviewing relevant government databases to which the County Recorder has access, to the extent practicable, such as the AZMVD database that can be accessed using the statewide voter registration database. See [A.R.S. § 16-165\(K\)](#). In some situations, confirmation may require direct communication with the registrant.

²⁸ As explained earlier, County Recorders have access to SAVE pursuant to their own or the Secretary of State's Memorandum of Agreement with USCIS (the "USCIS MOA"). See Section II(A)(6) above. However, under the terms of the current USCIS MOA, SAVE shall not be used for list maintenance purposes, i.e. to cancel an existing registration. Thus, a comparison with SAVE for this purpose is not currently practicable.

²⁹ This generally includes persons already registered when the DPOC requirement became effective in 2004. See [A.R.S. § 16-166\(G\)](#).

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c. Thirty-five-day notice that is required to be sent to the voter

If the County Recorder has confirmed non-citizenship as explained above, the County Recorder shall send the person notice by forwardable mail that the person's registration will be canceled in thirty-five days unless the person provides DPOC. The notice shall include a list of documents the person may provide as DPOC and a postage prepaid pre-addressed return envelope.

If the person (1) does not respond to the notice within 35 days, or (2) responds to the notice by stating that the person is not a United States citizen, the County Recorder shall cancel the person's voter registration. If the person responds providing DPOC, the County Recorder shall change the "Citizenship Verified" status to "yes," and maintain the voter registration in active status, and make the person a full-ballot voter if not already. In the voter registration database, the "Registrant Record Notes" should be updated with a description of the DPOC provided in response to the notice. Maricopa and Pima should do the same in a functional equivalent field of their respective systems.

If the person is in an inactive status, the County Recorder shall still send the required notice and follow the procedures outlined above. [A.R.S. §16-165\(A\)\(10\)](#).

c. Post-cancellation notice

After canceling a registration, the County Recorder shall send a notice by forwardable mail informing the person that the person's registration has been canceled, the reason for the cancellation, the qualification of electors pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-101](#), and instructions on registering to vote if the person is qualified.

3. Voters issued a driver license or the equivalent of an Arizona nonoperating identification license in another State

As stated above, each month ADOT shall furnish to the Secretary of State a list of persons who have been issued an out-of-state license, and then the Secretary of State shall provide County Recorders a list of registered voters who have been issued an out-of-state license. [A.R.S. § 16-165\(F\)](#).

a. Processing the monthly list from ADOT

The Secretary of State shall process the monthly list from ADOT within 10 days of receipt by sending Pima and Maricopa Counties the data via the AVID interface. For Pima and Maricopa Counties, the interface will determine if there are any soft and hard matches for "Active" records. For the thirteen AVID counties, AVID will send the soft and hard matches to their respective AVID County dashboard queues to determine matches.

If there is a true match, the County Recorder shall send each person a notice by forwardable mail. The notice shall inform the person that failure to return the form within ninety (90) days will result in the person's registration being placed in inactive status. The notice shall include a postage

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prepaid preaddressed return form requesting the person confirm by signing under penalty of perjury that the person is either:

- A resident of this state and is not knowingly registered to vote in another state; or
- Not a resident of this state.

If the person is currently inactive, a notice shall not be sent, and a new NVRA start time should not be initiated.

During the ninety-day period after the notice is sent, the County Recorder shall take one of the following actions:

- If the person returns the form within ninety days confirming that the person is a resident of Arizona and in the same county, the County Recorder shall maintain the registration in active status. The County Recorder shall scan the notice into the voter registration record and update the voter's address as needed.
- If the person returns the form within ninety days confirming that the person now resides in a different county or outside of Arizona, the County Recorder shall cancel the registration.
- If the person fails to return the notice, at the end of the 90-day period, the County Recorder shall change the person's registration status to inactive. If the person does not confirm their registration address or vote for two federal/statewide general election cycles after being placed in inactive status, the person's voter registration may be canceled. [52 U.S. C. § 20507\(d\)\(1\)\(B\)\(i\)-\(ii\)](#).
- If USPS returns the notice, the county recorder shall retain or scan the returned notice (or barcode) and document that the notice was undeliverable. At the end of the 90-day period, the County Recorder shall change the registration status to inactive. If the registrant does not confirm their registration address or vote for two federal/statewide general election cycles after being placed in inactive status, the registrant's voter registration may be canceled. [52 U.S. C. § 20507\(d\)\(1\)\(B\)\(i\)-\(ii\)](#).

b. Post-cancellation notice

After canceling a registration, the County Recorder shall send a notice by forwardable mail informing the person that the person's registration has been cancelled, the reason for the cancellation, the qualification of electors pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-101](#), and instructions on registering to vote if the person is qualified.

D. Cancellation through NVRA Process Due to Address Changes

One of the principal ways to ensure the accuracy of registration records is to update records based on a registrant's change of address. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(a\)\(4\)\(B\)](#). A County Recorder receives address change information in various ways: directly from the registrant, from the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) National Change of Address (NCOA) service, through returned mail from USPS, and from ERIC reports. A County Recorder may update (and in some cases cancel) a registration record depending on the circumstances.

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One piece of returned official election mail alone is not sufficient to cancel a registrant’s record. Rather, a County Recorder generally must send two official election mailings to the registrant (only one official election mailing is required if a registrant appears on a NCOA or ERIC report pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-166\(E\)](#)), and only if a registrant does not respond to the mailing(s) or vote during a specified period after the mailings were sent, is the County Recorder permitted to cancel the record. The requirements below are outlined in the NVRA and the process is referred to here as the “NVRA process.”

A County Recorder is permitted, but not required, to utilize USPS’s NCOA service to preliminarily identify registrants who have moved to a different residence address. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(c\)\(1\)\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-166\(E\)](#). Because NCOA’s data reflects actual change-of-address information that the registrant has provided to USPS, the NVRA authorizes a special process to be utilized for list maintenance purposes. The NCOA data serves the same function as a First Notice that is returned undeliverable. Thus, a County Recorder need only send one additional notice, which serves as the Final Notice, to invoke the NVRA process. This process should not be initiated when a registrant changes their mailing address but not their physical or residential address, if different.

1. Initiating the NVRA Process Based on Returned Election Mail

To invoke the NVRA process based on returned election mail, a County Recorder must complete the following steps:

1. Send an official election mailing by non-forwardable, first-class mail marked with a statement required by USPS to receive an address correction notification (the “First Notice”). Official election mail includes but is not limited to:
 - A voter registration card;
 - A 90-day notice to AEVL registrants issued pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-544\(D\)](#);
 - A ballot-by-mail issued pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-542](#) or [A.R.S. § 16-544](#);
 - Any other first-class, non-forwardable official election mail.
2. If the election mail is returned undeliverable, the County Recorder must send a follow-up notice to the registrant within 21 days after the mail is returned to the County Recorder (the “Final Notice”). If the returned mail contains a forwarding address for the registrant, the County Recorder must send the Final Notice to the new address. Otherwise, the County Recorder must send the Final Notice to the same address used for the initial mailing.
3. The Final Notice must contain a voter registration form or an appropriate internet address through which the registrant can update their address. The Final Notice also must warn that if the registrant does not submit a new voter registration form or update their address within 35 days, the registrant will be placed in “inactive” status.
4. If the registrant does not submit a new voter registration form or otherwise update their address by the 35-day deadline, the County Recorder must change the registrant’s status to “inactive” with the reason code “NVRA inactive address” (or functional equivalent).

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[A.R.S. § 16-166\(A\), \(C\), \(E\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-544\(E\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(b\)\(2\), \(d\)\(1\)\(B\), \(d\)\(2\)](#).

The registration may be canceled through the NVRA process if the registrant:

- Does not timely respond to the Final Notice by submitting a new registration form or otherwise update their voter registration address with the County Recorder; and
- Fails to vote in any election in two federal/statewide general election cycles following the Final Notice.

[A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(7\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-166\(E\)](#); [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(b\)\(2\), \(d\)\(1\)\(B\), \(d\)\(2\)](#).

If the preceding conditions have been met, under the NVRA, the registrant's record shall be canceled after four years from the date of the Final Notice or following the second general election after the Final Notice. [A.R.S. § 16-166\(C\), \(E\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-165\(A\)\(7\)](#).

2. Special Procedures Applicable to NCOA Notices

A County Recorder is permitted, but not required, to utilize USPS's NCOA service to preliminarily identify registrants who have moved to a different residence address. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(c\)\(1\)\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-166\(E\)](#). Since NCOA data reflects actual change-of-address information the registrant has provided to USPS, the NVRA authorizes a special process to be utilized for list maintenance purposes. The NCOA data serves the same function as a First Notice that is returned undeliverable. Thus, a County Recorder need only send one additional notice, which serves as the Final Notice, to invoke the NVRA process.

If the County Recorder chooses to use NCOA data, any *initial* notice pursuant to this Section must be sent on or before May 1 of a general election year. The County Recorder may also send additional notices after May 1. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(c\)\(2\)\(A\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-166\(E\)](#). Sending this notice by May 1 also allows a County Recorder to simultaneously send a 90-day notice to AEVL voters for the primary election in the same mailing. [A.R.S. § 16-544\(D\)](#).

a. When NCOA Data Indicates Out-of-County Move

If NCOA data indicates that the registrant moved outside the county, the County Recorder must send a notice to the new address by forwardable mail informing the registrant how to remain eligible to vote. The notice must:

- Enclose a postage paid and preaddressed return form or envelope by which the registrant may confirm the intent to cancel their registration;
- Notify the registrant to re-register if they moved to another county; and
- Notify the registrant to update the County Recorder within 35 days of the letter if the registrant's change-of-address was only temporary.

[52 U.S.C. § 20507\(c\)\(1\)\(B\)\(ii\), \(d\)\(2\)\(B\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-166\(E\)](#). This letter serves as a Final Notice in the NVRA process.

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b. When NCOA Data Indicates In-County Move

If the NCOA data indicates that the registrant moved within the county, the County Recorder must supplement the registrant's record with the new address obtained through NCOA. The County Recorder also must send a notice to the new address by forwardable mail to provide the registrant an opportunity to confirm or correct the address change. The notice must:

- Notify the registrant that the County Recorder updated the registrant's record with the new address;
- Enclose a postage prepaid and pre-addressed return form by which the registrant may confirm or correct the address change; and
- Notify the registrant that if they do not confirm the new address within 35 days, the registrant will be placed in "inactive" status.

[A.R.S. § 16-166\(E\)](#). This letter serves as a Final Notice in the NVRA process.

3. NVRA Recordkeeping Responsibilities

A County Recorder must document all Final Notices sent to a registrant, along with any communication from the registrant received in response to a Final Notice, in the registrant's record in the voter registration database. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(i\)\(2\)](#).

E. Systematic Cancellations within 90 Days of Election Prohibited

A County Recorder must complete any program to systematically cancel registration records at least 90 days before a primary or general election. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(c\)\(2\)\(A\)](#). Systematic programs include the cancellation of records through the NVRA process described in [Chapter 1, Section IX\(D\)](#). Systematic programs also include potential cancellation of records based on periodic summary reports from jury commissioners or jury managers, as well as periodic notices from the Secretary of State based on a review of Arizona Department of Transportation data, as described in [Section IX\(C\)](#) above. However, the 90-day prohibition does not preclude cancellation of records based on:

- Automatic cancellations through the statewide voter registration system of hard matches based on death, felony conviction, or mental incapacitation;
- Merging/cancellation of duplicate records (whether manual or automatic) when processing new voter registration forms;
- Cancellation at the request of the registrant; and
- Cancellation of records added to the voter registration database in error.

[52 U.S.C. § 20507\(c\)\(2\)\(B\)](#).

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X. REPORTING VOTER REGISTRATION INFORMATION

A. Voter Registration Statistics

Each County Recorder must report to the Secretary of State and the officer in charge of elections the number of active and inactive county registrants as of the following dates:

- **In even-numbered years:**
 - January 2;
 - The last day to register to vote for the March PPE;
 - April 1;
 - The last day to register to vote for the August primary election; and
 - The last day to register to vote for the November general election.
- **In odd-numbered years:**
 - January 2;
 - April 1;
 - July 1; and
 - October 1.

In addition, registration reports must be provided to the Secretary of State as of the registration deadline for any special election. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(G\)](#).

The reports must be broken down by political party and according to precinct, legislative district, and congressional district. For reporting purposes, political parties are limited to the Republican Party, Democratic Party, and any other statewide recognized political party that qualifies for representation on the ballot at the time of the report.³⁰ The “Other” total reported to the Secretary of State should include all registrants registered as “other,” “independent,” “party not designated,” “PND,” “no party” (or any substantially similar designation) or any non-recognized political party.

These totals should be reported to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable following the applicable cutoff dates. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(H\)](#). The totals must include only registrations as of the reporting cutoff periods.

For reports prepared as of a registration cutoff date, the County Recorder should ensure that the same active and inactive registration numbers reported to the Secretary of State match any registration statistics reported to the officer in charge of elections for purposes of determining voter turnout.

³⁰ A current list of statewide recognized political parties is available at the Secretary of State’s website, <https://azsos.gov/elections/information-about-recognized-political-parties>.

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As soon as practicable upon receipt of all 15 county reports, the Secretary of State must prepare, publish, and retain a statewide summary of the voter registration statistics. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(H\)](#).

B. “Federal-Only” Registration and Ballot Report

The County Recorder or other officer in charge of elections must file a report with the Secretary of State, and post on the County Recorder’s website, the number of people who are registered to vote using the state or federal form who have not provided documentary proof of citizenship. In even-numbered years, the report must be made on January 2, April 1, and the last day on which a person may register to be eligible to vote in the next presidential preference, primary, and general election. In odd numbered years, the report must be made on January 2, April 1, July 1, and October 1. Additionally, after each general election, the County Recorder must post on the County Recorder’s website the number of ballots cast by those eligible to vote for federal offices only. [A.R.S. § 16-161\(B\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-168](#).

XI. PROVISION OF REGISTRATION DATA TO THIRD PARTIES

A. Precinct Lists to Recognized Political Parties

Each County Recorder must provide, at no cost, a list of active and inactive registered voters to the State and County Chairpersons of the recognized political parties that are entitled to continued representation on the ballot pursuant to [A.R.S. § 16-804](#). [A.R.S. § 16-168\(C\)-\(D\)](#).

1. Content of Political Party Precinct Lists

The precinct list must contain the following information about each registrant:

1. Registrant’s full name, which includes first name, middle name, last name, and suffix in different columns;
2. Party preference;
3. Date of registration;
4. Residence address;
5. Mailing address (if different from residence address);
6. Zip code;
7. Telephone number (if available);
8. Birth year;
9. Occupation (if available);
10. Voting history for the past four years, including which party ballot was issued and method of voting (polling place, early, or provisional);
11. Whether the registrant is on the AEVL;

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12. Voter ID number; and
13. Registrant's registration status and status reason, including "federal-only" designation if applicable.

[A.R.S. § 16-168\(C\)](#). Precinct lists should generally be provided in electronic format, and County Recorders are encouraged to make the lists available to the political parties through a secure website or Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) portal. If the list is provided in printed format, the list must be created in alphabetical order (by registrant last name) and be organized by precinct, unless otherwise agreed upon by the County Recorder and the political party at issue. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(E\)](#).

2. Timing of Political Party Precinct Lists

A County Recorder must provide precinct lists as of the following dates:

- **In even-numbered years:**
 - January 2;
 - The last day to register to vote for the March PPE;
 - April 1;
 - The last day to register to vote for the August primary election; and
 - The last day to register to vote for the November general election.
- **In odd-numbered years:**
 - January 2;
 - April 1;
 - July 1; and
 - October 1.

[A.R.S. § 16-168\(C\)-\(D\), \(G\)](#).

Precinct lists developed for the primary and general election must be provided within eight days after the close of registration. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(C\)](#). Otherwise, the remaining precinct lists must be provided within 10 business days after the applicable reporting dates. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(D\)](#).

3. Requests for Political Party Precinct Lists

To receive precinct lists at no cost, a recognized political party must seek precinct lists from the applicable County Recorder within eight days after the close of registration for precinct lists developed for the primary and general election or within 10 business days after any other applicable reporting dates. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(C\), \(D\), \(L\)](#). Counties may establish a process for recognized political parties to opt to automatically receive precinct lists for each election.

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A County Recorder need not provide this precinct list for the primary or general election to a recognized political party if that party will have less than four partisan candidates (other than presidential electors) on that county's ballot. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(C\)](#).

A recognized political party may seek precinct lists from the Secretary of State only if the applicable County Recorder fails or refuses to provide the list. In this case, the Secretary of State may charge the County Recorder a fee to produce the records as outlined in [Chapter 1, Section XI\(C\)](#) below. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(L\)](#).

B. Use of County Registration Rolls by Political Subdivision

Any political subdivision of the state, including a city or town, may use the county registration rolls to conduct an election. At least 60 days before any such election, the governing body of the political subdivision shall negotiate a contract with the County Recorder to reimburse the County Recorder for the *actual* expenses in preparing the necessary lists for use in the election. The County Recorder shall not charge more than the actual additional costs that such preparation entails. [A.R.S. § 16-172](#).

C. Public Records Requests by Third Parties

Any person or organization may make a public records request for registrant information to a County Recorder or the Secretary of State. [52 U.S.C. § 20507\(i\)](#); [A.R.S. § 16-168\(E\), \(K\)](#); [A.R.S. § 39-121.01\(D\)](#). A County Recorder or the Secretary of State may request a properly completed public records request form to be submitted before responding to the public records request. Registration records must be produced within 30 days of receipt of a proper request. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(E\)](#).

Copies of registrant records may be provided exclusively in electronic format, including via a password-protected Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) site, Virtual Private Network (VPN), or other secure method of electronic transmission. In addition to the fees set forth in [A.R.S. § 16-168\(E\)](#), the County Recorder or the Secretary of State may charge for the cost of an electronic storage medium in which to deliver the records in a secure format.

If a person or organization requests to inspect registrant records in lieu of requesting copies, a County Recorder or the Secretary of State may establish how and under what conditions the records may be inspected. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(F\)](#).

1. Scope of Registrant Records Not Subject to Disclosure

The following components of a registrant's record are confidential and may not be viewed, accessed, reproduced, or disclosed to a member of the public:

1. Month and day of birth;
2. SSN (or any portion thereof);
3. AZDL/ID#;

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4. Indian census number;
5. Father's name;
6. Mother's maiden name;
7. State or country of birth;
8. Signature;
9. Email address;
10. Any registration source code or other indication of location of registration;
11. Any documents submitted as proof of citizenship; or
12. Any secured record.

The information listed above may be viewed, accessed, or reproduced by the registrant (if the information pertains to the registrant's own record), an authorized government official in the scope of the official's duties, designated voter registration assistance agencies, for signature verification on petition and candidate filings, for election purposes and for news gathering purposes by a person engaged in newspaper, radio, television or reportorial work, or connected with or employed by a newspaper, radio or television station, or pursuant to a court order. If requested for news gathering purposes by a person engaged in newspaper, radio, television, or reportorial work, a County Recorder may condition release of such confidential information (other than secured, source code information, and DPOC records) upon execution of a non-disclosure agreement. A registrant's e-mail address may not be released for any purpose. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(F\)](#).

A registrant's signature may be viewed or accessed by a member of the public only for purposes of verifying signatures on a candidate, initiative, referendum, recall, new party, or other petition or for purposes of verifying candidate filings. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(F\)](#). A County Recorder may establish the conditions under which the signature may be viewed or accessed, including prohibition of photography.

2. Permissible Uses of Registrant Records

Registrant records may only be used for political or political party activity, a political campaign or election, nonpartisan voter registration or outreach, revising district boundaries, or any other purpose specifically authorized by law. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(E\), \(N\)](#).

A person or organization in possession of a precinct list or other registrant information may not allow the list or information to be used, sold, or otherwise transferred for any purpose except those authorized above, including posting to the internet. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(F\)](#). The County Recorder or Secretary of State shall deny a public records request intended for a commercial purpose. The sale of precinct lists or registrant records to a candidate or political committee for a political or campaign use does not constitute a prohibited commercial purpose. [A.R.S. § 16-168\(E\)](#).

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XII. Minority Language Assistance

Jurisdictions covered under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act are required to provide language assistance for covered languages, including assistance regarding voter registration, and are required to furnish oral instructions, assistance, or other information related to registration and voting for covered languages that are historically unwritten. [52 U.S.C. §10503\(c\)](#). This applies to all stages of the electoral process including notifications, announcements, or other informational materials concerning the opportunity to register, and the deadline for voter registration, the time, places and subject matters of elections, and the absentee voting processes. [28 C.F.R. § 55.15](#).

Examples of measures that can be taken to comply for historically unwritten languages include having speakers of the minority language serve as registrars or deputy registrars and the use of decentralized places of registration, with minority language materials available at places where speakers of the minority language are likely to come register. [28 C.F.R. § 55.18\(c\)](#). Jurisdictions must take appropriate steps to publicize the availability of materials and assistance in the minority language; some examples of means to publicize the availability of assistance include making announcements over minority language radio or television stations and direct contact with language minority group organizations. [28 C.F.R. § 55.18\(e\)](#).

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